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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
In the 1970s and 1980s health care expenditures increased excessively, both in absolute 
numbers and as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP). Table 1.1 shows the total 
expenditures on health care as percentage of the GDP in thirteen OECD countries. 
Table 1.1: Total eo<penditure on health (percentage of GDP) 
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Aust:rnli:J. 4.1 7 7.4 7,8 8,2 9 9,1 
Austria 4,3 5,3 7,6 6,6 7.1 8,2 7,7 7,6 7.7 
Belgium 4 6.4 7.2 7,4 8,7 8,8 9 9.1 
Canada 5,4 7 7,1 8,2 9 9,2 8,9 9.4 9,6 
France 3,8 5.4 7,1 8,2 8,6 9,5 9,3 9,4 9,7 
Germany 6.2 8,7 9 8,5 10,6 10,6 10,8 10,9 
Japan 3 4,5 6,5 6,7 5,9 6,8 7,6 7,8 
Netherlands 7,5 7.4 8 8,4 8,2 8,5 9,1 
Spain 1,5 3.6 5,4 5.5 6,7 7,6 7,5 7,5 7,6 
Sweden 6,9 9,1 8.7 8,4 8,1 8,4 8,8 9,2 
$\Vi.tzcru.nd 4,9 5,4 7,3 7,7 8,3 9,7 10.4 10,9 11.2 
United Kingdom 3.9 4,5 5,6 5,9 6 7 7,3 7,5 7,7 
United Sutes 5 6,9 8,7 10 11,9 13,3 13.1 13,9 14,6 
Source OECD Health data 2004 
Between 1980 and 2002 the percentage of the GDP spent on health care in The 
Netherlands increased from 7.5 to 9.1. This rise was even more e::-..-plosive in countries like 
The United States or Switzerland. Governments in most OECD countries reacted on this 
so-called cost-explosion through supplier regulation. See, for instance, Zweifel and Breyer 
(1997) and Schut and Hassink (2002). 
The combination of public regulation of health services and the sheer size of the 
health care sector attracted the attention of economists. Other aspects of health care that 
have made it an interesting area of research for economists include uncertainty about the 
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costs and effects of medical treatment (Arrow, 1963), the uncertainty involved in the 
randomness of an individual's illnesses (Arro'.v, 1963), and the presence of externalities 
(Phelps, 1997). The effects of health care, and their measurement and valuation, the 
externalities and the institutions that evolved, are the important topics of this thesis. 
The relatively new sub-discipline of health economics has contributed to many 
areas of health care (see for an extensive oveni.ew Culyer and Newhouse (2000)). These 
contributions resulted in different, often complementary, policy recommendations aiming 
to increase efficiency and consumer choice in health care, given equity constraints like 
arrangements regarding the access to care. Policy measures taken to control health care 
e::-..t>enditures in many countries, including The Netherlands, are a systematic positioning of 
economic evaluations in the assessment of ne'\v health care technologies (see Rutten (2000), 
Van den Berg and Rutten (2002), McDaid et al. (2003), and McDaid and Cookson (2003)), 
and the gradual introduction of a system of managed competition (see Schut and Hassink 
(2002) and (Schut, 2003)). 
An economic evaluation is a systematic valuation of the relative efficiency of 
health care interventions. It deals '\V-i.th the uncertainty about the effects of health care to 
provide decision makers '\V-i.th information that can be used in decisions making regarding 
the implementation of new interventions or the prioritisation of different interventions, 
given the health care budget. Implementation involves, among other things, deciding on 
what interventions to include in insurance packages. In a system of regulated competition, 
insuxance companies rather than individual consumers purchase care from health care 
suppliers, because individual consumers lack the necessary knowledge and bargaining 
power to purchase the care for the price-quality relation of their choice. However, these 
considerations apply to the cure sector, rather than the care sector. This is especially true 
for home care, which accounts for 20 percent of the long-term care expenditures, while the 
long-term care e::-..t>enditures account for 20 percent of the total health care e::-..-pendirures in 
The Netherlands. 
Table 1.2 gives the e::-..-pendirure on inpatient care as a percentage of total health 
care expenditures in thirteen OECD countries. 
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Table 1.2: Expenditure on inpatient care (percentage of total health care expenditure) 
1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Austrafu 43 51.6 48,8 46.5 43.1 40,7 40.2 
Austri.1. 44,7 38,3 38 38.2 
Bdgium 25,7 33.1 34 32,8 33,5 
Canada 43,7 52,6 53,8 51.6 49.1 44.6 30 29,1 28.8 
France 38,6 40,6 50.2 48,7 45,7 45.1 4"' 
-" 
41,7 41,3 
Gcrm=y 30,8 33,2 34.1 34,7 36,9 36.6 36.1 36,1 
Japan 34,1 26.4 30,9 32,8 33 36,8 39 38,9 
Ncrhcrbnds 54.6 54.1 49.2 49,1 39,8 40,5 40.8 
Spain 54,1 SS.i 44.1 31 28.2 27,9 27,6 
S\veden 49 46,3- 31.6 31.2 
Swiacrl.-md 3-5,7 44.4 47,5 46,7 47.9 47,9 46.8 47,3 48.1 
Vnited Kingdom 
United States 35.6 41.1 44.1 4D.4 36.1 '0" .J-.- 28,4 28 27,6 
So11m·: OECD Health do/a 2004 
Table 1.2 sho.-..vs that over the last 40 years the expenditures on inpatient care decreased in 
most countries indicating a shift from inpatient care to less expensive outpatient care. This 
shift can partly be explained by the abovementioned policy measures that have been 
gradually introduced in the cure sector. 
The care sector has some specific characteristics compared to the cure sector and 
therefore not all of the abovementioned policy measures can be easily introduced easily in 
the care sector. For instance, because many care demanders have a chronic disease, they 
often have a relatively long-term relationship with their care suppliers. Home care coverage 
by health insurance involves moral hazard because most people cannot do vvithout home 
care. The outcome and quality of the care are often difficult to measure because the health 
status of part of the care demanders Vlill decline any·way due to the nature of their disease. 
Finally, in the care sector a lot of care is provided by informal caregivers. Research into 
these issues raises interesting methodological and implementation problems. This thesis 
discusses some of these problems focussing in particular on informal care. 
An important issue in this thesis is how to prevent undesirable shifts in the 
fmancing of health care from the health care budget to the private resources of care 
recipients. These shifts may occur as a consequence of policy recommendations derived 
from economic evaluations that do not adopt a societal perspective and hence fail to take 
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into account all of the costs and effects of an intenrention. If~ for instance, informal care is 
not accounted for~ an intervention may seem cost-effective while in fact it is not and lead 
to policy recommendations that shift costs from the health care sector to informal 
caregivers. Another important subject of this thesis is the supply and demand of informal 
care and their impact on institutional changes in health, social or labour policy. The 
demand analysis is embedded in a discussion about the introduction of cash benefits 
(personal budgets) in the care sector. Cash benefits are seen as a tool to attain consumer 
independence in the care sector, as, by analogy, in a system of managed competition in the 
cure sector. 
1.2 Informal care 
Informal care is usually defined as unpaid care provided by non-professional caregivers to 
care recipients they have a socilll reilltion 'With. In The Netherlands are 750,000 informal 
caregivers providing care for more than three months a year and for more than eighth 
hours per week (Timmermans, 2003). Informal care is usually preferred by the care 
recipients both to formal care and to institutionalisation (Van Hout~ren, 2000) and (Van 
den Berg and Van den Berg, 2000), because most people prefer to stay at home in their 
own environment. 
Scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds do research on distinct issues 
regarding informal care. Sociologists and psychologists measure and describe the burden of 
informal caregiving. Economists model the supply of informal care and try to value 
informal care. There are tree unexplored issues regarding informal care, which are central in 
this thesis. We will discuss them in more detail below. First, the supply of informal care, 
second, informal care in economic evaluations and tbird, the demand of informal care in 
relation to the introduction of cash benefits in the care sector. 
1.3 The supply of informal care 
There is a lot of information about the characteristics of informal caregivers. It is, for 
instance, well-known that informal care is frequently provided by women to their partner 
or to their parent(s) (Hughes eta!., 1999) and (Schulz and Beach, 1999). Economists often 
stress the opportunity costs involved in terms of paid work sacrificed (J'viuurinen, 1986), 
(Carmichael and Charles, 1998) and (Carmichael and Charles, 2003). It is suggested that 
these opportunity costs rise due to the increasing labour market participation of women 
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(Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Sociologists and psychologists argue that providing 
informal care is often stressful and burdensome, especially when informal care is provided 
by caregivers who have also other responsibilities (Dautzenberg, 2000). Unfortunately, this 
literature fails to model the endogeneity of doing paid work and providing informal care. 
This means that doing paid work affects informal care supply and providing informal care 
affects labour market participation. Endogeneity is of importance, because it gives more 
precise information about the choices of informal caregivers regarding the provision of 
informal care. This thesis models and discusses this endogeneity. 
1.4 Informal care in economic evaluations of health 
care 
As described before, due to the rising health care expenditures, economic evaluations are of 
increasing importance to inform policy makers about the costs and outcomes of new 
interventions in health care are. It is suggested that economic evaluations should adopt a 
societal perspective to give information on all costs and effects and to prevent the 
implementation of policies 'W'ithout knowing all consequences for the indiv'iduals' 
concerned (Gold et al., 1996). Adopting a societal perspective implies that the costs and 
effects of informal care should be incorporated in economic evaluations. However, 
informal care is often ignored in economic evaluations (Stone et al., 2000), because the 
societal perspective is not adopted or due to problems of measurement or valuation of 
informal care. 
:tvfeasurement of informal care is a necessary condition for the valuation of 
informal care. However, this issue is often neglected. (An exception is, for instance, (Clipp 
and Moore, 1995)) This thesis tries to fill this gap in the literature. The main focus of the 
existing literature about the incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations is on 
the informal caregivers, especially on the valuation of the time inputs of informal 
caregivers. Two methods are recommended to value the time spent on providing informal 
care: the opportunity cost method and the pro>-] good method (Gold et al., 1996), 
(Drummond et al., 1997), (Posnett and Jan, 1996), and (Smith and Wright, 1994). The 
former values informal care at the price of the opportunities forgone due to informal 
caregiving, e.g., labour market participation, while the latter values informal care at the 
price of alternative professional home care. Some important practical and theoretical 
problems \vith these methods, however, are underexposed in the literature. For instance, 
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how should one measure the amount and CJ'"Pe of time forgone when informal care is 
already provided for many years as is often the case in chronic disease? Or, '\vhy should one 
value at the price of professional care if informal caregivers choose to provide the care 
themselves, implicitly rejecting the professional alternative? Moreover, there is increasing 
evidence that providing informal care induces morbidity and in some sub-populations even 
mortality risks occur (Schulz and Beach, 1999). These effects of providing informal care are 
not included in the opportunity and prm .. ·y good methods thus neglecting significant costs 
and effects. This requires the development of methods that incorporate these risks. In this 
thesis these questions v.ill be addressed and methods to include such items will be 
developed and tested. 
1.5 Cash benefits 
In many countries, long-term home health care is flnanced and organised through a 
supplier-regulated system, in which (social) insurers pay caregivers directly. Care recipients 
get their care in kind. From the nineties on'\vards, some countries developed alternative 
systems in which care recipients get sums of money (cash beneflts also called consumer-
directed services or personal budgets) to purchase care instead of getting their care in kind. 
This enables recipients rather than home care agencies to choose their health care and 
follow their own preferences. Care recipients can now decide who prov"ides the services 
and for what quality. It often enables them also to hire their informal caregivers. Countries 
that e:: .. :per:imented '\v":ith cash beneflts include Austria, France, Germany, The Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States (US). (See for detailed descriptions of the 
programs (Tilly eta!., 2000) and (Tilly and Wiener, 2001)). 
Studies that analysed the effects of the introduction of cash beneflts are mainly 
descriptive (see Tilly eta!. (2000) and Tilly and Wiener (2001) for overviews). They do not 
give explicit attention to the role and position of informal caregivers. This thesis tries to 
contribute to this literature by analysing the economic effects of the introduction of cash 
beneflts in health care and by analysing the psychological effects of paying informal 
caregivers v."ith cash beneflts. 
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1.6 Research questions 
This thesis deals '\vith informal care. The adopted approach is mainly economic, but also 
concepts and methods from other disciplines like sociology and psychology are used. W/e 
deal 'With three different but related economic problems regarding informal care: 
1. \X'hat is the relation between providing informal care and other economic activities like 
paid work? 
2. How should informal care be incorporated in economic evaluations of health care? 
3. What are the (economic) consequences of the introduction of cash benefits in the 
long-term home health care sector in general and for informal care in particular? 
In trying to find answers on the research questions we '\.1.lill combine economic theory 'With 
econometric techniques. Therefore, we used different sources of data. First we used data 
collected by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planbureau (SCP) within the framework of the 
analysis of informal caregivers' demand for paid care leave (Timmermans, 2003). It 
contains information of respondents who had someone in their social environment who 
needs care regarding their possible care supply and al kinds of background characteristics 
like, for instance, labour market participation. The other four data sets we used were 
especially developed for this thesis. One data set contains informal caregivers caring for 
care recipients \vi.th Cerebrovascular Accident (CVA), also called stroke, who were 
identified in the context of the EDISSE study (Huijsman et al., 2001). Another data set 
consists of caregivers provi.ding informal care to people with Rheumatoid .Arthritis (RA). 
These data were collected as a supplement of the RA + study, a panel study on health and 
health care utilisation among people ·w-ith RA Gacobi et al., 2001) and Gacobi et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, we approached a more heterogeneous population of care recipients (in terms 
of disease characteristics) and their informal caregivers 'Nith the aid of Dutch regional 
suppon centres for informal caregivers, united in 'X-Zorg'. Finally, we contacted care 
recipients v:rith a cash benefit and their informal caregivers through 'Per Saldo'. 'Per Saldo' 
is a Dutch association for people 'Nith a cash benefit. More details about the data and data 
collection will be provided in the chapters concerned. 
1.7 Approach and outline 
Tbis thesis attempts to contribute to the theoretical and policy oriented economic literatw:e 
on informal care. \Vle discuss ow: ideas belO\v in general and separately for each chapter. It 
is worth noting that all the chapters are based on existing papers. This may involve some 
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overlap. Besides, the terminology could differ bet\.\reen the chapters just like the convention 
of the tables and equations. But it allo\VS reading the different chapters independently. 
The structure of this thesis is summarised in figure 1.1 The first issue in this thesis is how 
the supply of informal care relates to other activities of informal caregivers, especially paid 
work, our frrst research question. Chapter 2 analyses this theme from a standard economic 
point of view. It proposes a utility framework and presents an econometric model 
e::-.."Plaining the decision to do paid work on the one hand and to provide informal care on 
the other hand. The same model structure is used for other applications, for instance, to 
analyse the relation between paid work and childcare. It may help to inform policy 
decisions about all kinds of support services for informal caregivers, like paid care leave. 
The second issue in this thesis deals \vi.th the introduction of informal care in 
economic evaluations. Chapter 3 describes and discusses the current practice of 
incorporation of informal care in econonuc evaluations. It also discusses alternative 
methods for the incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations. Necessary 
conditions for the incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations are the use of a 
clear defulltion and a reliable measurement of informal care. An alternative definition of 
informal care is put fonvard that can also be used in the changing institutional environment 
of long-term health care due to the introduction of cash benefits. This chapter also 
discusses some issues in the measurement of informal care, while chapter 4 presents the 
results of an empirical test for the reliable measurement of time spent on informal 
caregiving. The chapter compares the often used recall method in surveys regarding 
informal care at two moments in time (test-retest reliability) and 'W-ith the gold standard of 
time measurement, a diary. There is some literature about the measurement of informal 
care time, but it does not, however, compare the results of the recall method \Vi.th a diary. 
The opportunity cost method and the proxy good method are often suggested as tools to 
value informal care. They are discussed and compared in chapter 5. Both methods involve 
some measurement problems that are often overlooked. We discuss them and provide 
some solutions. Moreover, this chapter compares the results of both methods and shows 
that different methods, just like a different operationalisation of the methods, leads to 
different results which could bias economic evaluations. Because both methods have also 
important theoretical limitations, this thesis proposes the use of three other valuation 
methods, namely the contingent valuation (CV) method, choice experiments (CE), and the 
well-being valuation method (WBV). In the literature there is some suspicion towards the 
application of CV to value informal care. Chapter 6 presents empirical ev"idence about this 
22 lnjorlllal con·: o!lt'CM0111ic approach 
issue. Moreover, this chapter shows how to frame CV questions to elicit the preferences of 
real informal caregivers, e.g. in the form of willingness to accept. However, chapter 6 only 
takes the perspective of the informal caregivers and not of their care recipients. Therefore, 
chapter 7 presents an economic model of informal care that takes into account the 
perspectives of both the informal caregivers and their care recipients and that models the 
interdependencies. in their preferences. We use this model to derive hypotheses about the 
willingness to pay and the 'Willingness to accept for informal care of the caregiver and the 
care recipient and about the effect of changes in certain key variables on the valuation of 
informal care. These hypotheses are tested and are to a large extent confirmed, which 
suggests that CV may be fruitfully applied to value informal care. CE are sometimes called 
CV's close cousins in the farnil:y of stated preference methods. They do not have the strong 
welfare economic theoretical foundation as CV, but they also do not suffer from some 
biases, like strategic bias, as CV does. A comparison of the results of both methods in this 
thesis is attractive. Chapter 8 presents the results of a relatively simple application of CE to 
value informal care in a homogeneous population of caregivers, while chapter 9 presents the 
results of another application of CE. But the method is now applied to a larger and more 
heterogeneous (in terms of disease characteristics of the care recipients) sample. Chapter 10 
presents the results of the application of the \X!BV method to value informal care. It shows 
the flexibility of WBV and compares the results with CV. 
The final chapters of this thesis deal with the last mentioned research question 
about the effects of the introduction of cash benefits in the long~ term home health care 
sector. Chapter 11 investigates empirically the impact of the introduction of cash benefits on 
the price and quantity of care purchased. The effects concern ex post static moral hazard. 
This means that care recipients ceteris paribus purchase more or more expensive care than 
they would buy in the absence of health insurance. These effects of the introduction of 
cash benefits are not yet discussed in the literature. Chapter 12 investigates empirically the 
psychological consequences of paying informal caregivers through cash benefits. It is 
suggested that a monetarisation of informal care will involve some negative psychological 
effects in terms of the motivation of informal caregivers (Timmermans, 2003). However, 
there is no empirical evidence for this suggestion. Chapter 12 tries to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
Chapter 1: Introd11ction 
Figure 1.1: Overview thesis (chapter number ID parentheses) 
The supply of informal care 
Informal care and labour supply (2) 
Informal care in economic evaluations 
Definition, overview of proposed methods 
and current practice (3) 
Measurement (4) 
f-----+ 
Standard approaches: 
f-----+ Introduction (1) Conclusion (13) 
Opportunity and pro~-y good methods (5) 
Alternative approaches: 
Contingent valuation method (6) and (7) 
Conjoint measurement method (8) and (9) 
Well-being evaluation method (10) 
Cash benefits 
Economic effects of cash benefits (11) 
fvionetarisation of informal care (12) 
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2 The simultaneity between informal care 
and labour supply1 
Summary 
This chapter investigates the labour s:tpp!J and care supp!J decisions if itiformal caregit'ers. We use a 
stnrcfltra/ model to model the direct relationship between labour strpp!J and itifonna! care supp!y and vice 
versa. Moreov(!0 11Jt account for endogenei!J and sample selection. Empirical res!tlts shon; that prot'Z"ding 
itifomJa! care has a negative ifftct on the amount rf paid ;vork peiformed. Converse!J_, having paid work has 
a negative iffect on the amo1mf of irifomJtJ/ care provided_. but the number of hours JJJorked does not. There 
are large dijferences in the JJJorking and care balance between males and ftmales and persons with and 
without young children. 
2.1 Introduction 
Informal care provided by their families or friends to people \.Vi.th chronic diseases and 
tenninally ill persons accounts for a substantial part of their total long-term care utilisation 
(Norton, 2000), (Tirnmermans, 2003), and Van den Berg (2004). Understanding the factors 
that determine informal caregivers' care and labour decisions is crucial for the development 
of policies to support caregivers. This chapter investigates both the labour and care supply 
decisions of informal caregivers. 
There is a good deal of literature regarding the supply of informal care; see Van 
Houtven (2000) for an extensive overview. Studies that are not referred to in Van Houtven 
(2000) include Carmichael and Charles (1998), Carmichael and Charles (2003), and 
Checkovich and Stern (2002). Carmichael and Charles (2003) find that women are more 
likely to provide informal care than men and also that women actually do provide more 
informal care than men. They also find that the factors influencing the supply of informal 
care differ benveen men and women. For men, wage and income variables are the most 
significant factors, while other factors such as marital status, presence or absence of 
children and the characteristics of the care recipients (physical impairment) do not play a 
role. Checkovic and Stem (2002) find that the further a child lives from his or her parents, 
the less care he or she will provide; they also find that children who work provide less care. 
1 Based on Van den Berg. B .• Woittiez, I., 2004. The simultaneity bet\Veen informal care and labour supply: A 
strucnm.l equ.1.tion model Submitted for publication. 
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The difference bern•een the Checkuvic and Stern paper and our chapter is that they 
estimate a reduced form model. Taking account of this endogeneity, Stern (1995) (Stern, 
1995), argues that labour supply is statistically insignificant for the informal care decision. 
Informal care is of increasing importance for health care in Western societies. It is 
believed that the preferences of care recipients have changed to stayi.ng at home instead of 
being institutionalised (Van Houtve~ 2000). Van Houtven and Norton (2004) state that 
care recipients often prefer informal care to professional care. From a budgetary point of 
view, health care policyn1akers prefer the use of informal care because it is cheaper than 
professional care. In the short ru~ at least from a health care budget point of view, 
informal care is a free substitute for professional home care. However, in the medium and 
long run this may not necessarily be the case. It is well known that providing informal care 
can be stressful and may increase informal caregivers' morbidity and mortality risks (Schulz 
and Beach, 1999). Much work has been done to measure the impact of providing care on 
the health of informal caregivers, with major contributions in the fields of psychology and 
sociology. For examples, see Pea.rlin et al. (1990), Gallagher and Mechanic (1996), Kramer 
(1997), Hughes et al. (1999), and Schulz and Beach (1999). In economic terms, the 
evidence for informal caregivers' increased morbidity and mortality risks due to providing 
informal care implies that informal care is not free when viewed over the medium and long 
term. In fact, even in the short term, the provision of informal care is not free: at the very 
least it entails opportunity costs, for instance in terms of forgone paid work, unpaid work 
or leisure. See, e.g., O'Shea and Blackwell (1993), Posnett and Jan (1996), Ettner (1996), 
Carmichael and Charles (1998), and Carmichael and Charles (2003). 
Identifying the determinants of the supply of informal care, including informal 
caregivers' opportunity costs, is of importance for health, social and labour policy. For 
health policy it is important because a decline in the supply of informal care would increase 
the demand for alternatives that are more costly from a health care budget perspective. 
Moreover, it would force some care recipients to accept institutionalised care instead of 
being cared for at home. In the last decade, social and labour policy has focused on 
facilitating the combination of work and caring for children or persons who are chronically, 
terminally or temporarily ill. A knowledge of the determinants of the supply of informal 
care is crucial for the development of effective social policy programmes, such as care leave 
facilities (SCP, 2001). New instruments, such as consumer-directed services (also called 
direct payments, cash benefits or personal budgets) in the long-term care sector, enable 
care recipients to buy in services, for example from informal caregivers (filly and Wiener, 
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2001). Increased use of consumer-directed services could have a major impact on the 
labour market participation rate of informal caregivers. Information about the determinants 
of informal caregivers' labour supply could make it easier to predict the labour market 
consequences of increased use of instruments such as consumer-directed services in the 
health care sector. In the long run it would probably reduce the labour supply, which is 
substituted into care time. On the other hand, reduced sick leave and a reduced time 
burden \vould increase the labour supply. 
The policy relevance of the determinants of the supply of informal caregivers is 
stated above. Additionally, finding the determinants for the supply of informal caregivers is 
also interesting from a theoretical point of vi.ew, because there is a simultaneity bet\Veen the 
provision of informal care and labour market participation. Providing informal care affects 
labour market participation and labour market participation affects the provlSlon of 
informal care. For instance, Carrrllchael and Charles (1998) model the provision of 
informal care as an exogenous factor in the labour supply decision, as do Barmby and 
Charles (1992) and Carmichael and Charles (2003). The same holds for the related problem 
of simultaneity between labour supply and the demand for child care. See for examples 
Blau and Hagy (1998), lvlichalopoulos and Robins (2000), and Powell (2002). They all focus 
on the effects of wage and price of care on labour supply and child care demand, without 
modelling the direct relationship bet\Veen labour supply and child care demand. In their 
2003 paper, Carmichael and Charles devote e::-..-plicit attention to this endogeneity problem. 
They state: "Thus, while we are unable to estzi11ate a more general allocation-of-time model that controls 
for the possibility that iiformal care responsibilities are e.-wgenottsjy (we think thty mean endogenousfy) 
determined_. there is the possibili!J of bias in o11r reSJflts. Howez)er, it is di.fftmlt to believe that for women 
a'!JWC!J' i'!fomwl care is any more endogenoJts than child care and yet child care is generalf; treated as 
exogeno11s in laboJtr mppf; models. Indeed_, endogenei!J is possibfy more problematic in association with 
child care than with infoJ7JJal care. After all while contraceptz'on makes the decision to haPe children a 
genlfine one, chronic illness in a close relativ·e is something bryond the individttalS control (p.797)." Ettner 
(1995) uses the same kind of reasoning when she compares the concern of governments 
Mth the consequences of both child care and informal care for social and private costs. 
''The arg11ment for government inten·ention !710)' be stronger in the case if e!dercare than childcare. The 
e:>.··i:Stence if disabled parents cannot be influenced fty one·S beha11ior, as is ftrtili!J, and so cannot be regarded 
as a choice Pariah/e. F:rrthermore, caregiving needs are m11ch more variable among the elderf; than among 
yo11ng children (p.65). ,_. 
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In making their statements Carmichael and Charles (2003) and Ettner (1995) 
implicitly assume that the whole social network of an individual \.Vi.th impairments 'Will 
provide informal care. In reality, however, the empirical literature suggests that the 
provision of informal care is not equally distributed over all members of society. 
This chapter adds to the literature by modelling the direct relationship benveen 
labour supply and informal care supply where both labour and informal care are treated as 
endogenous. The supply equations are derived from a utility theory framework. Om: model 
is tested empirically by analysing data from 1106 respondents, all of whom had someone in 
their social setting in need of care. Two out of three had a paid job, wh.ile three-quarters of 
the respondents provided informal care. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First we present the theoretical and 
econometric models. Next we present the data and give the results of the estimations and 
present some simulations. The chapter ends with our conclusions and a discussion of our 
findings. 
2.2 The model 
In this section the theoretical model is first set out, follov.i.ng which the empirical 
specification is derived. 
2.2.1 Theoretical model 
We developed a model of the individual's supply-of-work and supply-of-informal care 
decisions. We propose a utility maximisation model where the individual chooses bet\\Teen 
consumption, paid work rime and informal care rime. Consumption and paid work time are 
standard elements in utility functions concerning the allocation of time. See for an 
overview, e.g., Gronau (1986). By including the provision of informal care as an element in 
the utility function, we implicitly assume that individuals derive utility from providing 
informal care. Others, for example Barmby and Charles (1992) assume that the reasons for 
providing informal care are chiefly altruistic, leading them to build a model where the 
welfare of the dependent enters the utility function of the informal caregiver. This implies, 
however, that informal caregivers do not derive direct utility from the provision of 
informal care. Through the assumption that the welfare of the dependent depends upon 
the amount of informal care provided, the welfare of the care recipient enters indirectly 
into our proposed utility function of the informal caregiver. 
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Suppose an informal caregiver ma.;drnises the following utility function subject to 
t\Vo constraints: 
uc = uc (Q, L, C; X1, Xz) 
where: Q = consumption 
L =leisure 
C = hours of care 
(1) 
X1 = exogenous variables affecting leisure, such as presence of young children 
and health of informal caregiver 
X2 = exogenous variables affecting hours of care, such as presence of young 
children, health of informal caregiver, and health of the care recipient. 
The constraints faced by the potential caregiver are a time constraint and a budget 
constraint. The time constraint divides the total time T between paid work (N), leisure (L) 
and informal care (C): 
T=N+L+C 
T = total time available 
N = working time 
(2) 
The budget constraint shows that total money (the sum of non-labour income and 
labour income) can be spent on consumption with the corresponding price p. 
pQ =w*N +Y 
where p = price of consumption 
w =wage rate 
Y = non-labour income 
The informal caregiver's decision problem may be stated as follows: 
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ma..;;: uc (Q, L, C; X1, Xz) (4) 
Q,L,C 
s.t. wT + Y = p*Q + w*L + "''*C (5) 
Imposing a quadratic utility function, the demand for care and leisure equations 
are derived by solving the flrst order conditions of the Langrangian: 
(6) 
\ (wT + Y- p*Q- w*L- w*C) 
The influence of the exogenous variables is modelled by making the preference 
parameters a dependent upon X,. see also Pollak and \Vales (1981). The solution to this 
problem then yields the following demand equations: 
(7) 
C = y .. , Y! + Y? T. + Y" Q· 1 ""'1]- ~ -'-1 .) 1 (8) 
Qi = \ViT + Yi- wi*Li- Pi*Ci (where Pi is assumed to be equal to 1) (9) 
where ~1 and Y1 are vectors of parameters, 
and ~1, ~2, ~3, Y! , yzand Y3 are functions of a and b.* 
Variables that are typically included in the vector X1 are age, gender, the presence 
of young children (negative effect), wage rate, level of human capital (education) (positive 
correlation) and health of the informal caregiver. (See table 2.1 for an overview.) Variables 
that are typically included in Xz are age, gender, the presence of young children (negative 
effect), health of the caregiver and recipient, closeness of kinship and physical proximity. 
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2.2.2 Empirical analysis 
We use a wo-step procedure to estimate this system of equations. First we estimate the 
reduced form equations using to bit estimation, thus taking account of the specific nature of 
the data (Scott Long, 1997). Next we use the estimated values as instruments in the 
structural equations. 
The data contain information on hours of work and hours of care, so that the 
leisure-equation (equation U)) is translated into an hours-of-work-equation. According to 
this equation hours of work are related to hours of care, consumption and exogenous 
variables. Using budget-constraint (3) and time-constraint (2), consumption is substituted 
out. This yields the first structural equation of our model that v,.ill be estimated, in which 
how:s of work are related to hours of care and various exogenous variables. 
(1 0) 
Analogously, a structural equation for care can be derived, relating hours of care 
to hours of work and various exogenous variables. 
c: = Xjj2 *2 + *4[.; + ·~ (11) 
Ni = weekly working hours of individual i 
ci = hours of care supplied by individual i 
~jl, xij2 = exogenous variables j of individual i 
*1, *2, *3, *4 =parameter vectors 
St;, S2i = error term 
Both N;~ and c· are unobsenrable; what we observe are a variable N; indicating 
whether a person participates in the labour market or not (zero hours of work) and, if they 
participate, how many hours they work; and a variable C indicating whether a person 
provides care or not (zero hours of care) and, if they provide care, for how many hours: 
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Ni = Ni ifNt > 0 (works) 
=0 othenvise (does not work) (12) 
c = Ci if Ci > O(provides care) 
=0 othenvise (does not provide care) (13) 
Equations (10)-(13) constirute a system of simultaneous equations, wlllch has 
been estimated using an instrumental variable method. The reduced form estimators are 
used as instruments (see equations (14) and (15)). 
Nt = J;j1 ·1 + Xij2 ·2 + SJi (14) 
(15) 
= param.eter vectors 
=error term 
Assuming that Sli and S2i have an independent normal distribution, equations (14) 
and (15) constitute standard tobit models. The model has been estimated for every person 
who is a potential \Vorker and/ or a potential carer. 
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2.3 Data 
This section first describes how the data '\vere collected, following '\vhich the sample 
characteristics are presented. 
2.3.1 Data collection 
Data were collected for the Dutch care leave programme (SCP, 2001). Benveen September 
1999 and l'vfarch 2000 a random sample of households in the Netherlands '\vere interviewed 
about their use of a broad range of facilities including (health) care. The next three 
questions, put tO all respondents aged 16 year and over, are particularly relevant. 
1) 'Is someone in your social environment (family, friends, acquaintances) chronically ill 
or disabled, and hence in need of help regularly?' 
2) '1s there someone in your social environment who has needed help during the past 
three years for longer than t\vo weeks due to illness, accident or hospital admission?' 
3) 'Has someone in your social environment been cared for and died in the past three 
years?' 
Situations 1-3 are referred to below as chxonic care, temporary care and terminal care, 
respec~vely. 
Those respondents who ans,vered in the affrnnative to one of the three questions 
above were included in the sample. They were given another written survey, which 
contained questions about the general characteristics of the potential care recipient, the 
type of impairment, the care provided and the various caregivers involved (professional, 
private or informal). Ultimately 1290 people completed the survey. 
2.3.2 Sample characteristics 
Due to missing values on one or more of the variables, 1106 of the 1290 respondents were 
ultimately included in the analyses. Table 2.1 thus presents the sample characteristics of the 
independent variables of these 1106 respondents. 
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Table 2.1: Sample characteristics (n=1106) 
Variable 
Dependent variables 
Hours of informal care 
Hours 'l.vorked 
Company and job charactetisdcs 
Dummy service industry {other::: 1) 
Dummy less th2n 20 employees (yt:s = 1) 
Dummy bet\veen 20 and 99 employees (yes= 1) 
Dummy control own \vork scht:dule (no= 1) 
Dummy shift-\vork (yes= 1) 
Dummy \VOrb during wt:nings (yes= 1) 
Dummy \vorks during nights (yes= 1) 
Informal caregiver charactetisdcs 
Prc::dicted hourly wage 
Dummy informal caregiver's :tge 16-34 (yes= 1) 
Dummy inforrn.'ll caregiver's age 35-44 (yes= 1) 
Dummy infomul caregiver's age >44 (yes = 1) 
Dummy gender informal can:g:ivt:r (fem:Uc = 1) 
Durmny child younger than 12 (yes= 1) 
Dummy eduCLcion informal c~egiver low (yes= 1) 
Dummy education informal caregiver middle {yes= 1) 
Dummy education informal C.1Iegiver high (yes= 1) 
Combination p:Ud job and pro\'iding inforrn:U cart: 
Dummy h::ts taken holiday for tO pro ... -ide care (yes= 1) 
Dummy has taken emergency or sick leave (ves = 1) 
Health infonn.U caregiver 
Subjective health inforrn:U caregiver 
(vt:ry good= 1; very bad= 5) 
Hindrance '\vith activ-ities due to pain 
(not at all= 1; very much= 5) 
Dummy physical impairments (yes = 1) 
Care redpient charactcrisdcs 
Durruny care recipit:nt's age unkno\vn (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient's age 1-39 (yes= 1) 
Durruny care recipient's age 40-64 (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient's age 65-80 (yes = 1) 
Dummy care recipient's age =>SO (yes= 1) 
Dummy gender care recipient (female= 1) 
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Mean SD/~n 
13.63 0.69 
20.84 0.52 
0.58 0.01 
0.23 0.01 
0.23 0.01 
0.35 0.01 
0.74 O.Ql 
0.05 0.01 
0.14 0.01 
9.52 0.21 
0.23 0.01 
0.33 0.01 
0.44 0.01 
0.64 0.01 
0.35 0.01 
0.41 0.01 
0.38 0.01 
0.22 0.01 
0.20 0.01 
0.08 0.01 
1.92 0.02 
1.55 0.03 
0.21 0.01 
0.01 0.00 
0.15 0.01 
0.28 0.01 
0.31 0.01 
0.25 0.01 
0.65 0.01 
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Variable 
Dummy education Qte recipient lO\v (yes- 1) 
Dummy education care recipient middle (yes= 1) 
Dummy education care n:cipient high (yes= 1) 
Dummy education care recipient unknown (ves = 1) 
Dummy care recipient needs emotional support (ves = 1) 
Dummy imp:U.red can be left ::Uone (yes= 1) 
r._vpe of care situation 
Dummy type of care siruation: temporary (yes= 1) 
Dummy type of care siruation: termin.1l (yes= 1) 
Dummy type of care siruation: chronic (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient lives ••-ith inform:li caregiver (yes = 1) 
Dummy care recipient lives independently (yes = 1) 
Dummy C.'lre recipient in nursing home (yes= 1) 
Other care 
Dummy care recipient also receives other inform.1l C.'lre (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient receives profes~-:ional care (ye--s= 1) 
Dummy care recipient receives private care (yes= 1) 
Relationship berwcen potential informal caregiver and care recipient 
Dummy respondent is pr:im.1.ry informal C.'lregiver (J·es = 1) 
Dummy relationship partner {yes = 1) 
Dummy rebtionsbip close rebtive (J·es = 1) 
Dummy relationship ocher (yes= 1) 
Travel time 
Travel time inform:li caregiver 0 min 
Travel time inforrn::U caregiver 1-15 min 
Tmvel time informal c:J.re.;iver 16-30 min 
Travel time inforrn::U caregiver >30 min 
Mean SD/ n 
0.36 0.01 
0.35 0.01 
0.22 O.Ql 
om 0.01 
0.65 O.Ql 
0.81 0.01 
0.40 0.01 
0.21 0.01 
0.39 0.01 
0.19 0.01 
0.70 0.01 
0.10 0.01 
0.66 0.01 
0.44 0.01 
0.10 0.01 
0.34 0.01 
0.12 O.Ql 
0.51 0.02 
0.36 O.Ql 
0.19 0.01 
0.57 0.01 
0.19 0.01 
0.05 0.01 
Table 2.1 al<o shows that of the 1106 respondents, 826 (74.7%) provide care in 
one of the above situations 1-3, i.e. are informal caregivers. The remaining 280 respondents 
(25.3%) do not provide informal care despite the fact that there is someone in their social 
environment in need of care. In addition, 749 (67.7%) respondents have a paid job, '\vhile 
357 (32.3%) do not, 
It is conspicuous that the majority of informal care is provided for care recipients 
aged bet:\Veen 65 and 80 years. More than t\.vo-thirds of the care recipients cannot be left at 
home alone or need emotional support, lviany care recipients also receive other informal 
care (66%) and professional care (44%), while some (10%) are also in receipt of private 
care. 34.4% of the care recipients receive other informal care while 12.2% receive only 
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professional care. About a third of the care_gJ.vers are the primary caregiver; 12% are 
partners, but most are close relatives. Most informal caregivers are aged over 44 years and 
live close to their care recipient O-ess than 15 minutes' travelling time). 
Table 2.2: Informal caregivers' labour market participation 
Numbcr 
Percentage 
No paid job 
281 
34.0 
Paid job 
545 
66.0 
Table 2.3: Non-caregivers' labour market participation 
No paid job Paid job 
Number 76 204 
Percentage 27.1 72.9 
Total 
826 
100 
Total 
280 
100 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that non-caregivers are in employment more often than 
caregivers: almost 73% versus 66%. This difference is statistically significant (Pearson chi-
square (1) = 4.5236; Pr = 0.033). 
2.3.3 Distribution of the dependent variables 
Table 2.4 shows the distribution of the hours of paid work performed each week, while 
table 2.5 presents the same information for the '\veekly hours of informal care provided. 
Table 2.4: Mean hours of paid work per '\Veek in categories 
Hours per week Frequency % Cumulative % 
0 357 32.3 32.3 
1-20 191 17.3 49.6 
21-40 535 48.4 97.9 
>4D ?' 
-0 2.1 100 
Ton! 1.106 100 
Mean hours per week 
Ovcral.l 20.8 
Without zcro~ 30.8. 
As table 2.4 shows, a majority of the potential informal caregivers work bet\\reen 21 and 40 
hours per '\Veek. 
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Table 2.5: Mean hours of informal care provided per week in categories 
Hours per week Frequency % Cumulative % 
0 280 25.3 25.3 
1-20 633 57.2 82.5 
21-40 99 9.0 91.5 
> 40 94 8.5 100 
Toul 1.106 100 
Mean hours per week 
Over:ill 13.6 
Without zcros 18.3 
Table 2.5 shows that most informal caregivers provide care for up to 20 hours a week 
(57%). 
2.4 Results 
This section presents the estimation results of the econometric models. The effect of 
informal care on labour supply is shown in section 2.4.1; this is follo'\ved in section 2.4.2 by 
the effect of labour supply on informal care. Finally, section 2.4.3 contains a number of 
simulations. 
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2.4.1 The effects of informal care hours on working hours 
Table 2.6 shows the effect of providing informal care on working hours, controlled for a 
number of exogenous variables. 
Table 2.6: Tobit estimations, dependent variable: paid \vork time 
Informal care rime 
Infonn.'ll c.1.re hours 
Company and job characterisdcs 
Dummy sen-i.ce industry (other= 1) 
Dummy k~$:; tlun 20 employet:S (yes = 1) 
Dummy bet\veen 20 and 99 employees (ves = 1) 
Dummy control own \vork schedule {no = 1) 
Dummy :;;hift-\vork (yes= 1) 
Informal caregiver characteriscics 
Prt:dicted hourly \V::tge 
Dummy inforrru.l cn-egiver':::; age 35-44 (yes= 1) 
Dummy infonn:U caregiv~:r's age >44 (yes= 1) 
Dummy go::ndt:r informal caro::givt:r (f<.."'Il:llt::::: 1) 
Dummy child youngcr th= 12 (yo::s :::: 1) 
Dummy t:ducacion informal caro::givt:r middlt: (yo::s:::: 1) 
Dummy t:ducation informal caro::givcr high (yes:::: 1) 
Combination paid job and providing informal care 
Dummy has t:J.ken holiday to provide C.'lrt: (vcs:::: 1) 
Dummy h:l.s taken emerg.::ncy or sick leavo:: (yt:s:::: 1) 
Healrh informal caregiver 
Subjective health informal c.trcgivt:r 
(very good :::: 1; very bad :::: 5) 
Hindrance with acciYities due to pain 
(not at ill:::: 1; very' much:::: 5) 
Dummy physical imp:airmems (ves :::: 1) 
Interct:pt 
Standard t:rror 
Coefficient 
~.15 
-2.66 
3.86 
10.10 
9.51 
-3.92 
0.73 
-3.55 
-8.12 
-10.19 
-6.41 
-1.00 
-1.33 
13.60 
10.56 
0.13 
0.78 
-5.83 
22.26 
17.98 
1.106 
T-value 
-3.53 
-2.00 
2.24 
6.33 
6.84 
-1.99 
1.11 
-1.52 
-4.99 
-1.43 
-4.66 
-0.34 
-0.17 
-3.39 
7.50 
4.07 
0.14 
0.95 
2.37 
There is a statistically significant negative relation bet\veen the hours of informal 
care provided and the number of hours of paid work. In other \Vords, all things being 
equal, the more informal care that is provided, the fewer hours of paid work the informal 
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caregiver provides. A correction was applied for other exogenous variables, some of which 
also influence the number of hours of paid work. There is a statistically significant positive 
relation between company size and the employee's control over their own ·work schedule. 
The larger the company, the more hours are worked, and employees who have control over 
there own work schedules work more hours. Shift-workers work fewer hours than other 
employees. Older individuals and persons with young children work fewer hours than 
others. Taking leave in order to provide informal care, and taking emergency or sick leave 
to provide informal care, has a positive effect on hours of paid work. This is partly a 
participation effect and partly a volume effect. Part-time workers can provide care in there 
free hours, while full-time ·workers have to take leave. Moreover, the positive relation 
between care leave facilities and number of hours' paid work suggests that these facilities 
are good institutions for ensuring informal caregivers' amount of paid '\vork. It is worth 
noting that the variable 'hourly wages' is endogenous to hours of paid work. People with 
small or part-rime jobs are less likely to have high salaries compared to their counterparts 
who work more hours. \Ve therefore operationalised hourly wages using a Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1976). 
2.4.2 The effects of working hours on informal care hours 
The effects of hours of paid work on the number of hours' informal care provided are 
shown ill table 2. 7. 
Table 2.7: Tobit estimations, dependent variable: informal care time 
Paid work 
Hours p:lid \vork 
Dummy \vo:t:ks during ~-(:nings (ye....; = 1) 
Dummy works during nights Cws = 1) 
Care recipient characterisdcs 
Dummy gender care recipient (female= 1) 
Dummy educ::tcion c:1re r(:cipicnt middle (yt:s = 1) 
Dummy educ::tcion cne recipit:nt high {yes= 1) 
Dummy education care rt:cipient unknown (yt:s = 1) 
Dummy care recipient's :1ge unkno-wn (yes= 1) 
Dummy car(: recipient's :1ge 1-39 (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient's age 40-64 (yes= 1) 
Dummy care recipient's :l£e =>80 0;cs = 1) 
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Coefficient T-value 
-0.21 -2.06 
12.69 3.38 
4.69 1.83 
0.03 0.02 
-2.51 -1.37 
-4.83 -2.16 
4.96 1.37 
-12.39 -1..33 
4.63 1.65 
4.35 1.98 
0.25 0.12 
39 
Paid work 
Dummy can: n:cipi1:nt needs emotional support (y1:s- 1) 
Dummy imp3.i:red can be left J.lone (yes::: 1) 
Type of care situation 
Dummy type of c~e situ:1tion: temporary (yes::: 1) 
Dummy type of c~e situ:J.tion: tenn.irul (yes::: 1) 
Dummy c~1: recipient in nursing home (yes::: 1) 
Dummy c~e n:cipient lives \\rith inform:li c~egi..-er (yes ::: 1) 
Informal caregiver characteristics 
Dummy inform:U c~egiver's :1.ge 35-44 (yes::: 1) 
Dummy inforrn:Jl caregiver's age >44 (yes ::: 1) 
Dummy gender informal c~egiver (fem<1.le::: 1) 
Dummy child younger than 12 (J'l:S::: 1) 
Dummy educ:1.tion infonn:ll c:tregiver middle (yes::: 1) 
Dummy educ:.ttion infonn:ll caregiver high (yes ::: 1) 
Combinacion paid job and providing informal care 
Dummy has t:tken holid:l.y tO provide care (yes::: 1) 
Dummy has t:tken emergency or sick leave {yes::: 1) 
Ocher care 
Dummy care recipient :Uso receives other inform:tl care (yes::: 1) 
Dummy c~e recipient receives profession:tl c~e (ves::: 1) 
Dummy care recipient receives private care (yr::s::: 1) 
Rclariom .. "hip between informal caregiver and care recipient 
Dummy relationship: close rehtive (yes::: 1) 
Dummy rehtionship: close other (yes::: 1) 
Tr:wcl time 
Travel tim1: infonn.1.1 caregiver more th:1.n 1-15 min 
Travel time infonn.1.1 c1.regiver more th.'Ul 16-30 min 
Health informal caregiver 
Subjective health inform:tl c~egiver 
(very good ::: 1: very b:.td ::: 5) 
Hindrance "\vith activities due to pain 
(not at all::: 1; very much::: 5) 
Dummy physical impairments (yes ::: 1) 
Intercept 
Standard error 
N 
Coefficient T-value 
1.29 0.81 
-4.79 -2.43 
2.30 1.39 
6.50 3.07 
0.68 0.25 
2.14 0.45 
2.75 1.29 
3.02 1.27 
1.15 0.44 
-4.79 -2.49 
0.80 0.45 
0.78 0.35 
12.25 4.87 
11.07 3.29 
-16.54 -8.51 
-0.29 -0.18 
2.27 0.94 
-2.90 -0.73 
-9.91 -2.36 
-5.99 -1.70 
-1.47 -0.39 
1.56 1.29 
1.30 L25 
-3.19 -1.45 
22.13 2.92 
22.69 
1J06 
We can derive from table 2.7 that hour spent in employment have a negative 
effect on the number of hours of informal care provided; the more a person works, the less 
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rime they spend providing informal care. This could be either a participation or a volume 
effect. To establish which is the case, we therefore also estimated the relation bet'J.Teen 
hours of work on hours of informal care where the respondent is already providing 
informal care, thus eliminating the participation effect. In this model, the effect of '\vorking 
hours is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no volume effect of work on the 
providing of informal care: informal caregivers appear to provide the necessary care despite 
their labour market responsibilities. 
Table 2.7 also shows that working during the evening and at night (at the 10 
percent level) has a positive effect on the amount of informal care provided. W:/orking 
during the evening or at night would appear to enable informal caregivers to provide care 
during the day. Holiday and emergency or sick leave arrangements offer opportunities to 
provide care, and therefore we find a positive effect on the number of hours spent 
providing care. Having young children, on the other hand, reduces the opportunities to 
provide care, resulting in a negative effect. 
Care recipients v.i.th a higher education background receive less informal care than 
recipients '\vith a lo'\ver education level, perhaps because they are better able to arrange help 
for themselves. Terminally ill persons receive more hours of informal care than other care 
recipients. This is in line -..vith the results found in (SCP, 2001). Partners provide most of 
the informal care, and the results show that the greater the social distance, the less care is 
provided. 
2.4.3 Simulations 
The coefficient for the effect of informal care on working hours reported in table 6 tells us 
something about the ceteris paribm effects. To obtain an idea of how much the number of 
provided informal care hours varies bet\.Veen different groups, however, we have calculated 
the follo'\ving statistics, as shown in table 2.8, in order to take account of the effect that an 
average person who does not work has different characteristics from one who does work. 
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Table 2.8: Simulation results 
P:micipacion in care Hours of care Labour rrurket Hours of paid work 
p:micipation 
Non-caregiver 0.43 0 0.80 20 
Caregiver 0.67 13 0.74 15 
Non-worker 0.64 10 0.58 5 
\V'orker 0.59 8 0.84 22 
1Vh1e 0.55 5 0.92 30 
Ferrule 0.64 10 0.66 9 
With young children 0.57 6 0.74 16 
Without young children 0.63 10 0.76 17 
Although the probability that a non-caregiver \.Vill start providing care is still 0.43, 
the predicted number of hours of informal care provided is zero. Males, non-workers and 
persons 'Without young children not only have a smaller probability of providing informal 
care than females, workers and persons '.vith young children, but if they do provide care 
they do so for far fe'\ver hours. 
Table 2.8 also shows the probabilities of labour market participation and hours of 
paid '\Vork. The table shows even more pronounced differences for the number of working 
hours. Although there is a difference in e::...-pected working hours bet\Veen caregivers and 
non-caregivers, the difference is not as substantial as beNreen males and females. 
2.5 Conclusions and discussion 
This chapter investigates the simultaneous labour supply and care supply decisions of 
potential informal caregivers based on a sample of 1106 Dutch respondents. \Ve accounted 
for endogeneity and sample selection. Providing informal care has a negative effect on the 
weekly amount of paid work performed, and paid work has a negative effect on the weekly 
amount of informal care provided. The participation effect is responsible for the relation 
bet\Veen paid '\Vork and providing care, whereas the amount of paid work does not 
influence the amount of care provided. This implies that informal caregivers provide the 
necessary care despite their labour market responsibilities. There are important differences 
bet\veen some subgroups in our sample; males, non-workers and persons '.V'ithout young 
children not only have a smaller probability of providing informal care than females, 
workers and persons with young children, but if they do provide care they do so for far 
fewer hours. On the other hand, while there is a difference benveen the probabilities of 
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labour market participation and hours of paid '\vork of caregivers and non-caregivers, the 
difference is not so substantial as bet\veen males and females. 
A possible weakness of our study is the measurement of the care recipient's care 
demands. We did not have much information about the health status of the care recipients 
and were therefore not able to apply a very detailed correction. Another weakness could be 
the measurement of informal care time. Measurement of time is difficult. \Ve used a 
number of recall questions, creating the risk of lack of precision. It could be that some very 
specific groups were not included in our sample, for instance informal caregivers providing 
care to care recipients with heavy care demands. Caution therefore needs to be applied in 
generalising ou:r :results. 
Our results have some policy implications. The amount of paid work seems to 
have no influence on the amount of informal care provided. This could imply that informal 
caregivers provide the necessary amount of care. In developing institutions to support 
informal caregivers, policymakers would perhaps do better to focus on participation rather 
than on volume. 
Most papers on the supply of informal care in relation to the prov-ision of paid 
'\vork do not account for endogeneity. We have filled this gap in the theoretical literature by 
using a structural model to model the direct relation between labour supply and informal 
care supply, and vice versa. 
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3 Economic valuation of informal care: 
An overview of methods and applications1 
Summary 
Irifbrn;al care makes ttp a significant part cf the total amolfnf of care provided to patients JJJt!h chronic and 
terTI'Iinal diseases. Sti/4 informal care is often neglected in economic evaluations of health care programs. 
Probabjy this is related to the fact that the costs of informal care are to an important e..'<fent related to time 
inputs lry relatives and friends if patients and time is not easy to value. Development rf theoreticai!J sound_, 
) 1tf easijy applicable valuation methods is therefore important since ignon·ng the costs of i'!forma! care mqy 
lead to ltndesirable shifts between formal and informal care. lv[oreover, there is increasing evidence that 
prov·iding informal care may lead to health problems for the caregiver, both in terms of morbidity and 
mortali!J. Up till now these health rffects have not been incorporated in economic evaluations. More 
attention for the identification and valuation rf the jill! costs and health rffects rf informal care for the 
infoT!lla! caregiver seems needed therefore. This chapter presents a critical eJ/a/11ation rf the available methods 
to incorporate informal care in economic eva/Nations. 
3.1 Introduction 
Informal care plays a substantial role in the total care provided, especially for care of people 
\Vi.th chronic and terminal diseases. To give an indication, in The Netherlands it was 
estimated that around ten percent of the population of sixteen million inhabitants prov-i_des 
informal care (SCP, 2001). Because informal care is a less visible part of total care, in terms 
of costs and effects, it has often been ignored in economic evaluations and (subsequent) 
policymaking. At present the attention for informal care seems growing. There is increased 
insight in the amount of informal care provided (in different disease areas) and the tasks 
that caregivers provide (SCP, 2001). lvforeover there is gro\Vi.ng evidence that informal care 
has adverse effects on informal caregivers in terms of for example opportunity costs and 
quality of life (Schulz and Beach, 1999). At the same time informal care is increasingly 
being considered as a valuable substitute and complement of e::...-pensive formal care. 
Therefore, policy makers have increased their attention for the position of informal 
caregivers. Tbis increased attention for informal care is especially important since the 
t Based on Van den Bcrg. B. Brou\ver. W.B.F.. Koopm.wsch.'Lp, M.A., 2004. Economic valuation of inform.'ll care: 
An overvit:\v of methods and applications. The European Journal of Health Economics 5(1). 36-45. 
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demand for informal care is likely to increase in the future, due to the ageing of the 
population, the -wish to be cared for at home by relatives and friends, and the rationing of 
formal care in many countries. Changes in treatment patterns of patients, in particular 
substitution from inpatient to home care, may have a substantial effect on the amount and 
nature of informal care provided, as '.veil as increased possibilities for monetary 
compensation of informal caregivers. 
Parallel economic evaluations of health care are more and more often used to 
inform decision- makers on the relative efficiency of the programs in terms of benefits and 
costs (Rutten, 1996). Despite the increasing popularity of these economic evaluations, there 
is a lack on consensus and uniformity of the methodology used in these evaluations. This 
can lead to differences in which elements are considered to be a necessary part of the 
analysis and how these elements should be valued. Of course such discrepancies in what to 
incorporate in the analysis and how to incorporate this, can lead to problems in the 
interpretation of results and in comparison of results of different studies. 1foreover, it can 
lead to miscalculations and wrong policy recommendations. In this context it is argued that 
economic evaluations should preferably take the societal perspective (Russell et al., 1996, 
pp.5~7) and (Drummond et al., 1997, p.106). This means that everyone affected by an 
intervention under study should be considered and all sigllificant (health) outcomes and 
costs that flow from the intervention should be counted regardless of who experiences the 
outcomes and costs. This to prevent undesirable shifts in costs Vvi:thin the health care sector 
and bet\Veen the health care sector and other sectors including the informal economy. The 
societal perspective also has implications for the '.vay costs and outcomes should be 
measured, i.e. they should be measw::ed in such a way that the full impact on affected 
members is captured v.i.thout double counting. 
\\!hen the societal perspective is adopted, informal care needs to be incorporated 
in economic evaluations, as has been recognised (Luce et al., 1996) and (Drummond et al., 
1997). However, presently the costs and outcomes of informal care are often ignored in 
economic evaluations (Stone et al., 2000). This sometimes relates to the fact that the 
societal perspective is not adhered to, e.g., (Gerard and Mooney, 1993), but, for instance, a 
health care budget perspective. More importantly probably, the methods available to 
measure and value informal care tend to be quite erode and the incorporation of informal 
care by no means uniform. More standardisation as well as improved methods appear 
needed, while recognising the fact that the proposed methods should be compatible 'W'ith 
the common types of economic evaluation in health care: cost-benefit analysis (CBA), cost-
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utility analysis (CUA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). The availability, development 
and use of such methods is a prerequisite for the incorporation of informal care in 
economic evaluations. 
In this chapter we v,.ill discuss available methods. As the costs of informal care are 
to a large extent related to time inputs by informal caregivers 2, identification and valuation 
of informal caregivers rime inputs are an .important focus of this chapter. The time 
investment may lead to impacts normally referred to as costs, e.g. opportucity costs due to 
forgone paid work and to impacts on health-related quality of life (morbidity and mortality 
risks) or well-being. \'Jc will discuss the incorporation of these different impacts in 
economic evaluations3. 
The triad of definition, measurement and valuation is crucial for the incorporation 
of informal care in economic evaluations. Therefore, the structure of this chapter is as 
follows. First, the heterogeneity of the commodity informal care is highlighted and a 
definition is proposed in section 3.2. In section 3.3, some measurement issues in correctly 
assessing the informal caregivers input are brought under attention. In section 3.4, the 
different valuation methods are discussed. Some of these methods aim at valuing the time 
inputs of informal caregivers, while others focus on assessing the impact of providing 
informal care on informal caregiver's health or burden. In section 3.5, some additional 
problems in the valuation and incorporation of informal care are highlighted. Finally, 
section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Informal care: a heterogeneous commodity 
A clear deflnition of '\vhat informal care entails is a necessary condition for a proper 
measurement and subsequently for the valuation of informal care in economic evaluations. 
However, providing such a defm.ition is not strllightfor\vard. One might agree on the fact 
that informal care at least involves care provided by someone from the social environment 
of the care recipient. On the basis of some prior relationship ber..veen carer and patient, 
therefore, a caregi'-'ing situation evolves. Even though this is a good starting point, informal 
care is a rather heterogeneous commodity. Defm.itions of informal care therefore can vary 
greatly (Borgermans et al., 2001, p. 3), also in practical work. 
z See Netten (1990) for an overview and discussion of other costs rel1ted to informal care. 
3 TI1e effects of receiving inform.<tl care on ca.n: recipients \vill not be addre%ed in this chapter. 
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The heterogeneity does not only relate to differences in time investment and 
duration of care, which of course is an important first source of diversity. It also relates to 
the (number of) tasks provided, since informal care can be divi.ded into different 
components, such as (1) housework, like cleaning and cooking, (2) personal care, like 
dressing, (3) support with mobility, (4) administrative tasks, and (5) socialising, like 
comforting a patient, e.g., Humbert and Van den Dungen (1994). Not all of these tasks 
need to be performed by one informal caregiver or needed in all caring situations. 
Moreover, to make it even more complicated, not all of these tasks are necessarily informal 
care. For instance, housework may be normal for a housewife, but when her husband falls 
ill, she may have to increase the number of household tasks provided, the number of hours 
provided etc. Only the additional part of housework and administrative tasks due to the 
disease of the care receiver should be seen as informal care. If the informal caregiver 
alxeady used to clean the house before the care recipient became ill it should not be 
considered .informal care. And not all housework may necessarily be solely to the benefit of 
the patient. Economists make a distinction bet\veen household private and household 
public commodities in that context. Household private commodities are consumed by one 
individual solely, while all members of the same household consume household public 
commodities jointly and therefore benefit from increased activ-:ities in this area (Bergstrom, 
1997, pp. 23-24). 
Another important issue is whether the caregiver and care recipient share the 
same household. Tbis may have consequences in terms of time investment, travel time, 
tasks provided and so on. Moreover, sharing the same household may make it more 
difficult to separate informal care tasks from normal household activities (even for the 
informal caregiver). In addition, there may be differences in terms of the freedom of choice 
to become an informal caregiver. It is conceivable that persons outside a household Qike 
neighbours and friends) enter a caregiving situation more voluntarily compared to people 
sharing the care recipients' household4• The latter may feel more obliged to care. Related to 
this point is the social relationsbip (e.g. spouse, parent, child, sister, neighbour and friend) 
between the patient and the informal caregiver. Tbis can affect the \vay the provision of 
care is perceived, both by the care receiver and by the caregiver. Moreover, a person may 
care for a care recipient alone or together \V-:ith other (1nformal) caregivers. Often a 
distinction is made between primary and other caregivers. The primary caregiver is likely to 
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provide most hours of informal care and to coordinate the care provided by other 
(informal) caregivers. 
An additional source of heterogeneity is the starring point and course of a 
caregiving episode. The starting point of caring may be obvious (e.g. with a stroke or heart 
anack) or slowly evolv-ing (e.g. with rheumatoid arthritis or dementia). In the latter situation 
the caregiver grows in hls or her role, gradually taking on more and more tasks, 'W'ith no 
clear distinction between before and after becoming an informal caregiver and sometimes 
between normal and caregiv-1.ng tasks. In the former situation, the caregiving situation arises 
abrupdy and the forgone normal activities and additional informal care efforts are clearer. 
This issue has also implications for the measurement of informal care and is therefore also 
discussed below. 
3.2.1 Towards a definition 
On the basis of the discussed heterogeneity and the starting point that informal care 
involves, we define informal care as: 
"a q~tasi or non-market composite commodity consisting of heterogeneo11s part! produced (paid or 11npaid) 
f?y one or more 111embers of the social environment of the care recipimt as a result of the care demand of the 
care recipimt. '' 
In this definition, we leave open the possibility for informal caregivers to be paid. It is 
often debated whether or not informal caregivers may receive some form of payment and 
still be considered informal caregivers. This question becomes increasingly relevant now 
rlllt personal bttdgets become more popular, ·w-ith which informal caregivers may be paid as 
well as formal caregivers. One possible answer is that as long as an informal caregiver does 
not receive a full market ·wage for all of his or her activities, they can be defined as informal 
care. Perhaps, a better answer would be to say that only when the caregiver would not want 
to care for someone outside of hls social environment for a similar wage, it is considered to 
be informal care. \'Vben the caregiver would care for anyone, regardless the social 
relationship, it is either a volunteer -(nearly) unpaid- or a professional carer- paid. 
4 Tills depends for an imporunt pan on the institutional conn:.:u of :1 society. In some societies it is usu:ll to 
dcm:1Ild inputs of f:unil.y members before one could cbim support from health care profession:Us, while other 
societies are less dcma.nding on f::u.ni.ly members. 
s (1) Home keeping (the :-tddirional part), (2) personal care, (3) support \lrith mobility, (4) :~dministmtivc tasks (the 
:~ddirion.al part), and (5) to some t:..'(tcnt socialising. 
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3.3 Measurement issues 
Since the costs of informal care are to an important extent related to the rime inputs of 
informal caregivers, valid (time-specific) ways of measuring are necessary for the valuation 
of informal care. We \Vill discuss some major issues in the measurement of time spent on 
informal care, i.e. the choice of a measurement method, the distinction of informal care 
and normal housework, joint production, and several informal caregivers caring for one 
care recipient.6 
Two frequently applied methodsi of collecting time budget data are the diary 
method and the recall method. The diary method is normally considered to be the gold 
standard Guster and Stafford, 1991, p.473). Answers typically depend on the questions8 
posed and the recall period used. In general, however, estimates from the diary method 
tend to be lower than estimates from the recall method. Tbis is especially true for 
housework Guster, 1985, p. 5). Still, a disadvantage of the diary method compared to the 
recall method is that it is very time consuming, which can bias the results in favour of less 
busy respondents. 
Besides the applied method and recall period used, the assessment of time 
investment also entails the e::":plicitness of questions posed. For example~ one may ask: HmJJ 
ma;ry ho1trs did )'Oil spend on informal care d1rring the last week? Some respondents could consider 
certain tasks as informal care while other respondents could consider them as leisure or 
house'\vork. To prevent this kind of bias, the analyst should preferably present the 
respondents a list of informal care tasks and ask them to indicate how much time they 
spent on those tasks during a certain period. Using such a list makes it necessary however, 
to make a distinction between normal housework and informal care. This is especially the 
case if the informal caregiver and care recipient share the same household or if informal 
care has been provided for several years. Only the additional part of housework due to the 
disease of the care recipient should be counted as informal care. One has to be clear about 
this point in a survey. Still, it may be difficult for respondents, especially in cases where 
informal care has been provided for many years already, to dis~ouish between normal 
tasks (i.e. those also performed if the patient had not been ill) and informal care. 
6
_ See Juster (1985) and Juster and Stafford (1991) for excellent methodological overv"ie\vs of the measurement of 
tun,. 
7 Other methods are for C(atnple the 'buzzer' method and the 'outsider' method. 
K ''\Vhen the inren.---iewee is asked ho\v much rime he spent on certain activities, r:tther than \vh.a.t acci·vities he 
engaged in during a certain time. the results are bound to be less accur:J.te bec.1.use there is no rime constraint (e.g. 
daily activities usually do not add up tO 24 hours) {Gron:m. 1986. p. 279). 
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Joint productioll, defined as doing two or more activities at the same time by one 
person, is another complicating factor. The more 'joint' activities are, the less accurate the 
results tend to be. The problem tends to be more complicated when for example leisure 
activities are combined with providing informal care, for example, watching telev"'ision and 
superv"'ising after a care recipient '.V'ith AJzheimer. Spauwen (2002) showed that there is a 
positive relationship between prov"'iding informal care household acti>riries and normal 
household activ"'ities at the same rime. Providing informal care was, ho'\vever, not combined 
\vith other activities like for instance leisure. This combination is often suggested in the 
literature but not supported by this data. 
Another point of attention is that diaries and the recall method often, though not 
necessarily, relate to one informal caregiver, while in many cases more informal caregivers 
are involved. This can lead to an underestimation of the total amount of provided informal 
care and the time involved in it. 
Finally, in developing the survey, one has to keep in mind the discussed 
measurement problems and the preferred valuation method needs to be the starting point. 
3.4 Valuation methods for informal care 
Various methods for the valuation of informal care have been discussed in the literature 
and have been applied in previous research. In this section we present an ovenriew of the 
different methods. They can be divided into three categories: revealed preference, stated 
preference9, and other10 (table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Valuation methods for informal care 
Revealed preference methods 
Opponunity costs 
Proxy good 
Stated preference methods 
Contingent v:liuation 
Conjoint me:tsun:mt":m 
Others 
Objective burdt":n 
Subjeccivt": burden 
Hdlth- rcl:tted qu.'llity of life 
Well-being 
ry This distinction is of importance since the "difference between [the n.--vealed and St:l.ted preference method] 
comes doY ... n to using uncompensated (1\l.brsh.-illian) demand cuntes in case of revdled preference valuation 
method, and estimating the income-compensated (Hicksian) demand curves in the C:l.Se of the Stl.ted preference 
valwtion method·· (B:ursm.'L, 2000, pp. 54-55). 
to Objective and subjectivt": burden :ue not valu.1.tion methods but merely an indication of the burden of caring. 
Moreover, the methods in the column "others" :ue more genc.ral concepts :10d involve a lor of specific methods 
or instruments. 
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The major problem in valuing informal care is that by definition no market prices 
exist. It is often argued that informal care in economic evaluations should be valued \\lith 
the opportunity cost method (Smith and Wright, 1994, p. 139), (Posnett and Jan, 1996, p. 
20), and (Drummond et al., 1997, p. 86]. As an alternative the pro:-.'}' good method is also 
proposed (Luce et al., 1996). However, there are some problems with both methods, as 
they VJill be discussed below. In addition, the pro's and con's of other available methods to 
value informal care are discussed below. 
3.4.1 Revealed preference methods 
Both the opportunity cost method and the pro::-..y· good method use real life decision data to 
value informal care and may therefore be seen as revealed preference methods. This means 
that preferences of informal caregivers are deduced from informal caregivers' decisions or 
from decisions in the market for close substitutes of informal care. For the application of 
both methods, only the time forgone or spent on informal care has to be measured and 
valued in different states of the world: \Vithout and with the intervention under study or 
reference case and intervention. The advantages and disadvantages of both methods VJill be 
discussed below. 
Opportunity cost method 
The opportunity costs of informal care are the informal caregiver's benefits forgone due to 
spending time on providing informal care. In general, the forgone benefits are 
approximated by an individual's market wage rate. So, the value of informal care equals the 
market wage rate of the informal caregiver multiplied \vi.th the hours of time forgone or the 
hours spend on informal care. 
In an optimal world this implies that from the perspective of the informal 
caregiver the value of all hours spent on informal care, including the last e."ceeds the 
caregiver's hourly market wage rate. Thus the opportunity cost method gives just a 
minimum of the value of informal care. However, informal caregiving often involves non-
labour market participation, for instance for full-time housewives or retired people. As a 
solution to the non-labour market participation, one can use a modified opportunity cost 
method to frnd out the reservation wage rate of the informal caregiver. This is the wage 
rate for which an individual is v.illing to supply at least one hour on the labour market 
(Kooreman and Wunderink, 1996, p. 113). Another practical solution is the imputation of 
the known wage of similar people (e.g. same sex, educational level and -age). To make the 
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valuation more complicated informal care is often at the cost of unpaid work or leisure 
time. The analyst needs to impute a valuation of these types of time forgone to get a value 
of informal care. 
An advantage of the opportunity cost method compared to its close substitute, 
the proA-y good method, is that it is not necessary to distinguish bel:\veen different informal 
care tasks provi.ded, which makes it easier to use. Still, distinguishing ben:veen the different 
types of normal time use sacrificed is necessary. As indicated, especially \.vhen informal care 
has been provided over longer periods of time, it may be difficult for respondents to 
indicate what time use has been sacrificed. An alternative approach is to ask what people 
would preferably want to do \.vith their freed time if this had no longer to be spent on 
informal care (Chapter 5). 
Despite the recommendations to use the opportunity cost method to value 
informal care, the method has some important disadvantages. Using the opportunity cost 
method to value informal care instead of just to indicate informal caregivers opporrunity 
costs leads to different values of the same commodity informal care due to one's potential 
\.vages somewhere else in the economy. For instance, the same type and amount of 
informal care provided by a professor of health economics gets in the first case a higher 
value than informal care provided by a PhD student all other things equal (especially during 
paid work, but mostly valuation of leisure and unpaid activities are related to income as 
well - as micro-economic theory suggests). This is the so-called Hawrylyshyn paradox 
(Hawrylyshyn, 1977) and (Gronau, 1986). An e-xplanation for the Hawrylyshyn paradox is 
that providing informal care involves different direct utilities, sometimes also called process 
utility, for the professor and his PhD srudent. It is debatable whether or not this direct 
utility should be incorporated in economic evaluations while traditional measures of market 
output do not incorporate them. Moreover, the opportunity cost method is quite general 
.....vith a focus on the valuation of time forgone due to informal ca:regiving instead off the 
valuation of the full impact of providing informal care for the informal caregiver. 
Double counting of other, e.g. care recipients' costs or outcomes, is not expected 
to pose a serious problem. The costs of informal care can be incorporated in the cost side 
of CBA, CUA or CEA, as they are purely monetary. The method can also be used in 
combination .....vith other methods to measure the full impact of informal care, like health-
related quality of life. In that case avoidance of double-counting needs more attention as 
well as the appropriate way of incorporating the health effects of informal caregivers in 
economic evaluations. The latter issue is further discussed below. Examples of the 
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application of the opportunity cost method to value informal care, are studies done by 
Ettner (1996) and O'Shea and Blachvell (1993). 
Proxy good method 
The proAJ good method or market cost method values time spent on informal care at the 
(labour) market prices of a close market substitute. Tbis approach requires the availability 
of a market substitute for the non-market good, wbich is assumed to be almost perfect. 
The time spent on informal care is valued at the wage rate of a market substitute, '\vhich 
can differ for different tasks: e.g. housework is valued at the market '\vage of a professional 
house worker and personal care is valued at the market wage of a professional nurse. 11 
This method is also rather simple and crude. Using a list of performed activities 
and the time spent on these activ-i.ties, it is possible to calculate some kind of formal proA·y 
value. Ho'\vever, the method has also some disadvantages. First, by using wage-rates of e.g. 
health care professionals as the proxy value, one assumes that formal care and informal 
care are perfect substitutes. For instance, no differences in efficiency and quality are 
assumed to exist. Jt is also assumed that informal caregiv-i.ng does not involve direct 
(dis)utility. This means that neither the care recipient, nor the informal caregiver enjoys the 
fact that the latter provides the care. Another point of concern is the used wage rates. Due 
to collective agreements and regulation the wages of professionals in the health care sector 
do not necessarily represent real labour scarcity in society. 
The proxy good method poses other measurement problems than the opportunity 
costs method, because the analyst does not need to know the different sources of time 
forgone. However, the distinction between "normal" tasks and informal care tasks as 
discussed above is crucial. For the practical application the availability of a close market 
substitute in the heavily regulated health care sector or the informal sector for household 
senr:ices is also crucial. 
The monetary costs of informal care according to the proA·y good method can be 
incorporated in the cost side of CBA, CUA and CEA. Double counting -with e.g. care 
n:cipient's outcomes or costs is not expected to be a serious problem because only the 
informal caregiver's perspective is used. The method can be also be used in combination 
'With other methods, like health-related quality of life, but ~crain the threat of double-
counting needs attention. 
11 One c= dcb?.tt: \vhethcr this should be the gross wage (the rc:ll opporruniry costs to society) or the ncr \V:lge 
(d1e \vage r.:ttc for \vhich the profession.'ll is willing to sacrifice:: lcisure). 
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3.4.2 Stated preference methods 
Next '\Ve discuss t\Vo stated preference methods for the valuation of informal care: the 
contingent valuation method (CVM) and conjoint analysis (CA). Stated preference methods 
are used to measure and value respondents' preferences mosrly for non-market 
commodities through (oral or "'rritten) surveys. Often, the aim is to find a monetary 
valuation of a non-market commodity, such as informal care. This monetary valuation is 
used as a proxy for respondents' well-being because well-being is not direct measurable. 
However, an indi\ridual's preferences are not always a good indicator of an individual's 
well-being (Ng, 1983, pp.7-12). This may be the case (i) when the preferences of an 
individual may not only be affected by his own welfare, but also by his consideration for 
the welfare of others; (ii) due to ignorance and/ or imperfect foresight; and (ili) '\vhen an 
individual exhibits irrational preferences.12 One has to keep in mind those cases in the 
application of stated preference methods. 
Contingent valuation method 
Hicks (1939) identified t\.Vo methods to express the efft:ct of an inte.rvc:ntion on an 
individual's '\veil-being in a money metric: compensating variation (CV) and equivalent 
variation (EV) (see also Hausman (1981) and Boadway and Bruce (1984, pp. 39-43). These 
methods are commonly kno"Wn as "villingness to pay (\VfP) and willingness to accept 
(\TI A). One could apply CV1vf to value informal care e.g. by assessing the nurumum 
amount of money an informal caregiver would need to receive to be '\Vil.ling to provide a 
certain or an additional amount of informal care . 
.Although the concepts of \TIP and W'TA are relative easy to grasp, the practical 
application of CVJ\1 could be troublesome in the context of informal care, because 
informal caregivers often claim that money is at least low on their agenda [Smith, 1994 
#36]. This could imply that informal caregivers find it unseemly to indicate that they would 
need a monetary compensation in order to provide informal care to somebody in their 
social environment they love. Moreover, economists often reject CVlvi bt:cause the method 
conflicts 'Nith the one of the central axioms in economics: revealed preference. They argue 
that it is just the intention of respondents that is measured in CV1vf instead of real 
1~ "The preference of an individual is here defined i.rr:ltion:U if he prefers x over Jl despite the fact th.1.t his \vdfare 
is higher in J' th.w in x, :1nd his preference is unaffected by considerations of the \Vdfarc of other individuals (:1ny 
sentient cn.--ature c:111 be an individual here), or by ignorance or imperfect foresight (Ng, 1983, p. 10)" 
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behaviour as required in the revealed preference a.-ciom. In addition, on an applied level it is 
well known that CVlvf studies involve different types of bias13. Finally, double counting 
could be a major problem in the application of CVlvf to value informal care since informal 
caregivers are assumed to take the preferences and perhaps the health of their care 
recipient into account. 
An example of the application of the CVi\1 method to a close non-market 
substitute of informal care is a study done by Garbacz and Thayer (1983). They used an 
e::-..-perirnent in senior companion program services to value companionslllp \Vi.th the CVlvf. 
In their design, respondents were placed in a hypothetical market where the current level of 
their services was reduced with either 25 percent or 75 percent. Then, respondents were 
asked either to deter:rnine their ma.-ximum \X'TP to prevent the reduction or their minimum 
\VI' A to be compensated for the proposed reduction in serv-i.ces. Finally, these results were 
compared to the actual costs of the program to see whether or not the reduction in the 
service level could be justified on the basis of CBA. 
Conjoint analysis 
Conjoint analysis (CA) or conjoint measurement (C1v1) is a method for the analysis of 
respondents' preferences for a set of multi-attribute alternatives. It can be linked to 
Lancaster's attribute based utility theory (Lancaster, 1971). Lancaster's contribution was 
that he stressed that a commodity possesses more than one characteristic. For example, a 
meal \\•ill have both nutritional and aesthetic characteristics in different relative proportions 
for different individuals. 
Green and Srinivasan (1978, p. 104) define CA as: "a'!)' decompositiona! 171ethod that esti171ates the 
strttctllre qf a COJ7Stt171er-:r priferences (. .. ]7 given his/ her overall evalHations of a set if a!temalives that are 
prespecijied in terms of levels of different atflibettes. •• 
Different CM techniques are available, such as ranking, rating and discrete choice 
or choice experiments. Respondents are for instance asked to rate different states of the 
world, often called vignettes, to reveal their preferences. The states of the world can differ 
according to dimensions, called attributes. If one attribute is a price, it is possible to derive 
13 St:t: 11itchell :111d C:l.I:Son (1989) for an o::xtensive ovcrvio::\v of these and otho::r pr:1ctical problt:ms in assessing an 
indiv-1du.'ll's \'VTP or \\7TA. 
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implicit prices for the other attributes. Thus a value in monetary terms can be derived. One 
can also attain a utility outcome from the respondents' choices. 
Within economic evaluation CA is of gro'-ving importance for the measurement of 
care recipient's preferences, see Ryan and Farrar (2000) and Ratcliffe (2000) for overviews. 
A Dutch study (De Groot et al. 2000) used CA to investigate to what extent people Msh to 
spend more or less time on providing informal care given their own circumstances and 
what determines their choice berw-een hiring a professional caregiver and providing 
informal care. The design of this study makes a distinction berw-een providing informal care 
for a partner, parent (m-law), family, or friends and neighbours. In general, the researchers 
concluded among other things that the amount of rime available and the amount of time 
necessary to spend on informal caregiving are important predictors of an individual's 
decision to be involved in the informal caregiving process as opposed to hiring another 
caregiver. The social relation bet\Veen informal caregiver and care recipient however makes 
the trade-off subtler. The closer the social relationship, the more willing an informal 
caregiver is to provide the care himself. The less close the social relationship, the more 
important other considerations become. Providing informal care for a parent (in-law) for 
instance is more likely to be preferred when it involves more than one hour a day 
preferably one or rw-o days a week. Moreover, it is in providing informal care to a parent 
(in-law) preferred if informal caregivers get a small monetary compensation. This finding is 
contrary to the before mentioned suggestion of (Smith and Wright, 1994). 
Advantages compared to CV11 are CA's ability to elicit respondents' preferences 
for different detailed scenarios and respondents' ability to e:..-press their preferences for 
more than one scenario. CA's complexity, in other words respondents need to consider a 
number of attributes at the same time, simultaneously may be a problem. 
Double counting again can be a problem in the application of CA, as in CA the 
informal caregivers can also take the preferences of the care recipient into account. 
3.4.3 Other methods for measuring the impact of informal care 
In this section other methods to capture the impact of informal care are presented. First, 
we deal \.\lith the assessment of objective and subjective burden of informal care. Although 
these are no valuation methods from an economic point of view, much work is done in this 
area by e.g. sociologists and psychologists. Next, we discuss health-related quality of life 
measurement in the context of informal care. Finally, we discuss direct measurements of 
well-being. The central problem with these methods is that their results cannot easily be 
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incorporated in economic evaluations. Vie will discuss this issue after we have discussed 
the methods. 
Objective burden assessment 
Objective burden entails assessing the time invested in caring, the seriousness of the care 
recipients' illness, and the caring tasks performed. Problems concomitant to the 
measurement of time '\vere discussed above. Two examples to measure the time spent on 
caring for Alzheimer patients are the Caregiver Activities Time Sunrey (CATS) (Clipp and 
Moore, 1995) and the Caregiver Activity Survey (CAS) (Davis et al., 1997). Both 
instruments are developed to incorporate informal care in economic evaluations. However, 
the underlying aim was to translate the results in monetary units '\v-ith the pro::-.:y good 
method. 
The results of objective burden assessment can be used as additional information 
for the decision maker. However, normally, the focus in economic evaluation lies on 
monetary costs and health effects solely. Additional outcomes, such as the objective burden 
of informal care are hard to incorporate coherently and comparably in an economic 
evaluation. Still, due to the practical difficulties V'v-ith deriving a monetary value of informal 
care one could argue that it is better tO present an additional outcome measure in an 
economic evaluation than to neglect informal care or to attach an arbitrary monetary 
valuation to it. 
Subjective burden assessment 
There is abundant literature on the impact of providing informal care on informal 
caregivers, see for e~arnple, Kramer (1997), Hughes et al. (1999), Schulz and Beach (1999), 
Low et al. (1999), Leblanc et al. (1997), Gallagher and Mechanic (1996), and Pearlin et al. 
(1990). Often a distinction is made ben:veen the physical, emotional and social burden of 
informal caregiving. The assessment of subjective burden relates to the strain of care as 
experienced by the informal caregiver. Informal caregivers may, e.g., be asked about lack of 
support of others and disruption of their schedule. Many subjective burden instruments are 
disease-specific and focus often on the negative aspects of caring. 
Three problems related to subjective burden are mentioned here. First, the 
concept of subjective burden is lacking a theoretical foundation leading tO a lack of 
conceptual clarity (Kramer, 1997, pp. 227-228), (Gallagher and Mechanic, 1996) and 
(Hughes et al., 1999). This leads to results in differences in the elements captured in terms 
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of subjective burden and differences in the way these elements are made operational and 
measured. This makes the interpretation and comparison of the results rather troublesome. 
Second, the subjective burden assessment focuses mainly on the negative aspects of the 
caring process experienced by the informal caregivers. The positive aspects of caring are 
often neglected and if not, the rationale behind the choice of the included positive aspects 
is hardly ever indicated. Finally, existing subjective burden instruments do not value the 
subjective burden they "merely' register it on some scale. 
Given the informational richness of burden assessments, it has been suggested to 
incorporate the results of these studies in economic evaluations (Drummond et al., 1991). 
1\foreover, the results of subjective burden assessment could, like the results of objective 
burden assessment, be used as a kind of additional natural units of information in CEA. 
Howc.--ver, Drummond et aL (1991, p. 171) are sceptical since subjective burden measures 
may not be very responsive to change while in economic evaluations it is exactly a change 
or difference that needs to be registered and valued. 
The measurement of subjective burden may lead to fewer problems than the 
measurement of objective burden. To indicate the amount of time spent on canng 1s 
perhaps more difficult for informal caregivers than to express their feelings about a list of 
items on a certain measurement scale as in subjective burden. Still, the interpretation of 
objective figw:es may be more straightfo!\Vard than the interpretation of their subjective 
counterparts. 
Health-related quality of life 
It ruts been argued that the provision of informal care can lead to both mental and physical 
health problems (Hughes et al., 1999), and even to higher mortality risks (Schulz and 
Beach, 1999, p. 2215). These are indications that informal caring is an independent risk 
factor for mortality and morbidity concerning some groups of informal caregivers, e.g. 
elderly spousal caregivers (Schulz and Beach, 1999). In that sense, health-related quality of 
life measurement may be used in order to assess the impact of providing informal care on 
informal caregivers health, as the main goal of health care is to preserve or restore health 
C.C.Iohide eta!., 1988). 
How to register possible health-related quality of life changes due to informal 
caregiving is controversial. Moreover, the causality of the relation bet'\.\reen prmriding 
informal care and health-related quality of life losses remains unclear. E.g., does the strain 
of providing informal care lead to reductions in health-related quality of life or do people 
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\.Vith health problems who become informal caregivers find this more straining? This 
causality is crucial if one Uti.shes to incorporate informal caregivers' health losses in 
economic evaluations because the focus of an economic evaluation is on the health effects 
of an intervention. Moreover, some health-related quality of life reductions reported in 
informal caregivers (like depression and anxiety) may be related more to the mere incidence 
of illness in ones social environment and less 'With the prmrision of informal care. In other 
words, reductions in health-related quality of life when a child falls ill may occur regardless 
of whether or not the parents provide informal care. This kind of health-related quality of 
life reductions should not be incorporated in economic evaluations. 
Mohide et a!. (1988) developed a Caregiver Quality of Life Instrument (CQLI). 
They used Torrance's time trade-off (TTO) technique to obtain utility scores for three 
standardised caregiver situations and utility scores for the respondent's own state. The 
respondents were asked to choose bet\.'veen being in alternative states of the world for 
different periods of time. The alternative states of the world differed in five dimensions: 
t\vo social dimensions, i.e. amount of time to socialise \.Vith family and friends, and quality 
of the relationship bet\.'\Teen the caregiver and the care recipient; t\1.rO physical dimensions, 
e.g. degree of physical wellness and energy, and adequacy of amount of sleep; and one 
emotional dimension, e.g. degree of happiness and freedom from an....Uety and frustration. 
The CQLI is used to obtain utility scores from informal caregivers. The results however, 
have to be interpreted carefully to avoid double counting. It would be incorrect to add the 
utility scores of informal caregivers and care recipients simply in economic evaluations 
because their utility functions are expected to be interdependent. If the informal caregiver 
takes into account the utility of the care recipient and the care recipient does vice versa, 
adding their utility scores will lead to a misperception of the total utility. 
Disadvantages of the CQLI are its complexity and its high costs. The method is 
not easy to understand thereby limiting its application and introducing possible bias. It is an 
expensive method because it requires face-to-face interviews by trained interviewers, which 
may not be feasible in many contexts. 
Well-being 
Psychologists and sociologists have done a lot of research on the concept of well-being. A 
distinction is made bet'J.;een satisfaction \.Vith life as a whole and satisfaction \.Vith a specific 
domain. The main findings are that subjective variables explain individual satisfaction 
better than objective variables, and that domain-specific satisfaction is strongly correlated 
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v.rith well-being in terms of satisfaction v.rith life as a whole (Frijters, 1999, p.115). In 
(health) economics this research is uncommon, partly because the objections of economists 
against the measurability and comparability of well-being and partly because of the focus 
on health rather than well-being. Frijters' tries to remove the opposition from economist 
a.::,CY3lnst the measurement of well-being. 
We suggest that informal care could also be valued by registering changes in well-
being of informal caregivers. An advantage of this method is that it allows to combine 
economic and non-economic factors affecting the preferences of an individual (Ng, 1980, 
p. 64). To our knowledge, no research has been done using this concept to value informal 
care. It would be interesting to measure informal caregiver's well-being to compare it v.rith 
informal caregivers health-related quality of life or v.rith the well-being of the general 
population. Possible, differences in reported well-being could be used as alternative 
measures to the so far discussed methods. Moreover, they could be incorporated in 
economic evaluations taking a societal perspective that is broader than a health perspective. 
3.5 Some unresolved issues 
We have discussed different methods for the valuation of informal care. It proves that not 
all of those methods can be incorporated in the main types of economic evaluation. The 
main reason is that CEA, CUA and CBA require different kinds of information. 1vioreover, 
not all methods yield complete valuations of informal care. Finally, it is not always clear 
who should value informal care: the care recipient, the informal caregiver or the general 
public? In this section, we discuss these matters somewhat further. 
3.5.1 Incorporation 
The issue of incorporation is connected u,.i_th y-ielding monetary or non-monetary results. 
All three types of economic evaluation can incorporate a monetary value of informal care, 
at the cost-side of an analysis. This implies that the valuation methods that y-ield monetary 
values can be used in all three evaluation contexts; CBA, CUA and CEA. The opportUnity 
cost method, the prOAJ good method, CVIvf and CM. Sillce in CBA, all illformation on 
costs and outcomes needs to be expressed ill monetary terms, the mentioned valuation 
techniques are also the only ones that can be used in CBA. In principle, measurement of 
objective burden, subjective burden, health-related quality of life and well-being will y-ield 
non-monetary outcomes. However, it is worth noting that it is possible to translate the 
Chapter 3: Econolllit w/Jtotion rf il!fomJa! core: An ormieJJ' of f!Jethods and applications 61 
non-monetary outcomes in money outcomes. In the context of a CUA, one needs 
valuation techniques yielding preference-based or utility-based outcome measures. Utility 
based, health-related quality of life changes in informal caregivers could therefore in 
principle also be included in such an analysis. How to combine these changes with changes 
in health-related quality of life in care recipients is however unclear. Moreover, preference-
based or utility-based C:tvf or well-being measures may also considered to be suitable for 
incorporation in CUA, as they reflect preferences or utility of informal caregivers. 
1.-feaningfully combining these with quality of life changes of patients seems however 
impossible, leading such CUAs to become multi-criteria analyses. Finally, in CEA, one may 
use the four above-mentioned techniques as well as objective burden and subjective burden 
measures. The latter may be seen as a measure of the impact of informal care in 'natural 
units' to be put on a balance sheet of pros and cons. 
3.5.2 Partial or complete valuation 
Complete valuation methods focus on all aspects of informal care, while partial valuation 
methods focus only on some aspects of informal care. Especially burden measures and 
health-related quality of life measurement can be used to indicate only some aspects of 
informal care. Ideally, they should be complemented \Vith od~er valuation methods, 
avoiding double counting. CVivi and CM are normally used to create a total valuation of 
informal care. However, it often depends on the questions asked and the tasks considered 
whether such a complete valuation is reached. In CM, for instance, complete valuation 
would entail specifying all aspects of informal care in a vignette. This could be troublesome 
in practice. All the other methods do not yield a total valuation of informal care. Therefore, 
methods could be combined, like e.g. complementing the opportunity cost method \vi.th 
health-related quality of life measures. 
3.5.3 Who to ask 
Finally, who should value informal care? This is a complicated issue in the context of the 
valuation of informal care. A first response could be to use actual informal caregivers as 
source of valuation. However, this source may come up with biased or strategic answers, 
just as in health state valuations. To avoid such problems, one may measure the preferences 
of the general public as potential, acrual or former care recipients or informal caregivers. 
Just as for the valuation of health-related quality of life, the general public may be used as a 
'more objective' though less informed source of valuation therefore. 
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Besides this problem, there is also the problem of whether the producer of 
informal care or the consumer of informal care should value this non-market commodity. 
Should an additional hour of informal care be valued by the producer, e.g. the value this 
additional hour has for the informal caregiver or rather by the consumer, e.g., the value of 
the additional hour to the patient. The answer to this question is a matter of perspective 
probably (e.g. do we wish to determine the impact of informal care on the (health or 
wellbeing of the) patient or do we '\Vi.sh to determine the impact of providing informal care 
on the caregiver), but also has implications for the methods chosen in the economic 
evaluation. In the opportunity cost method for instance, the informal caregiver is central to 
the valuation of informal care. His time investment and his wage rate are used. In the case 
of the pro::-..7 good method some kind of societal replacement value is calculated on the 
basis of for instance formal caregivers wage rates. For CV1vf, CJ\If as well as well-being it is 
however more difficult to grasp who should be central to valuation. As long as the informal 
caregiver enters a caregiving situation voluntarily and given the focus on health outcomes 
in relation to costs, it appears that the valuation of informal care should be caregiver 
centred. Yet, this point and the interdependencies between preferences of caregivers and 
care recipients should receive more attention. 
3.6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Despite its contribution to the care for chronic and terminally ill patients, informal care is 
often neglected in economic evaluations of health care programs. The incorporation of 
informal care in economic evaluations is however crucial to prevent undesirable policy 
recommendations. Informal care should not be treated as "free' in economic evaluations, as 
this may lead to cost-ineffective care strategies from a societal perspective and even to 
health damage in the population at large. It is therefore crucial to incorporate the full 
impact of providing informal care on informal caregivers as well as on the patient. We have 
discussed different methods available to value and register the impact of informal 
caregiving on the informal caregiver. 
The main message of this chapter is that to preserve undesirable shifts due to new 
policies on the account of informal caregivers a full valuation method of the costs and 
effects of providillg informal care for the informal caregivers is necessary. In theory CV 
and CM are such methods. However, this has to be confirmed in practice. For instance, it 
has to be confirmed the application of CV and CM yields reliable results and that 
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respondents indeed can incorporate all aspects of informal care in their valuation of it. A 
clear advantage of both methods is that they yield monetary results and can therefore easily 
be incorporated on the cost side of all types of economic evaluations. 
As long as no valid empirical applications of CV and CM exist, the opportunity 
cost and proxy good method can be used to incorporate informal care in economic 
evaluations. Ho'\vever, both methods do not cover the full costs and effects of informal 
care. Therefore, they should be complemented '\\rith other methods like for instance health-
related quality of life measurement in informal caregiving, be it at the price of a more 
complex interpretation of the results of economic evaluations. Moreover, more empirical 
evidence is necessary to ensure that health-related quality of life methods are sensitive 
enough to measure changes in the health-related quality of life of informal caregivers due 
to the provision of informal care. It is also worth noting that a combination of for example 
the opportunity cost method and health-related quality of life measurement does also not 
necessarily cover the full impact of informal caregiving because for instance the direct 
utility of the informal caregiver is neglected. 
More research is needed and it is recommended to combine different methods in 
ongoing research in order to detect the full impact of informal caregiving as well as 
gathering more information on the performance of different methods. \'{/e should get more 
serious about valuing something valuable as informal care. 
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4 Measurement of informal care: 
An empirical study into the reliable 
measurement of time spent on informal 
caregiving 1 
'~jter dinner, he mqy find bimse(f drinking Bra;;;jlia;z coffee_, smoking a D11tch cigar, sipping a French 
cognac, reading The I\'ew York Times.. listening to a Brandmb11rg Concerto and entertaining his S;vedish 
wife- all at the same ti!l;e, with varying degrees of SJtccess. ''(Linder; 1970_. p.79) 
Summary 
Incorporation of informal care in economic ewluations rf health care ij troublesome. The debate fomses on 
the l/ahtation rf time spent on informal caregiving; JJJbt!e time measlfrement a related and mC!J be even more 
inportant isslfe, tends to be mglected. Reliable time meas11rement is a necessary condition for the valuation 
of irifhrmal care. 
In this chapter hvo methods if time measurement m"/1 be compared and eva!Nated: the diary .• the 
gold standard and the recall method., an often-applied method. The main o!jective of this comparison is to 
e;..,.plore the reliability of the measurement of time spent on providing informal care. In addition this chapter 
gives empirical evidence regarding the nJeasJJrf!IJeJlt ofjoint production and the separation behveen 'normal' 
housework and additional houmvork due to the care demands of the care recipients. Finaljy, a test-retest 
abo;d the stabi!iry of the recall method over time Jl;as peifcmmd. 
A total if 199 informal caregivers for care recipients in a heterogeneoJtS popH!ation completed the 
diary and the recall method. Corrected for joint production, informal caregivers spent a!nJost 5.8 ho11r a dcry 
on providing informal care. 
The recall method is a reliable method to meaS/Ire time spent 011 prOl/iding i;iforma! care 
compared to the gold standard, the diary: if one assumes that respondents take into accOJmt joint production 
when completing the recall q11estionnaire. OthenPise: the recall method Ol!erestin;ates the time spent on 
providing informal care. The recall method moreover proved to be Jill Stable over time. This could be d11e to 
learning ifftcts from completing a diary. 
1 B:t.Sed on Van den Berg, B., Sp:tmven, P., 2004. Measurement of informal c::tre: An empiric:tl study into the 
refuble measurement of time spent on informal crregiving. In revision He::Uth Economics. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations of health care is troublesome. The 
debate focuses on the valuation of rime spent on informal caregiving, see for instance 
Smith and Wright (1994), Posnett and Jan (1996), McDaid (2001) and chapter 3. A perhaps 
more important and related but often neglected issue is the measurement of time spent on 
providing informal care. Reliable measurement is a necessary condition for the valuation of 
informal care. This is also recognised by McDaid (2001) and in chapter 3. 
In this chapter t\vo methods of time measurement '\vill be compared and 
evaluated: the diary and the recall method. The main objective of this comparison is to 
discuss the reliability of the measurement of time spent on providing informal care. First, 
we try tO validate the recall method compared to the diary. The diary is the gold standard 
for the measurement of time use Guster and Stafford, 1991) and (Robinson, 1985). This 
validation is of importance because the diary is more time consuming for respondents than 
the recall method and therefore less useful for applied research, especially in a context 
\vhere time spent on informal caregiv'ing is just one of the many topics of a survey. \Y/e also 
present empirical evidence about the measurement of joint production, a persistent 
problem in the measurement of time in general and also in informal caregiving. A more 
specific problem in the measurement of informal care is the separation between 'normal' 
housework that somebody does anyway and additional house\vork due to the care demands 
of the care recipients. We tried to solve tllls problem by separating 'normar house\vork and 
housework due to informal caregiving in the diary. Another aim of this chapter is to 
present empirical evidence about the stability over time of the results of the recall method. 
In other words, we tested the recall method for test-retest reliability. Finally, as a spin off 
we give an indication about the amount of time informal caregivers spent on providing care 
to a heterogeneous population of care recipients. 
A sample of 199 informal caregivers providing care to a population of care 
recipients heterogeneous in terms of disease characteristics, consisting mainly people \vith a 
chronic disease, completed the diary at one and recall method at t\VO moments in time. 
This implies that we choose for within subject comparisons in our analyses. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we describe and 
discuss the developed cliary and recall method, against a backdrop of avrulable literature. 
The data are presented and described in section 4.3. Section 4.4 gives the results of the 
comparison between the diary and recall method. The results of the recall methods' test-
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retest reliability are described in section 4.5. The final section presents the discussion and 
conclusions. 
4.2 Methods 
Both the diary and recall method are written suDteys. \"'V'e introduce them in this section in 
more detail~ against the backdrop of literature about time measurement. 
4.2.1 Time measurement 
It is not easy to measure an individual's time use. There are different methods for the 
measurement of time, see Juster (1985), Gronau (1986), Juster and Stafford (1991), and 
Kooreman and \'Yunderink (1996) for overviews. The most important methods are the 
diary, considered the gold standard, and the recall method Ouster, 1985) and Ouster and 
Stafford, 1991). This gold standard is however not universally accepted; see for an 
alternative approach for instance Homan (1988. p.77). In a diary, respondents are asked to 
\vrite down all their activities during a specified period of time. The diary has an important 
disadvantage, in that it requires a lot of time and effort from the respondents. The method 
is also very costly for researchers. Therefore, measuring time 'W-1.th a diary is not feasible in 
all situations. This could well be true for the measurement of informal care time as care 
responsibilities put a heavy burden on informal caregivers. Therefore, a time-consuming 
research method like the diary might not be the appropriate choice here. A less demanding 
method like the re-call method would be preferred. 
In the recall method, respondents are asked ho'\v much time they spent on a list of 
activities during for example the previous day or '\Veek. Obviously, a major concern '\v-1.th 
this retrospective way of questioning is its reliability because of recall bias. Another concern 
is the less systematic '\vay of questioning in a recall method compared to the diary. 
Another problem in time measurement is how to measure tasks that are carried 
out simultaneously.2 Doing several activities at the same time or a period of time is called 
joint production (Kooreman and Wunderink, 1996). This is an important issue in informal 
caregiving. Thus while looking after a person 'Al'ith Alzheimer, informal caregivers may 
perform other (informal care) tasks like cleaning or '\Vatching television. Robinson (1985, 
pp.46-48) suggests that respondents correct for tbis joint production when completing a 
~ Simult:l.Ileously docs not necess:uily mean :l.t exactly at the same moment. It can also mean during the same 
period of time (for instance 15 minutes). 
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recall questionnaire. He presents some empirical evidence for this suggestion. In many 
recall methods, respondents reported time usc that add up to more than 168 hours (J times 
24) a week. It seems that especially activities that are most often performed in combination 
'\vith or as secondary to other activities, like watching television, childcare and resting, are 
responsible for this outcome. 
Joint production can be measured \.Vith a diary. In a di-ary, one can ask 
respondents to report all their activities during a certain amount of time, for instance one 
quarter of an hour. Ho'\vever, the researcher has to decide how to allocate the time betv.recn 
the reported activities performed during that period. In practice most applications of the 
diary ask respondents only about their main activities instead of all activities (Kooreman 
and Wunderink, 1996). 
Some instruments were developed to measure the time spent on informal 
caregiving, for example the CATS (Caregiver Activities Time Survey) (Clipp and Moore, 
1995), the CAS (Caregiver Acti•~ty Survey) (Davis et al., 1997), and the RUD (resource 
utilization in dementia) (\Virno et al., 2002). The mentioned instruments are examples of 
the recall method. Unfortunately, they failed to validate their recall methods by comparing 
them v.rith the diary. Their focus was on test-retest reliability or on the relation bet\Veen the 
time spent on informal caregiving and the severity of the care recipient's illness. All 
instruments were developed to measure caregiving for people in a homogeneous sample in 
terms of diseases, viz. Alzheimer or Dementia. 
4.2.2 The informal care diary 
\Ve developed an informal care diary to collect reliable information about the time informal 
caregivers spent on providing informal care during a typical 24-hour period. A 24-hours 
period '\Vas divided into 96 units of time (96 periods of 15 minutes). Three types of 
informal care tasks were distinguished: (1) support \vith activ-ities of daily living (ADL), e.g. 
personal care, (2) support '\v-ith instrumental activities of daily living (IADL), e.g. man~aing 
home adaptations, and (3) housework (HDL), e.g. cleaning the house. \Ve added some 
general categories of other potential time uses, e.g. sleeping, paid work and unpaid work. 
To get more precise information about the time spent on informal caregiving, we divided 
ADL and IADL tasks each into four sub-categories, and HDL tasks into six sub-categories. 
In the diary, the columns contained the tasks '\vhile the rows contained the units of time. 
See Appendi-x 1 for a page from the diary. 
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To account for joint production, respondents could indicate t\Vo or more 
activities for the same quarter of an hour. This was eA-plained in the introduction to the 
cliary. W/e also gave an example of joint production in the introduction to prevent 
respondents from thinking that they were allowed to put only one cross in every quarter of 
an hour. It is worth noting that as a result of the possibility of indicating t\Vo or more 
activ-i_ties per quarter of an hour, the total amount of provided informal care could add up 
to over 24-hours a day. 
We corrected for joint production \\rith equation 1: 
Co17'eded activity A = (96 q11arters /total number of activities per dq;') * activiry A (1) 
Total number of activities per day is the sum of the respondents' crosses in every 
quarter of an hour. Obviously, the minimum number of activities per day is 96 because a 
day consists of 96 quarters of an hour. 
As cliscussed before, it :is clifficult to separate 'normal' HDL tasks from informal 
care HDL tasks. \Y.fe tried to solve this problem by splitting the HDL tasks column in 
normal care tasks, prov-i_ded in the informal caregiver's O\\-TI interest and informal care HDL 
tasks, performed solely to meet the care demands of the care recipient. The latter column 
was given a blue colour to stress the clifference bet\Veen the two. This enables us first to 
compare the recall method 'Wi.th the diary 'Wi.th only the truly informal care. And second to 
compare the rec:ill method with the diary where the informal care part of housework is 
added to the 'normal' housework to find out whether or not respondents take into account 
this clifference when completing the recall questionnaire. 
To get a representative picture of the informal care provided during a week 
\vithout making too heavy demands on the respondents, we asked the informal caregivers 
to report their time use for only wo days a week. Therefore, we took nvo specific days and 
two reserve days. Moreover, we divided our sample in 21 subgroups covering al possible 
combinations of nvo days a week. We asked the informal caregivers to fill out the diary 6 
times during the day: during their breakfast, lunch, and dinner, beN.reen these meals, and 
before going to bed. Thus the diary involves a much shorter recall period compared to the 
recall method. Another advantage of the diary above the recall method is that the diary 
gives respondents a systematic overv-i_ew of their rime use during an entire day thereby 
forcing them to think systematically about their time allocation during that day. 
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4.2.3 The informal care recall method 
The informal care recall method was developed to collect information about the time 
informal caregivers spent on providing informal care during the week preceding the 
interview. \X!hen completing the recall questionnaire, the respondents were asked 
emphatically tO consider the same week as in the diary. 
The recall questionnaire focussed on the same informal care tasks as the diary. 
Respondents could choose to report their time use in minutes per day or in hours per week 
because some activities are perhaps routinely done everyday, while others are less of a 
routine. See for the exact questions Appendi"X: 2. 
The recall method questions were not presented as the central focus of the survey 
but as just a part of it. This to prevent respondents from becoming a'\vare of the research 
rum. 
4.2.4 Diary versus recall method 
\\ie 'W'ill compare the results of the diary and recall method in t\'VO stages. First, the diary 
not corrected for joint production will be compared to the recall method, in line v,.i_th 
Robinsons' (1985) argument that respondents account for joint production when they 
complete the recall method. Second, the diary corrected for joint production "vill be 
compared to the recall method. This, because the objective of the measurement of informal 
care is the valuation of informal care to incorporate it in economic evaluations. It is 
therefore important to correct for joint production for one \.Vishes to attach a monetary 
value to time spent on informal caregiv-1ng and providing informal care is combined with 
other activities, one could argue that it is not correct to attach the full monetary· value. 
Instead of attaching part of the full monetary value, one could better measure the time 
spent on providing informal care corrected for joint production. \Ve 'W-ill test whether or 
not the recall method is successful in this respect. 
Again, the diary is seen as the gold standard in both cases. Possible differences 
bet'\veen the diary and recall method will be tested for with at-test (Rice, 1995). 
4.2.5 Alternative approach 
Homan (1988, p.77) suggests a complete different approach. He argues that it is better to 
measure time in an aggregated way ins read of the disaggregated ways we discussed before. 
In other '\vords, he proposes to use just one question about the aggregated time spend on a 
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certain task, instead of many different questions because the latter approach involves the 
danger of double counting. According to Homan, another advantage of this approach is 
that it leaves the classification of the activities performed at home up to the respondents. 
In case of providing informal care some respondents could indicate some tasks as informal 
care, while other respondents do not consider the same tasks as informal care. We also test 
Homan's approach as an alternative in this chapter. In the survey we therefore asked the 
follov.ing question: 
'Hmv m11ch time did yolf spend on ho;tsm;ork d;m.ng the last ;veek?'-" 
\YJe focussed on housework instead of informal care to prevent that respondents became 
aware of our research aim. We will test for possible differences bet\Veen this question and 
the results of the diary and recall method. 
4.2.6 Test-retest reliability 
\Y/e also tested for consistency of the recall method over time. Five months before this 
study, the respondents completed the same recall method as part of another study. This 
makes it possible to test the recall method for test-retest reliability. For the recall method to 
be a reliable method to measure informal care rime compared to the diary, a second 
condition for its application is stability over time. Moreover, critique on a within sample 
comparison could be that completing a recall method a few days after completing a diary 
would involve learning effects for respondents. Therefore, a test-retest of the recall 
method's reliability over time could provide useful additional information. 
To test the recall method for stability over time, we also asked 1n our survey 
whether in the opinion of the informal caregivers, the health status of the care recipients 
had changed compared to the previous study. It is obvious that there is a strong relation 
beN.Teen the amount of informal care provided and the care demands relative to the health 
status of the care recipient. The question about a probable change of the care recipit:nts' 
health status, enables us to compare possible differences bet\veen informal careglVers 
indicating that the health status of the care recipient had remained the same over orne 
versus caregivers indicating that the health status of the care recipient had improved or 
deteriorated. Again, possible difference will be tested for with at-test (Rice, 1995). 
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4.2.7 Background variables 
To get a better and broader picture of the informal care siruation, we also measured health-
related quality of life of informal caregivers with the EQ-SD and the EQ VAS (Essink-Bot 
et aL 1993) as pan of the same survey as the informal care recall method. We also 
measured informal caregivers' subjective burden ""i.th a visual analogue scale 0/AS) ranging 
from 0 ("not heavy at all") to 100 ("much too heavy"). Finally, we asked the informal 
caregivers some general background questions. 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Data collection 
The data were collected in April 2002. To make sure that our research would enable a 
comparison between the diary and recall method instead of just being an exercise in 
informal caregivers~ mathematical skills, we tried to prevent that the information in the 
recall method was directly derived from the diary. Therefore, after an information letter, we 
flrst sent the diary with the specified dates. Then '\VC sent them the suDTey including the 
recall method. The diary had to be returned before the survey was filled out. This '\vas 
stressed in the first question of the suDTey. If the diary was not returned before respondents 
returned the survey, both were excluded from the analysis. As pointed out before, the recall 
method in the su.nrey covered the same week as the diary. 
4.3.2 Study population 
Our study population consists of informal caregivers who had participated in an earlier 
study, that is benveen October rill December 2001, hereafter referred to as the December 
population. In this study, they had been asked whether they were willing to participate in a 
future research. Of the 568 informal caregivers who had indicated that they would be 
v.rilling, 301 caregivers (53 percent) returned the diary and the survey. We lost some of 
them due to the quality of their response. Thus respondents who failed to indicate their 
rime use during one or more quarters of an hour, were excluded. We also lost respondents 
because they did not return their diary and survey separately and thus circumvented our 
prevention measure as discussed above. In all, we ended up \.Vith 199 completed diaries and 
surveys. 
We also sent a letter to ask the non-responders about their motivation not to 
respond. Important arguments include the diary is too difficult (11% of the entire 
population of 568), no time (5%), forgotten (6%), we '\vere too late to respond on time due 
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to the pre-specified dates (1 %), the care recipient died bet\veen the first and this second 
study (6%) or the informal caregiver was ill (3%). Posing that the diary is too difficult 
indicates a feasibility problem of the method. 
4.3.3 Characteristics of the respondents 
Table 4.1 gives the descriptive statistics of the study sample. 
Table 4.1: Background characteristics of informal caregivers (n=l99) 
Sex1 70.6 
Agd'- 57.1 
Educ:tcion3 
IJ;, 50.9 
kledi11m 24.1 
Higb 25.2 
Income in ew:o3 
Lns than S4S 19.9 
545-725 15.3 
725-900 8.5 
900-1135 13.6 
1135-1600 13.6 
1600-2275 16.5 
2275-3000 9.1 
More tban 3000 3.4 
EQ-SD' 0.77 
EQVAS2 70.27 
Subjective burden VAS: 54.30 
1 Pt:rccnlagc Jcma!t:s 
::Mean 
J Percentages 
The majority of informal caregivers are female '\vith a mean age of 57.1 years 
(minimum of 21.0 and ma....Qmum of 83.0). This suggests that our population is quite 
comparable '\vith other samples of informal caregivers. Moreover, their reported subjective 
burden is not that high. Some informal caregivers report very low EQ-SD scores; 5.6 
percent a score below 0.3. 
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4.4 Results diary versus recall method 
The results of the comparisons of the diary and recall method are presented in this section. 
First, the uncorrected diary and the recall method are compared. "Uncorrected' means not 
corrected for joint production. Thls implies that informal caregivers could indicate that 
they spent over 24 hours a day on providing informal care. Then we compare the results of 
the corrected diary with the recall method. In both comparisons only the real informal care 
part of housework is included. Then we discuss a comparison beroreen the diary including 
'normal' housework and the recall method. To test whether or not respondents take this 
difference into account when completing the recall method. Finally, we present the results 
of the comparison bet\Veen the aggregated question of time spent on housework with the 
diary and recall method. 
4.4.1 Uncorrected diary versus recall method 
Table 4.2 gives the results of the uncorrected diary and the recall method. Column 4 gives 
their mean difference, and column 5 the statistically significance of tllls difference. 
Table 4.2: Diary versus recall method (n=199) 
Diary Recall Difference Correction Difference 
Diary 
minutes a minutes a Recall p, > minutes a Recall Pr> [tJ 
day day -Diary (t] day Joint 
Prod. 
HDL 
Prepar:u:ion of 59.17 61.92 2.75 0.6067 39.63 22.29 0.0000 
food ::tnd 
drink; 
Cleaning th(: 59.36 4<.08 -15.28 0.0034 18.30 25.78 0.0000 
hom:<:: 
Washing, 16.13 24.24 8.11 0.0007 11.21 13.03 0.0000 
ironing and 
sewing 
Taking CJ.n: of 18.20 19.76 1.56 0.8262 10.01 9.75 0.0775 
::tnd phying 
with your 
children 
Shopping 24.57 31.91 7.33 0.0507 17.88 14.03 0.0001 
CMtilllrtd on th1· !leX/ page 
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Diary Recall Difference Correction Difference 
Diary 
minutes a minutes Recall Pr > {t] minutes a Recall Pr> [t] 
day a day -Diary day Joint 
Prod. 
M:Unterunce 8.63 25.34 16.il 0.0000 5.87 19.~ 0.0000 
work.. odd jobs. 
gardening 
HDLTot:li 186.07 207.25 21.18 0.1833 102.90 104.34 <.0001 
ADL 
Personal care 87.59 47.97 -39.62 0.0042 65.58 -17.61 0.1874 
Mov-ing around 28.61 6.82 -21.79 0.0000 19.11 -12.29 0.0005 
in the house 
Moving or 21.82 18.67 -3.15 0.4976 15.12 3.56 0.4068 
travelling 
outside 
Eating and 66.97 10.60 -56.37 0.0000 44.98 -34.38 0.0000 
drinking 
ADL Toul 204.99 84.06 -120.93 <.0001 144.78 -60.72 <.0001 
IADL 
:\Liling trips 32.98 20.64 -12.34 0.0186 23.54 -2.90 0.5194 
and visiting 
f:unily 
He:tlth c::tre 11.27 0.00 -11.27 0.0000 8.62 -8.62 0.0000 
contacts 
Organising 20.46 60.27 39.81 0.4075 14.53 45.75 0.3409 
help. house 
:J.dapmcions 
Soci.'ll 90.60 118.69 28.08 0.1017 54.54 64.15 0.0001 
assistance 
IADLTot:tl 155.31 199.60 44.28 0.3866 101.23 98.37 0.0520 
Total 546.37 490.90 -55.47 0.3376 348.91 141.9888 0.0134 
We found a difference of almost an hour per day in the total time reported to 
have been spent on informal care between both methods, 'W--ith the recall method resulting 
in an hour per day less than the diary. This difference is, however, limited in relative terms, 
only 10 percent. The difference is also not statistically significant. This suggests that on an 
aggregated level it is possible to measure informal care '\vith the recall method in a reliable 
way. On the indivi_dual and subgroup level there are also some differences. For HDL en 
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IADL the recall method reports higher results than the diary. But on the individual tasks 
level the diary sometimes scores higher. Although some differences are statistically 
significant, the subgroup totals are not statistically significant. ADL tasks show the 
opposite pattern. The diary scores are all higher compared to the recall method and the 
subgroup total is statistically significant. 
Table 4.2 presents the average results of the whole sample. It is worth noting that 
not all tasks are performed by all informal caregivers. Some tasks are performed by more 
informal caregivers than other tasks. For instance, only 11 percent of the respondents help 
the care recipient to move around the house. We also checked for differences benveen the 
first and the second day of the diary and we found no statistically significant difference. So 
it seems likely that as the diary project continues, the respondents do not seem to alter their 
answers, after their experience 'Nith the first day of the diary. Another shade is the 
difference bet\veen a diary on a weekday and a diary filled on a \Veekend day. There were 
nvo statistically significant differences in behaviour bet\veen week and weekend days. The 
respondents spent more time on aid in visiting and excursion in the weekends (35.1 versus 
15.0 minutes a day) and they spent no time at all on escorting their care recipients on 
medical '~sits during the weekend (p = 0.0053 and p < .0001 respectively). The first 
difference seems to be fact of life and the second one is even more obvious, because one 
would not expect to v-i_sit a doctor or physician in the weekends unless it is an emergency. 
4.4.2 Corrected diary versus recall method 
We also present the results of the diary corrected for joint production in table 4.2, column 
si'X. Column seven presents the mean difference benveen the corrected diary and recall 
method, while column eight gives the results of the t-test for this difference. 
A comparison bet\\i'een the corrected diary with the recall method shows a 
completely different picture. The differences in case of HDL tasks become larger, while 
they become smaller in case of ADL tasks. IADL tasks show a mi'Xed pattern. The t\\i'O 
tasks that are more easily combined 'With other tasks, social assistance and aid in organising 
and administration show even larger differences. Tasks that are less easily combined \V-i_th 
others, like aid in visiting and excursion and aid contacting health care show smaller 
differences. Moreover, the recall method overestimates the provision of informal care 
compared with the corrected diary \v-i_th more than t'W"O hours per day. Thls difference is 
especially due to the HDL and IADL tasks. 
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Finally, the total difference is statistically significant which suggests that the 
measurement of informal care \\lith the recall method compared v.rith the corrected diary 
overestimates the time spent on caregiving. 
4.4.3 Informal care and housework together 
Respondents may have difficulties in distil\,ouishing between 'normal' HDL and informal 
care when they complete the recall method. This could be an explanation for the 
overestimation of HDL \Vi.th the recall method in table 4.2. In the diary, informal caregivers 
indicate that they spent 458.56 minutes per day on 'normal' HDL. Corrected for joint 
production, they spent 298.69 minutes a day on 'normal' HDL. If we add the for joint 
production corrected 'normal' HDL to the informal care HDL, '\ve get a time use of 505.93 
minutes per day. This is over twice as high as the 207.25 minutes in the recall method. The 
difference is also statistically significant (p < .0001). It is therefore not likely that 
respondents are not able to make a distinction beN·een 'normal' HDL and informal care 
when they complete a recall method. 
4.4.4 One question HDL 
Informal caregivers report that they spent 169.24 minutes per day on HDL. This is much 
lower than the 458.56 minutes per day in the diary (p < .0001) and the 298.69 for joint 
production corrected minutes per day in the diary (p :::: 0.0485). Because of the statistically 
differences, we can conclude that asking just one aggregated question about an indivi.dual's 
time use leads to an underestimation. 
4.5 Results test-retest reliability 
This section presents the results of the test-retest reliability of the recall method. First we 
compare the results of all respondents. Subsequendy, we compare the results of 
respondents who indicated that the health status of their care recipient was comparable at 
the tv.ro measurement moments. 
4.5.1 Test-retest for all respondents 
Of the 199 respondents, 150 completed the recall method at both moments in time. We 
analysed only their results. 
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Table 4.3: Test-retest recall method (n=ISO) 
Difference 
December April December Pr > [t] 
April 
HDL 
Pn:par.tcion of food and drinks 35.72 62.08 -26.36 <,0001 
Cleaning the house 23.04 45.32 -22.28 <,0001 
Washing. ironing :tnd Sc\vi.ng 9.59 25.50 -15.91 <,0001 
Taking care of and pbying '\v-ith your children 8.25 21.42 -13.18 0.0623 
Shopping 16.74 35.38 -18.64 0.0002 
M:llnten.mce \vork. odd jobs. gardening 6."l 27.56 -21.09 <,0001 
HDLTot:Il 99.82 217.27 -117.45 <,0001 
ADL 
Pcrson:U care 17.98 37.43 -19.45 <,0001 
Moving around in the house or going tO the toilet 6.44 15.39 -8.94 0.4619 
Nfoving or rnvclling outside the house 4.65 3.39 1.27 0.4862 
E:1.ting and drinking 14.28 10.45 3.84 0.1754 
ADL Total 43.36 66.65 -23.29 0.0939 
V!DL 
:Yb.kmg trips and visiting Eunily or friends 10.75 19.86 -9.11 0.0837 
Health care contacts 5.86 21.86 -16.00 0.0002 
Organising help. aids, house adaptations or raking 4.23 0.00 4.23 0.0119 
care of financial matters like insurance 
Soci:U assisranct: 3.99 75.96 -71.97 0.2590 
IADL Total 24.83 117.69 -92.85 0.1494 
Tot:J 168.01 401.61 -233.60 0.0010 
Table 4.3 shows that informal caregivers report that they spent almost three hours 
a day more on providing informal care in April compared to December. Especially HDL 
tasks contribute to this difference. For ADL and IADL tasks the differences are also in 
favour of the April study, but these differences are smaller and not statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. 
78 I'!fom:al care: an cconon:ic approach 
4.5.2 Test-retest for respondents caring for care recipients 
with a stable health status 
From the 150 respondents analysed above, 70 respondents care for care recipients \\-"".ith a 
stable health status. It is, therefore, likely that the weekly amount of care they provided is 
comparable at the t\vo moments they completed the recall method3. 
Table 4.4: Test-retest recall method for care recipients with a stable health status (n=70) 
Diffc:rence 
December April December Pr> [t] 
April 
HDL 
Preparation of food and drinks 40.99 53.78 -12.79 0.0705 
Clt::uUng the house 18.21 40.33 -22.12 0.0003 
Washing, ironing :1nd S<='-\'ing 7.59 20.39 -12.79 0.0001 
Taking care of and pL'rying with your children 9.99 25.21 -15.23 0.0712 
Shopping 14.96 26.11 -11.16 0.0073 
Maintt:mnce work. odd jobs, gard<.:ning 5.04 21.07 -16.04 <,0001 
HDL Total 96.i7 186.90 -90.13 <.0001 
ADL 
Personal crrc 18.36 34.58 -16.22 0.0013 
Moving around in tht.: houst.: or going tO tht.: 7.78 2.20 5.57 0.0044 
toilt.:t 
Moving or travdling outsidt.: the hou.st.: 6.14 4.38 1.77 0.6155 
Eating :md drinking 20.43 9.18 11.24 0.0193 
ADL Total 52.71 50.34 2.36 0.7980 
IADL 
:tvb.king trips :md v-i..;icing f~y or friends 11.13 22.99 -11.86 0.2326 
He:J.l.th care cont:l.crs 4.67 19.69 -15.02 <.0001 
Organising hdp, aids, house adapt:l.rions oc 3.07 0.00 3.07 0.0008 
t.."lki.ng cart.: of financial matters like insuranct.: 
Soci.'ll assistance 2.88 9.18 -6.31 0.0035 
Ii\DL Total 21.75 51.86 -30.11 0.0051 
Tout 171.23 289.10 -117.87 <,0001 
Table 4.4 shows the same pattern as table 3. However, the differences are much 
smaller although still statistically significant in case of HDL tasks and the total time spent. 
} Thert.: can of course be many other circumstances that changed in the mean time. They include the care rt.:cipient 
gets no'\v more or less othcr inform::t.l care or more or less prof.:ssion:li Clie. 
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These results suggest that the recall method is not stable over time. In April 
informal caregivers spent much more time on providing informal care compared to 
December. An e::..."Planation for this difference could be that respondents learned from 
completing the diary and therefore indicated that they spent much more time on providing 
informal care after completing the diary. Empirical evidence for this learning effect is that 
much less respondents failed to complete the recall method in December compared to 
April (47 versus nvo respectively). This idea is supported by the fact that in particular HDL 
tasks contribute to the differences. If we are concerned 'W'ith learning effects, then we have 
to be more careful in interpreting comparisons bet\Veen the diary and recall method. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Incorporation of informal care in economic evaluation of health care is troublesome. 
Although reliable measurement is a necessary condition for a reliable valuation of info:r:mal 
care, the debate focuses hltherto mainly on the valuation of informal care and tends to 
ignore the interrelated issue of the measurement of time spent on providing informal care. 
This chapter tries to fill this gap. 
We compared and evaluated t\Vo main methods of measuring time spent on 
providing informal care: the diary and the recall method. The main objective was to explore 
the reliability of the measurement of time. We therefore compared the recall method with 
the diary, the gold standard for the measurement of time use. 
A total of 199 informal caregivers for care recipients m a heterogeneous 
population completed a diary and recall method. The recall method is a reliable method to 
measure time spent on providing informal care compared to the diary, the gold standard, if 
one assumes that respondents take into account joint production when they complete the 
recall method. Othenvise, the recall method overestimates the time spent on providing 
informal care. This is a serious problem if one wishes to incorporate informal care in 
economic evaluations. 
In the context of informal caregiving the separation bet\Veen 'normal' housework 
and additional housework due to the care demands of the care recipients is often neglected 
and asks specific attention. It is likely that respondents are not able to separate betv.reen 
normal HDL and informal care when they complete the recall method. \Ve did not find any 
evidence that this distinction is not clear to respondents when they complete the diary. 
The gold standard for time measurement is not universally accepted. An 
alternative approach is to use just one aggregated question to measure time spent on a 
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certain category of tasks. We tested for this approach. It seems to result in an 
underestimation of time use. 
Finally, we did a test-retest about the stability of the recall method over time. The 
recall method proves to be unstable over time. This could be due to learning effects from 
completing the diary. One has to be cautious in attaching significance to results of studies 
applying the recall method. 
A weakness of this study is that there seems to be a feasibility problem Vlith the 
diary. More than a tenth of the sample indicated not to participate in our research because 
they found the diary too difficult to complete. Another weakness is the correction for joint 
production. Thls correction is an arbitrary choice of the researcher, but perhaps could 
future qualitative research prmride more idea's to deal Vlith this problem. 
The application of the recall method to incorporate informal care in economic 
evaluations seems to involve an overestimation of the total amount of informal care 
provided. Future research Vlith other designs like betw"een subject comparisons could 
provide more evidence about the reliability of the recall method. Another promising area 
for future research is the optimal amount of task a diary and recall method should contain 
in order to get the most reliable outcomes. 
Probably the recall questionnaire is a reliable method to measure informal care if 
one informal caregivers flrst exercise Vlith a diary. 
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Appendix 2: the recall questionnaire 
We u;ou!d like to know how much time you spend on giving irifbrma! care to your care recipient. Please, 
consider the Past 1JJeek! 
1: Did you last week spend time on the activities below in your care recipients' house? 
Minutes Hours 
perdqy per week 
a. Preparation of food and drinks? 
b. Cleaning the house? 
c. Washing, ironing and sewing? 
d. Taking care of and playing with your chlldren? 
e. Shopping? 
f. Maintenance wor~ odd jobs, gardening? 
2: Did you last week spend time on assisting your care recipient '\Vi.th the activities below? 
Minutes Hours 
perdqy per week 
a. Personal care (dressing/undressing, washing, I~ c:=J or c:=J 
combing, shaving)? 
b. Moving around in the house or going to the toilet? I~ c:=J or c:=J 
c. Eating and drinking? I~ c:=J or c:=J 
d. Moving or travelling outside the house I~ c:=J or c:=J 
(aid with walking or wheelchair)? 
e. Millilllg trips and visiting family or friends? I~ c:=J or c:=J 
f. Health care contacts (like "Visiting a doctor)? I~ c:=J or c:=J 
g. Organising help, aids, house adaptations or I~ c:=J or c:=J 
taking care of financial matters like insurance? 
h. Social assistance? I~ c:=J or c:=J 
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5 Economic valuation of informal care: 
Lessons from the application of the 
opportunity cost and proxy good 
methods1 
Summary 
This chapter reports the results of an application of the opporttmiry cost method and the pro::g good method 
to determine a monetary value if informal care. We dndoped a StlrlN!J in JJJhich we asked informal 
caregit·ers to indicate the different rypes if time forgone (paid ;vork, unpaid ;:;;ork and leisure) in order to be 
able to provide infomml care. i\1oreover, 1Ve asked informal caregi?)ers how much time thry spent on a list of 
sL-..'i:een iJiforma/ care tasks during the week bifore the inteniew. 
Data were obtained from s11rvrys in two different populations: informal caregiZJers and their care 
recipients with stroke (CVA) and uith rheumatoid arthritis (R4). A total of 255 care recipients with 
CVA and theirprin;ary informal caregivers toffpieted a surory as JJJe/1 as 153 informal caregivers and 149 
of their care recipients JPith R4. 
The !lJea.strrement of informal care according to both methods is more problematic compared to the 
Z/alttation. ThiS i.s e.speciaJ!y the case for the opporttmi!J cost method and for the bott.sework part in the 
pro:;.y' good method. ~More precise gttide!ines are necessary for tbe operationa!isation of both methods in order 
to ensttre comparability of results and of economic evaluations of health care. 
5.1 Introduction 
Informal care plays a substantial role in the total care prov-i.ded, especially in case of care for 
people with chronic diseases and the terminally ill (Norton, 2000). Because informal 
caregivers sacrifice (amongst other resources) time to provide informal care, informal care 
should be incorporated in an economic evaluation taking a societal perspective (Luce et al., 
1996) and (Drummond eta!., 1997). Despite the recommendation to include informal care 
in economic evaluations, in practice informal care is often neglected in economic 
evaluations (Stone et al., 2000). It is quite common to consider informal care as a cost in an 
1 Based on Van den Berg. B .• Brouwcr. \V.B.F .• Van Exel, J.A.J .. Koopmanschap, M.A .• VM den Bos, G.A.rvL 
Rutten, F.F.H .• 2004. Economic v:1hution of informal care: Lessons from the application of the opportunity cost 
Md pro::-..-y good methods. In revision Social Science and Medicine. 
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economic ev-illuation and it is therefore suggested to incorporate the changes in use of 
informal caregiver time as direct non-health care costs into the numerator of the cost-
effectiveness ratio (Luce eta!., 1996, p.177)2. This implies that informal caregiver's time 
should be valued in monetary terms. It is often recommended to use either the opportunity 
cost method or the pro::-.:y good method3 to value the time investment in informal care 
(Posnett and Jan, 1996), (Luce eta!., 1996) and (Drummond eta!., 1997). Both methods 
have their strengths and weaknesses (McDaid, 2001) and chapter 3, and the opportunity 
cost method is preferred from a theoretical point of view (Posnett and Jan, 1996). 
Although alternative monetary valuation methods like the contingent valuation, 
conjoint measurement and well-being valuation methods are proposed, discussed and 
applied to value informal care by Van den Berget a!. (2004) and in the chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 
and 10, still the opportunity cost method and pro::-..-y good method are most commonly 
advocated and used. Probably an important reason for recommendations to use either one 
of these methods is their relatively straightforward application. In economic evaluations, 
where the focus is on the care recipients rather than on informal caregivers, this may be 
considered an advantage. 
That informal care in practice is often neglected in economic evaluations where 
informal care is an important input may have to do \.'Vl.th different reasons. They include (1) 
informal care is simply overlooked. (2) It is not overlooked but disregarded. (3) Many 
health technology assessment guidelines recommend conducting economic evaluations 
from more narrow perspectives than the societal perspective. Or ( 4) informal care is 
considered relevant but researchers may have difficulties \.'Vl.th measuring or valuing 
informal care because guidelines and handbooks are quite short about these issues and 
recommended valuation methods are less straightforward to apply than they appear to be at 
first sight. 
In terms of measurement of informal care as an input in health care, some 
important problems e.x.ist. One problem is the difficulty in measuring time forgone in order 
to provide informal care. Especially when proving informal care started many years ago, as 
is often the case in chronic diseases, the normal activities forgone are difficult to indicate 
for caregivers. Another problem concerns the distinction between "normal" housework 
and additional housework due to the health problems of the care recipient. If this 
distinction is not properly made it is easy to overestimate the time spent on informal care. 
~ This is not problematic =less informal care is the focus of the intervention under study in case of, for instance 
..respite care programs for informal caregivers. See, e.g., Mohide et a.l. (1988) or Drummond et a1. (1991). 
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Regarding the valuation of informal care, it may be difficult to find appropriate opportunity 
cost estimates for all different time uses and groups of caregivers. Moreover, in using the 
pro::-..y good method, problems may arise in finding appropriate v.rage rates of professional 
substitutes who might perform the care activities if no informal caregiver would be 
available. 
In this chapter we discuss the application of the opportunity cost method and 
pro::-..y good method in t\Vo caregiver populations - informal caregivers of care recipients 
with stroke (CV A) and caregivers of care recipients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Our 
aim is to indicate the costs of informal care in these two populations using both the 
opportunity costs and pro::-..y good methods. Moreover, we wish to detect the major 
problems in using these often recommended methods. Application of these two methods 
in such distinct populations is useful in tllil.t context. CV A is an acute condition with a clear 
starting point, while R.A.. is a slowly progressive chronic disease without a clear starting 
point. A starting point is important for the measurement of time forgone and time spent 
on informal care and has therefore important implications for the application of the 
opportunity cost method and pro::-..y good method. \YJ e also propose solutions for the 
problems in measuring time forgone when a clear starting point is lacking and for the 
distinction between "normal" housework and informal care. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we will discuss the opportunity 
cost and pro::-..y good methods and the developed measurement instruments. Then, the data 
and results from the application of both methods in the two populations \.Vill be presented. 
Finally, some lessons will be drawn from the application of these methods in the two 
populations and we v..ill compare our results with other studies. 
5.2 2. Opportunity cost and proxy good method 
In this section,. we present and discuss the opportunity cost and pro::-..y good methods from 
a theoretical point of view. Moreover, some major issues in the measurement of time spent 
on informal caregiving are discussed, related to the measurement of time forgone (for the 
application of the opportunity cost method) and correct measurement of effective time 
spent on informal care (for the application of the pro~-y good method). 
3 The proxy good method is also called r<.--placement cost method. 
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5.2.1 Opportunity cost method 
Often,. the opportunity cost method values informal care according to equation 1: 
Value informal care = lj w_, (1) 
where t; = rime spent on informal care tasks by informal caregiver i, and W; = the net 
market wage rate of informal caregiver i. If the informal caregiver is unemployed some 
pro::-.y for w; is used. One could for example use a modified opporrunity cost method to 
find out the reservation wage rate of the informal caregiver. This is the wage rate for what 
an individual is '\V-illing to supply at least one hour on the labour market (Kooreman and 
Wunderink, 1996, p.113). Another solution is the imputation of the actual wage of similar 
individuals (for example 'With the same gender, education and age). 
It is worth noting that in equation (1) all time investment is valued with the same 
wage rate. In this approach the value of leisure and unpaid work is supposed to equal the 
(would be) wage rate. If one rejects this assumption because the time spent on informal 
care is often not just at the cost of paid work but also at the costs of unpaid work and 
leisure, it would be better to value informal care Mth equation 2: 
Value informal care = n.: JJJ; + h.: s1 + I; t;, (2) 
where n; =informal caregiver ls hours of forgone paid work (J)J;), h, = informal caregiver ls 
hours of forgone unpaid work, s,, = shado\v price of unpaid work, li = informal caregiver ls 
hours of forgone leisure, and t1 = shadow price of leisure. In using the opportunity cost 
method according to equation 2, the amount and sources of time forgone should be 
measured. In addition, shadow prices for unpaid work and leisure need to be determined, 
which poses another challenge. Often, these shadow prices are based on a(n arbitrarily 
adjusted) wage rate, which makes the distinction bet\Veen equation 1 and 2 rather cosmetic. 
To measure time forgone in order to be able to provide informal care, one would 
ideally use a panel data structure, comparing the normal time allocation of caregiver A to 
A's time allocation when engaged in informal care, all other things equal. In practice, such 
measurement is often not feasible and therefore sub-optimal solutions are necessary. These 
may involve asking respondents how their time allocation has changed since engaging in 
informal care or comparing their time allocation to that of a comparable sample from the 
general public. 
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5.2.2 Proxy good method 
An alternative for the opportunity cost method is the pro::-..y good method. The pro::-..)r good 
method, also called market cost method or replacement cost method, values time spent on 
informal care at the Oabour) market prices of a close market substitute. Tbis approach 
requires the availa.bility of a market substitute for the non-market good, which is assumed 
to be almost perfect. The time spent on informal care is valued at the wage rate or market 
price of a market substitute, which can differ for different tasks: e.g. housework is valued at 
the market wage of a professional house worker and personal care is valued at the market 
wage of a professional nurse.4 
The measurement of time spent on informal care instead of the time forgone in 
order to be able to provide informal care is the cornerstone of the application of the proA-y 
good method. One can measure the time spent on informal care in different ways. Two 
important methods of collecting time budget data are the diary method and the recall 
method. The diary method is normally seen as the gold standard Guster and Stafford, 1991, 
p.473). This method is however time consuming for respondents and cosdy for 
researchers. Therefore in practice the recall method is often applied. Respondents is asked 
to indicate retrospectively how much time they spent on different care tasks during a 
certain time period. In order to be able to compare the results between different 
populations and different studies it is important to standardize the concept informal care, 
e.g. due to the development of a standard list of informal tasks. This also helps to assist the 
researcher to ensure that all relevant aspects of informal care are included. 
An alternative to these specific questions is to ask informal caregivers more 
general how many hours a week they normally spend on informal care. The drawback of 
this approach is that different respondents perhaps may use different definitions of 
informal care. 
fvioreover if one defines only additional housework as part of informal caregivi.ng, 
as would be reasonable, it is for the proxy good method important to distinguish "normal" 
housework from additional housework due to informal caregiving. This is especially 
troublesome if the informal caregiver and care recipient share the same household or if 
informal care has been provided for several years already (as for instance is the case with 
the slowly progressing RA). 
Chapte-r 5: Economic t"al1fation rf injom1al con:: Lessons from the application rf the opportunity cost and pro>.y good methods 89 
5.3 Applying the methods in two populations 
In this section, we describe the use of both the opportunity cost method and the prm .. 'Y 
good method ID two popuhtions of informal caregivers: one caring for care recipients after 
a stroke (CVA) and the other caring for care recipients with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA). 
These populations were approached as part of larger srudies: an evaluation of stroke units 
for care recipients "'With CV A and a study on health and health care utilisation among care 
recipients with RA. Some of the information gathered in the two studies was therefore not 
fully symmetrical, but this mainly pertains to additional information. The structure of this 
section is as follows. First, we describe the t\Vo populations of informal caregivers. Then, 
we discuss how we operationalised the nvo methods in this studies. Fillally, we present the 
results from the application of the t\VO methods in both populations. 
5.3.1 Populations 
Informal care for care recipients with CVA 
The CV A data were collected as a supplement to the EDISSE study (Huijsman et al., 
2001). This study evaluated three stroke service experiments in The Netherlands. Care 
recipients with CV A were included at hospital admission and followed for a period of si..x 
months. Data on admission in hospitals, nursing homes and rehabilitation centres was 
collected through medical records. Home care utilisation was measured by care recipient 
(or pro),.7) oral interviews. Care recipients were asked whether or not they received 
informal care. If they received informal care, we asked them to indicate their significant 
informal caregiver. Then, the informal caregiver was asked to fill in a written survey. If the 
primary informal caregiver was not present, the interviewer left a survey behind, so the 
informal caregiver could return it by mail. 
A total of 597 CVA care recipients were included in the EDISSE study. 181 care 
recipients died in the period up to 6 months after stroke. 336 of the care recipients went 
back home \Vithin si.-x months after CV A. A total of 255 informal caregivers completed the 
survey. Descriptive statistics of the informal caregivers and their care recipients are 
presented in table 5.1. Table 5.1 shows both the descriptive information for all caregivers 
as well as for partners versus other caregivers. Tills distinction is important because 
partners can differ from other carers in several respects due the fact that they often share 
~One can debate whether this should be the gross wage (the real opportunity costs to society) or the m:t wage (the 
v..-age rate for which the professional is willing tO sacrifice leisure). 
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the same household with the care recipient. The latter makes the ilisrincrion be~een 
housework and informal care more complicated. 
Table 5.1: Characteristics informal caregivers and their care recipients 
Characteristics CVA total CVApanner CVAother RA total RApanner RAother 
Informal caregivers 
Age1 60.2 65.8 53.2 62.1 63.1 49.9 
FemaleZ 63.4 64.9 61.6 24.7 18.3 92.3 
Partner' 54.5 100 0 91.5 100 0 
Ed!lcation'2 
Primary school 14.2 19.1 8.3 13.4 13.2 15.4 
Lower vocational 44.6 52.7 34.9 45.6 42.6 53.8 
Medium vocational 25.8 17.6 35.8 25.6 24.3 23.1 
Higher vocational 11.7 9.2 14.7 9.4 9.6 7.7 
University 3.8 1.5 6.4 4.0 4.4 0 
Duration of carel n/a n/a n/a 11.4 8.6 10.7 
Occupatio,P..} 
Housework 24.1 34.4 12.7 17.7 16.4 30.8 
Disability 22.4 33.6 10.0 56.9 53.6 15.4 
pension/retired 
Paid job 41.8 20.5 65.5 35.9 32.9 69.2 
Other 11.6 11.5 11.8 4.6 10.7 15.4 
Monthly income1• 4 1,487.43 1,544.98 1,423.93 1,503.42 1,503.42 Unkno\vn 
Care redpients 
Age' 72.3 68.4 77.1 62.1 62.5 56.8 
FerrnlC: 57.3 40.6 78.2 83.9 84.7 75.0 
Ed!lcotio~ 
Primary school 19.6 19.9 16.7 
Lower vocational 48.6 50.0 33.3 
Medium vocational 14.2 13.2 25.0 
Higher vocational 6.1 5.9 8.3 
University 3.4 2.9 8.3 
Occt!patio!F 
Housework 38.9 40.9 16.7 
Disability 51.8 51.1 58.3 
pension/ retired 
Paid job 15.4 15.3 16.7 
Omcr 
EQ-5D' 0.49 0.61 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.49 
EQ-VAS' 55.61 55.56 56.18 
Contim1ed on the ne:>."'' page 
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Characteristics CVA total CVApartnct CVAother RA total RA partner RAother 
Professional car~ 26.1 25.7 30.8 
\'Vairing list 5.9 6.4 0 
professional care~ 
Other informal careZ 68.0 70.7 38.5 
i'-1=255 N=139 l'J=116 N=153 N=140 N=13 
1 Mean 
2 Percentages 
J The percentages add tip to over 100 pt•rcent dJte to the fad !hat so !lie n:spondcnts rrported di.ffirent ocmpations. 
~ Nok that in case oJCV A tht' nd !!lonthfy inco!!le is pri!!ak incon1e, while in case ifR4tbc nel n;ontbfy inCOIJJI' isja!!li/y inco!!le. 
Table 5.1 shows that the mean age of the CV A caregivers was 60.2 years, almost 
two thirds were women and 42 percent had a paid job. About half of the caregivers were 
partners of the care recipients. Partners were, compared 'W'ith other informal caregivers, 
older, had less often paid work and their main occupation was more often housework. 
They had also more often a disability pension or were retired. The CV A care recipients had 
a mean age of over 72 years and their EQ-SD score was low: 0.49. 
Informal care for care recipients with RA 
The data for the RA part of this study were collected as a supplement of the RA. + study, a 
panel study on health and health care utilisation among people 'With RA Gacobi eta!., 2001) 
and 0 acobi et al., 2003). In the 2001 wave of this panel, 365 of 683 care receivers indicated 
to receive informal care. We approached all care receivers and asked the 365 receiving 
informal care to hand over our mail survey to their primary informal caregiver. Moreover, 
we asked all care receivers to complete a mail survey themselves. We included a question 
for the 318 care recipients 'W'ithout informal care if they perhaps currently received informal 
care. If so, we also asked them to hand a mail survey over to their primary informal 
caregiver. 
Table 5.1 also shows the characteristics of the RA informal caregivers. The 
average RA. caregiver was 'Nith 62.1 years slightly older than the CVA caregiver and more 
than 90 percent of those informal caregivers were the care recipients' partner. Slightly less 
RA informal caregivers had a paid job compared to CV A. The duration of prov:iding 
informal care for RA. care recipients was 11.3 years, while the disease duration was 13.0 
years. So, prmri.ding informal care starts often quickly after the diagnosis of RA.. For CV A 
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we assume that providing informal care starts clirecdy after the diagnosis.s The EQ-SD 
scores of the RA care recipients were with 0.48 similar to the CV A care recipients. R...A.. care 
recipients however were younger and more often female than the CV A care recipients. 
The care recipients' partners were predominandy male in case of RA, while the 
other caregivers were m:llnly female. The latter is quite common (informal caregivers are 
often females) and the former reflects the relatively high prevalence ofRA in females. 
5.3.2 Operationalisation of the valuation methods 
The opportunity cost and proxy good methods were both incorporated into the surveys. 
Here, we describe them in more detail. 
Opportunity cost method 
\Y/e asked informal caregiver's in retrospect what types and amount of time (paid work, 
unpaid work and/ or leisure) they gave up in order to be able to provide informal care. The 
reliability of similar questions probably increases the more recent and the more well 
defined the informal caregiving episode started. This makes a comparison between CV A 
with a clear starting point and RA without one particularly interesting. 
In anticipation of the absence of a clear starting point in the RA population, we 
also asked some additional questions. These questions also pertain to the best alternative 
time use, not retrospectively, but rather in terms of on what activity the respondents would 
preferably spend time as well as how many hours a week if they could reduce their time 
investment i.n infonnal care. These questions were phrased as follows: 
"Suppose, )'011 do not have to spend time on providing irifbrma! care af!)lmore. Would )'Ott preftr to spend 
this time on paid ZJJork, unpaid work or leisttre?' 
Proxy good method 
There are no instruments available that make a distinction bet\Veen "normal" housework 
and additional housework due to informal care. In the existing instruments, for example 
the CATS (Caregiver Activities Time Survey) (Clipp and Moore, 1995), the CAS (Caregiver 
Activity Survey) (Davis et al., 1997) and the RUD (resource utilization in dementia) (Wimo 
5 Information about co-morbidities is lacking so w~ have to a55um~ clut the pro.,"'ision of informal carr:: is due 
toCVA orRA 
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et al., 2002). this distinction seems to be neglected. We asked informal caregivers to report 
whether, and if so, how much time they spent on a list of si-xteen activities (see table 3 for 
the complete list) in the week preceding the interview. We distinguished between (1) 
housework (HDL), (2) activities of daily living (ADL), (3) instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADL). Travel time may also be an important aspect of total time use in informal 
caregiving. Therefore, we added also a question about travel time due to informal 
caregiving. Some questions had answer categories in minutes per day, while others had 
answer categories in hours per week, depending on the e::-..-pected time investment per week. 
In order to derive the time spent on different informal care tasks, we asked the 
caregivers No different types of questions. The first type of question asked respondents: 
'How much time did you spend on assistance with ... "? 
These questions pertained to support activities, for example assisting the care recipient in 
visiting the toilet or with mobility outside. Given their nature, answers to these questions 
would ine,itably indicate time spend on informal care (correct responses assumed for the 
moment). The second type of question asked the respondents: 
'How much time did you spend on ... "? 
These questions mainly pertained to time spend on different types of housework. Because 
our study focussed on time investment in the conte.xt of informal care, we were sceptical 
about the respondents' ability to separate "normal" from additional housework, particularly 
for informal caregivers sharing the same household as the care recipient. For caregivers not 
sharing the same household as the care recipient, additional housework may be estimated 
more easily than for caregivers sharing the same household as the care recipient. However, 
e.g. separating time spend on shopping due to informal caregiving or for their own purpose 
could also be troublesome when the informal caregiver does not share the same household 
as the care recipient. 
Comparing the indicated time allocation on housework of informal caregivers 
with that of the general population could indicate whether or not caregivers are e::-..-pected to 
have indicated 'additional time' spent on these tasks or rather 'normal time'. Information 
on time allocation of the Dutch general public was derived from the Dutch Time-
Allocation Survey 1995 (TB0'95) (SCP, 1995). These data were collected with time budget 
94 Informal care: an economic approach 
diaries. Respondents (n=3227) reported every 15 minutes per day their time spent on a 
broad range of activities including HDL tasks. With the results from the TBO, we forecast 
the e::...-pected time spend on several HDL activities in the t\Vo populations corrected for age 
and gender. Tbis forecast can be compared to the reponed time in order to get some idea 
on the correctness of the answers provided in our sample. 
Finally, one could argue that the time invested in prO\riding informal care should 
equal the total time forgone due to providing informal care. A possible difference may be 
due to the fact that one of the N.ro methods is easier to complete. It is also possible that 
this is due to the neglect of joint production in one way of questioning or because the 
figures do not adequately reflect that certain household tasks (e.g., house maintenance) are 
sacrificed to perform more urgent household tasks (cleaning or cooking). Possible 
differences bet\Veen the t\VO populations may also have to do with the starting point, which 
is clear in CV A while it is lacking in RA. This makes that for many RA informal caregivers 
the period of retrospect is substantial. 
5.3.3 Results from the two valuation methods 
Opportunity costs - measuring time forgone 
We distinguished t:lu'ee types of time forgone in order to be able to provide informal care: 
paid work, unpaid work and leisure. Table 5.2a presents the types and time forgone in both 
populations. 
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Table 5.2a: Informal caregivers' opportunity costs of time 
CVA (255) 
Paid work 
Unpaid \VOrk 
Lcisuxe 
Total 
RA (153) 
Paid work 
Unpaid work 
Leisure 
Total 
Percentage respondents 
performing activity 
before carcgiving 
episode 
38.0 (97) 
13.4 (29) 
n/a 
40.4 (103) 
35.3 (54) 
24.2 (37) 
58.2 (89) 
69.9 (107) 
* pmmtage based on total gnurp (n 255) 
Mean hours Percentage respondents 
a week having forgone activity 
before due to informal care 
27.7 (103) 18.5 (17) 
1.7 (103) 35.7 (10) 
n/a 32.2 (82)" 
29.4 (103) 27.5 (70) 
15.9 (107) 16.7 (9) 
2.5 (107) 27.7 (10) 
7.2 (107) 30.3 (27) 
25.6 (107) 19.6 (30) 
Mean hours a 
week forgone 
3.0 (70) 
0.6 (70) 
8.8 (70) 
12.4 (70) 
2.2 (30) 
1.2 (30) 
6.1 (30) 
9.5 (30) 
It first shows the percentage of respondents involved in the three different 
categories before they became an informal caregiver, just like the mean hours per week in 
column 3. Ne.~t, table 5.2a gives the percentage of respondents that gave up paid work, 
unpaid work or leisure in order to pro-vide informal care. This percentage is based on the 
number of people performing these acti-vities before they became an informal caregiver 
(column 2). Column five gives the total number of hours forgone a week per acti-vity for 
the total group. The columns -mro and four were based on dichotomous answer categories, 
while columns three and five were based on (less often completed) open-ended answer 
categories. 
The results show that 18.5 percent of CV A caregivers \\lith paid work reduced 
their time spent on paid work, resulting in a reduction of 3 hours paid work per week on 
average. The RA caregivers \Vith paid work indicated a slightly lower amount of paid work 
forgone, i.e. 2.2 hours a week, whereas the amount of unpaid work forgone was higher (1.2 
respectively 0.6 hours a week). In case of CVA we collected no information about the 
amount of leisure before the informal care episode started. A majority of RA caregivers 
indicated to spent time on leisure before the caregiving episode started. Assuming that all 
CV A caregivers enjoyed leisure before becoming a caregiver, CV A caregivers slightly more 
often indicated to have given up leisure in order to pro-vide informal care (32.2 percent 
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versus 30.3 percent). Moreover, the average number of hours of leisure forgone was higher 
in the CV A group (8.8 versus 6.1 hours a week). 
In totaL CV A caregivers indicated higher opportunity costs than RA caregivers: 
12.4 hours versus 9.5 hours per week respectively. It is worth noting that table 2 also 
indicates rapidly decreasing numbers of completed surveys when asking about numbers of 
hours forgone, which leads to average scores for RA for instance based on only 30 
caregivers. 
As mentioned above it is perhaps difficult for informal caregivers to inclicate the 
amount and sources of time forgone if a clear starting point is lacking as in RA, because the 
caregiving episode started probably many years ago, for example before retirement. 
Moreover, the number of care tasks prov-i_ded as well as the time spent on caregiving may 
slowly increase, ·without clear start points. Such increases may go unnoticed. This makes it 
expectedly difficult for the RA respondents to indicate time spent on other activ-i_ties 
forgone. \Ve tested for this hypothesis by means of a simple correlation coefficient 
benveen respondents indicating both their opportunity costs of time and the number of 
years they provide care yet. The relative strong correlation coefficient of 0.50 supports this 
hypothesis. Because we expected difficulties in indicating their opportunity costs of time, 
we also asked RA caregivers on what activities they would spend their time if they no 
longer had to fulfill care tasks. Table 5.2b shows the results. 
Table 5.2b: Alternative question posed to RA informal caregivers (153) 
Paid work 
Unpaid '\VOrk 
Lci$urc:: 
Total 
1\' be!1JJee!l brackets 
Percentage respondents indicating they Mean hours a week 
would spend freed time on activity 
6.5 (10) 
9.2 (14) 
59.5 (91) 
65.4 (100) 
0.6 (100) 
1.0 (100) 
5.7 (100) 
7.3 (100) 
Most informal caregivers preferred to spend freed time on leisure. The absolute 
numbers of caregivers indicating that they preferred to spend freed time on paid work or 
unpaid work resemble those in table 5.2a. For leisure however, there is a substantial 
clifference compared to the results reported in table 5.2a. In terms of hours per week, both 
methods yield similar results for unpaid work as well as for leisure. However, the amount 
of paid work is in the alternative question (table 5.2b) lower compared to the amount of 
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the table 5.2a question. This might be related to the fact that some caregivers have retired 
\.vi thin the long time interval of 11.4 years between the start of providing informal care and 
date of survey completion. Therefore, although the alternative method may be useful in a 
context of long term care and slowly progressive diseases, the validity of provided answers 
remains to be established. 
Proxy good method - measuring time investment 
In applying the proxy good method, time investments on different caregiving tasks needs 
to be assessed. w·e dis~ouished HDL, ADL and IADL tasks and travel time. The time 
investments for the n.vo populations are presented in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 presents both the percentages of caregivers performing specific 
acti;,rities as well as how many hours a week they spent on these activities. 1fost informal 
caregivers performed HDL tasks, and the time investment in these tasks was relatively 
large, i.e. 21.2 hours a week. A majority of caregivers ·were also involved in IADL tasks, yet 
the time involved in these tasks was substantially lo'\ver compared tO HDL, i.e. 3.7 hours a 
week. About one third of the informal caregivers was involved in ADL tasks, which 
required around t\.VO hours per week. More CV A than RA. caregivers had to travel which 
probably has to do with the fact that far more RA. caregivers were partners tO the care 
recipient. The overall percentage of caregivers performing tasks was similar in both groups, 
but the RA. caregivers providing some 7 hours more care per week. This difference is 
related tO the performance of HDL tasks, probably because more RA. caregivers are men 
who indicate HDL perhaps more often as informal care compared tO CV A caregivers. 
The large amount of time invested in HDL tasks may reflect the fact that 
"normal" HDL tasks are not fully separated from additional HDL tasks. Therefore, we 
compared the time allocation of these caregivers to that of the general public, using the 
results from the TBO srudy described above. We predicted the time spent on different 
HDL tasks by OLS-regression (see appendix A). If these predictions would match reported 
values or if reported values would even be higher than predictions, this would be an 
indication that normal rather than additional time use would be reported. The results are 
shown in table 5.4. 
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Table 5.3: Informal care time in mean hours a week 
CVA' 
Preparation of food and drinks 56.8 
Time investments in shopping. 85.3 
groceries etc. 
Housecle=ing 62.5 
Washing. ironing or SO\"--ing 62.9 
C:u:ing for and phying \Vith own 4.8 
children 
Chores. g::trdening, mainten.wce 
HDL (Total) 
.Aiding p::triem \'\i"ith person.'ll care 
Aiding patient in v-isiting the toilt:t 
43.8 
89.0 
18.2 
8.5 
Aiding patient mov-ing around 18.6 
"'ithin tht: house 
Aiding patient \'\lith eating and 19.2 
drinking 
ADL (Total) 32.9 
Aiding the patient in travelling 38.5 
outside the house 
Aiding the patient \vi.th ·visiting and 45.5 
in excursions 
Aiding the p:1tient in cont:1.cting 59.7 
he:tlth care suppliers 
Aiding patient in organising home 34.4 
:1daputions. etc. 
Aiding patient in financi:tl matters 55.1 
(insurance, rent) 
lADL (Total) 
Travelling to and from p::trienr 
Total 
76.9 
42.4 
94.5 
r Percentage i!f{iitating that thq spend time on the actir'i!J• 
Mean hours a RAt 
week 
3.3 
4.6 
0.2 
2.4 
1.3 
14.0 
0.6 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
1.6 
0.6 
0.9 
0.6 
0.2 
0.6 
2.9 
1.7 
20.2 (218) 
76.7 
87.2 
86.0 
43.0 
11.3 
74.2 
94.1 
34.9 
6.7 
17.7 
10.3 
37.3 
38.8 
51.4 
60.5 
23.2 
39.7 
68.6 
8.8 
96.1 
:Mean bolfrs a JJietf. spend on tbis actir'i!J given that tbq indicakd to spend time on the attir'i(}' 
1\' behPeen brac!:.ets 
Mean hours a 
week 
5.0 
6.3 
2.0 
0.9 
4.2 
2.9 
21.2 
1.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.2 
2.1 
1.1 
1.2 
0.9 
0.1 
0.4 
3.7 
0.3 
27.4 (147) 
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Table 5.4: Housework part of informal care 
Variable CVA RA 
Forecast Reported Forecast Reported 
Normal additional Normal additional 
Preparation of food and 7.6 3.3 9.8 5.0 
drinks 
Time investments in 2.9 4.6 4.3 6.2 
shopping, groceries etc. 
Housecleaning 1.6 2.3 2.5 1.8 
Washing, ironing or SO'\v'iug 1.0 0.2 1.6 1.0 
Caring for and playing 'W-ith 3.3 2.4 4.0 4.3 
own children 
Chores, gardening, 4.1 1.0 3.7 3.0 
maintenance 
Total 20.6 13.9 26.0 21.3 
N 204 135 
Table 5.4 shows that total reported time investment in HDL tasks is less than 
predicted time investment: 6.7 hours less for CVA and 4.7 hours less for RA.. Yet the 
differences are small compared to the total time investment especially in case of RA.. \Y/e 
tested with a t-test if the difference between the predicted and reported HDL time was 
significant. This was the case in both populations (CVA: p <.0001 and RA: p = 0.0086). 
Still, given the relatively high numbers of reported additional hours, 'vhich implies that 
tOtal time spent on HDL would be 34.5 and 47.3 hours per week for CVA and RA 
respectively, one may wonder whether the HDL results in table 3 are not an 
overestimation. 
Comparing the two methods - measurement 
\Vhen \Ve look at the measurement of time, the proxy good and the oppormnity method 
yield different results. The average \Veekly time spent on caregiving is 20.2 hours in case of 
CVA and 27.4 hours in case of RA using the pro"-y good method (table 3). The 
opportunity cost method yields substantial lower estimates: 12.4 and 9.5 hours respectively 
(table 5.2a). The alternative opportunity cost used in the RA population leads to even lower 
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rime estimates (7.3 how:s). These substantial differences demand more research in terms of 
validation of the measw:ement methods. 
Another important aspect of the comparison is the number of respondents that 
complete the questions. As can be derived from tables 5.2 and 5.3, the measurement 
questions related to the pro::-..: good method appear to perform much better than those 
related to the opporrunity cost method. 
Money value using the opportunity cost method 
Accord.IDg to equation 1, in the opportunity cost method the how:ly wage of informal 
caregivers is used to value the provided informal care. Table 5.5 shows these wage rates, 
while those for RA are somewhat overestimated, because they represent how:ly household 
mcome. 
Table 5.5: Opporrunity cost method and pro::-..: good method compared 
CVA per CVA per RAper hour R.A per '\veek 
hom week 
Opportunlty cost 17.34 204.64 10.64 (n 37) 49.18 (n 7) 
method (n=60) (n:;o23) 
Proxy good cime 17.34 336.20 10.64 (n=37) 178.84 (n=37) 
v.rith housework (n=60) (n=59) 
Pro:...-y good Without housL·v..-ork 18.24 119.80 20.24 (n=147) 153.51 (n=147) 
method (n=218) (n=218) 
\'VJ.th houscv..-ork 13.51 239.24 12.19 (n=147) 334.76 (n=147) 
(n=218) (n=21S) 
The subgroup v.i.th available information about income from paid work was 
relatively small. Combined with missing data of time investment accord.Jng to the 
opporrunity cost method, the numbers used in final calculations (\Vi.thout imputations and 
other missing variable interventions) becomes very low: n = 23 for CVA and n = 7 for RA. 
Using these cases only the average costs per week for CVA were 204.64 Euro and for RA 
49.18 Euro. If we impute the available information for the total sample these numbers 
would change for CVA to 215.02 Euro (17.34 Euro times 12.4 hours per week) and for RA 
to 101.08 Euro (10.64 Euro times 9.5 hours per week). 
The opporrunity cost method is often applied by combining time input rather 
than activities forgone with an hourly wage rate. If we adopt that approach, e.g. if wage 
rates are combined with the time investment as indicated in table 3, costs per week would 
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amount to 336.20 Ew:o for CV A and 178.84 Euro for RA. These figures are based on the 
sub-sample of caregivers for which time and income information was available. Leaving 
out HDL activ-i.ties (if one considers these to result in an overestimation of time 
investment) would change the results to 72.38 Euro for CVA and 27.66 Euro for RA. If 
one would apply the average wage rate to the whole group that indicated time investment, 
the weekly cost estimates '\vould change into 350.27 Euro for CVA and 291.44 Euro for 
RA. These differences in results demonstrate that the operationalisation of the methods 
and the sub-samples used to calculate costs on cause large differences in results. 
Money value using the proxy good method 
For applying the pro::...; good method to value informal care, one has to End a close market 
substitute as a pro::-..-y for the value of informal care. In The Netherlands professional home 
care seems to be a good proxy. The tariff of a professional caregiver for HDL tasks is 
approximately 8.53 Euro per hour, for ADL tasks 32.67 Euro per hour and for IADL tasks 
also 32.67 Euro per hour. 
Using these figures, the cost estimates can be derived, as shown in table 5. The 
hourly wage rate differs bet\"lleen CV A and RA because the combination of different types 
of tasks is different for the NlO groups. Again, t\\ro estimates are shown, one with and one 
'W-ithout HDL time investment. The costs for RA appeared to be higher compared to CV A. 
Comparing the two methods - valuation 
Wben we compare both methods, it is clear that important differences arise, both between 
as well as 'W-ithin methods when us.ing different operationalisations. Some of the differences 
relate back to the differences .in measured time investment (measurement according to 
equation 1 or 2). Other differences relate to distinct hourly values of professional care 
(housework is cheaper compared to personal care) or even to the use of hourly .instead of 
private household income in case of RA. It is also worth noting that we only value the 
informal caregivers' opportunity costs of time 'W-ith the opportunity cost method. But in 
comparing the opportunity cost method 'Wi.th the proxy good method one should also take 
into account other caregiver opportunity costs like financial outlays. This because these 
costs are included in the tariffs of professional caregivers as used with the prOAJ good 
method. See (Netten, 1990) for an overview of other caregiver opportunity costs. In sum, 
weekly cost estimates range from 72.38 to 350.27 Euro for CVA caregivers and 49.18 to 
334.76 Euro for RA caregivers. 
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5.4 Discussion 
This chapter aims to discuss the usefulness and difficulties in applying two often 
recommended methods to value informal care in economic evaluations of health care: the 
opportunity cost method and the pro::-..·y good method. Valuing informal care is a t\VO smge 
process. (1) Measurement of the amount and sources of time forgone in order to be able to 
provide informal care (opportunity cost method), or measurement of the amount of rime 
invested in informal care (proxy good method). (2) Economic valuation: determining 
accurate shadow prices per hour of provided informal care. 
Results show that the rv,ro methods do not differ very much -with respect to the 
valuation step. Higher opportunity costs per hour in case of RA compared to CV A are 
related to the use of family income in case of RA and private income in case of CV A. 
Differences benveen the methods are quite small or explained by the relative low prices of 
housework in case of the prO),.)' good method with housework. The measurement step 
however, seems tO be more problematic and crucial, as the opportunity cost method and 
prm.:y good method yield quite different results. On average total weeldy time spent on care 
giving is 20.2 hours in case of CV A and 27.4 hours in case of RA using the prm,.·y good 
method, whereas the opportunity cost method yields much lower estimates (12.4 and 9.5 
hours respectively). The measurement questions related to the pro),.; good method appear 
to perform better than those related to the opportunity cost method, at least from a 
response point of v"i.ew. Tills does not necessarily imply that the answers are reliable. [Van 
den Berg, Submitted #128] for instance compared the results of a retrospecTive way of 
questioning like here proposed in the pro::-..y good method with a diary (\v"i.thin subject 
comparison). They concluded that a retrospective way of questioning involves an 
overestimation of the provided informal care. A comparison of our results with national 
time allocation data revealed that the number of additional HDL hours for informal care as 
derived from the survey might be an overestimation (between subject comparison). Further 
research could focus on measurement of informal care using for instance diaries \\1-i.th a 
focus on informal care (between subject comparison). Diaries are however more costly for 
researchers and time consuming for respondents. 
In gene~ clarification of terms used in the survey measuring time seems to be 
crucial. Our analysis seems to indicate that the terms 'unpaid work' and 'leisure' in the 
opportunity cost method were not entirely clear for all respondents. Tills because the 60 
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percent of RA caregivers indicating that they spent time on leisure before the caregiving 
episode started is strikingly low (table 5.2a). One would e).-pect a percentage close to 100 
percent, as almost everybody enjoys leisure now and then. The same holds for unpaid work 
because one would expect that almost everybody performs some unpaid work (in and 
around the house). For the measurement of time we recommend to add an additional open 
answer category in order to give respondents the possibility to indicate possible other 
opportunity costs. This holds also, but to a lower extent, for the pro).y good method. 
Giving respondents the opportunity to indicate other informal care tasks could provide 
additional insights. 
In applying the pro).y good method, one could also use the market prices of 
house workers. On the one hand this would be a better prO).'Y because the market for 
house workers is not as heavily regulated as the health care market. On the other hand the 
quality of home keepers could be less than the quality of the professional caregivers due to 
for instance education and training. So, using the salaries of house workers could 
underestimate the value of informal care. There is also an institutional argument in favor of 
the professional caregiver. If in The Netherlands no informal caregiver would be present, 
the care recipient would get professional care as a consequence of his insurance and he 
does not need to hire a house worker. 
It is conspicuous if we compare our results 'With for instance (O'Shea and 
Blach.-well, 1993) that in particular our informal caregivers reported lower opportunity costs 
of paid work forgone. They found that on average 24 percent of informal care provided 
was at the costs of paid work, 37 percent at the costs of unpaid work, 32 percent at the 
costs of leisure. O'Shea and Blach.-well (1993) also added a category voluntary activity 
forgone and found that 7 percent was at the costs of voluntary activity. Moreover, their 
average amount of time spent on providing informal care was around n.vice as much 
compared to our estimates (50.5 hours a '\Veek versus 20.2 and 27.4 for CVA and RA 
respectively). Our chapter adds to this literature by estimating the opportunity costs of 
caring directly from informal caregivers involved in the caregiving episode instead of 
indirectly through for instance the general population as O'Shea and Blach.""\V·ell (1993) did. 
They justified their approach by assuming that care recipients were not able to indicate 
informal caregivers' opportunity costs of care and they only interviewed care recipients. We 
interviewed both care recipients and their informal caregivers. Timmermans (2003) found 
that informal caregivers (a sample of the general population in The Netherlands) on 
average '\vorked 9.9 hours a week less due to providing informal care. This is much higher 
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compared to our findings. However, Timmermans (2003) included also respondents who 
stated that they rejected additional paid work due to their caregiving responsibilities. 
Informal caregivers who indicated that they were stopped with paid work reported an 
average of 9.1 hours per week, while informal caregivers -with a paid job reported 3.6 hours 
per week less paid work due to the provision of informal care. 
In order to assure the incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations, it 
would be useful to develop more precise guidelines for the operationalisation of both 
methods instead of just the recommendation to apply one of them. A comparable 
operationalisarion is necessary in order to ensure comparison in results between different 
studies that provide economic valuations of informal care and also bet\veen different 
economic evaluations. 
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6 Economic valuation of informal care: 
The contingent valuation method applied 
to informal caregiving 1 
Summary 
This chapter reports the rest1lts of the application of the contingent 7/alllation method (CVM) to determine a 
monetary t'a/m if informal care. We discuss the mrrent practice in valuing irifhrma/ care and a theoretical 
model of the costs and benifits related to the provision ?[informal care. In addition, 11Jt developed a stm)ty in 
;vhich informal caregivers-' n;iffingness to accept (TVTA) to prwide an additional holfr if informal care JJJas 
elicited. This method is better than norn;aljy recommended va/!fation methods able to captttre the 
heterogenei!J and cf.ynamics ofiiforma! care. 
Data JJJere obtained from postal mrvrys. A total o/ 153 informal carr:..:,az.?Jers and 149 care 
recipients with rheumatoid arthritis refltroed a completed sJm)ry. IrifOmJa! caregitNrs reported a mean WTA 
to provide a l!)pothetical additional hour if informal care if9.52 Euro (n=124). i\1a'!Y hypotheses deriz,·ed 
from the theoretical model and the literafltre JJJere supported by the data. 
CVM is a promising alternative for t.-'\··iSting methods like the opportunity cost method and the 
pro~'g good method to detem1ine a monetal)' va/m if informal care that can be incorporated in the 
n11merator if a'!)! economic evaluation. 
6.1 Introduction 
Informal care plays a substantial role in the total care provided, especially in case of care for 
people '\\lith chronic diseases and terminally ill people (Norton, 2000). It is care provided by 
someone from the social environment of the care recipient, for example a spouse, parent, 
sister or neighbour. Informal care is a heterogeneous commodity in the sense that 
important differences in time investments, duration of providing informal care and number 
of provided care tasks exist bet\Veen informal caregivers. Moreover, providing informal 
care is often a dynamic process. The process is closely connected '\\lith the care demands of 
the care recipient that are in turn dependent on for instance the care recipient's health 
status. We define informal care therefore as: 
1 B:tst:d on Van den Berg, B .• Brou\ver, W.B.F .• V:m E'(cl J.A.J., Koopmanschap. M.A., 2004. Economic 
valu.1.tion of informal c:tre: The contingent valuation method ::tpplied to inform.'ll c:tregiving. Accepted for 
publication Health Economic~. 
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"A quasi or non-market compos-ite commodi!J consisting of heterogeneo11s parts produced (paid or Ntpaid) 
l?J· one or more members of the social environment rf the care recipient as a result of the care demands of the 
care recipient'' (Van den Berget a!., 2004). 
In this definition we have left open the possibility for informal caregivers to be paid. It is 
often debated whether or not informal caregivers may receive some form of payment and 
still be considered informal caregivers. This question is increasingly relevant now that 
personal budgets become a more popular instrument of financing health care, \\lith which 
informal caregivers may be paid as well as formal caregivers (rilly et al., 2000). 
In economic evaluations that take the societal perspective everyone affected by an 
intenrention should be considered and all significant outcomes and costs that flow directly 
or indirectly from the intervention should be counted regardless of who experiences the 
outcomes and costs (Russell et a!., 1996) and (Drummond et a!., 1997). This implies that 
informal care should be incorporated in economic evaluations of health care. In practice 
however, informal care is often neglected in economic evaluations (Stone et al., 2000). Tbis 
may bias economic evaluations of interventions that depend on (substantial) use of 
informal care. Partly, this neglect of informal care may reflect the fact that the valuation of 
informal care is troublesome. The costs of informal care are to an important extent related 
to time inputs by relatives and friends of the care recipients and their time is difficult to 
measure and value (Van den Berget al, 2004). See Netten (1990) for an overview of other 
costs related to informal care, such as home adaptations and the costs of assistance devices. 
It is suggested to incorporate the changes in use of informal caregiver time as 
direct non-health care costs into the numerator of the cost-effectiveness ratio in economic 
evaluations (Luce et al., 1996, p.177). Two monetary valuation methods are often 
recommended to value the time investment in informal care: the opportunity cost method 
(valuing hours spent on informal care at a - would be - wage rate) and the pro::...y good 
method (valuing informal care hours at the wage rate of a professional caregiver) (Posnett 
and Jan, 1996), (Russell eta!., 1996) and (Drummond eta!., 1997). However, both methods 
are rather insensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of informal care. Still, the 
opportunity cost method only considers what is sacrificed in order to be able to perform 
informal care (e.g., paid work, unpaid \Vork or leisure) but does not incorporate the 
preferences of informal caregivers in terms of their current use of time. Moreover, fincling 
appropriate wage rates for the retired, the disabled, or for sacrificed leisure by for instance 
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eliciting (would be) wage-rates, seems difficult. The prm .. -y good method uses the price of 
market alternatives to value informal care. Indeed, informal care can be seen as a quasi-
market commodity as market alternatives like professional nurses or house workers are 
available and consequently market prices e...Ust. However, it is debatable whether informal 
care and the market alternatives are full substitutes. Moreover, this method also neglects 
informal caregiver's preferences. 
Both methods also do not incorporate the full effects of prov"i.ding informal care 
for the informal caregivers and therefore do not capture the full impact of providing 
informal care. It is increasingly recognized that providing informal care has both positive 
and negative effects on the informal caregiver, (dis)benefits, like for example enjoying 
providing care for someone you love or decrements to informal caregivers' health as a 
result of straining care tasks (Orbell et al., 1993), (Kramer, 1997), (Hughes et al., 1999) and 
(Schulz and Beach, 1999). It is suggested to use health-related quality of life measurement 
in informal caregivers to measure the full impact of informal care, e.g., (i\1ohide et al., 
1988) and (Brouwer et al., 1999). However, this implies that next to care recipient's 
outcomes, informal caregiver's outcomes should be used as an outcome measure in 
economic evaluations. Luce et al. (1996, p.177) therefore argue that the preferred solution 
would be a monetary valuation method, capable of capturing all relevant aspects of 
informal care. The results could then be incorporated into the numerator of any economic 
evaluation. This is especially preferable in situations in which informal care is not the main 
focus of an economic evaluation. \X!hen evaluating, for example, support programs for 
informal caregivers the costs and (health) effects related to informal care may of course be 
further distinguished, see e.g. Drummond et al. (1991). 
A method capable of capturing all relevant aspects of informal care should ideally be 
sensitive to the different circumstances informal caregivers are faced with and reflect the 
true preferences of informal caregivers. The contingent valuation method (CVlvf) is such a 
method at least in theory. To date this method has not been used to value informal care to 
our best knowledge. In this chapter we report an application of CVM: to value informal 
care using a sample of 153 caregivers providing care to care recipients \.V"i.th rheumatoid 
arthritis. 
The main focus of tl"le chapter is to attempt to value the full impact of providing 
informal care on the informal caregiver through asking informal caregivers how much 
monetary compensation they minimally require in order to provide an additional hour of 
informal care per week. CVJ\1, in the form of willingness to accept (\VIA) in this chapter, 
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has the advantage of being sensitive to the circumstances and preferences of informal 
caregivers in comparison to the opportunity cost method and prm,·y good method. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, we discuss a theoretical framework 
for the valuation of informal care. Second, we describe the methods used in this study. 
Then we present the data and the results after which the chapter concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical background: welfare economics 
A theoretical model of providing informal care has been developed by Smith and Wright 
(1994). The aim of their model was to consider the full impact of informal care. Their 
particular concern was " ... to discuss how to evaluate the contribution of informal carers in 
economic appraisals of alternative forms of continuing care for chronically disabled people 
(Smith and Wright 1994, p.137)." Smith and Wright (1994) tried to combine the concepts 
of direct and indirect utility and exclude topics from other disciplines like family roles, 
obligations, rights, duties and responsibilities. 
Figure 6.1: Informal caregiver's marginal costs and marginal benefits of providing informal care 
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the informal caregiver's marginal costs (.tvfq and marginal 
benefits (MB) of providing informal care based on (Smith and Wright, 1994). The MC 
include among other things the opportunity costs of time, financial outlays, forgone career 
opportunities, higher morbidity and mortality risks, and strain. The positive slope of the 
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MC curve indicates the higher MC of allocating an additional time unit to informal 
caregiving, for most of the informal caregivers. On the other hand, the 1vffi among other 
things contain friendship, companionship, pleasure and the informal caregiver's perception 
of the utility of the care recipient from being informally cared for. The 1v.lJ3 curve has a 
negative slope to show that for most informal caregivers an increase in the time spent in 
caregiving will decrease the :MB of caring but they '\V-ill remain positive, contrary to Smith 
and \Vright's marginal valuation line (lvf'Vh), which has a constant downward slope down 
to zero. T* denotes the optimal level of informal care provi.ded from the viewpoint of the 
informal caregiver. From that point onward, providing informal care yields more costs than 
benefits. It is important to stress that this point of optimality does not necessarily coincide 
""-ith the optimal T* from the care recipient's (or even societal) perspective. Given utility 
interdependence between informal caregiver and care recipient, the informal caregiver \'V-ill 
incorporate his perception of the preferences of the care recipient in his decision. 
It is also worth noting that beyond T* providing additional hours of informal care 
1s not rational without adequate compensation. Of course, social and institutional 
restrictions or transaction costs may cause some temporary variation around point T*. Yet 
beyond that point informal care leads to more costs than benefits. This interpretation ofT* 
is different from that of Smith and Wright (1994), who indicate that as long as the marginal 
benefits are positive, "positive utility is derived from caring" (Smith and Wright, 1994). We 
would rather suggest that this is only the case until T*. Moreover, Smith and Wright (1994) 
indicate that beyond T* "there is a perceived burden on the carer as the marginal valuation 
is substantially lower than the marginal costs" (Smith and Wright, 1994). We would use the 
term disutility here as opposed to Smith and Wright (1994) who talk about disutility beyond 
the point from where the J\.1Vh line crossesT. 
The interpretation ofT* depends on what is included in the MC and 1vfB curves. 
We suppose that all relative costs and benefits of alternatives are included in the MC and 
f...ffi of informal care. Thus, when MC and 1v.lJ3 intersect (at T* in Figure 6.1 ), it may be 
more advantageous to hire professional care or to leave the care recipient \'V-ithout 
additional care from that point onward. The intersection therefore indicates that some 
alternative is better than informal care from the informal caregiver's viewpoint. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Figure 6.1 is static and does not describe the dynamics 
of informal care very well. In the short run the position of MC and 1v.lJ3 may indeed be 
considered fixed as shown in Figure 6.1. However, in the long run the MC and :\113 curves 
can shift, for example, due to a change in health status and the resulting care demands of 
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the care recipient. Finally, the relative magnitudes of the slopes of the lvfC and }.;ffi curves 
can differ substantially between informal caregivers. CV1vf is capable to measure the 
informal caregiver's net difference between NfC and NIB. The next session discusses this 
method in more detail. 
6.3 Contingent valuation method 
CVJ\.f is a monetary valuation method, capable of deriving the net value per hour informal 
caregiving from the perspective of the informal caregiver. It is an often used valuation 
method rooted in applied welfare economics. CVlv:I is based on the work of Hicks (1939), 
who developed measures of losses and gains by holding utility constant. In comparison to 
other valuation methods like the opportunity cost method and pro::-..7 good method, CVi\1 
holds the advantage of being sensitive to real preferences of individuals, because utility is 
assumed to be held constant. See for general oveni.e\vs of CVM lvlltchell and Carson 
(1989), Johansson (1995), and for applications in health care, Diener eta!. (1998), Klose 
(1999), and Olsen and Smith (2001). 
Hicks (1939) developed different measures of (dis)benefit; compensating variation 
and surplus, and equivalent variation and surplus. On an applied level, one can use 
willingness to pay (WTP) or \villingness to accept (WTA). Therefore, in applied work the 
central issue in measuring (dis)benefits is whether to use WTP or \X!TA questions. In many 
cases this is just a question of property rights. In other words, does the respondent have to 
buy or to sell the commodity under valuation? (Bromley, 1995) Therefore, in many 
applications in health care it is natural to use \\lTP because one values respondents' 
benefits from, for instance, new technologies or medicines. Indeed, Diener et al. (1998), 
Klose (1999), and Olsen and Smith (2001) report that over ninety percent of the CVM 
applications in health care use \VTP. But, because conventional economic theory states that 
in most circumstances WTP and W'TA y-ield roughly the same results (\Xlillig, 1976), one 
could in principle apply both to all situations. However, empirical srudies show that \X!TA 
often exceeds \VTP (Bro'WTI and Gregory, 1999). Therefore, it is argued to apply WTP 
instead of WTA because it gives an under bound estimate of the valuation (Brown and 
Gregory, 1999). See Brown and Gregory (1999) for an extensive summary of reasons for 
the \\!TP-\'VT A disparity. In health care applications, just a few studies tested for the WTP-
\VTA disparity. Botisova and Goodman (2003), for instance, applied CVM to value travel 
rime for methadone maintenance clients. They found somewhat higher \VIA values 
compared to WTP values. 
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In the context of having to give up time, as is the case in our srudy, it is natural to 
use WTA. In terms of Figure 6.1, this means that providing an additional hour informal 
care (T1-T) involves both MC and :MB. \"VVA measures informal caregivers' required 
compensation in cases where their MC exceeds their NIB. That way, CVlvi should be 
capable of providing a preference based net valuation of informal care. In sum, we opt for 
a property right argument instead of an empirical argument in the decision between the 
application of\'V'TP or \VIA. Applying WTA yields an estimation of the value of the hour, 
\Vhich has to be sacrificed in order to be able to provide informal care. Therefore, the value 
of this time input is seen as a cost. 
Although having the advantage of being sensitive to preferences of respondents 
and having a theoretical foundation in welfare economics, CV1v1 has often been criticised. 
In principle, these criticisms hold both for WTP and \VT A. Criticisms include the use of 
survey questions, strategic behaviour, scope validity as well as the relation between C%'1 
answers and respondents' income. The use of hypothetical rather than actual choice 
situations is a major concern, especially for economists, reflecting their preference for 
revealed rather than stated preference methods. CVJ:vi holds the danger of strategic 
behaviour by respondents (N(.itchell and Carson, 1989). However, when respondent's 
answers do not direcdy influence reimbursement or provision of the commodity, as is the 
case -with public commodities, the risk of strategic behaviour by respondents is limited 
(Pauly, 1995). It has also been questioned whether respondents can answer me~afully to 
the sometimes very hypothetical questions posed (Carson, 2001). The more concrete and 
conceivable the hypothetical situation under valuation is, the more likely it seems that the 
provided answers are reflecting some real preference (Fischhoff, 1991). Caution is 
warranted in applying CVlvf to situations where respondents find the questions posed 
contradictory or upsetting (Pauly, 1995). In fact, this has been put forward as an argument 
against the application of CVlvi to value informal care (Smith and Wright, 1994). We 
believe however (and will demonstrate so in the remainder of this chapter) that it is 
possible to formulate questions on informal care in such a way that respondents do not 
consider them to be upsetting. Another concern in the application of CVl\11 is that answers 
should be but sometimes are not sensitive to the quantity of the commodity under 
valuation. for example, to save t\vo whales one would have to be willing to pay more than 
to save only one \vhale. See for detailed discussions of 'scope validity' Kahnemann and 
Knetsch (1992), Milgram (1993), Carson (1997), Kahneman et al. (1999b) and Carson 
(2001). CVlvf can also conflict \vith equity considerations, as it is not an income-neutral 
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valuation method Gohansson-Stenman, 2000) and (Donaldson et al., 2002). Therefore, it is 
sometimes argued that C\11..1 should not be applied to value health care commodities. 
Recent applications of CVM have used the correlation between income and \X'TP as a 
measure of theoretical validity, while early day applications saw it as a point of concern in 
the equity debate (Olsen and Smith, 2001, p.46). The importance of the issue is clear and 
any economic evaluation of health care involving informal care should preferably highlight 
the distributional consequences of a certain intervention or method. It is worth noting that 
the opportunity cost method as an important alternative for CVIvi to value informal care 
also depends systematically on income. This does not hold for the pro::-..-y good method. 
6.4 CVM applied to informal caregiving 
6.4.1 Developed survey 
Our central objective was to find a monetary value for informal caregiver's time. We 
applied CVM to value informal care by assessing an informal caregiver's 'W~oness to 
accept (\Xi! A) to provide an additional hour of informal care. Therefore, we used a specific 
study design, in order to be able to acknowledge the diversity of care situations in relation 
to CVJ\1. 
We asked the informal caregiver if other caregivers were involved in the 
caregiving process and if the care recipient was on a waiting list for professional or 
residential care. Moreover, we asked respondents how many hours they spent on informal 
caregiving during the last week according to a list of si.'l:.teen care items. We distinguished 
three types of care tasks: (1) housework (HDL) like cleaning, (2) activities of daily living 
(ADL) like personal care and, (3) instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) like 
organizing home adaptations or contacts with health care suppliers. Then we described a 
hypothetical situation with governmental support possibilities. This was a scenario to 
prevent 'out of the same pocket' e::-..-penditures and to make clear that informal caregivers 
got the compensation in terms of a net sum of cash money. 
"Suppose yo11r partner needs one additional hour if care a week and that the government JVill pcry yoH to 
provide this additional holfr if care. Which one if the follmving tasks wottid yOJf preferabfy provide during 
that hoHr? 
(1) Hot~se "'ork .. (2) personal care, (3) st!pport, (4) organizational tasks, (5) social sttpport, (6) I do not 
want to provide additional care_. and (7) other tasks_. like ...... " 
114 I'!fon!la! care: an econof!Jic approach 
Subsequently we asked them: 
"What is the mimirmm amotmt of monry yo/.1 JJJott!d JJJant to receit·e from the government to provide thiS 
additional h011r of care? (1) fr Ectro .. (2) Less than fr Ectro, that is ...... (3) More than fr Ectro, that 
is .... " 
We choose a dichotomous choice format v.i.th open follow-up question. The 
respondents could accept or reject a certain bid }X (x E {4.54, 6.81, 9.08, 11.34, 13.61}) in 
Euros, initial jX (x E {10, 15, 20, 25, 30}) in Dutch guilders. We also gave them the 
opportunity to fill in a higher or a lower bid if ft was either too low or too high. The bids 
were chosen because they encompass the market prices and health sector tariffs for 
housework and they were randomly distributed over the respondents. This approach has 
been successfully applied before (Baarsma, 2000) and extensively discussed (Kartman et al., 
1997). We choose this format because in the pilot phase of this study direct open-ended 
questions turned out to be too difficult for respondents. The pilot phase gave us the 
understanding that the respondents understood the task they were confronted w1th. 
To get a broad picrure of the informal caregiving situation and to be able to 
capture the heterogeneity of providing informal care, we asked informal caregivers as well 
as care recipients some additional questions in order to have context information, which 
may influence 'WT A. We measured health-related quality of life of both informal caregivers 
and care recipients with the EQ-5D (EuroQol Group, 1990), (Essink-Bot eta!., 1993), and 
(Dolan, 1997). Many instruments are developed to measure informal caregiver's subjective 
burden of provi.ding informal care (Kramer, 1997). \Vie applied the Caregiver Reaction 
Assessment (CRA..) (Given et al., 1992) and Qacobi et al., 2003), because it, as opposed to 
most subjective burden instruments, contains both a positive (''self-esteem') and negative 
dimensions ("disrupted schedule", "financial problems", lack of "family support", and 
"loss of physical strength"). The CRA.. however, has no sum score. Therefore, we also used 
a visual analogue scale ry AS) ranging from 0 ("not hard at all") to 100 ("much too hard") 
to measure the overall subjective burden of informal caregiving. Finally, we asked both 
informal caregivers and care recipients some socio-demographic questions. We used 
postcode areas as a prOAJ for income. This has been shown to be a reliable method (Smits 
et a!., 2002). 
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6.4.2 Hypotheses 
In order to capture all relevant aspects of informal care, CVlvf should be sensitive to the 
different circumstances faced to informal caregivers. \Ve formulated fifteen hypotheses 
based on the theoretical model, the literature on CVlvi and previous research on informal 
caregiving to get an impression of the validity of the \VfA approach to value informal care. 
Most hypotheses concern the preferences, capabilities and responsibilities of the informal 
caregivers, institutional factors or address the scope validity of informal care. Our 
hypotheses are listed in Table 6.6. 
As can be seen in Table 6.6, we hypothesised that WTA increases \.V-i.th: 
the informal caregiver's income; 
the fact that an informal caregiver is not \Villing to supply an additional hour of 
informal care (preference); 
the fact that the care recipient 1s on a waiting list for professional care 
(mstirutional); 
the number of hours of care already provided by the informal caregiver (scope); 
a higher subjective burden on the sub scales "disrupted schedule", "'financial 
problems", "lack of family support" and "loss of physical strength" (capability); 
a higher overall subjective burden (capability) and; 
providing informal care to a care recipient who also receives other informal care 
(responsibility). 
On the other hand we hypothesised that \VI' A decreases 'With: 
higher EQ-SD scores of the informal caregiver (capability) and the care recipient 
(scope); 
higher subjective burden on the sub scale "'care-derived self-esteem" (preference); 
providing informal care to a care recipient who also receives professional care 
(responsibility) and; 
having flexible working hours in a paid job as informal caregiver (l!lstitutional). 
To understand the reasoning behind the hypotheses, it is imponant to have some 
idea about the relative position of the caregiver to T* in Figure 6.1. Two sources of 
collected information give an indication. First, if the care recipient is on a waiting list for 
professional or residential care and second if the informal caregiver is unwilling to provide 
an additional hour of informal care. \Y/e expect a relatively higher WTA in both of these 
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cases. Subjective burden may have some relation 'With the relative position of informal 
caregivers in Figure 6.1. It gives an indication of the informal caregiver's direct (dis)utility. 
However, the exact nature of thls relationship is unclear. We do expect that higher 
subjective burden (meaning higher scores on the negative domains and lower scores on the 
positive domain) translates into higher \'VIA. In relation to health-related quality of life, we 
e::...-pect that a relatively low health-related quality of life of the informal caregiver and the 
care recipient lead to a higher \X!TA. For informal caregivers thls is e::...-pected because a lo'\v 
health-related quality of life implies a relatively lo'\V capability to care, and for the care 
recipient this relationship is e::...-pected because a relative low health-related quality of life 
implies more care demands. Moreover, it would help to confirm the validity of CVM in this 
context if informal caregivers consider the quantity of their current amount of provided 
informal care. \YJe name the latter t\Vo hy-potheses scope effects. It is worth nothing that 
this reading of scope effects differs from the common interpretation in the CVJ\1literature. 
Usually, tests for sensitivity to scope can be implemented either internally or externally 
(Carson et al., 2001). An internal test elicits the same respondents' \X!TP or \YJTA for 
different quantities of the commodity under valuation, while an external test elicits the 
WTP or \'VTA of different but statistically equivalent subgroups for different quantities of 
the commodity under valuation. Being the only person responsible for the provision of 
care may be relatively burdensome and therefore lead to a higher \'VTA. It is plausible that 
providing informal care for people 'With a paid job could involve for instance additional 
stress. Therefore, an informal caregiver with flexible working hours in a paid job would 
eA-perience fewer problems in combining informal care with his paid job and is therefore 
expected to require less compensation, ceteris paribus. Finally, \VTA answers, as opposed 
to WTP answers, are not as strictly influenced by budgetary constraints (income is often 
used as a prm,:y for the budget constraint). Yet in our application people with a higher 
income have higher opporruniry costs of prmriding informal care in terms of forgone paid 
work time and leisure (the shadow price of leisure is forgone paid work) compared to 
people 'Wi.th a relative lower income. Therefore, we expect that people 'With a relative higher 
income require more compensation compared to people 'Wi.th a relative lower income. 
6.4.3 Study sample 
The data for this study were collected as a supplement of the RA.+ study, a panel srudy of 
health care utilisation among people with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) Gacobi eta!., 2001) and 
Qacobi et al., 2003). In the 2001 wave of this panel, 365 of 683 care receivers indicated to 
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receive informal care. We approached all care receivers and asked the 365 receiving 
informal care to hand over our mail sunrey to their primary informal caregiver. Moreover, 
we asked all care receivers to complete a mail survey themselves. We included a question 
for the 318 care receivers without informal care if they perhaps currendy received informal 
care. If so, we also asked them to hand a mail survey over to their primary informal 
caregiVer. 
A total of 153 informal caregivers returned the mail survey and '\ve have data for 
149 pairs of care receivers and informal caregivers. The care receivers of four informal 
caregivers did not rettlm their survey. Moreover, 21 care receivers had deceased, 12 were 
irretrievably relocated and four respondents sent in their sunrey too late for analysis. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Background statistics 
Table 6.1 gives the descriptive statistics of the study sample. Just 24.7 percent of the 
informal caregivers are female. Tbis is striking because normally the majority of informal 
caregivers is female. An obvious e::..."Planation is that 91.5 percent of the informal caregivers 
are partners of the care recipient and the incidence of RA is much higher in '\vomen as 
compared to men. Informal caregivers' and care recipients' age ranges bet\\Teen 26.0- 87.1 
and 28.3 - 85.2 respectively. The occupation percentages add up to over 100 percent 
because some respondents indicate two main occupations. 
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Table 6.1: Characteristics informal caregivers and care recipients 
Characterisric 
Informal caregivers 
Agel 
Se.'X2 
Parrncr3 
Live together 
Ecbrcation 
Lo'l.v 
Middle 
High 
Ocmpation 
Paid job 
Flexible job 
House 'l.vorker 
Retired 
Disability pcn.-.ion 
lnconn4 
Incomt: 1 
Income 2 
Incomt: 3 
Income 4 
Income unknown 
Care recipient 
Agd 
Sex2 
Edlfcation 
Low 
Middle 
High 
Ocmpation 
Paid job 
HOU$e 'I.VOrker 
Recirt:d 
Disability pension 
:-.Jo 
'In years 
2 Pcm:nlag<' malts 
J Percentage partmrs 
4 Income 1 is tbc /ouJest cakgory and income 4 !be higbcst. 
Mean 
62.1 
75.3 
91.5 
87.6 
34.9 
46.3 
13.4 
35.3 
51.6 
17.7 
49.7 
7.2 
20.3 
4D.S 
19.6 
0.8 
13.8 
62.1 
16.1 
43.9 
38.5 
9.5 
15.4 
38.9 
32.2 
19.5 
10.1 
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Table 6.2 gives some other background characteristics of the study sample, such 
as care duration, the amount of informal care provided, subjective burden and EQ-5D 
scores. 
Table 6.2: Characteristics informal caregivers and care recipients 
Characteristic 
Informal caregivers 
C:rre dw:ation1 
Pc::rforming HDL t.1.sks2 
HDL 
Performing ADL usks2 
ADL 
Performing IADL tasks2 
IADL 
'Total informal c.1.re time 
Opportunity costs paid work2 
Opportunity costs unpaid \vork2 
Opportunity costs lcisurc::2 
CR.i\ subsc.'llc:: 1 
CRA subsole 2 
CRA subsc.'llc:: 3 
CRA subsole 4 
CRA subscale 5 
Subjc::ctivc:: burdc::n 0f AS) 
EQ-SD 
Care recipients 
EQ-SD 
Waiting Jist2 
Profc::ssion.'ll c.1.rc::2 
Other informal c:rr2-
1 Inycar.r 
:: In pcrcmtage 
Mean 
11.4 
94.1 
21.7 
37.3 
5.4 
68.6 
5.2 
27.1 
6.1 
8.0 
18.9 
13.2 
7.3 
12.2 
9.0 
29.4 
24.6 
0.78 
0.48 
5.9 
26.1 
68.0 
Min 
0.2 
0.5 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
5 
3 
5 
4 
11 
0 
-0.074 
-0.43 
Ma.x 
50.3 
115.5 
31.5 
26.0 
133.5 
25 
15 
25 
18 
35 
100 
The mean care duration is 11.4 years, reflecting the fact that rheumatoid arthritis 
is a slowly progressive disease. Si..x percent of the care recipients is on a waiting list for 
professional or residential care. Almost 40 percent of the informal caregivers perform ADL 
tasks while 68.6 percent of them perform IADL tasks and more than 90 percent perform 
HDL tasks. The EQ-5D scores of the informal caregivers are much higher than those of 
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the care recipients (0.78 versus 0.48). In order to provide informal care, informal caregivers 
sacrifice leisure (18.9 percent), unpaid work (8.0 percent) and paid work (6.1 percent). 
Many informal caregivers (67 percent) did not indicate what time use was sacrificed in 
order to prmride care. To some extent thls may have to do "\V.ith the fact that for most 
informal caregivers providing informal care has become part of their normal time use, 
given the average care duration of over 11 years. The mean CRA scores on the negative 
subscales 1 to 4 are relatively low compared to the ma..Jmum feasible scores (25, 15, 25, 20 
respectively), indicating a moderate burden on average. Moreover, the mean score on the 
positive subscale 5 is relatively high compared to its ma.'illnum (35) indicating that the 
informal caregivers in our sample derive a lot of self-esteem from providing informal care. 
6.5.2 Informal care tasks 
We asked respondents to indicate their favourite informal care task. Table 6.3 presents the 
answers on these questions. 
Table 6.3: Most favourite informal care task of informal caregiver in percentages and in 
mean 'W'TA 
Preferred informal care rask Percentage MeanWTA N Min Max 
Housework 64.1 9.72 91 0 31.76 
Pcrso=l c.ue 4.6 7.20 7 0.45 13.61 
Suppon 9.8 8.10 13 0.91 18.15 
Organisational t:l.sks 0 0 0 0 0 
Social suppon 4.6 8.70 6 4.54 11.34 
I don't \V:mt to provide :m additional hour 8.5 10.59 6 0 27.23 
Other t.'lsks. like 
····················· 
7.2 9.25 8 0 43.11 
Over 64 percent of the ID.formal caregivers indicate housework as their favourite 
informal care task. Nobody indicates organisational tasks as their favourite task, while 68.6 
percent of the informal caregivers perform organisational tasks (fable 6.2). In addition, 8.5 
percent of the informal caregivers is not -willing to provide an additional hour of informal 
care, and 5.9 percent of the informal caregivers care for a care recipient on a waiting list for 
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formal care. This means that at least 14.4 percent of the respondents appears to be at or 
beyond point T* in Figure 6.1. 
6.5.3 WTA 
We offered the informal caregivers a \XlTA start bid that they could either accept or reject. 
In the latter case, they could subsequently indicate a higher or a lower WTA. Table 6.4 
sho\VS the results of the WTA question. 
Table 6.4: Part of the respondents that accept or reject the WTA start bid for an additional 
hour informal care a week 
Start bid' Atcep.f 1.Vlcm.: Less? Mis.~ ]\..TJ A1can1 S.D. 1 Min1 J\1tD.....! 
4.54 34.3 31.4 2.7 31.4 35 6.19 3.03 0.00 13.61 
6.81 48.4 12.0 19.4 19.4 31 5.81 2.63 0.00 11.34 
9.08 52.3 18.2 13.6 15.9 44 9.67 5.34 0.00 27.23 
11.34 44.0 24.0 16.0 16.0 25 14.57 7.31 6.81 31.76 
13.61 50.0 222 22.2 5.6 18 14.32 9.79 0.00 43.11 
Tot~ 45.8 21.6 13.7 19.0 153 9.52 6.58 0.00 43.11 
1 EHroS 
:c Pacentagt's 
J J\.TtrllJbcr of ob.r1n'atiMs 
45.8 Percent of the informal caregivers accepted the start bid, 21.6 percent 
indicated a higher WTA than the offered start bid, and 13.7 percent indicated a lower \XlTA 
than the offered start bid. Finally, 19.0 percent did not answer the WTA question. The 
results in Table 4 indicate the existence of a starting point bias. We tested for starting-point 
bias by OLS-regression Mth WTA as dependent and the start bid as independent variable. 
Over 24 percent of the variance in \'VIA is explained by the start bid (t-value = 6.22 and p-
value <. 0001). If .._ve correct for general background characteristics the start bid is still 
significant (t-value = 5.82 and p-value < .0001). 
We corrected for starting point bias by running first an OLS-regression with the 
start bid as independent variable next to the other independent v"ariables in Table 6.5 and 
WlA as dependent variable. Then we predicted the corrected \XlTA per informal caregiver. 
Finally, we run an OLS-regression .._v-1th the corrected WTA as dependent variable and the 
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variables in Table 6.5 as independent variables. This corrected \VTA was used to test our 
hypotheses. 
6.5.4 Explaining WTA 
Tables 6.3 and 6.5 explain informal caregivers' 'WTA. Informal caregivers indicate a 
different WTA for different informal care tasks (Table 6.3). WTA varies from 7.20 Euro 
(personal care) to 10.59 Euro (not '\vi.l.ling to provide an additional hour). The latter 
informal caregivers indicate a higher mean \VTA compared to the others. This may imply 
that they are at or beyond point T* (Figure 6.1) and therefore require a higher amount of 
money to invest an additional hour in informal care. 
Table 6.5: Corrected 0 LS regression of 'WT A a 
Independenr variable Para.mcrcr csrllnarc Srandard error t-Value Frob> jTj 
Intercept" 21.81 9.18 2.38 0.0218 
Informal caregiver 
Dummy income 1 (1:::yes) -0.49 1.55 -0.32 0.7526 
Dummy income 2 (l:::yes)* 7.39 1.29 5.72 <.0001 
Dummy income 3 (1 :::ye$)* 7.27 1.44 5.05 <.0001 
Dummy income unkno\vn (1 :::yes}" -4.30 1.45 -2.97 0.0048 
Age -0.15 0.10 -1.50 0.1410 
Dummy se.....: (1:::m:Jc)A' 5.87 2.67 2.19 0.0335 
Dummy education 1 (1:::yes) 0.74 1.05 0.71 0.4344 
Dummy eduGJ.cion 2 (1:::yes) 0.58 0.98 0.59 0.5586 
Dummy paid job (1:::yes) -1.79 1.45 -1.23 0.2236 
Dummy house worker (1 :::yes)* 5.16 1.22 4.24 0.0001 
Dummy retired (1 :::yes) -1.39 1.38 -1.01 0.3173 
Dummy fle.....:ible job (1:::yes)* -5.35 0.79 -6.75 <.0001 
EQ-5D' 13.88 2.68 5.18 <.0001 
.Y.G.rgin::U hour IC -0.15 0.89 -0.17 0.8667 
Opportunity costs paid work (1:::yes)* -5.14 ? --
- . .J:J -2.21 0.0325 
Opportunity COSts unp::lld \VOrk 5.62 2.02 2.78 0.0080 
(l:::yes)* 
Opportunity costslcisure (l:::yes) 0.95 1.16 0.82 0.4185 
CRA subl 0.04 0.12 0.32 0.7504 
CRA sub2 0.16 0.14 1.14 0.2591 
CRA sub3* -OA-0 0.11 -3.66 0.0007 
CRAsub4 0.10 0.18 0.53 0.5993 
CR.>\ subS"' -0.38 0.11 -3.27 0.0020 
CO!!tinm·d on tbe next page 
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Indepcndenr variable 
Vas subjectivt: burden"' 
Dummy \'V'TA houst:\vork (1 =yes) 
Dummy \V'TA personal care (1 =yes)* 
Dummy \VfA mobility (l=yes) 
Dummy \VfA support (l=ycs)* 
Dummy\VfA I don't wam (l=yes)* 
Informal CU"e years 
Dummy relationship (1 = partner) 
Care recipient 
EQ-SD' 
Agt: 
Dummy sex (l=male)"' 
Dummy education 1 (l=yes)* 
Dummy education 2 (1=yes) 
Dummy c:u:t: recipient on waiting list 
(l=yt:s)" 
Paramerer esdmare 
-0.09 
-1.64 
-5.19 
-0.90 
6.04 
10.85 
-0.07 
-4.25 
-5.96 
-0.02 
7.10 
7.37 
1.40 
8.30 
Dummy cart: recipient receives -5.10 
proft:ssiom.l care (1=yes)"' 
Dummy other infotrr13.l c:tre (1 =yes) 1.89 
~ K' 0.8841.: At!i R1 0.7863 F 9.04: 1\t 84. 
* Significanl at tbe 95% confidence !ere/. 
Srand:ud error 
0.02 
1.21 
2.16 
1.51 
1.78 
2.07 
0.05 
3.32 
1.49 
0.09 
2.80 
1.29 
1.14 
1.85 
1.09 
0.98 
t-Va!ue 
-3.90 
-1.35 
-2.41 
-0.60 
3.39 
5.24 
-1.48 
-1.28 
-3.99 
-0.22 
2.54 
5.71 
1.23 
4.49 
-4.66 
1.93 
Prob> jTj 
0.0003 
0.1825 
0.0202 
0.5547 
0.0015 
<.0001 
0.1449 
0.2070 
0.0002 
0.8294 
0.0147 
<.0001 
0.2243 
<.0001 
<.0001 
0.0597 
Table 6.5 shows that .informal caregivers' \'V'TA can be explained by different 
characteristics of the caregivers: income, sex (men indicate a higher \'i7TA compared to 
women), occupation (housewife or househusband compared to other), informal caregivers' 
and care recipients' EQ-SD, opportucity costs (compared tO no opportucity costs), 
subjective burden ("lack of family support", "care-derived self-esteem", and VAS) and care 
tasks. Characteristics of the care recipients play also a role: sex (a higher \'V'TA in case of 
male care recipients), care recipients' education (low education leads to higher \'V'TA 
compared to high education). Being on a waiting list for professional or residential care 
raises the \VI A and receiving professional care lowers W'T A. 
124 Infom:al care: aN economic approacb 
6.5.5 Hypotheses 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show '\Vhether the results supported our hy-potheses. 
Table 6.6: Hypotheses 
H_vpochesis Independent variable Effect dependent variable Result 
Higher income:: Higher WIT A ACCI:.·pted 
2 Not \v"illing to supply an addiciorul hour Higher \VTA Aw .. -ptcd 
3 Cu:.;; recipient on \V~cing list Highc::r \VT A Acct:ptt:d 
4 :.:Vfore hours of inform::tl care Higher \'VTA Rejected 
5 Higher EQ-SD informill caregiver Lower WTA Rejected 
6 Higher EQ-SD care recipiL--nt Lm.ver \VfA Accepted 
7 Higher subjective burde:n "disrupted schedult:" Higher \VTA Rejected 
8 Higher subjt:ctivt: burden "fin.wclll prob!t":ms"' Higher \VfA Rejected 
9 Higher subjectivt: burden "lack of f:unily Higher \VTA 
support" 
Rejected 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Higher subjective burden "loss of physical Higher \'VTA 
stn:ngth'' 
Highc::r subjective burdo::n "cart:-derived sdf- Lo\ver \VfA 
Highc::r subjective burdt:n 0lAS) 
Care recipient rt:ccives professional can: 
Care recipient receives othcr inforrn..'ll cart: 
Flexibility of p:Ud work 
Higher \VfA 
Lo>ver\VfA 
Higher\VfA 
Lo\ver\VfA 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Many hypotheses are accepted. Especially the hypotheses concerning institutional 
factOrs (hypotheses 3 and 15), preferences (hypotheses 2 and 11), and responsibilities 
(hypotheses 13 and 14) are accepted. J:vforeover, the joint influence of the different income 
dummies on WTA is significant (F-value = 28.25, p-value < .0001) (hypothesis 1). One 
hypothesis about scope validity is accepted (hypothesis 6). 
Seven hypotheses are rejected. We tested the influence of the informal caregivers' 
cunent amount of time spent on informal caregiving (hypothesis 4) in three different ways: 
(1) By considering the total amount of time spent on informal care by care task, (2) by 
considering only the total amount of time spent on informal care and (3) by considering the 
required additional hour of informal care relative to the total amount of time spent on 
informal care. In all cases no statistically significant influence of the time investment on 
\VIA could be detected. Tills might imply that informal caregivers are insensitive for the 
current amount of time spent on caregiving when indicating their Wl A for providing an 
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additional hour. There is a statistically significant influence of the caregiver's EQ-SD on 
\VTA (hypothesis 5). The influence does, however, not have the e:: .. :pected negative sign. 
The different CRA sub scales and the VAS show a heterogeneous pattern. This may be 
partly the result of the fact that many of the subjective burden elements have a relationship 
with other variables. For instance, hypothesis 7 is rejected, but this may be related to the 
significant influence of opportunity costs. Similar relationships may exist bet\Veen the 
variables in hypotheses 8 and 1, those in hypotheses 9 and 14, and those in hypotheses 10 
and 5. Hypothesis 12 is also rejected. The influence of the self-rated burden on \TIA is 
significant but negative where a positive influence was expected. This is perhaps because 
the impact of "care-derived self-esteem" on total subjective burden is large. lvforeover, as 
we have seen in Table 3, the mean overall subjective burden is just 24.6, while the 
distribution is skew -with a median of 16, a 25 percent quartile score of 0 and a 75 percent 
quartile score of 40. Finally, the different care task dumrrlles (F-value :::::: 16.14, p-value < 
.0001) and the different opportunity cost dummies (F-value = 6.95,p-value = .0006) have a 
significant influence on \TIA. We did not formulate hypotheses to this effect. 
6.5.6 Non-response 
\Ve have seen in Table 6.3 that 19 percent of the informal caregivers are not willing to 
respond the \VTA question. Non-response analysis indicates that respondents who are 
un'\villing to indicate their \VTA are older (p-value < .0001), more often partner of the care 
recipient (p-value :::::: 0.0002), without a paid job (p-value :::::: 0.0069), more often situated in a 
relatively low CRA sub scale "financial problems" (p-value = 0.0453) and indicate a 
relatively low overall subjective burden (p-value:::::: 0.0004). 
In addition, due to rrllssing values of other independent variables, only 55 percent 
of all responses are used to test the hypotheses (Table 6.5). There are some statistically 
significant differences in the known informal caregiver characteristics used in and excluded 
from the OLS regression. Male informal caregivers are more likely to be excluded from the 
regression (p-value = 0.0030). This holds also for non-partners (p-value = 0.0053), 
informal caregivers without a paid job (p-value :::::: 0.0122), informal caregivers 'With a 
relatively low CRA sub scale "self esteem" score (p-value :::::: 0.0192), and informal 
caregivers with an unknown income (p-value :::::: 0.0428). 
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6.6 Discussion and conclusions 
If one takes a societal perspective in economic evaluations, informal care should be 
incorporated in the analysis. Therefore, it should be valued. If informal care is not the main 
focus of an economic evaluation, it should be valued in monetary terms to incorporate it 
on the cost-side of an economic evaluation. The valuation of informal care is however 
troublesome. Therefore, this chapter investigates the use of CVM in valuing informal care. 
The recommended opportunity cost and proxy good methods both seem unable 
to capture the full impact of informal care. CVlvf may be bener capable of fully valuing 
informal care, as it is more sensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of informal care. 
An important advantage of CVM compared to the other two methods is its ability to elicit 
informal caregivers' preferences and to provi.de a total valuation. That means that all 
informal caregiver's costs and benefits, as shown in Figure 6.1, in principle are taken into 
account and not just the informal caregivers' costs of caregiving or a societal pro::-..-y for 
those costs. The outcome of CVM: is a monetary value, which facilitates the incorporation 
of results in economic evaluations in which care recipients' effects are the primary outcome 
measure. Therefore, one could incorporate the impact of providing informal care for the 
informal caregiver valued \vith CV11 on the cost side of the cost-effectiveness ratio. The 
same kind of reasocing holds here as is, for instance, the case in incorporating both 
production losses and gains on the cost side of an economic evaluation (Torrance, 1986). 
Using additional measures of the impact of informal care in combination '\.V'ith 
CV11 may lead to a misrepresentation of the full impact of informal caregiving or to 
double counting of different costs or benefits. In principle, CV:l\{ could also be used for 
economic evaluations in the form of a cost-benefit analysis in which informal caregivers' 
effects are the primary outcome measure. Our results however, do not provide evidence 
about the sensitivity of CVM: in the context of informal caregivers' effects as the primary 
outcome measure in economic evaluations. We recommend future research in this area. 
Vie have presented the provision of informal care as an unrestricted and rational process. 
But if one '\.V'ishes to apply CVM: to incorporate informal in economic evaluations one has 
to recognise that there are in practice often combinations of informal and formal care. In 
addition, due to real life restrictions such as the rationing of professional care, the optimal 
amount of informal care from the viewpoint of the informal caregiver may not always be 
provided. l'Yioreover, in economic evaluations, an incremental approach is central, 
calculating the additional costs and benefits in comparison to some alternative. This implies 
that we have to measure the amounts of time spent on informal care by informal caregivers 
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under the t\VO different treatment regimes. The difference in time investment by informal 
caregivers between these alternatives should subsequently be valued in such a way that the 
results reflect the care siroation under srody. CVlvf is capable of providing such preference 
based net valuations. 
\'V'e presented in this chapter the results of a first application of CVM to value 
informal care. The mean \'\ITA for an additional hour of providing informal care was 9.52 
Euro. lvfost (almost 65%) informal caregivers preferred to provide an additional hour of 
housework. \Ve could therefore compare our result with the market \vage rate of a 
housekeeper. The tariff on the black market is 7.94 Euro and the ma.."Ximum tariff in the 
health care sector per hour housework is 22.83 Euro (Oostenbrink et al., 2000). So, 
compared to the tariff for professional trained housekeepers our results are quite low and 
more comparable -with the wage rate of unskilled housekeepers. 
We have seen that 67 percent of the informal caregivers revealed no opportunity costs of 
their time, while on the other hand 81 percent of the informal caregivers were willing to 
indicate their \'\ITA. On first sight this may imply an overestimation of the full impact of 
informal care when using WTA compared to the opportunity cost method. Ho\vever, 
probably many informal caregivers were not able to indicate their opportunity costs 
because they provided on average informal care for more than 11 years. Improved methods 
for assessing missed opportunities due to informal caregiving seem needed therefore. 
We have to be careful in generalising our results because our sample consisted of 
informal caregivers for care recipients \vith rheumatoid arthritis solely. The sample was 
rather small and there seems to be a non-random non-response. Older caregivers, partners 
liv-ing together \vith the care recipient and caregivers without a paid job and -with a relatively 
low overall subjective burden and subjective burden concerning financial problems due to 
providing care were statistically significant less 'Jl.illing to respond than their counterparts. 
Larger and more heterogeneous samples may provide stronger results and may enhance the 
generalisability of results. We also had to deal '\\,i.th starting point bias, probably a result of 
our dichotomous choice format -with open follow-up questions. In furore research, one 
could try to work with open-ended questions, despite of our negative eA-perience with this 
format in a small pilot of this srody. lvioreover, it would be interesting tO collect additional 
qualitative information in furore research about respondents' reasons for the values they 
stated as is, for instance, recommended by the NOAA.. panel (Arrow et al., 1993). Our 
srudy was not developed to test for scope effects. Furore research could develop tests for 
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scope effects to confirm the validity of C'Vlvf in the context of the valuation of informal 
care. 
Our empirical results indicate that C~ is sensitive too much of the 
heterogeneity and dynamics of informal care. Many hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical model and literature could be accepted, in particular those concerning income, 
institutional factors, preferences and responsibilities. TI1e t\VO hypotheses under the name 
scope showed a mi.-.;:ed pattern, however. Informal caregivers providing care to care 
recipients "Wi.th a relatively low health-related quality of life require ceteris paribus more 
compensation compared to their counterparts. However, the \'IT A of our respondents 
proved to be insensitive to the amount of informal care provi.ded, in contrast to our 
expectations. This of course may also reflect that the total amount of care provided is less 
important than od~er characteristics and perhaps even to some extent determined by these 
other characteristics, like subjective burden. The hy-pod1eses about informal caregivers 
capabilities especially measured by the negative dimensions and the overall subjective 
burden as well as informal caregiver's health-related quality of life were all rejected. 
Informal caregiver's health-related quality of life, subjective burden 'lack of family support' 
and overall subjective burden were statistically significant but had the \.vrong' sign, '\vhile 
the others were not statistically significant. An e::-..rplanation for this could be that informal 
caregivers do not experience that much subjective burden (on average 24.6 on a scale of 0-
100). The same holds for the negative domains and also for informal caregiver's health-
related quality of life (mean 0.78 with a ma.-...:imum of 1). Still, CVlvf seems able to capture 
much of the heterogeneity of informal care, as e.g. can be illustrated with its sensitivity to 
different care tasks provided. The different opportunity cost dummies had a significant 
effect on \'VIA indicating that informal caregivers who were able to indicate their 
opportunity costs seem to reflect their opportunity costs in their \VI' A. 
In advance, we questioned the applicability of CVM in the case of informal 
caregiving because it is suggested that financial considerations are often low on the 
informal caregiver's agenda (Smith and Wright, 1994). This could be a major problem in 
the elicitation of an informal caregiver's \'ITA. As we have seen, 81 percent of the informal 
caregivers were willing to e::-..rpress their \'VTA for providing an additional hour of informal 
care. This supports the application of CVM to value informal care. Therefore, we 
encourage the application of our approach in different populations. \"{!e hope that this 
chapter has demonstrated that CV1vf is a promising alternative valuation method for the 
economic valuation of informal care. 
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7 The economic value of informal care: 
A study of informal caregivers' and 
patients' willingness to pay and 
willingness to accept for informal care1 
Summary 
w·e provide a nnJJ test of the feasibility if using contingent z,·al11ation to value informal care. We start with a 
theoretical model if itifo17J1al caregiving and detive that willingness to PtlJ' depends positiz;e!J on 1vealth and 
negative!J on own health, whereas the efftct of otber's health is sign-ambiguous. These prediction.r are tested 
in two new datasets Oll patients' and caregivers' 1vif!ingness to pqy (WTP) and ni!!ingness to accept 
(WTA) for informal care. The data are generai!J consistent nith the theoretical predictions: JJJea!th general!J 
has a positive impact and own health a negative impact. Other's health has a mixed efftct. U:7e find on(y 
snJalf differences between WTP and WTA. Our findings suggest that contingent Z/a!Jtation may be a ttsejit! 
tecbnique to va!tte iriformal care in economic eval11ations if bea!th care. 
7.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that economic evaluations should adopt the societal perspective (Russell 
et al., 1996) and (Drummond et al., 1997). This means that everyone affected by the 
intervention should be considered and that all significant outcomes and costs that flow 
from the intervention should be counted (Russell et al., 1996). Informal care is a significant 
pan of the total care provided to care recipients with chro:rllc or terminal diseases (Norton, 
2000). In spite of this, the costs and effects of informal care, both for the informal 
caregiver and for the patient they care for, are often ignored in economic evaluations 
(Stone et al., 2000). This might be due to a lack of valuation methods that are both 
theoretically valid and empirically feasible. 
The existing literature on the valuation of informal care focuses on the informal 
caregivers, in particular on the valuation of the time spent on prmriding informal care. The 
two methods that have been proposed to value the time spent on providing informal care 
1 Based on Van den Berg. B., Bleichrodt., H .• Eeckhoudt. L, 2004. The economic value of informal care: 
A study of inforrn.'ll c:u:egivcrs' and patients' \·villingness to pay and '\Villingness to accept for inforrn.'ll care. 
Acc~tcd for publication Health Economics. 
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are the opportunity cost method and the replacement cost method. Neither of these 
methods accurately reflects the preferences of the informal caregiver and of the patient. 
The opportunity cost method values informal care by foregone wages and, therefore, 
ignores the (dis)utility that informal caregivers derive from providing informal care. For a 
cost analysis this is appropriate, for a full cost-benefit analysis the opportunity cost method 
is too narrow. The replacement cost method (also called pro::-..y, good method) values 
informal care at the price of the market substitute, professional care, and, therefore, 
assumes that informal care and professional care are perfect substitutes. This assumption is 
not realistic, however. The informal caregiver decided to provide informal care because he 
or the patient considered professional care too expensive or of too low quality (Gronau, 
1986), or because professional care is not available, e.g. when the patient is on a waiting list 
for professional care or out of a feeling of obligation. Valuing informal care at the price of 
professional care, in consequence, does not reflect the preferences of the informal 
caregiver and the patient. 
The valuation of the effects of informal care for the patient are rarely addressed, 
probably because it is believed that these \.v:ill be picked up by quality of life estimates. This 
belief may not be justified, however, because the common methods for valuing health-
related quality of life are unable to detect the interdependency ben.veen the preferences of 
patients and informal caregivers. For instance, the EQ-SD asks respondents to focus solely 
on their O'\vn health status. Such interdependencies can, however, be important in the 
provision of informal care. 
The aforementioned problems can in theory, be avoided by using the concept of 
'\villingness to pay (WTP) or \.V"illingness to accept (\'V"TA). The contingent valuation 
method (CV) is one '\vay to measure \V'TP or \'VTA. CV is rooted in applied welfare 
economics and direcdy elicits informal caregivers' and patients' preferences. The feasibility 
of applying CV to value informal care has been sho'\vn in chapter 6. That chapter, however, 
was somewhat ad hoc in that it lacked a formal theoretical model of the valuation of 
informal care. Hypotheses were merely formulated on the basis of a graphical model and 
on intuitive grounds. Chapter 6, moreover, focused mainly on the preferences of the 
informal caregivers. 
The aim of the present chapter is to extend the research initiated in chapter 6 into 
the feasibility of using CV to value informal care. We present an economic model of 
informal care that takes into account the perspectives of both the informal caregiver and 
the patient and that models the interdependencies in their preferences. We use this model 
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to derive hypotheses about the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept for informal 
care of the caregiver and the patient and about the effect of changes in certain key variables 
on the valuation of informal care. V/e then test these hypotheses in t\.vo ne'\v datasets. 
In '\Vhat follows, section 7.2 describes our theoretical model of informal caregiving 
and derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section 7.3 describes the t\"llO datasets, while 
section 7.4 results. Finally, section 7.5 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Theory 
7.2.1 The Informal Caregiver 
Consider fust the informal caregiver. \Y/e assume that the informal caregiver derives utility 
from consumption (Cic), his own health (hie), and the health of the patient (hp)· The patient 
receives both formal care (FC) and informal care (1C). We assume that informal care has a 
dh 
positive effect on the patient's health,~ > 0. To justify this assumption suppose that a 
patient has problems "'i.th mobility. Providing informal care for this patient may mean 
helping him with mov-ing around and, consequently, the mobility of the patient improves. 
Obviously, the more care is prov-ided, the more opportunities the patient has to move 
around and the more his mobility improves. Our conclusions are, however, not affected in 
dh 
case informal care does not improve the health of the patient,~ = 0. No assumptions 
are imposed about the effect of formal care on the patient's health. The informal 
caregiver's utility becomes: 
(1) 
where U1c is the caregiver's utility function. \vrhether this is a von Neumann-
Morgenstem utility function or any other ty-rpe of multi-attribute utility function is 
immaterial for our analysis. The only restriction '\ve impose on Uk is that it is increasing and 
concave in consumption, the caregiver's health, and the patient's health. 
As seems plausible, caregiving is more urgent the worse is the patient's health and 
we, therefore, assume that the effect of informal care on the patient's health is larger the 
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d2h;c 
worse is the health of the patient dhpdiC < 0. This latter assumption is not necessary; all 
d2hic 
conclusions derived below remain valid when dhpdiC = 0. 
Several studies suggest that informal care may have a negative effect on the 
informal caregiver's health (Hughes et al., 1999), (Schulz and Beach, 1999) and we, 
dh 
therefore, let di2 ::; 0. Because caregiving is more burdensome the worse is the health of 
the patient, we assume that the negative effect on the caregiver's health is larger the worse 
d2h 
is the health of the patient: dh d~C < 0. Again, this latter assumption is not necessary; all 
p 
d2h 
conclusions derived below remain valid '\vhen dhpd~C :::::: 0. 
Reflecting the institutional setting in the Netherlands ('\ve \.Vill use the data from 
tw"o Dutch samples tO test some predictions of the model), we take formal care as 
exogenously given. We also assume that the amount of informal care is exogenously given. 
\YJe believe that this assumption most closely mirrors the practice of informal caregivi.ng. 
Alternatively, we could take the amount of informal care as endogenous, i.e. as determined 
by the optimizing behavi.or of the caregiver. lvfodifying the analysis in this way does not 
change the predictions of the model as '\Ve show in Appendi' 1. 
The informal caregiver has .initial wealth \YJ;c and can earn labor income at wage 
rate r. The amount of time the informal caregiver can work depends on the amount of 
informal care he provi.des, assuming that there is no joint production betw"een paid work 
and providing informal care. The informal caregiver's budget constraint then becomes: 
W:, + r(1-IC) = C<o (2) 
Substitution of (2) into (1) gives: 
U" = Ui'(W<o + r(l-IC), h:,(IC), h,(IC,FC)) (3) 
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We can now determine the informal caregiver's willingness to pay for a decrease in the 
amount of informal care, defined as the ma.'illnum amount of wealth he is willing to give 
up for a decrease in the amount of informal care that he provides. That is, we seek to 
determine the amount .6. that solves 
U''(W;cb. + r(l-rC-8), h" (IC-8), h, (IC-o,Fq) = U''(W;, + r(l-rq, h>o(Iq, h,(IC,Fq) 
(4) 
Totally differentiating (3) gives: 
oh au, oh,, au, 
=--+----
arc oh, arc oh" 
auic 
aw,, 
(5) 
The first term in (5) represents the monetary gain from reducing the amount of informal 
care, additional labor income. The second term denotes the monetary value of the change 
in utility that follows a decrease in informal care. The sign of the second term is 
. ~ ~ . . 
amb.tguous, because CliC > 0 and CliC :::; 0. However, we found that mformal caregiVers 
generally want to pay for a reduction in the amount of informal care they provide, even 
when they have no paid job. This 
intuition behind this negative sign is that the informal caregiver provides more informal 
care than he considers optimal (recall that the amount of informal care is exogenously 
determined). That is, in the case of no wage income, the benefits of giving informal care 
oh au, oh· au, 
are less than the costs, or ~ Clhp + di 2 Clhic is negative. To also take into account the 
oh au, oh· au, 
possibility of zero \Villingness to pay, we assume that~ Clhp + CJI2 Clhic $ 0. 
Let us examine what happens if some key variables change. First we consider the effect of 
a change in the patient's health. From (5) we obtain: 
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(6) 
()2Uic 
The term CJhpdhic indicates how the informal caregiver's marginal utility of health 
changes \Vi.th the patient's health, and the term 
(J2Uic 
dh,dW,, indicates how the informal 
caregiver's marginal utility of wealth depends on the health of the patient. It might be 
reasonable to assume that both terms are nonnegative. We can see no plausible reason why 
the caregiver would value additional health or wealth less \Vhen the patient is in better 
health. On the other hand, it is conceivable that he values extra health or \vealth less if the 
(}2Uic CJ2Uic 
patient is in worse health. In that case, the terms dhpdh;c and ClhpdW;c are positive. If we 
(J2Uic ()2lJic 
assume that dhpdh;c and ClhpClW;c are both positive, then the first term in the numerator of 
(5) is negative. is zero then an increase in the patient's health 
dh dU'' dhi dU'' 
increases the caregiver's willingness to pay. If~ dhp + ar2 Clh;c is negative, the effect of 
a change in the patient's health on the amount the informal caregiver's willingness to pay is 
sign-ambiguous. 
The effect of the informal caregiver's health on his willingness to pay is equal to: 
We assume the marginal utility of wealth 
depends on health, is nonnegative. This assumptions is common in the literature on 
willingness to pay ((Jones-Lee, 1974), (Weinstein et a!., 1980)) and there exists some 
empirical evidence to support it ((Viscusi and Evans, 1990), (Sloan et a!., 1998)). 
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(J2Uic 
Hammerschmidt et al. (2004) found, however, that 
ah,oaw" 
()Vic 
rs negative. 
nonnegative then Clhic is negative. Hence, the better the caregiver's health status, the less 
he is willing to pay to reduce the amount of informal care that he prov--ides. In the 
derivation of (J) we assumed that the effect of informal care on the patient's health and on 
the informal caregiver's health do not depend on the health of the informal caregiver. It 
seems conceivable that the positive effect of informal care on the patient's health increases 
with the caregiver's health and that the negative effect of informal care on the caregiver's 
heald~ is less the better is the caregiver's health. The conclusions are not affected if 1.ve 
make these assumptions. 
The effect of the informal caregiver's wealth on ills willingness to pay is equal to: 
(8) 
Under the assumptions made above, the first term in the numerator of (8) is sign-
ambiguous, the second term is positive. It seems reasonable, however, that ceteris paribus 
the effect of the patient's health on the caregiver's marginal utility of wealth is small 
compared to the other terms in (8). If so, the effect of wealth on willingness to pay for a 
reduction in informal care is positive, i.e., the illgher the caregiver's wealth, the more he is 
\\-illing to pay for a reduction in the amount of informal care. 
7.2.2 The Patient 
Let us next consider the patient. We assume that the patient derives utility from his 
consumption (cp), the informal caregiver's health, and ills O\Vn health. The patient's utility is 
increasing and concave in all its arguments. Due to his illness, the patient does not engage 
in labor market activities. Besides informal care, the patient may also receive formal care. 
The price of formal care is set, ..... vithout loss of generality, equal to 1 per unit of formal care. 
As before, the amount of formal care and the amount of informal care are exogenously 
given. The patient's utility is equal to 
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UP= UP(c,, h,,(IC), h,(IC,FC)), (9) 
'\vhere UP is a general multiattribute utility function. The patient's budget constraint is: 
W, = c,+ FC (1 0) 
and thus 
UP= Ue(w, + FC, h,,(IC), h,(IC, FC)) (11) 
The patient's \v'illingness tO pay for increases in informal care is defined as the amount .6. 
that solves 
and is equal to: 
ah, aue ahk aue 
--+--
- dWp _ arc ah, arc ah,, 
VP - - drc - aue (13) 
aw, 
ah, ah,, 
Because arc > 0 and arc :£ 0, (13) is sign-ambiguous. We found, however, that 
patients are willing to pay for increases in the amount of informal care, and hence, it seems 
. ah, aue ah,, aue . . . . . 
plaus1ble to assume that CliC Clhp + arc dh;c 1s posmve. G1ven that the amount of 1nformal 
care is e..xogenously given, this positive sign suggests that the amount of informal care the 
patient receives is less than he considers optimal. 
We next consider the effect of changes in the key variables, starting v.-"i.th the effect of a 
change in the patient's health. 
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(14) 
As noted, empirical evidence suggests that the marginal utility of wealth increases 
d'Ur 
\Vi.th own health and, therefore, dh d\YJ ;:::: 0. It is further conceivable that the patient 
p p 
enjoys increases in his own health at least as much when the informal caregiver is in good 
health than when 
assumptions, 
avr 
dh, 
d2Ur 
he is in bad health. This implies that dhpdh" ;;:::: 0. Under these 
1s negative and willingness to pay for increases in informal care 
decreases with the patient's health. Tbis seems plausible: the better the patient's health the 
less he needs additional informal care and the less he ""i.ll, in consequence, be '-villing to pay 
for additional informal care. 
Equation (15) shows the effect of the informal caregiver's health on the patient's 
·\villint:>o-ness to pay. 
d2U' dh aur dh;, aur r=-+--) 
dh<odW, 'd!C dh, d!C dh" 
d2Ur 
(15) 
It seems reasonable to assume that dh;cJ\Vp is nonnegative. That is, the patient 
enjoys extra wealth at least as much when the caregiver is in good health than when he is in 
bad health. If so, under the assumptions already made, (15) is sign-ambiguous. Adding 
assumptions about how the effect of informal care on the patient's health and on the 
informal caregiver's health depends on the health of the caregiver does not change this 
conclusion. 
Finally, consider the effect of changes in wealth on the patient's \.Vil.lingness to pay 
for an increase in informal care: 
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dVP 
aw, (16) 
The flrst tern of (16) is sign-ambiguous, the second negative. It might be e::-..-pected, 
ho'.vever, that ceteris paribus the effect of the informal caregiver's health on the patient's 
d'U' 
marcinal utili tv of wealth, , , , is small compared to the other terms in (16). If so, (16) 0 
• - ohicUWp- · 
is positive and the patient's willingness to pay for an increase in informal care will increase 
with income. 
The theoretical predictions derived in this section are summarized in Table 7.1. 
The table shows the effect on the informal caregiver's and the patient's '-villingness to pay 
of the three key variables wealth, patient's health, and informal caregiver's health. A plus-
sign indicates a positive relationship, a minus-sign indicates a negative relationship, and a 
question mark means sign-ambiguous. 
Table 7.1: Theoretical predictions 
+ + 
7.3 Methods 
We collected t\VO sets of data to test the predictions of our theoretical model, summarized 
in Table 1. The first data set consisted of patients \Ni.th rheumatoid arthritis (RA.) and their 
informal caregivers. These data were collected as a supplement of the RA + srudy, a panel 
study of health care utilisation among people with RA (Gacobi et a!., 2001), Gacobi eta!., 
2003)). In the 2001 wave of this panel, 365 out of 683 care recipients indicated to receive 
informal care. We mailed them a postal survey. Moreover, we asked them to hand over an 
enclosed survey to their primary informal caregiver. Because we collected the data as a 
supplement to the RA + study, patients were encouraged by their physicians to participate. 
The second data set was collected sh months after the RA sample with the aid of 
Dutch regional support centres for informal caregivers. \Ve approached 59 regional centres, 
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40 of which were 'Willing to participate in the research. Through these centres, we sent 3258 
postal surveys to informal caregivers and asked them to hand over an enclosed survey to 
the patient they cared for. We refer to this data set as the heterogeneous (HET) sample. 
In both samples we determined patients' \.villingness to pay (WTP) for an 
additional hour of informal care per week and their v,rillingness to accept (\"'VIA) for a 
reduction by one hour in the amount of informal care they currently received. For the 
informal caregivers we determined their WlA to provide an additional hour of informal 
care per \.veek and their \VTP to reduce the amount of informal care they prov-i_ded by one 
hour per week. In the latter case we told them that another caregiver would provide that 
hour of care instead. \Ve feared that if we did not tell the caregivers that their care would 
be replaced, some of them would be unwilling to answer because the care recipient needed 
the care. Note that the replacement of care does not affect our theoretical predictions. 
dh 
Assuming that the difference in quality of the care is negligible, it follows that ()I~ > 0. It is 
dh 
easily verified that setting~= 0 in Eqs. (6) - (8) does not affect the entries of Table 7.1. 
The full wording of the questions is given in Appendi.'\. 1. In case the patient was a 
child or the patient was not able to fill in the sunrey due to his health problems, the parents 
or the informal caregiver were asked to complete the 'objective' part of the survey, 
questions like gender and age. They were instructed not to fill in the 'subjective' questions 
like \VTP or WTA. 
There is a continuous debate about payment formats in CV srudies. Open-ended 
questions might be the best way to elicit respondents' ma.>dmum or minimum prices 
because this question format does not involve any of the biases that have been identified in 
the literature. :i\iitchell and Carson (t{itchell and Carson, 1986) showed that open-ended 
questions work smoothly when respondents are familiar '\vith the concept under valuation. 
We felt that this condition is fulfilled for the valuation of informal care. In the pilot study 
for RA we found, however, that respondents had difficulties with the open-ended question 
format. \Y/e therefore opted for dichotomous questions '.V-i_th open-ended follow up. The 
respondents could either accept or reject a bid of x Dutch guilders, where x was one of 
{10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. This corresponds to the follov:Jing amounts in Euros: {4.54, 6.81, 9.08, 
11.34, 13.61 }. The bids were randomly allocated to the respondents. If a respondent 
rejected the bid, he was asked to state the bid that he would accept. This kind of approach 
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has been successfully applied before (Baarsma, 2000). In the HET sample '\ve used open-
ended questions, because these questions worked well in the pilot tests of this srudy. 
In both samples, we measured health-related quality of life of the informal 
caregivers and the patients through the EQ-SD algorithm (Dolan, 1997). In the RA-
popuhtion, '\ve also measured the impact of providing informal care on the informal 
caregiver through the Caregiver Reaction Assessment (CRA.) (Qacobi et al., 2003), (Given 
et al., 1992)). In the RA sample, we used postal codes as a prm,-y for household wealth. It 
has been shown that thls proxy method is reliable (Smits et al., 2002). In the HET sample, 
the patient and the caregiver were asked to state their net monthly family income. The time 
spent on providing informal care was measured by presenting a list of si.-..;:teen care tasks. 
Informal caregivers were asked to report the time they spent on these tasks during the 
week preceding the intervie'\v. 
Patients were asked whether they received any other informal care and 
professional home care and whether they were on a waiting list for professional care. 
Informal caregivers were asked whether they had paid work, about their social relationshlp 
'\Vith the patient, whether they lived together 'With the patient, and how many years they 
already provided informal care. Finally, patients and informal caregivers were asked some 
socio-demographlc questions. 
7.4 Results 
One hundred forty nine pairs of patients and their informal caregivers completed the RA 
survey, a response rate of 40.8%. Four hundred forty-four pairs of patients and their 
informal caregivers completed the HET survey. There were also 65 patients in the HET 
survey who completed a survey 'Without their informal caregiver returning the questionnaire 
and 421 informal caregivers who completed the questionnaire 'Without their patient 
returning the questionnaire. Hence, the final HET sample consisted of 509 patients and 
865 informal caregivers, which amounts to a response rate of 21.1 %. An explanation for 
the difference in response rate bet\Veen the RA and the HET sample may be that in the RA 
sample, physicians supported the research and stimulated participation, while in the HET 
sample there were no such incentives to participate. 
7.4.1 Sample characteristics 
Table 7.2 gives background information about the patients and their informal caregivers. 
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Table 7.2: Characteristics care recipients and informal caregivers 
Characteristic 
Care recipients 
Age (m years) 
Se."\ (percent.'l£;e males) 
Ed11calion (percentagl'.>) 
Low 
11idclle 
High 
EQ-SD 
Waiting list (percentnge) 
Professional care (percentage) 
Other informal care (percent.1.ge) 
Incon/1' (percmtages) 
Income low 
Income middle 
Income high 
Income unknown 
Net monthly family income {Euro) 
Informal caregivers 
Age (rn years) 
Sex (percentnge males) 
Partner (percentage) 
Live together (percentage) 
Paid job (percentage) 
Educalion (pe·ra:ntageJ~ 
Low 
1-lidcllc 
High 
Income (percentagu) 
Income low 
Income middle 
Income high 
Income unkno\\n 
i\!et monthly family income {Euro) 
Care duration (m years) 
Total informal care time (hours per week) 
EQ-SD 
Mean RA sample 
62.1 
16.1 
43.9 
38.5 
9.5 
0.48 
5.9 
26.1 
68.0 
22.8 
41.6 
24.2 
9.4 
N/A 
62.1 
75.3 
91.5 
87.6 
36.9 
34.9 
46.3 
13.4 
22.8 
41.6 
24.2 
9.4 
N/A 
11.4 
26.4 
0.82 
2.26 
Mean HET sample 
66.6 
48.8 
52.1 
31.0 
12.1 
0.30 
11.5 
58.3 
41.6 
N./A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1371.3 
60.2 
2.3.3 
48.9 
58.2 
23.4 
37.9 
44.7 
16.0 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
1627.28 
8.7 
49.0 
0.75 
N/A CRA loss of physical strength 
N 149 509 patientS and 865 informal 
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The table sho'\vs that there are some differences bettveen the t\:vo samples. In the case of 
RA, almost 90 percent of the caregivers live together with their patient, in the HET sample 
this is true in approximately 60 percent of the cases. Other differences are that the 
proportion of male patients is higher in the HET sample, that quality of life, both of the 
patient and of the caregiver, is lo'\ver in the HET sample, and that the amount of informal 
care provided (in mean hours per week) is substantially higher in the HET sample. 
Table 7.3 gives the diseases of the patients and the informal caregivers. 
Table 7.3: Percentage patients and informal caregivers '\vi.th certain disease in HET 
Diseases 
Respir:J.tory disc::ases 
Circulatory disc::asc::s 
Digestive diseasc::s 
Endocrine::, mc::tabolic and nutritional diseases 
Musculoskeletal dist.--asc::s 
Neurological clis~sc::s 
Skin diseases 
Psychological disc::ases 
N 
1 Rrporkd I!)· tbt in.fom;a/ cartgin·r 
7.4.2 WTP and WTA 
Paticnt1 Informal caregiver 
0.07 0.29 
0.19 0.45 
O.Q7 0.09 
0.08 0.13 
0.27 0.67 
0.28 0.56 
0.05 0.06 
0.20 0.16 
865 865 
The response rate for the \X1TP /\VTA questions ranges from 75.2% to 82.6% in the RA 
sample and from 51.2% to 63.9% in the HET sample. Within samples, there is not much 
difference in response rates betureen the WTP and the 'WT A questions. 
Table 7.4 shows the mean and median results of the WTP and 'WTA questions. In 
both samples, \TIA is higher than \VTP. In all but one case the difference is significant. 
The difference benveen \VTA and \X!TP is relatively small compared to CV studies that 
valued other types of "goods''. These studies typically found that \VTA was at least two 
times larger than \VTP (Horo\Ni.tz and McConnell, 2002). Despite the different payment 
formats in the t\.vo populations, both mean and median \'VTP and 'WTA are quite similar. It 
is '\vorth nothing, however, that \'VTP for the informal caregiver is slightly overestimated 
because we told subjects that the hour of care they would pro·vide less would be replaced. 
This means 
oh, 
that arc will be approximately zero, instead of positive when there is no 
compensation, and (4) shows that \X!TP is higher than when there is no compensation. 
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Table 7.4: Results CV questions in Euro 
;.'vk'= \\ITP SD Me:m\VTA SD Diffen:nce Meclim :Medi:1.n 
(n) (n) \VI'P-\VTA \'X'TP \\ITA 
RA 
C::u:e recipients 7.84 (120) 4.43 8.22 (112) 4.13 P=0.1789 6.81 6.81 
Inform.'ll 7.80 (114) 4.58 9.52 (123) 6.61 p ~ 0.00i7 9.08 9.08 
ctregivcrs 
HET 
C:u:e recipients 6.72 (325) 5.30 8.62 (308) 6.41 p < 0.0001 6.81 6.81 
Info:rmal 8.61 (443) 5.73 10.52 (503) 6.80 p < 0.0001 6.81 9.08 
c:u:egivers 
\XlTP and \'\ITA are lower than the formal market tariffs for professional home 
care in the Netherlands. In 2002, the ma.-..Qmum price for professional housework was 26.70 
euro and the ma..-..Qmum price for professional personal care was 34.10 euro. This ma..ximum 
pnce was set by an agency responsible for setting the ma..-..Qmum prices for health care 
services. 
7.4.3 Estimations 
We next present empirical results on the relation between \VIP and \Vf A and income and 
both the patient's and the informal caregiver's health-related quality of life. We tried several 
functional forms for the relation, including logarithmic and quadratic specifications. The 
models that we present are those that fitted the data best. Conclusions are not affected by 
only presenting the models that best fitted the data: it '\Vas never true that a variable that 
was statistically insignificant in the models presented was statistically significant in any of 
the other models. We estimated all models by ordinary least squares 'With robust standard 
errors. 
As discussed before, in case of RA there may be a starting-point bias and we, 
therefore, corrected for the provided start bids by means of an independent variable. \VJe 
did not have income information for a substantial part of the Rt\ sample. \YJe, therefore, 
used dummy variables, including a dummy '"income unknown", to test for the effect of 
income. 
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Table 7.5: Informal caregivers' and patients' log \XiTP and log WTA in the RA. sample (P 
values in parentheses) 
Independent variables Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent 
variable: Informal v"ari.1.ble: Informal variable: Patients· variable: Patients· 
caregivers'log caregivers· log log\\7TA logWTP 
WTA \VTP 
St:ut bid 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.03 
(0.000) (0.135) (0.000) (0.146) 
Dummy income low -0.36 -0.48 0.23 0.11 
(me. middle = ref.) (0.070) (0.033) (0.100) (0.544) 
Dummy income high -0.05 -0.22 0.28 0.29 
(me. middle = ref.) (0.810) (0.229) (0.019) (0.015) 
Dummy income 0.13 -0.47 0.02 -0.08 
unkno'Wn (0.317) (0.020) (0.905) (0.616) 
(inc. middle = ref.) 
Informal caregiver"s -1.64 0.70 
heolth (0.118) (0.342) 
Informal c:1Iegiver's 1.29 -0.74 
health2 (0.138) (0.190) 
Patient's health 0.49 -0.64 
(0.241) (0.001) 
Patient's health2 -1.17 0.50 
(0.118) (0.129) 
Intercept 1.43 2.28 1.59 1.73 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R' 0.19 0.11 0.26 0.08 
F-test for income 3.36 0.65 2.37 3.18 
dummies (0.038) (0.525) (0.098) (0.045) 
N 121 113 109 120 
Table 7.5 summarizes the data for the RA. sample. The start bid has a higher coefficient in 
the regression for \VT A than in the regression for \'VfP both for informal caregivers and 
for patients. Moreover, the start bid is only statistically sigrllficant in the regression for 
WTA. This suggests that the start bid has led to an upward bias in WTA, but not in \'VfP. 
The influence of .income on WTP and WTA is largely in line 'Nith our theoretical 
predictions. If statistically sigcificant, the dummy for low income is negative and the 
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dummy for hlgh income is positive. Income has no significant impact on informal 
caregivers' \VTP: the F-test for the joint influence of the income dummies is insignificant. 
Ovm health has the predicted negative effect on patients' \'VTA; in all other 
regressions the impact of own health (i.e. the impact of caregiver's health on caregivers' 
\V!A and WTP and of patient's health on patients' \VTP) is not statistically significant. No 
statistically significant evidence of other's health (i.e. patient's health on caregivers' \X!TA 
and \VTP and caregiver's he:llth on patients' \'VTA and \\7TP) is observed. Measuring 
informal caregiver's he:llth "With the CRA subsc:lle "loss of physical strength' instead of the 
EQ-SD did not affect the above conclusions. 
Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9 report the results for the HET sample. Because the 
HET sample consisted of patients and inform:ll caregivers with various diseases there is a 
danger ofheteroskedasticity. \\7e therefore divided HET into different subgroups. 
Table 7.6: Informal caregiver's log \'VTA in the HET sample (P values in parentheses) 
Independent vari.1.bles A B c D E 
Log monthly income -0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 
(0.422) (0.763) (0.897) (0.325) (0.960) 
Informal C:tregivcr's hcalth 1.51 -0.45 -0.53 -0.27 
(0.086) (0.008) (0.005) (0.059) 
Informal caregiver's hc:llth2 -1.64 -0.41 
(0.032) (0.010) 
Patient's hcal.th 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.10 0.11 
(0.615) (0.214) (0.054) (0.381) (0.358) 
Paticnt's hcalth2 -0.68 -0.56 -0.44 -0.27 -0.43 
(0.041) (0.069) (0.086) (0.141) (0.123) 
Const:mt 3.03 2.40 2.82 3.07 2.51 
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
R' 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 
N 94 166 94 172 182 
Note:: .mbgronp A - Rt:spiratOl)' diseases; .mbgrrmp B - Cirmlatory di.scasa; s11bgroup C - Digatit•e diseases; EndocriliiJ 
JJ!elabofi.c and n11tritional di.rea.rc.r; Skin di.rta.re.r; P{Ytbo!ogical Jiga.ra; sl!bgro11p D = iVfusculosl::.elctal di.reaSt'.S; mbgro:rp E = 
l\lwrolo~gica/ diseases 
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Table 7. 7: Informal caregiver's log WTP in the HET sample (P values in parentheses) 
V:u:Ublc A B c D E 
Log monthly income:: 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.31 
(0.261) (0.014) (0.038) (0.015) (0.006) 
Infonn.'ll aro::givds health ·0.64 1.82 1.74 1.87 1.42 
(0.026) (0.077) (0.129) (0.055) (0.173) 
Inform::J c:u:cgivcr's health: -1.58 -1.42 -1.73 ·1.30 
(0.046) (0.127) (0.028) (0.109) 
P::tcient's ho::alth 0.30 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.25 
(0.018) (0.033) (0.040) (0.042) (0.057) 
P::tticnt's ho::alth2 
Constant 1.67 0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.63 
(0.046) (0.936) (0.994) (0.971) (0.480) 
R' 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.10 
N 88 148 86 153 164 
Note:: .wbgro11p A - Rt:.rpira!Of]' &reases; SHb~~ro1rp B - Ciradator:y diseases; Slfb~f!.roitp C - Digatit•t diua.rcs; End!Jcrinc, 
n:dabo/ic and nlflritional disi'O.\o·; Skin dist•a.ra; P!)·cho/ogical diseases; .orbgro11p D = kfmm/{)J-/:;dttal diseases ;s11bgroup E = 
1-lmro/ogica/ diseases 
Table 7.8: Patient's log WTA in the HET sample (P values in parentheses) 
Variable A B c D 
Log monthly income 0.03 -0.02 
(0.805) (0.896) 
Inform::J cart:givds hellth 1.00 -0.81 -0.09 
(0.324) (0.358) (0.906) 
Inforrn:U c:rrcgiver's health2 -1.14 0.57 -0.02 
(0.261) (0.440) (0.973) 
P:1.cienr's he:tlth 0.93 0.38 0.54 0.11 
(0.126) (0.218) (0.101) (0.712) 
Pacitm's he:Jth~ 
-1.82 -0.90 -0.85 -0.41 
(0.052) (0.086) (0.061) (0.306) 
Constant 1.95 2.20 2.10 2.31 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.010) 
R' 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 
" 
74 124 165 133 
l'\Totc: s~rbgro11p A - Rt_o,rpirofOIJ' di..>cascs; Digestit·e disem·cs; Endocrine, m•Jabolic atld tllllritiot!ol diseases; Shfl dis!'aS/'.1·; 
Pi)•tbologico/ diseasa SHIJ._f!.roitp B = Grcula!Ot]' diseasa sHbgro~tp C = L'vftrsm/oJh.lcta/ discascJ~· S!dl._f!.!wtp D = 1\Tt'lrro!ogico/ 
discasa 
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Table 7.9: Patient"s log WTP in the HET sample (P values in parentheses) 
Va.ri:J.blc A B c D 
Log monthly income 0.24 0.21 
(0.071) (0.071) 
Informal caregiver's health 1.39 0.06 
(0.199) (0.339) 
Informal caregiver's health~ -1.25 
(0.158) 
P:~tient'::; health 0.60 1.03 
(0.100) (0.033) 
Patient's he:Uth~ -0.66 -0.87 -1.38 
(0.038) (0.133) (0.048) 
Const.w.t 1.91 1.57 -0.01 0.29 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.995) (0.721) 
R' 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 
N 105 126 128 183 
Note:: Sllb!!fOHP A IV.·spiralol)' diseas/'J: Digcstiz:e diseases: Endocrine, metabolic and n11tnlional diseases: Skin diseases; 
Prycbological di..rtases; .mf::::,aro1tp B = CircHialo!)• diSI'ascs; .mbgroup C = Mltsatloshklol diseases: s11bgroflp D = Nmrological 
disu;.ra 
The stratification was based on the informal caregivers' and patients' illnesses. W'hen there 
were not enough :respondents per illness, we clustered them. The criterion was that there 
should be at least 50 respondents per subgroup and that there should be no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in the resulting subgroups. As the tables show, the goodness of fit of the 
various models, as measured by the adjusted R2 is low ID some subgroups, which means 
that we should interpret the results with caution. 
The effect of income on \TIP and \VTA is mi-.::ed. Income has the predicted 
positive effect on ID.formal caregivers' \VTP and, in two out of four subgroups, on patients' 
\VTP. In all other cases, the effect of income is not statistically significant. 
Own health generally has the predicted negative effect in general ID.formal 
caregivers' 'WTA and 'WTP decrease with caregivers' health and patients' \VIA and \VTP 
decrease with patients' health. In some cases the effect of patients' health is inverse U-
shaped; \TIP and \TI A rise first as O\\ITI health improves, then they fall. 
The impact of other's health is mi-.::ed. Patient's health has generally a negative 
impact on informal caregivers' \VIA, but a positive impact on caregivers' \"VfP; there is no 
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statistically significant effect of caregiver's health on patients' \'VTA and the effect on 
patients' \'V'TP is inverse U-shaped. 
7.5 Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to test in further detail whether CV can be used to value 
informal care. To that end "ve specified a theoretical model of informal caregiving and 
tested "vhether WTP and \VT A satisfied the predictions that we derived from that model. 
Of course, one could object that a violation of these hypotheses might indicate a 
misspecificarion of the model. The model was rather general, however, and based on 
findings from the empirical literature. We, therefore, e::..-pect that most caregivers and 
patients behave approximately in the way specified by the model. Hence, if people are able 
to come up '\Ni.th meaningful answers to CV questions, then we would expect that their 
responses are to a large extent in line with the specified model. 
With respect to the impact of income, we generally find the predicted positive 
effect in the RA sample and, to a lesser extent, in the HET sample. 0"\V!l health generally 
has the predicted negative effect in the HET sample, but in the RA sample we only observe 
it for patients' \"'Q'TA. The effect of other's health (for instance patient's health on 
caregiver's \'V'TP and \'VTA and vice versa) varies. Recall that our model made no 
predictions regarding this effect. We tentatively conclude that our findings are generally in 
the direction predicted by the theoretical model, even though the effects are not always 
statistically significant and some dev-iations exist. 
An encouraging finding for the use of CV to value informal care is that we find 
only small differences between \'V'TP and \'iff A. The mean WTP is in all cases lower than 
the mean \VIA and the ratio of mean \VIA over mean W!P ranges from 1.0 in case of 
RA care recipients to 1.3 in case of HET care recipients. These ratios are quite small 
compared to other studies that report \'VTA/\X7TP ratios ranging from 1.4 (Eisenberger 
and Weber, 1995) to 61.0 ((Brookshire and Coursey, 1987), (Brown and Gregory, 1999)). 
For the medians the ratios are even closer to 1, only for informal caregivers in the HET 
sample is the ratio different from 1 (1.3). The reason why '-Ve find small disparities between 
\X7TA and WTP might be that our subjects have relatively well-defined preferences over 
informal care. Most likely they have thought about how much they would be willing to 
spend on additional care. In the other studies that have been reported in the literature, 
people are often asked for their valuation of goods on which they have spent litde thought. 
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In such cases, people's preferences are likely to be more affected by biases (Fischhoff, 
1991). These biases can explain the often huge differences bet\Veen \"VTP and \'VTA. 
In most applications of CV to health only WTP was asked ((Diener et al., 1998), 
(Olsen and Smith, 2001)). An exception is a study of Borisova and Goodman (2003), 
whose findings about the disparity between WTP and WTA are in line with ours. They 
applied CV to value travel time and found a ratio between \VIA and WTP of 1.3. 
Let us finally discuss two limitations of our study that may be addressed in future 
research. A first problem may be that the observed explanatory power of our models, in 
particular in the HET sample, was rather low. It should be kept in mind though that low R2 
values are not uncommon in e::...-plaining individuals' subjective valuations. Objective 
variables do not fully e::...-pla.i.n individual choices since the importance of personality on 
determining individual well-being cannot be ignored. A recent rev-i.ew suggests that 
objective socio-economic and demographic variables can e::...-plain up to 20% of individual 
well-being (Kahneman et al., 1999a). E::...-phnatory values that are comparably low as ours 
have been observed in other CV studies in health Qohannesson et al., 1993). A second 
limitation is that we did not test for scope effects: the finding that valuations are insensitive 
to the size of the effect. In our study this might have meant that respondents had the same 
WTP for, say, a NlO hour increase in informal care as for a one hour increase in informal 
care. It is well known from previous studies that scope effects can be important ('l eung et 
al., 2003). Whether they also affect the valuation of informal care remains to be tested. 
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Appendix 1. 
We show that taking informal care endogenous does not change our conclusions. We 
determine the optimal amount of informal care that the informal caregiver '.Vi.ll supply. His 
optimisation problem is: 
ma.x L = U''(cio, h"(IC), h,(IC,FC)) + A.(c"- W" -r((l-IC)). 
c;" IC, A. 
(Al) 
The flrst order conditions are: 
(AZ) 
ilL ilU'' ()h" dU'' ilh 
arc = ilh" arc + ilh, ~ + A.r = 0 
(A3) 
ilL 
dA = c"- w,,- r(l-rC) = 0 (A4) 
Totally differentiating (Al) gives 
dA.(c"- W" -r((J-rq) +A.( de"- dW" + rdiC) = 0 (AS) 
CJUic 
By (AZ), (-=;-- + A )de" = 0 and by (A4) Cio- W"- r(l-rC) = 0. Hence, we are left with 
UC1c 
(A6) 
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Or 
(A7) 
dUe dUic 
By (A2), A= --a . = -aw· , and hence we arrive back at (5). Note that this does 
C1c 1c 
not mean that 'Willingness to pay will be the same. In fact, from (A3) we know that 
willingness to pay at the optimum amount of informal care is zero, whereas in (5) it may 
well be different from zero (when informal care is not at its optimal level). The predictions 
of the effects of changes in wealth, the patient's health and the informal caregiver's health 
on willingness to pay are, however, similar and tills is what we intended to sho\.V. 
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Appendix 2 
Informal caregiver WTA 
Suppose )'Ottr patient needs per meek 1 holfr e.---:tra care and the government compensates yolf for thiS. What 
is the minim11m amount if monry you would want to receive from the government net ?f ta.--.:es to provide this 
additional ho11r of care? (1) fx E11ro, (2) Less than fx E11ro, that is ..... , (3) More than fx E11ro, that 
lJ ••.. 
Informal caregiver WTP 
S tppose there is a possibifi!J! for )'011 to provide per week 1 hour less informal care. Someone else wiU replace 
you, so the total amotmt if care for the patient remains the same. W:hat is the ma..'\'·imum amount if monry 
you 1vould 1vant to pqy in order that someone else takes over this hottr of care? (1) jx Euro, (2) Less than 
fx Ettro, that is ..... , (3) More than fx E11ro, that is .... 
PatientWTA 
S11ppose yott per ;;;eek 1 hour less informal care and the govern!7Jent compensates yoH for this. What is the 
mininmm amount rf monry yoH WOJtid want to recei?N from the government net qf ftL-..:es for this ho11r less 
informal care? (1)JX Ettro_. (2) Less than fX Euro, that is ..... , (3) More than fX Et~ro, that is .... 
Padent WTP 
Suppose yott need an additional hottr qf informal care per week and )'Ott have to pqy for this hour )'Ottrse!f. 
What is the ma.:· ... imlfm amotmt qf tJJonry yott wottld want to pqy for thiS extra hottr informal care? (1) Jx 
Etrro, (2) Less than fx Ettro, that is ..... , (3) lvfore than fX Euro, that is .... 
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8 Economic valuation of informal care: The 
conjoint measurement method applied to 
informal caregiving1 
Summary 
This chapter reports the results cif the application if the cof!ioint mea .. mrement method (CM) to determine a 
monetary Palue of informal care. Compared to the norma/jy recommended va/11ation methods> like the 
opport:miry cost method and pro>..y good method, Ci\1 is probab!J better able to capture the heterogeneiry rf 
irifom;a/ care. 
Wf developed a Sffn!fj)f in which itiformaf caregiverS were asked to rate four different frypotheticaf 
informal caregjz-ing sitttation.s_. which differed nith respect to care hoHrs_, care tasks and monetary 
compensation. Data were obtained from postal Slfn'9'S. A total of 135 pairs of irifoJ7JJal caregivers and care 
recipients with rheumatoid arthritis (RA.) retumed a completed survry and were used in the ana!Jsis. 
Informal caregivers require an f:.-'(fra compensation if 1.00 Euro per hottr for providing one 
additional holfr if tbe same informal care ta.rk (meaning that from the Set'enth to the eighth hoHr, thry 
require 8 Euro). For providing tJpo e:...7ra ho11rs if care, thy require 2.00 E11ro cotnpensation per h011r. 
The relative valuation if infowaf care tasks is pery diverse. Respondents require a compmsation if 13.43 
EHro per hour for SJl_!itchingfrom providing fight house;pork to personal care and 0.56 Euro per hour for 
switchingfrom providing personal care to heazy housaJJork. ThoNgh OW is sometimes regarded cognitive/;' 
complex.. 70 percent if the respondents ;pere able and ;vi/ling to et/a/11ate the !:!ypothetica/ caregiving 
scenan·os. Especial/;' e/derfy respondents had more diJftcf.f!!J with the method 
OW is seen as a promising alternative for existing methods to detewine a monetary value if 
informal care. The presented l/a/J.1ations if informal care can be incorporated in the numerator if a cost-
rffoctiveness ratio in economic evaluations if health care. 
8.1 Introduction 
It has been argued that economic evaluations should preferably take the societal 
perspective (Russell et al., 1996) and (Drummond eta!., 1997). This means that everyone 
affected by the interv~enrion should be considered and all significant outcomes and costs 
1 Based on V:111 dt:n Berg. B .• Al :tvL, Brou\vt:r, \V.B.F .• V:lll Exd,J.A.J., Koopmanschap. :tvLA., 2004. Economic 
valwcion of inform::li care: The:: conjoint measurement method applied to informal cart:giving. Accepted for 
public.1.cion Soc:inl Science :llld Nledicinc::. 
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that flow from the intervention should be counted regardless of who experiences the 
outcomes and costs. 
Informal care is a significant part of the total care provided to care recipients Vvi.th 
chronic or terminal diseases (Norton, 2000). Despite the recommended societal 
perspective, the costs and effects of informal caregiving to the informal caregiver are often 
ignored in economic evaluations (Stone et al, 2000). The costs of informal care are to an 
important extent related to time inputs by relatives and friends of the care recipiems2. It 
has been recommended to value these time inputs in monetary terms (Russell et al., 1996) 
and (Drummond et al., 1997). Two monetary valuation methods are often recommended 
to value the time input in informal care: the opportunity cost method (valuing hours spent 
on informal care at a - would be - wage rate) and the prm . "y good method (valuing 
informal care hours at the wage rate of a professional caregiver) (Posnett and Jan, 1996), 
(Russell et al., 1996) and (Drummond et al., 1997). However, both methods have important 
limitations and seem unable to incorporate the full impact in terms of costs and 
consequences of informal care (Ch2.pter 3). Using (would be) '\vage-rates or the costs of 
professional care, leads to valuations of informal care that do not fully reflect the 
preferences of informal caregivers. It is for example increasingly recognized that providing 
informal care ruts both negative and positive aspects (Orbell et al., 1993) and (Kramer, 
1997). Therefore, the valuation of informal care should reflect the individual's trade-off 
between the (direct) utility and (direct) disutility associated with providing (additional) 
informal care. In addition, (direct) utility derived from informal care may depend for 
example on the duration of care, intensity of care (e.g. hours per week), care tasks (e.g. 
personal care), caregiver characteristics (e.g. engaged in paid work or retired), care recipient 
characteristics (e.g. health state and preferences) and so on. Ideally, such differences would 
be monetarised and combined Vvi.th informal caregiver's opportunity costs. This makes it 
possible to incorporate the full impact of informal caregiving in the cost side of any 
economic evaluation. However, the often-recommended opportunity cost and pro:>..-y good 
methods neglect many of the mentioned differences. 
Alternatively, individuals may be asked to elicit their valuation of the informal care 
they provide directly. Using a stated preference method has important advantages 
compared to the opportunity cost and pro:>..·y good methods, among others the ability to 
elicit informal caregivers' preferences for different informal caregiving situations in terms 
: Sec for :m ovenrie>.v of other costs related to informal C.1Ie, such as home adaptations :md the costs of assistance 
devices Netten (1990). 
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of informal care hours and informal care tasks. One of these stated preference methods is 
the contingent valuation method (CV), in which informal caregivers are, for example, asked 
to elicit their '-villil\:,oness to accept (\VTA) to provide an additional hour of informal care. 
Chapters 6 and 7 applied CV to informal caregiving. 
The method put fo!'\.Vard in this chapter is CV's 'cousin' in the family of stated 
preference methods, the conjoint measurement method (Ch1). In CM respondents are 
asked to rank or rate different hypothetical scenarios or to make pair '\vi.se choices. CM has 
important advantages as compared to CV. They include: (1) respondents are not directly 
asked to express an amount of money for a certain scenario as in CV, but to make a trade-
off betw"een different aspects of the scenarios presented. This implies that the focus in CM 
is not on money but on all the aspects of the presented scenario. Therefore, the danger of 
strategic answers on the one hand and protest answers on the other hand is less likely for 
CM as compared to CV. (2) More information about respondent's preferences is collected, 
because (instead of a single one as in CV) respondents simultaneously evaluate different 
scenarios. Moreover, information about respondents' relative preferences beween 
scenarios is collected. (3) A more specific issue in the case of informal caregiving is Smith 
and Wrigth's expectation that CV is not applicable to value informal care because money is 
at least very low on the caregiver's agenda (Smith and Wright, 1994). Therefore, a valuation 
method like CM that focuses less on money would be preferred in that context. (4) CM as 
opposed to CV is perhaps better able to capture the heterogeneity of a commodity because 
it has an explicit focus on the different components of the commodity under valuation. 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of the commodity informal care, for instance in terms 
of different care tasks and different amounts of provided care, CM would be a better 
method to value informal care than CV. Nevertheless, an important disadvantage of CJ:vi 
compared to CV is the relatively large (cognitive) burden it puts on respondents. Therefore 
we will also address CM's feasibility in this chapter. 
If we compare CM with the normally recommended methods to value informal 
care, we expect that CM '\vill produce smaller values of providing informal care compared 
to the opportunity cost method and pro::-..: good method respectively. In comparing the 
opportunity cost method '\vi.th a stated preference method like CM it is crucial to recognise 
that the latter in principle includes both the informal caregiver's opportunity costs of time 
and the derived (direct) utility and (direct) disutility of providing care. This implies that an 
informal caregiver deriving more (direct) utility than (direct) disutility from providing care 
states a lower value for this care compared to his opportunity costs. Only if one assumes 
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that most informal caregivers derive more (direct) disutility than (direct) utility from 
providing care, which is an empirical issue, the opportunity cost method would prov-ide 
lower values of informal care compared to a stated preference method. 1-Ioreover, they 
could indicate lower values than their opportunity costs of rime because they feel that they 
are less specialised in providing care compared to their market activ-ities. 
Formulating e::...1'ectations about the comparison of the pro::...y, good method and 
Civi is less straightforward. This holds because it is questionable whether respondents will 
base their responses (partly) on what professional caregivers would have earned. If not the 
comparison becomes a bit problematic, as respondents then have tv.ro unrelated sources of 
valuation. If respondents do compare their values 'With the values of a close market 
substitute, one could defend a same line of reasoning as presented above in the comparison 
bet\Veen the opportunity costs method and CM. For example lower valuations in case of 
CM a,amn if (direct) utility is expected to outweigh (direct) disutility. This expectation can 
also be supported by some basic principles from labour economics. Specialisation and 
education create higher comparative advantages of professionals versus non-professionals 
and therefore more valuable production. Consequently one could expect that informal 
caregivers report lower values in a stated preference approach if they compare themselves 
\Ni.th professional caregivers. We will compare our CM results with those of the 
opportunity cost and pro::...--y good methods. 
This chapter proposes and reports the results of the application of CM to 
determine a monetary value of informal care. The outline of the chapter is as follows. We 
introduce the CM method and we describe the CM questions as developed and used during 
this study. Subsequenrly, the data and results are presented. Then we derive a monetary 
value of informal care provided to people 'With rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Finally we 
discuss these results and the feasibility of the application of a relative simple form of CM. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 The conjoint measurement method 
Conjoint measurement (C:M), also called conjoint analysis (CA), is a method for the analysis 
of respondents' preferences over a set of multi-attribute alternatives. Green and Srinivasan 
(1978) define CM as: "a!!)' decompositiona! method that estimates the stmct11re of a cons1tmer's 
preferences[. . .], giv·en his or her ov·era/1 evaluation of a set of a!temativ·es that are pre specified in terms of 
lev·els of dijferent attn.butes." The idea behind this method is straightforward. One asks 
respondents for instance to rate different situations or commodity descriptions, often 
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called vignettes, to reveal their preferences. The situations differ according to some 
dimensions, called attributes. If the price or cost is included as an attribute, it is possible to 
derive implicit prices or costs for each of the other dimensions. So a monetary value of the 
good in question can be derived. 
CM has its economic foundation in Lancaster's attribute based utility theory' 
(Lancaster, 1991). Lancaster's contribution was that he stressed that a good possesses more 
than one characteristic. For example, a meal -will have both nutritional and aesthetic 
characteristics in different relative proportions. 
Within economic evaluations C:tv[ is of gro""Wing importance for the measurement 
of care recipient's preferences, see for instance Slothuus et al. (2002). See for overviews of 
the application of CM in health care Ryan eta!. (1998), Ryan and Farrar (2000) and (Ryan 
and Gerard, 2003). The latter show that CM studies in health care are mostly applied to 
elicit preferences of care recipients or the community. Moreover, the main focus of CM 
studies is to value benefits and to use these valuations in economic evaluations. 
\Vhile different CM techniques are available, such as ranking, rating and discrete 
choice or choice eA-periments, in health care a majority of applications use the discrete 
choice technique (Ryan and Gerard, 2003). 
Waiting time is an important attribute in CM studies in health care (Ryan and 
Gerard, 2003). Other rypes of time are travel time, time to return to normal activities, 
duration of illness and time preferences. One CM study focuses on an eA-plicit valuation of 
time (Mcintosh and Ryan, 2002). With one exception (Borisova and Goodman, 2003), 
CM's cousin CV has not been used to value time in health care applications. 
CM has a much longer history in other disciplines, for instance, in the transport 
economics literanue. The method has been applied in that area for different purposes, for 
example, to value travel time, statistical lifes, new travel alternatives or technologies, and 
externalities such as noise and pollution. Classical applications include the problem of 
shopping travel mode and destination choice (McFadden, 1974) the demand for electric 
cars (Beggs eta!., 1981), the prediction of ttavel demand (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), 
and automobile demand (Train, 1986). More recent applications include (Calfee and 
Winston, 1998), (Hensher, 2001), (Saelensminde, 1999) and (Saelensminde, 2001), and 
(Cherchi and DeDios Ortlizar, 2002). 
An important lesson from this literature is the hypothesis of Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The property of IIA means that respondents' choices do not 
depend on the nature of any of the other alternatives. In other words, very close substitutes 
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should not influence the choice probabilities. McFadden (1974) illustrates this \\-i.th an 
auto/bus e.;;:ample. Splitting the bus alternative in two different colour busses all other 
things equal involves a higher probability that a bus will be chosen compared to a car 
which is undesirable from a researchers point of view. The influence of possible violations 
of the IIA depends on the analysis method chosen. Especially the ordered logit model 
suffers from these violations, while the ordered probit model does not (Hausman and 
Wise, 1978) and (Beggs eta!., 1981). 
On an applied level, we could compare our findings with the main results in the 
transport economics literature, see e.g. Small (1992) for an overview. However, one has to 
be careful in making these kind of comparisons, because results often depend strongly on 
the operationalisation of the method and the context of the study. Calfee and WinstOn_ 
(1998, p.84), for instance, state that "values of time estimates differ greatly depending on 
the travel mode (e.g., bus versus car) and the purpose of the trip (e.g., work versus 
pleasure)". They (Calfee and Winston, 1998, pp.92-93) also argue that "value of time 
estimates derived from a mode choice model reflect the relative comfort, convenience, 
privacy, and so on of auto versus transit, which '\vill generally increase the value of travel 
time because transit modes are less desirable than auto in these respects.~' Therefore, values 
of time derived from mode choices are usually higher than those derived from varying 
aspects concerning a single mode (e.g., route, transfers, externalities), because in the former 
case the estimated (mode-specific) values also reflect the relative comfort and convenience 
of alternative modes. The values of time also differ importancly when e.>::pressed as a 
proportion of respondents' hourly wages. Values with a range of 20 to 100 percent of the 
gross wage were found (Calfee and Wmston, 1998). Because these findings have a wide 
range and are context specific, we '\Vill not compare our results with these studies. 
8.2.2 Informal care 
Informal care is here defmed as "a non-market composite commodity consisting of 
heterogeneous parts produced by one or more members of the social environment of the 
care recipient." Non-market means that no market prices exist. Therefore our central 
objective is to derive a monetary value for informal caregiver's time. A heterogeneous good 
means that informal care consists of different tasks like housework,. personal care or 
surveillance. The amount of informal care can also differ substantially bet'.veen different 
caregiving situations, for example, according to the care demands of the care recipient and 
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dependent on the available amount of professional care or other informal care. As will be 
discussed later in more detail, we included some of these variations in our vignettes. 
8.2.3 Survey questions 
Our central objective was to derive a monetary value of informal care consistent '-vith the 
heterogeneous nature of both the commodity informal care and the informal caregivers' 
real life situation. Therefore we fust asked the informal caregivers some questions about 
their current real life caregiving situation. These questions include how many years the 
informal caregivers have already provided informal care. We also asked respondents how 
many hours they spent on informal caregiving during the last week according to a list of 
_sixteen care tasks. We distinguished between three types of care tasks: (1) house ... vork 
(HDL) like cleaning, (2) activities of daily living (ADL) like personal care and, (3) 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) like organising home adaptations. We then 
measured health-related quality of life of informal caregivers and care recipients using the 
EQ-SD (Essink-Bot eta!, 1993) and (EuroQol Group, 1990). Furthermore, we measured 
subjective caregiving burden. Many instruments are developed to measure subjective 
burden of informal caregiving (Kramer, 1997). Because it contains both a posmve 
("derived self-esteem') and negative dimensions ("disrupted schedule", ""financial 
problems", lack of "family support", and "loss of physical strength') as opposed to most 
subjective burden instruments, we applied the Caregiver Reaction Assessment (CRA) 
[Given, 1992 #23]. The CRA has however no sum-score. To measure informal caregivers' 
overall subjective burden of providing care, we used a visual analogue scale 0' r\5) ranging 
from 0 ("not hard at all'') to 100 ("much too hard") (Van Exel eta!., 2004). We also asked 
both informal caregivers and care recipients some general background questions like 
whether or not they and their care recipient live together and some socio-demographic 
questions. 
8.2.4 The conjoint measurement method to value informal 
care 
To value informal care, we introduced a hypothetical caregiving siruation v,.i.th a set of four 
vignettes and we asked respondents to rate them. See for an example of the exact question 
fi,oure 8.1. 
Cbapll:r S: Ec011on:ic r'aiuatior: qf i'!fom:a/ can:: Tb(' cmyOinl !l/('dSifrr!lle!l! f!!dbod applid in i'!fom:al canghing 161 
Figure 8.1: Example of a choice question 
"People who need care are often in different sitttations. Below_. we sketch .four different situations that 
probabfy dzjftr strong/)· from the sittJation of your care recipient. Please_. imagine yourse!f in those 
situations. _._. 
Situation A: 
• Your care recipient needs 21 hours per week support v..i.th personal care 
• You provide every day 3 hours informal care, totalling 21 hours per week, v..l.th 
personal care 
• You receive in return an amount of 13.65 Euro per hom from the government 
ta.'l:.-free. 
Situation B: 
• Your care recipient needs 14 hours per week support v..l.th heavy housework 
• You provide every day 2 hours informal care, totalling 14 hours per week, '-"Vith 
heavy housework 
• You receive in return an amount of 9.10 Euro per hour from the government ta.'\.-
free. 
Situation C: 
• Your care recipient needs 7 hours per week support with personal care 
• You provide every day 1 hour informal care, totalling 7 hours per week, v..i_th 
personal care 
• You receive in return an amount of 9.10 Euro per hour from the government tax-
free. 
Situation D: 
• Your care recipient needs 7 hours per week support with light housework 
• You provide every day 1 hour informal care, totalling 7 hours per week, v.r.ith light 
housework 
• You receive in return an amount of 0 Emo per hour from the government ta.'\.-
free. 
Please give the fom siruations a rating bet\\reen 1 and 10. 10 is the from yom perspective 
best imaginable and 1 the worst ima.ooinable situation. 
I give situation A, B, C and D rate ...... (Sttbsequent!J for all sift1ations) 
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Table 8.1 gives an overview of the attributes chosen, and the levels distinguished '\vi.thin 
each attribute. 
Table 8.1: Overv-i.ew of attributes and their levels 
Attribute LeYd Code 
Informal care t.'l.sk Light house \vork Dummy: 1 yes 
Ht:avy house work Dummy: 1 ::: yes 
Persorul ca.re Dummy: 1 ::: yes 
Infon.nal care hour$ per \veek :l.Ild per day 7 7 
14 14 
21 21 
Infon.nal caregiver·s monet.'lry compensacion1 0 EURO per hour 0 
4.55 EURO per hour 4.55 
9.10EUROpcrhour 9.10 
13.65 EURO pcr hour 13.65 
1 Ori.._r;ina/!y 0/10/20/30 D11tch g11ildtrs 
WI e opted for the attribute levels for different reasons. The three care tasks were chosen 
because they include the most important informal care tasks for people with rheumatoid 
arthritis (RA). Riemsma et al. (1997) found that more than half of the people \vith RA 
demanded care with heavy housework, one third '\vith light housework, and around 20 to 
60 percent with personal care dependent on the care task. They also found that informal 
caregivers provided on average 33 hours per week care for people ""-ith RA. We felt that 
this amount would be an upper bound for our population for t\.Vo reasons. Firs~ Riemsma 
et al. (1997) included only care recipients that already had RA for five years, while we did 
not exclude care recipients that had had RA for less than five years. Therefore, we e:-..-pected 
that the care demands of our population would be less than Riemsma et al' s population. 
Second, it is well known that time measurement is complicated and that the measured 
amount of time depends on the questions asked; see e.g. Juster and Stafford (1991). 
Riemsma et al. (1997) distinguished 28 care tasks as opposed to the 16 tasks we choose. It 
could therefore be e:-..-pected that our population would report a somewhat lower amount of 
informal care provided and we chose therefore to include 7, 14 and 21 hours informal care 
per week respectively as the values of the time attributes. We selected the monetary 
compensation because it encompasses the Dutch market prices and health care sector 
tariffs for unskilled housework of 8.53 Euro per hour. 
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The three attributes and their chosen levels result in 6561 (33* 33* 34) possible 
caregiving situations. W/e reduced these to a manageable number of 16 vignettes3 and we 
chose one reference vignette and divided the remaining 15 in 5 groups of 3 vignettes. Thus, 
we ended up \.Vith 5 sets of 4 vi.gnettes (each including the same reference vignette) 
distributed over 5 random subsets in the population. 
8.2.5 Study sample 
The data for this study were collected as a supplement of the RA + study, a panel study of 
health care utilisation among people -wi.th rheumatoid arthritis (RA) Gacobi et al. (2001). In 
the 2001 wave of this panel, 365 of 683 care receivers indicated to receive informal care. 
We approached all and asked the 365 receiving informal care to hand over our mail sunrey 
to their primary informal caregiver as \Veil as to complete a mail survey themselves. The 
318 care receivers \vithout informal care were asked whether they now did receive informal 
care. If so, the same procedure as before was followed. 
A total of 153 informal caregivers returned the mail survey and we have data for 
149 pairs of care receivers and informal caregivers. The care receivers of four informal 
caregivers did not return their survey. Moreover, 21 care receivers had deceased, 12 were 
irretrievable relocated and four respondents sent in their survey too late for analysis. 
Finally, the returned sunreys of 18 informal caregivers were of insufficient quality. 
Therefore, the sunreys of 135 informal caregivers and care recipient combinations were 
suitable for further analysis. 
8.2.6 The derivation of a monetary value of informal 
caregiving 
In order to derive a monetary value of informal care one wishes to keep utility constant 
while varying the level of the different components (attributes) of utility. It is worth noting 
that respondents' ratings are proxies for respondents' utilities derived from the four 
different hypothetical situations. In varying these attributes one can derive the marginal rate 
of substirution benveen the attributes. If one includes a monetary compensation4 as one of 
~ This is c:illcd :m orthogorul :1..0:3y. Such orthogon::J. :uray is still able to cst:i.m..'tte m.'lin cfft:cts, but not 
inter:tccions. In :m orthogon.'ll array, each levcl of one attribute occurs \vith each levd of another attribute \v-:ith 
equ.'ll or :u least proportion.'ll frcquencit:s. \\!e used the ORTHOPLA..J\" procedure in the soft\v:rre package SPSS 
to arrange an orthogon.'ll design. 
4 One has to be c:rreful with the interpretacion if one includes prices or costs :J$ an attribute. Sec Ratcliffe (2000) 
for a critical discussion. 
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the attributes, the marginal rate of substitution ben.veen the attributes and the monetary 
compensation can be derived. 
We state it formally using a random effects ordered pro bit model: 
f,= fl + x';,/3 + z;y + a;+'" (1) 
where y ~is an unobserved latent variable denoting the utility respondent i (i = 1, ... , ~) 
derives from v\,onette t (t = 1, ... , 4), pis a fixed constant, x,1 is a K-dimensional vector of 
vignette attributes presented to respondent i at vignette t. Furthermore, z is a !vi-
dimensional vector of respondents' and informal care characteristics, while a:.+ s1, is the 
error term consisting of m·o components: s1, denoting an individual specific component 
that is treated as a random variable, and a;- denoting an individual specific component 
assumed to be fixed over the vignettes. Because the vignettes were randomly distributed 
among the respondents, we assume that there is no correlation bet\Veen x 1, and s,r 
Therefore the random effects ordered probit model is appropriate for our problem. Greene 
(2000) and Scott Long (1997) discuss the ordered probit model in more detail, while Hsiao 
(1986) and Verbeek (2000) give detailed discussions of random effect models). 
As stressed before, we observe respondents' ratings 1 to 10 (transformed here to 
the range of 0 to 9): 
y = 0 ify',;; 0, (2) 
= 1 if 0 < f ::; !-lt, 
=9if8o£y'. 
Given the fact that respondents could only give a rating from 1 to 10, they are 
supposed to choose the cell that most closely represents their own feelings. These ratings 
are proxies for a respondent's utility. 
Moreover, we choose the ordered probit model to analyse respondents' ratings for 
m·o main reasons. First, because this model does not suffer from possible violations of the 
IIA property like the ordered logit model as discussed before (Hausman and \Vise, 1978) 
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and (Beggs et al., 1981). Second, because it does not assume a cardinal interpretation of the 
ratings like OLS regression (Boyle et al., 2001). 
If we replace xj3 in (1) \.'Vi.th the vignette attributes andy~i, -w-ithy,;, we get 
(3) 
·where Hit is the amount of informal care hours at vignette t presented to individual i. 
Similarly, LH denotes light housework, HH denotes heavy housework, while C is the 
informal caregiver's monetary compensation. 
In order to derive the marginal rate of substitution benveen for instance the 
amount of informal care and an informal caregiver's monetary compensation (11RSHc) one 
keeps utility (y) constant (a marginal rate of substitution is by definition the point of 
indifference between two commodities (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) and (Mas-Colell et 
al., 1995)). To state it formally~ 
!YlRSHc = H/C (4) 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Background statistics 
Table 8.2 shows some descriptive statistics of the study sample. Just 17.4 percent of the 
informal caregivers are female. This is striking because normally the majority of informal 
caregivers is female. An obvious explanation is that in our sample 1 00 percent of the 
informal caregivers are partners of the care recipient and the prevalence of RA is much 
higher in women compared to men. Informal caregivers' and care recipients' age ranges 
from 32.8 to 87.1 and from 28.3 to 83.9 respectively. The occupation percentages add up 
to over 100 percent because some respondents indicated two main occupations. 
Table 8.3 provides some other background characteristics of the study sample, 
such as care duration, the amount of provided informal care, subjective burden and EQ-
SD-scores. The average care duration is 11.6 year reflecting the fact that RA is a slowly 
progressive disease. Of the care recipients is 6.7 percent on a waiting list for professional or 
residential care. Almost 40 percent of the informal caregivers perform activities of daily 
living (ADL) while more than 90 percent of them perform instrumental activities of daily 
living (IADL) and almost 90 percent perform housework (HDL). 
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Table 8.2: Characteristics informal caregivers and care recipients (n=135) 
Characteristic Mean S.D. 
Inform:Ji car~&ivcrs 
Agel 63.0 13.3 
Gender2 82.6 38.1 
hrrncr3 100 0 
live together 97.0 17.0 
Education 
Low 32.6 47.0 
:Middle 47.7 50.1 
High 14.4 35.2 
Occupation 
Paid job 34.1 47.6 
House "\vorker 16.3 37.1 
Retired 52.6 50.1 
Disability pension 7.4 26.3 
Income4 
Income 1 19.3 0.40 
Income 2 38.5 0.49 
Income 3 21.5 0.41 
Income 4 4.4 0.21 
Income unknown 10.4 0.31 
Fle.....ible jobs 51.1 50.2 
Care rea"pient 
Agt:l 62.1 13.1 
Gcnder2 15.2 36.0 
Education 
Low 44.3 49.7 
:.Yliddle 38.9 48.9 
High 9.2 29.0 
Occupation 
Paid job 15.2 36.0 
House worker 41.7 49.5 
Retired 31.1 46.5 
Dis:J.bility pension 19.7 39.9 
No 11.4 31.9 
' In _;'ears 
:: Perunlag,· n:ales 
J Percentage partners 
~Income 1 iJ· tbt lom·sl catt:gOl)' and income 4 /be bighest. We !/Sed pos/codt: areas as a pro>.:y for income. Sec Smits d aL (2002)jor 
a dismssion of Ibis approacb. 
5 Fft:xibili!J• of th1·paid job in tem;s o/ con/To! about oneS 0111n tin:e schedule conditional 11pon baring a paid job 
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Table 8.3: Characteristics of the caregiv'ing situation (n=135) 
Characteristic Mean Min Ma."' S.D. 
Informal caregivers 
Care dw:ation1 11.6 1.0 50.3 8.7 
Performing HDL msks2 88.9 
Hours HDL t.'lsks:' 14.1 0 101.5 14.0 
Performing ADL msks2 39.3 
Hours ADL osks3 2.2 0 31.5 5.0 
Performing IADL tasks2 91.9 
Hours IADL msksJ 11.3 0 107.0 14.6 
Total informal care time3 27.5 0 133.5 24.0 
Gavt: up paid work3 '? 0.- 10 3.7 
Gave up unpaid \vork3 4.9 15 4.9 
Gave up leisure> 8.2 2 24 6.4 
EQ-5D 0.82 -0.074 0.22 
CRA disrupted schedule 13.3 4 25 5.7 
CR.-\ financi~ probkms 7.2 3 15 3.6 
CRA bck of f:unily support 12.3 3 25 5.2 
CRA. loss of physical strength 9.0 4 18 4.5 
CRA. self-esteem 29.3 11 35 4.6 
VA$ 24.5 0 100 25.7 
Care recipients 
EQ-SD 0.48 -0.43 0.30 
Waiting list2 6.7 25.0 
Profession.1.l care=: 26.1 
Other inform~ C.1IL.2 68.0 
1 bt )·'car.r 
2 In paccnlage 
; lvlcan hom:r per ]))eel:; 
EQ-SD scores of the caregivers are much higher than those of the care recipients (0.82 
versus 0.48). In order to provide care, caregivers sacrifice leisure (18.9 percent), unpaid 
work (8.0 percent) and paid work (6.1 percent). 67 percent of the caregivers did not 
indicate what time use was sacrificed in order to provide care. To some extent this may 
have to do 'Wi.th the fact that for most caregivers provi.ding care has become their normal 
time use, given the average care duration of over 11 years. This hypothesis is supported by 
a relatively strong correlation between respondents indicating both their opportunity costs 
of time and the number of years they provide care yet (correlation coefficient= 0.50). 
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8.3.2 CM Ratings 
Table 8.4 gives the mean scores per v-ignette, uncorrected for characteristics of informal 
caregivers, RA care recipients and the caregiving situation. 
Table 8.4: Mean score per vignette (n=97) 
Vignette Attribute N (N Mean score Minimum Ma.ximu 
Hours1 TasksZ Money missing) m 
compcnsatio 
n 
A1 (R,f.) 21 3 13.65 18 (8) G.17 10 
A2 14 2 9.10 17 (9) 6.59 4 10 
A3 7 3 9.10 1G (10) 6.56 2 10 
M 7 0 19 (7) 5.95 10 
B1 (Ref.) 21 3 13.65 20 (11) 6.20 10 
B2 7 4.55 21 (10) 7.00 10 
B3 21 0 20 (11) 5.90 10 
B4 14 13.65 21 (10) 6.14 10 
C1 (Re£) 21 3 13.65 2G (10) 5.73 10 
C2 7 2 0 27 (9) G.04 10 
C3 21 2 4.55 2G (10) 5.08 9 
C4 14 4.55 2G (10) GAG 3 10 
D1 (Ro£) 21 3 13.65 21 (4) 5.00 10 
D2 7 9.10 22 (3) 7.55 4 10 
D3 7 2 13.65 21 (4) 5.8G 2 10 
D4 14 3 0 21 (4) 5.10 10 
E1 (R,f.) 21 3 13.G5 12 (G) 6.33 3 10 
E2 7 3 4.55 12 (G) 5.83 3 8 
E3 7 13.65 12 (G) 7.42 5 10 
E4 21 9.10 12 (G) 6.50 3 10 
Ovo::rallrd. 21 3 13.G5 9i (37) 5.82 10 
&f nji:n:ncc tignd!c 
1 PerJlletk 
:: 1 = li..._f!.h! hoi!ScJIIOTk. 2 = hem:/ brmseworl::._. and 3 =personal care. 
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The first column in table 8.4 gives the five (A to E) different combinations of vignettes that 
randomly were distributed among the respondents. Column two 'Attributes' gives the 
attribute description, while the number of respondents completing the rating of the 
vignette in question is in column three. Then the mean score of the vignette next to its 
minimum and ma.'illnum are in columns four to si..'\ successively. It is worth noting that 
vignettes A1, ... , E1 are all the same and therefore the reference vignette. 
The mean rating of the v~onettes ranges from 5.00 to 7.55. Half of the vignettes 
have the 'I.Vi.dest possible range varying from 1 to 10. The other half has a somewhat smaller 
range. Our reference vignette has an overall mean of 5.82, but varies according to the set of 
vignettes relative to which it was evaluated. It is for instance on average preferred to 
vignette A4 \vi.th fewer hours [i a week instead of 21 a week), another care task (light 
housework instead of personal care), but less money compensation (0 Euro versus 13.65 
Euro). Vignettes A2 and A3 are preferred to vignette A1 (the reference vignette) despite 
their lower money compensation (9.10 Euro versus 13.65 Euro), since A2 and A3 require 
less hours of care per week (respectively 14 and 7), while A2 also involves another care 
task. 
Table 8.4 also shows that not all respondents rated all four >rignettes. In set E the 
number of observations is t\Velve in all cases, indicating that t\Velve respondents rated all 
vignettes. In case of D however, there is one more missing in Dl, D3 and D4 compared to 
D2. 
For the interpretation of these results it is worth noting that we assume that the 
respondents gave an ordinal interpretation to their ratings. Therefore, we used a random 
effects ordered pro bit to analyse the results. 
8.3.3 Results of the random effects ordered pro bit 
Table 8.5 gives the results of the random effects ordered pro bit. In the frrst column are the 
independent variables and their estimated coefficients are in the second column. The first 
four independent variables are the vignette attributes. A star denotes that an independent 
variable is statistically signilicant at the p = 0.05 level. To investigate the possible influence 
of background characteristics, we performed the analysis again, adding three blocks of 
e::---planatory variables. A block of informal caregiver's background characteristics like 
gender, a block of care recipient's background characteristics like health-related quality of 
life and a block of characteristics of the informal care situation like the total amount of 
informal care provided. 
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Table 8.5: Results random effect ordered probit; dependent variable is vignette raring 
(n=174) 
Ind~.---pt":ndl:nt vnriab!t":t Paumett":r estim:m:: Sond.1.rd error \\i'ald Chi-Squ:ue p, > 
ChiSq 
Informal care hours* -0.02 0.01 -2.30 0.02 
Light hou~e\vork"' 0.29 0.13 2.20 0.03 
Heavy houst.'\VOrk -0.01 0.15 -0.08 0.94 
Informal cart":giver's compensation" 0.02 0.01 2.04 0.04 
Intt":rc~r 1" -1.65 0.22 -7.38 0.00 
Intercept 2"' -1.43 0.22 -6.62 0.00 
Intercept 3* -1.11 0.21 -5.31 0.00 
Intercept 4* -0.72 0.20 -3.54 0.00 
Interc~r 5 -0.29 0.20 -1.47 0.14 
Inrcrcepr 6 0.13 0.20 0.63 0.53 
lmerc~t 7" 0.44 0.20 2.20 0.03 
Interct":pt 8* 1.03 0.21 4.97 0.00 
Intercept 9* 1.19 0.21 5.73 0.00 
1 The intcmpts bcllmg to !he res1111s for !be nport mark.r 1 /o 9. Thf)' can be 11sed to contp:ile !be probabi!i()' tba! a particH/ar ri.._[!,ntlti' 
gets a mtain nport n;ark. The probahili!J• that a ct·rtain rignctte gets report marl::. 10 is 1 mimts the probabili(J1 that a report gtt.r a 1 
/o a 9. Sa· also cq11ati01l 2. 
Correction of the results of the ordered probit '-vith these blocks of background variables 
did not prov-i_de additional insights (none of these variables were significant at the p = 0.05 
level). This is presumably due to the relative small sample size and the relative large loss of 
respondents due to the non-response on the vignette raring. 
8.3.4 A monetary value of informal care 
Equation (4) shows how to derive the marginal rate of substitution bet\Veen the different 
~onette attributes~ including how to derive a monetary valuation of informal care Mth CM. 
We can use the calculated coefficients from table 8.5 to derive them. Table 8.6 presents the 
results. 
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Table 8.6: rates of substitution "Vignette attributes 
iVlRS 
H/C -1.00 
LH/C 13.43 
HH/C -0.56 
1-l/LH -0.07 
H/HI-l 1.79 
From table 8.6 we can derive that when informal caregivers would provide one extra hour 
informal care, their required compensation would ceteris paribus increase by 1.00 Euro 
(90% CJ: [0.06-4.10])5. For e.xample providing 15 instead of 14 hours personal care a week 
and an initial compensation of 4.55 Euro per hour makes that the informal caregivers 
require 5.55 Euro per hour (for each of the 5 hours) instead of 4.55 Euro per hour to 
pro"V"ide the 15 instead of the 14 hours informal care a week6. Of course~ the marginal costs 
of pro"V"icling an extra hour informal care are crucial if one Vlishes to use this result to value 
informal care in economic evaluations. In the above case, the marginal costs are 19.55 Euro 
(14 * 4.55 versus 15 * 5.55). Like\v1.se providing 16 hours instead of 14 would require an 
hourly compensation of on average 6.55 Euro per hour while the marginal costs are 41.10 
Euro. Furthermore, we can see that light housework is preferred to personal care and light 
housework is preferred to hemry housework, while personal care is preferred to heavy 
housework. In monetary terms, informal caregivers demand a compensation for S\v1.tching 
from light house\vork to personal care of ceteris paribus 13.43 Euro7 per hour (90% CI: 
[2.23-53.62]), and a compensation of 0.56 Euro per hour (90% Cl: [-1.47-55.34]) for 
sVlitching from personal care to heavy housework. 
8.3.5 feasibility of CM 
As can be derived from table 4, around 70 percent of the informal caregivers were willing 
or able to rate the "Vignettes. This questions the feasibility of CM to elicit informal 
caregivers' preferences. Therefore, we analysed \vhether or not the non-response on the 
rating questions is random. We did this by testing for differences in the means of the 
variables in table 8.2 and 8.3 bet\Veen the respondents who did and did not rate the 
"Vignettes. 
5 Confidence interval based on Monte Carlo simub.tion, using the sundard =ors in oble 5. 
6 15 instead of 14 hours a \veek tm.kes t..H = 1, while personal care does not clumge. so &H = 0 md t..HH = 0. 
7 Tl is a dummy va.ri:J.ble: 8T1 = 1 if the informal caregiver S\v:itches from personal ctre to light hou.~C'.vork). 
172 InjomJai carr: an cconon:ir approach 
\Ve found that older informal caregivers were less able or \\tilling to rate the 
~onettes (mean age 67.5 versus 61.2; p = 0.0159). Furthermore, the non-responders were 
often either lower or higher educated (p = 0.0242). Finally, the group non-responders 
contained relatively more old care recipients than the group responders (mean age 67.4 
versus 59.9; p = 0.0027). This is not surprising as all pairs of informal caregivers and RA 
patients are partners and, consequently, informal caregivers' and care recipients' ages are 
highly correlated. 
8.4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we have applied the CM method to determine a monetary value of informal 
care for R.J\ care recipients. An important advantage of CM compared to more 
conventional methods like the opportunity cost method and the proxy good method is 
CM's ability to capture more accurately the informal caregiver's preferences concerning this 
heterogeneous commodity. 
Informal caregivers require an additional compensation of 1.00 Euro per hour 
(for all hours provided) for provicUng an additional hour of the same informal care task. 
For providing two hours extra, they require an additional compensation of on average 2.00 
Euro per hour. For the incorporation of informal care in economic evaluations \ve used 
marginal instead of average costs. So the marginal costs of switching from providing for 
instance 7 hours informal care per \Veek v.rithout a monetary compensation to 8 hours 
informal care a week are 8 Euro. The marginal costs of providing 9 hours a week instead of 
the 7 without compensation are 18 Euro. Informal caregivers also require extra 
compensation of 13.43 Euro per hour when they switch from provicUng light housework to 
personal care. Moreover, they demand additional compensation of 0.56 Euro per hour 
when switching from prmriding personal care to heavy housework. 
How do these fincUngs relate to the often recommended methods to value 
informal care; the opportunity cost method and the pro::-..y good method? Chapter 5 found 
values of 23.44 Euro and 12.19 Euro per hour informal care applying the opportunity cost 
method and prm .. -y good method respectively using the same sample. If one excludes 
house\vork from the pro).._y good method because of persistent measurement problems, the 
value rises to 20.24 Euro per hour (it rises because housework is relatively cheap). 
Comparing these values ~i.th our results is not straightforv.rard because CM produces only 
relative values. For instance, informal caregivers require a monetary compensation of 10 
Euro per hour in order to increase the amount of prov-i.ded care with 10 hours compared to 
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an initial situation v.i.thout a monetary compensation ceteris paribus. This is a lower value 
compared to the values generated v.i.th the opportunity and proxy good methods, '\Vhich 
may indicate that respondents derive more utility than disutility from providing informal 
care. Jacobi et al. (2003) provide some empirical evidence for the latter idea using the same 
sample. They compare the CRA scores on the positive domain "derived self-esteem" 'Wi.th 
N.ro other samples: caregivi.ng for people '\vi.th dementia and for people with colorectal 
cancer. Caregivers for people '\vi.th RA report somewhat higher scores compared to the 
caregivers for people with dementia indicating that they may derive more (direct) utility 
relatively from providing informal care. 
Another explanation for the relatively low monetary value informal caregvers 
e::-..'Pressed could be the choice of our attributes: Informal caregivers in our sample indicate 
to provi.de 27 hours informal care a week. This implies that our hypothetical situations 
provide a lower bound compared tO the real amount of informal care provided. This could 
explain the relative low marginal rate of substitution bet\veen additional care and a 
monetary compensation. 
One has to be careful with the interpretation of our results. This is also recognised in the 
context of costs attributes versus price attributes (Ratcliffe, 2000). We asked informal 
caregivers implicitly to state their \VTA to provide additional care. It is not possible to 
derive from our findings informal caregivers' willingness to pay (\VIP) for a reduction of 
informal care, as one may tempt to do. Since the questions posed tO the respondents 
e::-..-plicitl.y focussed on a monetary compensation (\X'TA) and not on WTP. 
Another point of attention in this context is the incorporation of the results in 
econorrllc evaluations. Vie suggest the incorporation of the results in the costs side of an 
economic evaluation. 'Ibis because CM gives a monetary valuation of both the opportunity 
costs and the (direct) disutility and the (direct) utility of providing informal care. This 
makes that it is impossible to disentangle the costs and effects. Moreover, because effects 
are monetarised, they could by definition not be incorporated in the effect side of a cost-
effectiveness analysis or a cost-utility analysis. This holds as long as the care recipient's 
outcomes are the main focus on the effect side of the economic evaluation. If the informal 
caregiver is the focus of an economic evaluation, for instance the analysis of the costs and 
effects of a support program for informal caregivers, then CM is only appropriate in a cost-
benefit analysis or if one uses CM to derive a utility instead of a monetary value of informal 
care. However, one has to be careful if one compares economic evaluations that use CNI to 
mcorporate the costs and effects of informal care with economic evaluations that only 
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incorporate the costs of informal care valued '\vith the opportunity or pro::-..y good methods. 
As we have seen, CM yields lo'\ver results than the opportunity and pro::-..y good methods. 
This biases the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. Therefore~ a necessary condition for 
the comparison of the results of different economic evaluations is uniformity in the way 
informal care is valued. If one \.Vishes to capture both the costs and effects of informal care 
as is suggested if one adopts a societal perspective, CM seems a better method compared to 
the opportunity cost and pro::-..y good methods. 
\Ve constructed vignettes that present a wide range of informal caregiving 
situations. This was done in order to capture the heterogeneity of informal care. However, 
we only used three attributes. Therefore, much of the heterogeneity in terms of more 
qualitative information like subjective burden, health-related quality of life of informal 
caregivers and care recipients could not be captured. Vie tried to capture this heterogeneity 
by adding them as additional independent variables in the model. Ho'\vever, none of these 
variables were significant. This may indicate that they are less important than one rrllght 
expect them to be, or that respondents are very well capable of dealing "With hypothetical 
situations and abstracting from their O\.Vfi real life situation. Another e::-..-planation is the 
relative small sample size. The latter problem becomes more persistent if one looks at the 
relatively high non-response on the vignette rating questions. 
A point of concern in the application of CM by means of written surveys is the 
non-response to the CM questions. \Ve learned from an informal pilot study that rating the 
vignettes puts a substantial burden on respondents. In this study we found that around 30 
percent of the informal caregivers did not rate the vignettes. Especially relative older 
informal caregivers and both lower and higher educated compared to the medium educated 
informal caregivers were less v.rilling to rate the vignettes. Ho'\vever, since there were no 
differences in non-response for the large majority of e::._-planatory variables and 70 percent 
of the respondents completed the CM questions, there is not enough reason to advice 
against the application of CM in future studies to value informal care. However, it is 
something to keep in mind for specific populations and in generalising our results. 
Our application of CM showed that it is an interesting method to derive a 
monetary compensation of informal care. However, considering the standard errors and 
the confidence inte.nrals a larger sample size is necessary to get more reliable estimates. This 
problem is also encountered in other applications of c:rvr a ohnson et al., 2000) and 
(1v.fclntosh and Ryan, 2002), and seems to be related to the orthogonal design adopted here. 
Therefore, future :research could aim at confirrning the feasibility of C:tvf and our results for 
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RA in a bigger sample and 'With other than orthogonal designs. See for a discussion of 
possible designs (Huber and Zwerina, 1996) and (Carlsson and Marrinsson, 2003), New 
applications of CM could also focus on other more heterogeneous populations in terms of 
care recipients' disease characteristics. 
It is challenging to add additional attributes and levels to the vignettes in future 
research regarding the economic valuation of informal care. Ho'\vever, this could put 
greater burden on the respondents, perhaps at the costs of higher non-response, especially 
when attributes contain elements respondents are not familiar with (Ryan and Gerard, 
2003), Ryan and Gerard (2003) also emphasize that there is no empirical evidence on what 
constitutes this complexity. Moreover, there is no evidence about the question how many 
attributes an optimal CM design might contain in order to prevent non-response. So this 
has to be established through a process of trial and error. Yet, we know that choosing from 
32 alternatives '\Vi.th 26 attributes might be too hard for respondents (Ryan and Gerard~ 
2003). Van Ophem et al. (1999) suggest that this holds even if respondents are familiar 
'W'ith the commodity under valuation, in their: case, the demand for classical music by 
people who like classical music. 
Nevertheless, it would be very interesring to deal with greater heterogeneity of 
informal care by adding, for example~ more care tasks. One could think about socio-
psychological care tasks, for instance emotional support or supervising a care recipient, 
because they are also important in informal caregiving, especially in some disease specific 
populations like caregiving for people -._vith dementia. 
Another interesting issue relates to the qualitative information towards the 
provision of informal care. One could, for instance, add more qualitative information on 
the caregiving situation or an attribute covering the trade-off benveen informal caregiver's 
own tasks and other informal caregivers. Another option is to add more detailed 
information instead of our more general care tasks. For instance, instead of personal care 
one could distinguish support 'Wi.th \vashing the care recipient and support 'Wi.th dressing to 
get more detailed information about informal caregivers' preferences. Qualitative 
information could also be interesting because it is connected to the subjective burden 
literature, see for instance Pearlin et a!, (1990), !<ramer (199i), and Schulz and Beach 
(1999) for overviews. Normal the subjective burden measures are not preference based. 
C:J\{ could therefore add to this literature because it focuses explicitly on caregivers' 
preferences instead of just their problems in terms of burden. Adding care tasks provided 
by other informal caregivers could also fill a gap in the literature, in which the focus is 
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often just on primary informal caregivers (like in this study). lvfany empirical applications in 
the subjective burden literature involve just one, often the primary, caregiver. There could 
however arise conflicts between different informal caregivers caring for the same care 
recipient. This is recognised in the economic literature that uses, for instance, game theory 
to model this problem (Hiedemann and Stem, 1999). CM could also add to this literature. 
Moreover, the trade-off between professional and informal care would probably provide 
interesting information. 
As discussed before, non-response on the ~onette rating question is an issue in 
this study. A relatively simple but e::.--pensive solution for this issue could be oral instead of 
written surveys using trained interviewers. This may help to overcome a part of the non-
response problem, as well as improving the quality of the data. 
It is worth noting that the results of this srudy can also give information about the ttade-
offs informal caregivers make in choosing between the amount and the nature of the 
provided informal care. This can be a first step to understand the different perceptions of 
burden of care further and may aid in developing support programs for informal 
careg1Vers. 
In sum, we suggest CM is a promising method in the context of informal care in 
general, and especially may be regarded as a promising alternative for the existing methods 
to value informal care, like the opportunity cost method and pro::.-? good method. The 
presented monetary value of informal care can be incorporated in the numerator of a cost-
effectiveness ratio in economic evaluations. 
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9 Economic valuation of informal care: 
A choice experiment applied to a 
heterogeneous 
caregivers1 
population of informal 
Summary 
This chapter reports the results of the application qf a choice experiment (CE) to determine a monetary 
t•alue of informal care. Compared to the norma!!J recommmded val11ation methods_, like the opport:mi!J cost 
method and pro::g good method_, a CE is probab!J better able to capture the hetr:mgeneity of informal care. 
We dePeloped a SJtn'ry in which informal caregivers were asked to rate j011r different f!JPothetica! 
informal caregiving situations (care hours, care tasks and monetary coffljJen.ration). Thr:y were also asked to 
rate their current informal care situation compared to the fimr 1Jpothetical sih1ations. Data were obtained 
from postal survrys. These surorys JVere sent through regional support centres for informal caregit·ers o/ care 
recipients with various health problems. A total of 865 informal caregivers and 513 care recipients from 
this heterogeneo11s poptt!ation ret:m;ed a completed sttrory. 
Informal caregivers reqttire an extra compensation of 0.54 mro per hottr for providing one 
additional hottr of the same informal care task. Thry also reqttire a co!T;pensation of 4.32 fllro per ho11r for 
switching from proz,iding light ho11sework to personal care and 18.15 ettro per hottr for switching from 
proz,iding heary hottsework to personal care. Moreover, informal caregiver's ettrrent OPera!! real life sit11ation 
and some other real life backgrottnd characteristics influenced the ratings.. vi;;; choices. 
We conclude that CE ·s are a promising alternative for e::~.isting methods to determine a monetary 
value of informal care. The presented valuations of informal care can be incorporated in the !lf.tmerator rf a 
cost-ifftctiz,•eness ratio in economic r:wl11ations rf health care. 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the use of choice experiments (CE's), also called conjoint 
measurement or conjoint analysis, to incorporate informal care in economic evaluations of 
health care. Chapter 8 proposed and discussed this approach before. However, chapter 8 
used a relatively small sample (n=135) for the application of a CE and applied the CE to a 
1 Based on Van dt:n Berg. B., .>\1. M., Brouwcr, W.B.F., Van ExeL J.A.J., Koopmaschap, M.A., 2004. Economic 
v-aluation of informal cart:: A choice e.'\:pcrimt:nt applit:d to a hctcrogent:ous popuL'ltion of infonn.'tl C.U't:givt:rs. 
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homogeneous sample of informal caregivers in terms of disease characteristics, namely care 
recipients with rheumatoid arthritis. This chapter applies the CE to a relatively large sample 
of 865 informal caregivers providing care for care recipients with different diseases. They 
include neurological diseases, musculoskeletal diseases, psychological diseases, and 
circulatory diseases. 
It is suggested to incorporate the changes in use of informal caregiver time as 
direct non-health care costs into the numerator of the cost-effectiveness ratio in economic 
evaluations (Russell et al., 1996, p.177). Two monetary valuation methods are often 
recommended to value the time investment in informal care. First, the opportunity cost 
method, valuing hours spent on informal care at a -would be -wage rate, and second the 
pro:-..; good method, valuing informal care hours at the \vage rate of a professional 
caregiver (Posnett and Jan, 1996), (Russell eta!., 1996), and (Dnarumond eta!, 1997). Both 
methods however, are rather insensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of informal 
care. They also do not incorporate the full effects of providing informal care for the 
informal caregivers and therefore do not capture the full impact of providing informal care. 
Moreover, the pro:-..; good method does not reflect the true preferences of informal 
caregivers (Van den Berget a!., 2004). 
In theory, stated preference methods like contingent valuation (CV) and CE are 
sensitive to the heterogeneity and dynamics of informal care, capable to capture all relevant 
aspects of informal care, sensitive to the different circumstances informal caregivers are 
faced \vith and capable of reflecting the true preferences of informal caregivers. The 
method put fonvard in this chapter is CV's 'cousin' in the family of stated preference 
methods, CE (Roe et al., 1996). In CE's respondents are, for instance, asked to rate 
different hypothetical scenarios. Chapter 8 gives a detailed discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of CE compared to CV and to the opportunity cost and pro:-..; good 
methods. Here, we only stress that it is natural to apply CE to value informal care in order 
to incorporate it in economic evaluations, because of the heterogeneous nature of the 
commodity informal care. CE is especially developed to deal \vith the different components 
of a commodity as opposed to classical utility theory which assumed that individuals only 
derived utility from a commodity instead of the different sub components of the 
commodity under valuation (Lancaster, 1971). Chapters 3 and 8 discussed the 
complications that arise from the application of a total valuation method like a CE instead 
of partial valuation methods like the opportunity cost method or pro::-..-y good method to 
value informal care to incorporate it in economic evaluations. 
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CE's stem from mathematical psychology (Green and Rao, 1971). They are often 
applied in, for instance, the marketing literature (Green and Srinivasan, 1978) and (Green 
and Srinivasan, 1990), and in the transport economics literature (Calfee and Winston, 
1998). The method is in transport economics applied for different purposes but also to 
value time, in particular to value travel time. The application of CE in health care is of 
increasing popularity. Ryan and Gerard (2003) give an overview of the application of CE in 
health care . .A..lso \Vithin economic evaluations is CE of growing importance for the 
measuxement of care recipient's preferences, see, for instance, Slothuus et al. (2002)). Ryan 
and Gerard (2003) state that CE studies in health care are mostly applied to elicit 
preferences for heath care and to incorporate them in economic evaluations. "WD.ile we 
asked our respondents to rate four different hypothetical situation and their own real life 
situation, a majority of applications in health care use binary choices or paired comparisons 
instead of ratings (Ryan and Gerard, 2003). \'V.aiting time is an important attribute in CE 
studies in health care. Other types of time are travel time, time to rerum to normal 
activities, duxation of illness and time preferences (Ryan and Gerard, 2003). Finally, most 
applications in health care use payment at the point of consumption (Ryan and Gerard, 
2003), but, for instance, Vander Pol and Cairns (1998) use "'Ollingness to accept (WTA). 
This chapter proposes and reports the results of the application of CE to 
determine a monetary value of informal care. The main focus of the chapter is to attempt 
to value the full impact of providing informal care on the informal caregivers through 
asking informal caregivers in a heterogeneous population to rate four different hypothetical 
informal care situations. We included a hypothetical monetary compensation in the four 
situations in order to be able to derive a monetary compensation for providing different 
amounts of informal care and different care tasks. Moreover, we collected information 
about informal caregivers' and their care recipients' real life care situation in terms of, for 
example, the amount and nature of provided care, health-related quality of life and 
subjective buxden due to providing care and analysed whether they influenced the 
monetary valuation. \Yie also asked informal caregivers to rate their own real life caregiving 
situation compared to the four hypothetical situations. Asking informal caregivers to rate 
their own situation is a methodological attempt to deal v.i.th the informal caregivers' real 
life circumstances. Ne.-=:t to the application of CE to a larger and heterogeneous sample, 
asking caregivers to rate their ov.n situation is a new contribution of this chapter compared 
to chapter 8. 
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\'\7e chose to elicit real informal caregivers' preferences to provide care instead of 
the preferences of the general population. \Y/e did so because informal caregivers have 
experience in making choices about providing informal care. Therefore, they may be 
considered the best informed people and from a traditional welfare economic point of view 
the right individuals to state their preferences regarding informal care decisions. This may 
lead however to an underestimation of the monetary value of informal care because of the 
selection of respondents. Indeed, we only include individuals who have already shown to 
be v..illing to provide informal care in the elicitation of preferences, \Vhile people who are 
unwilling to provide care are e::-.:pected to require ceteris paribus a relatively higher 
compensation. See Dolan et al. (2003) for a more elaborate discussion of the different 
perspectives that could be used to elicit preferences. 
Another interesting question in relation tO the selection of respondents is whether 
current informal caregivers can abstract from their own caregiving situation in order to 
e>..-press their preferences about hypothetical caregiving situations described in the vignettes 
used in the CE. On the one hand, the caregivers are e>..-pected to use their life experience in 
stating their preferences. However, on the other hand they need to abstract from their own 
specific situation to express their preferences for the different hypothetical situations. 
Therefore, currently providing informal care may improve respondents' ability to elicit 
preferences for hy-pothetical caregiving situations, but the appraisal of different caregiving 
situations may also be influenced by their current caregiving situation. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 introduces the application of 
the CE in informal caregiving and describes the specific application of the CE in this study. 
Then we present the econometric model. Subsequently, we present the data and results. We 
derive a monetary value of informal care provided to a heterogeneous sample of informal 
caregivers in section 9.6. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude the chapter. 
9.2 Developed vignettes 
In this section, \Ve give a definition of the commodity informal care. Then we describe the 
developed vignettes. The ~onette attributes were derived from the definition and from 
empirical findings in other studies. 
9.2.1 Definition 
\YJ e define informal care as "a non-market composite commodity cons-isting of heterogeneous parts 
prod11ced ~?;· one or more IJJembers if the social environment if the care reapient'-" (Van den Berg et al., 
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2004). With the term non-market commodity we indicate that there exists no formal 
market for informal care and subsequently there exist no market prices. Therefore, this 
study aims to derive a monetary value for informal caregiver's time. A heterogeneous 
commodity means that informal care consists of different care tasks like house"\vork and 
personal care. The amount of informal care can also differ substantially betv.reen different 
caregiving situations, for example, according to the demand of the care recipient and the 
available amount of professional care or other informal care. Chapter 3 gives a detailed 
discussion of the heterogeneous nature and dynamics of the commodity informal care. Vle 
included some of these variations in our vignettes and tried tO capture other parts in the 
other independent variables. 
9.2.2 Vignette attributes 
Our vignette attributes are informal care hours, informal care tasks, and a monetary 
compensation, as denoted in table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Overview of attributes and their levels 
Attribute Lt.-vd Code 
Inform:li care rnsk Light house work Dummy: 1 yes 
Heavy house work Dummy: 1 = yes 
Personal care Dummy-: 1 = yes 
Informal c:u:e hours per week and per day 7 7 
14 14 
21 21 
Informal caregiver's monetary compensation 1 0 EURO per hour 0 
4.55 EURO per hour 4.55 
9.10 EURO per hour 9.10 
13.65 ECRO per hour 13.65 
1 Onj;lilai!J• 0/10/20/30 Dutch guilders 
Table 9.1 gives an overview of the attributes chosen, and the levels distinguished 
\Ni.thin each attribute. It also gives the coding of the data. \V'hen \Ve developed our vignettes 
there was no information about the amount and nature of care informal caregivers in a 
heterogeneous population normally provide. But there was some information on a disease 
specific level,. viz. a population informal cargivers providing care for people '.V-1.th 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) (R.iemsma et al., 1997). Therefore, the three care tasks were 
chosen because they include the most important informal care tasks (R.iemsma et aL, 1997). 
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Reimsma et al. (1997) also found that informal caregivers provided on average 33 hours per 
week care for people v.d.th Rc\. We felt that this amount would be an upper bound for our 
population. This because it is well known that time measurement is complicated and that 
the measured amount of time depends on the questions posed Guster and Stafford, 1991). 
Riemsma et a!. (1997) dist.U:souished 28 care tasks as opposed to the 16 tasks we choose. It 
could therefore be e::...-pected that our population would report a somewhat lower amount of 
informal care provided and we chose therefore to include 7, 14 and 21 hours informal care 
per week respectively as the values of the time attributes. We selected the monetary 
compensation because it encompasses the Dutch market prices and health care sector 
tariffs for unskilled housework of 8.53 Euro per hour. 
The three attributes and their chosen levels result in 6561 (3-'* 33* 34) possible 
vignettes. We reduced these to a manageable number of 16 vignettes.2 Then we chose one 
reference 'rignette and distributed the remaining 15 among 5 groups of 3 vignettes. Thus, 
we ended up with 5 sets of 4 vignettes (each including the same reference vignette). The 
sets were randomly distributed over our respondents. 
In our application, we focused on the trade-offs beween a monetary 
compensation and providing additional hours of care on the one hand and other care tasks 
on the other hand, because our objective was to derive a monetary valuation of informal 
care. Of course, the trade-off bet\veen informal care time and care tasks could also provide 
valuable information. Besides the information gathered in the CE exercise, we collected 
extra information on, for instance, the informal caregivers' objective and subjective burden 
and the rating of their own real life situation compared to the hjJ'Othetical situations as 
described in the vignettes. This information will be used as additional independent 
variables to see how they influence ratings (and possibly indirect the marginal rates of 
substitution). 
9.2.3 The survey and vignette questions 
Our central objective was to derive a monetary value of informal care consistent v.rith the 
heterogeneous nature of this commodity. We therefore first asked the informal caregivers 
some questions about their current careghdng situation. These included how many years 
the informal caregiver provides informal care already. Moreover, we asked respondents 
2 This is ca!.lt:d an orthogonal nrray. Such orthogonal amy is still able to escirn.atc m:Un effectS. but not 
imt:r.r.ccions. In an orthogonal array. each level of one attribute occurs with each level of another attribute \vith 
equ.'ll or at least proportional frequencies. We used the SPSS orthoplan procedure to nTange an orthogonal 
design. 
184 Infor!11al can:: an economic approach 
how many hours they spent on informal caregiving during the last week according to a list 
of si.·.:::teen care tasks. \Ve distinguished between three types of care tasks: (1) housework 
(HDL) like cleaning and cooking, (2) activities of daily living (ADL) like personal care and, 
(3) instrumentli activities of daily living (IADL) like contacts with health care. 
Subsequently we introduced a hypothetical caregiving situation Mth a set of four 
v--ignettes and we asked respondents to rate them. See for an example of the exact question 
fi,<>ure 9. L 
Figure 9.1: Example of a choice question 
"Pcopk: who need care mr often in diffirent sit11ations. Below, 11!e sketch jolfr dijferent sit11ations that probab(y diffir strong/;• from tht 
situation of.J'Oitr carr recipient. Please, imagine )'Oitrsc!f in the sit11alions." 
Situation A: 
• Your care recipient needs 21 hours per wet!k support with personal care 
• You provide every cby 3 hours .informal care, totalling 21 hours per week, with personal care 
• You receive in return an amount of 13.65 Euro per hour from the government ta.".;:-free. 
Situation B: 
• Your care recipient needs 14 hours per wet!k support with hea"')' houscv.·o:rk 
You provide every day 2 hours informal care, totalling 14 hours per week, 'vith heavy housework 
• You receive in return an amount of 9.10 Euro per hour from the government tnx-free. 
Situation C: 
• Your care recipient needs 7 hours per week support with personal care 
• You provide every d:1y 1 hour informal care, totalling 7 hours per week. with personal care 
• You receive in rerum an amount of9.10 Euro per hour from the government tax-free. 
Situation D: 
Your care recipient needs 7 hours per week support '\.'1/ith light housework 
• You prov:ide ev·ery day 1 hour informal care, totalling 7 hours per week, v,i.th light houscv.·ork 
• You receive in rerum an amount of 0 Euro per hour from the government tax-free. 
Ple:1se give the four simations a rating between 1 and 10. 10 is the from your perspective best imaginable and 1 
the worst imagin::tble situation. 
I give situation A, B, C and D rate ...... (.rubseqtrent/y for all sitHalions) 
Ple:J.Se compare your 0'\.-...11 real life situation with the four hypothetical situations. How would you rate your own 
real life situation? 10 is the from your perspective best llm.gimble and 1 the worst imaginable situation. 
Because chapter 8 found a relatively high non-response on the vignette ratings, we 
put extra attention on the design of the survey. The hypothetical situations were presented 
on the back of the sunrey, which had a different colour compared to the remainder of the 
survey. The respondents could fold this page in such a way that the vignettes could be 
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placed next to the rating questions, illstead of them being on a separate page as in the 
previous chapter. 
To get a better picruxe of the current illformal care situation, we also measured 
health-related quality of life of illformal caregivers and care recipients using the EQ-SD 
(Essink-Bot et al., 1993). We furthermore measured subjective caregiving burden. J\tfany 
instruments are developed to measure subjective burden of illformal caregiving (Kramer, 
1997). We applied the Caregiver Strains Index (CSI) (Jacobi eta!., 2003) because it contains 
a total sum score as opposed to other instruments that focus on different sub aspects of 
providing informal care, like financial problems and lack of family support. The CSI has a 
minimum score of 0 indicating no subjective burden ill terms of strain and a maximum 
score of 13 indicating much strain. A score of 7 or higher means that the informal caregiver 
is at risk. Finally, we asked both informal caregivers and care recipients some socio-
economic questions. 
9.3 Econometric model 
In asking informal caregivers to rate four hy-pothetical caregiving situations, we assume 
these ratings to be a prm.:y of informal caregivers' (direct and illdirect) utility and (direct 
and illdirect) disutility (Uic) derived from the four situations. This makes that our 
dependent variable is latent. We only observe respondents' ratings 1 to 10 (which were 
transformed to the range of 0 to 9): 
y = 0 if y' ,; 0, (1) 
= 1 if 0 < y" ,; )ll, 
=9if8:0:y". 
Given the fact that respondents could only give a rating from 1 to 10, they were supposed 
to choose the rate that most closely represents their own feelings. These ratings are proxies 
for an illformal caregiver's utility (derived from the hypothetical situation. Because 
respondents rated four different hypothetical situations our data have a panel structure: 
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. '/3 ' )' ;,= Jl +X;, + z,y + et;+ C,p (2) 
where y* is an unobserved latent variable denoting respondent i's ~ = 1, ... , :t\.1) utility 
derived from vignette t (t = 1, ... , 4), ;.tis a fi'Xed constant, xit is a K-climensional vector of 
vignette attributes presented to respondent i at vignette t. Furthermore, zi is a M-
dimensional vector of respondents' and informal care characteristics including the rating of 
informal caregivers' own real life situation, while ai + cit is the error term consisting of 
1:\Vo components: e:it denoting an individual specific component that is treated as a random 
variable, and cti denoting an individual specific component assumed to be fL>::ed over the 
different vignettes. Because the vignettes were randomly distributed over the respondents, 
we assume that there is no correlation bet\Veen xit and e:it. Therefore the random effects 
ordered pro bit model is appropriate for our problem. Greene (2000) and Scott Long (1997) 
discuss the ordered probit model in more detail, while Hsiao (1986) and Verbeek (2000) 
give detailed discussions of random effects models. An alternative for the random effects 
ordered probit is a random effects ordered logit model. The latter model suffers, however, 
from violations of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property (McFadden, 
1974) and (Beggs et al., 1981). This property means that adding a similar vignette, which 
resembles an existing vignette except for one irrelevant detail, should not alter the 
subsequent ratings. Other alternative methods for the analysis are OLS-regression or 
interval regression (Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003). Both, however, assume a cardinal 
interpretation of the ratings (Boyle et al., 2001), which is a strong assumption. 
If we replace x-;j3 in (3) \.Vith the ~onette attributes andy~;, with Yin we get our 
empirical model: 
(3) 
In order to derive a monetary value of informal care one wishes to keep informal 
caregivers' utility constant while vary-1ng the level of the different components (attributes) 
of utility. These components consist in our application of care tasks, hours of care 
provided, and an hourly monetary compensation. In vary-1ng these attributes one can derive 
the marginal rate of substitution (NJRS) beNreen the attributes. Including a monetary 
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compensation3 as one of the attributes, in our application in the form of willingness to 
accept (\'V'TA), enables us to derive the MRS beween the other attributes and the monetary 
compensation. For instance, to derive informal caregiver's WTA for extra informal care 
provided (lv!RSHc), one wishes to keep Uk constant. We state it formally: 
MRSHc=H/C (4) 
9.4 Data 
9.4.1 Study sample 
The informal caregivers in this study were reached via Dutch regional support centres for 
informal caregivers. We approached 59 regional centres. Out of these, 40 centres were 
willing to participate in the research. We spread 3258 postal suiV"eys via the 40 centres. This 
approach ensures us that informal caregivers are reached directly. The regional support 
centres are the only Dutch organisations were informal caregivers are registered and 
therefore through which it is possible to reach directly a heterogeneous sample of informal 
caregivers providing a substantial amount of informal care during a longer period of time. 
Alternatives, for e.~ple, disease specific groups or a representative sample from the 
Dutch population would not have ensured to reach a large sample of informal caregivers. 
We received completed surveys from 865 informal caregivers and 513 care 
recipients. Out of these, 413 informal caregivers returned their survey v.i.thout their care 
recipient and 452 couples of informal caregivers and care recipients returned the survey. 
There were also 61 care recipients who returned their survey while their informal caregiver 
did not. Those surveys were not analysed, because they do not contain information about 
informal caregivers' ratings of the vignettes. The returned surveys of 81 informal caregivers 
and 143 care recipients were of too bad quality or not filled in. Therefore, they were not 
used in the analyses. Finally, 30 informal caregivers and care recipients were untraceable 
relocated. 
9.4.2 Background statistics 
Table 9.2 shows some descriptive statistics of the study sample. 
3 Om: has to be careful v."ith the interpretation if one includes prices or costS as an ::mributc (Ratcliffe, 2000). 
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Table 9.2: Characteristics informal caregivers (n=865) and care recipients (n=452) 
Characteristic 
Infonnal caregivers 
Agt:t 
Gt:ndt:r~ 
Relation to care recipient} 
Portner 
Parent 
Child 
Other 
Live together+ 
Education; 
Education 1 
Education 2 
Education 3 
Education4 
Educ.<t.tion 5 
Education 6 
Education 7 
Ocmpatioff 
Paid job 
Job!t:ss 
Hou$e worker 
Retired 
Disability pen$ion 
Other 
IncomeS 
11/mss care recipients according to itifom:al carrgiwrfJ 
Mean 
60.2 
23.4 
48.9 
28.8 
10.3 
11.2 
58.2 
13.3 
24.6 
27.9 
6.2 
10.6 
12.5 
6.9 
23.4 
3.9 
4().7 
21.4 
6.5 
2.7 
1.627.28 
Dummy respiratory ®ea:>e$ 12.6 
Dummy circulatory diseases 30.3 
Dummy digt:stive cliseases 11.9 
Dummy endocrine, metabolic and nutritional 12.8 
di$e:J.SeS 
Dummy musculO$keletal diseases 
Dummy neurological cliseases 
Dummy skin diseases 
Dummy psychological diseases 
Care redpiencs 
Aget 
Contin11ed on the next pagt· 
40.5 
46.1 
8.3 
43.2 
66.6 
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Characteristic 
Gender 
Illna.i3 
Mean 
48.8 
Dummy respiratory diseases 13.5 
Dummy circulatory diseases 28.1 
Dummy digestive diseases 12.8 
Dummy endocrine, metabolic and nutritional 15.0 
dise:1ses 
Dummy musculoskeletal diseases 
Dummy neurological diseases 
Dummy skin diseases 
Dummy psychological diseases 
1 In]cars 
2 Percentage 111alcs 
J Percentages 
.; Pcrcmtage fi:;ing togdher 
5 Net l!:onthb']all:i(y incol!lc in tlfro 
48.2 
50.4 
10.2 
36.5 
Three out of four informal caregivers were female. Informal caregivers' and care 
recipients' age ranged from 16.5 to 89.5 and from 2.5 to 98.5 respectively. Category 
education 1 is the lowest and category education 7 the highest education. 
Table 9.3 provides some other background characteristics of the srudy sample, 
such as care duration, the amount of provided informal care, subjective burden and EQ-
5D-scores. 
The average care duration was 8.7 year reflecting that our population consisted of 
many informal caregivers that cared for care recipients -._vith a chronic disease. Of the care 
recipients, 11.5 percent was on a waiting list for professional home care or residential care. 
60.9 percent of the informal caregivers performed activities of daily living (ADL) while 87.4 
percent of them performed housework (HDL). The EQ-SD scores of the informal 
caregivers were unsurprisingly much higher compared to those of the care recipients (0.75 
versus 0.30 respectively). Finally, informal caregivers indicated that providing informal care 
was straining as can be concluded from the average CSI score o£7.9. 
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Table 9.3: Characteristics of the informal caregivers (n=865) and care recipients (n=452) 
caregiving situations 
Characteristic 
lnfonnal caregivers 
Can: durationl 
Performing HDL t:l$ks:: 
Hours HDL tasks3 
Performing ADL t:1sks~ 
Hours ADL task$3 
Performing IADL t::tsks~ 
Hours IADL tasks3 
Total informal c::u:e rime3 
EQ-5D 
CSI 
Rating current real life s.ituation 
Care recipients 
Waiting list=: 
Oth<.-r informal car.;; 
'In)'cars 
1 In percentage 
J In !liMn hours per ll'td:::. 
9.5 Results 
Mean 
8.7 
87.4 
93.3 
60.9 
51.8 
90.5 
68.9 
175.1 
0.75 
7.9 
6.2 
0.30 
11.5 
41.6 
9.5.1 Results of the random effects ordered pro bit 
\Ve give an ordinal interpretation to respondents' ratings and correct for correlation within 
respondents' answers. Therefore, we used a random effects ordered probit to analyse 
informal caregivers' ratings. Table 9.4 gives the results. 
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Table 9.4: Results random effects ordered probit of equation (3); dependent variable: 
rating informal caregiver 
Modell Model2 Mode13 Mode14 
Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-valuc 
Vignette acrributes 
Dummy light houSC\VOrk -0.10 -1.80 -0.09 -1.57 ·0.09 -1.40 -0.08 -0.84 
(1 =yes) 
Dummy he~vy houst:'l.vork -0.40 -6.37 -0.42 -6.42 -0.47 -6.42 -0.31 -2.79 
(1 =yes) 
Informal cnre hours ·0.01 -3.11 -0.01 ·3.44 -0.02 -3.53 -0.02 -3.06 
Informal car:e monetary 0.02 10.84 0.02 10.31 0.02 9.27 0.02 6.58 
compensation 
Infonnal carS:,.O'J·vers 
Racing own situation 0.06 4.88 0.07 4.82 0.08 3.52 
Age 
·0.00 -0.36 -0.01 -1.42 
Gender .Q.OS 
-1.06 O.Ql 0.09 
Edlft:atirm: rrj = edittotion 7 
Dummy education 1 (1 =yes) 0.20 1.23 0.26 0.95 
Dummy education 2 (1 =yes) 0.26 1.79 0.43 1.69 
Dummy education 3 {1 =yes) 0.17 1.20 0.30 1.24 
Dummy education 4 (1 =yes) 0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.10 
Dummy edua.tion 5 (1 =yes) 0.13 0.88 0.44 1.72 
Dummy educttion 6 (1 =yes) 0.14 0.98 0.28 1.15 
Net monthly income 
-0.00 -1.72 -0.00 -0.27 
Ocmpation: ref :::: h01m 1110rkt·r 
Dummy paid job (1 =yes) 0.02 0.28 -0.01 -0.07 
Dummy jobless (1 ::::yes) 0.25 1.44 0.16 0.51 
Dummy retired (1 = yes) 0.07 0.78 0.12 0.84 
Dummy disability pension 
-0.13 -1.11 0.10 0.50 
(1 =yes) 
Dummy other main activity 
-0.16 -0.93 ·0.44 ·1.84 
(1 =yes) 
&lation to care recipient: nf = 
partner 
Dummy parent (1 = yes) 
·0.03 ·0.34 -0.07 -0.35 
Dummy child (1 ::::yes) 0.05 0.50 0.16 0.79 
Dummy other (1 =yes) 0.13 1.07 0.03 0.15 
Dummy same household 0.26 3.03 0.24 1.65 
(1 =yes) 
Informal C:l.Ie years 
·0.00 -0.68 -0.00 -0.79 
Contin11ed on nc.'<:l page 
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Modell Modcl2 Modc13 Modcl4 
Cocf. z-valuc Cocf. z-valuc Coef. z-valuc Cocf. z-value 
Dummy other informal care -0.03 -0.50 -0.06 -0.63 
(1 =yes) 
Dummy \v:titing list (1 =yes) -0.24 -2.46 -0.19 -1.35 
Informal care time -0.00 -0.47 -0.00 -0.15 
Informal care tasks -0.01 -0.57 -0.00 -0.17 
Dummy l\DL tasks (1 =yes) 0.09 1.30 0.10 0.95 
Dummy LWL tnsks (1 =yes) 0.18 1.02 0.14 0.52 
EQ-5D 0.15 1.04 0.41 1.81 
CSI 0.03 2.25 0.04 2.20 
Illness care recipimts according lo 
infom;a/ cartginr.r (1 =yes) 
Dummy respiratory diseases -0.07 -0.94 
Dummy circub.tmy diseases -0.02 -0.25 
Dummy digestive diseases -0.18 -2.11 
Dummy endocrine. mcubolic 0.09 0.74 
:md nutritional diseases 
Dummy musculoskeletal -0.15 -2.55 
diseases 
Dummy neurologic:ll diseases 0.02 0.30 
Dummy skin diseases 0.12 1.36 
Dummy psychologic:ll diseases 0.08 1.42 
Care recipients 
Gender 0.05 0.54 
Age 0.00 0.94 
EQ-SD 0.23 1.82 
I!Jm-ss(1 =yes) 
Dummy respintory diseases -0.06 -0.51 
Dummy circuhtory diseases -0.29 -3.14 
Dummy digestive diseases 0.08 0.67 
Dummy endocrine, metabolic 0.16 1.34 
and nutritional diseases 
Dummy musculoskeletal 0.05 0.56 
diseases 
Dummy neurologic:ll diseases 0.13 1.50 
Dummy skin diseases -0.01 -0.12 
Dummy psychological diseases 0.11 1.14 
Intercept 1 -1.39 -15.83 -1.04 -9.22. -0.53 -1.48 0.23 0.37 
Intercept 2 -1.10 -13.02 -0.75 -6.77 -0.22 -0.60 0.54 0.87 
Contin11cd on next page 
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Modell Model2 Model3 Modcl4 
Cocf. z-valuc Cocf. z-value Cocf. z-valuc Cocf. z-valuc 
lnt<:rcept 3 -0.86 -10.38 -0.51 -4.63 0.04 0.10 0.77 1.25 
Intercept 4 -0.48 -5.97 -0.14 -1.30 0.43 1.21 1.15 1.84 
Intercept 5 -0.10 -1.21 0.24 2.16 0.82 2.30 1.49 2.39 
Imercc'Pt 6 0.38 4.70 0.72 6.56 1.32 3.69 1.96 3.14 
Int~rcept 7 0.84 10.31 1.18 10.59 1.80 5.02 2.42 3.86 
lnt~rcept 8 1.53 17.77 1.85 16.09 2.46 6.84 3.06 4.88 
Intercept 9 1.79 20.00 2.11 17.92 2.75 7.61 3.38 5.38 
N 2260 2108 1624 755 
We disti%auish four models in table 9.4. Model 1 just presents the results of 
respondents' ratings of the vrignettes. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level, except for the dummy "light house'\vork'. Informal caregivers also rated their 
current situation compared to the four hypothetical situations. Model 2 gives the results 
corrected for the informal caregiver's rating of their current situation. Informal caregiver's 
current situation has a positive and statistically significant influence on informal caregiver's 
ratings of the hypothetical situations. This seems straightfon.vard: the more positive 
informal caregivers are about their own real life situation, the more positive they rate the 
hypothetical situations. 
'1'//e collected information about the informal caregivers' background, for example, 
socio-economic variables (table 9.2), and we measured informal caregiving characteristics, 
for instance, informal caregiver time spent on proving informal care, health-related quality 
of life and subjective burden (table 9.3). Model 3 gives the results corrected for those 
independent variables. The dummies 'informal caregiver and care recipient share the same 
household' and 'care recipient is on a waiting list' are statistically significant. Sharing the 
same household yields, ceteris paribus, higher ratings of the hypothetical situations 
compared to not sharing the same household. Provricling care for somebody on a waiting 
list for professional care leads to lower ratings, ceteris paribus. Also, informal caregiver's 
subjective burden measured Vvi.th the CSI has a statistically significant influence on the 
ratings. The positive sign is, however, somewhat surprising. A higher subjective burden 
yrields higher ratings. 
Finally, model4 gives the results also corrected for care recipient's characteristics 
as reported by care recipients. The number of observations in model 4 is, however, quite 
low compared to models 1, 2 and 3 because fewer care recipients than informal caregivers 
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returned a survey. Care recipients' health starus has a statistically significant (at the 10 
percent level) impact on informal caregivers' ratings. The positive sign indicates that the 
healthier the care recipient is the higher informal caregiver's ratings are which is plausible. 
A comparison of the coefficients of the attributes of models 1, 2 and 3 shows that 
only informal caregiver's monetary compensation remains quite stable after correction for 
other independent variables. Moreover, the coefficient of informal caregivers' rating of 
their real life siruation goes up after correction for other real life variables. If '\ve compare 
model 3 v.i.th model 4, the coefficients of the vi.gnette attributes change a lot after 
correction for care recipients' characteristics. This may be due to the loss of many 
observations. However, in terms of statistical significance, the results of the four models 
are very stable. 
9.6 Informal caregivers' monetary compensation 
In the methods section we discussed how to derive a monetary valuation of informal care 
'\vi.th CE. From the estimated coefficients of the models in table 9.4 we derive the informal 
caregivers' marginal rates of substitution, using equation (4). \Y.ie present them in table 9.5. 
Table 9.5: Informal caregivers' marginal rates of substitution 
Modell Mode12 Mode13 Modcl4 
light house\.vork/Mon<.>t:u:y compensation -4,32 -3,96 -3.93 -3.36 
Hc::nry hou$ework/2vfono::tary compensation -18,15 -19.30 -21,54 -13,37 
C:u:e hours/Monenry compo::nsation -054 -0,63 -0.72 -0,91 
light houst..'\\'Ork/ C:u:e hours 7.98 6.27 5.41 3.68 
Heavy house\vork/ C:u:e hours 33,53 30,55 29,72 14,67 
There is some variation in the lYfRS of the different '\rignette attributes between 
the distinct models. Moreover, in absolute terms the 11RS between heavy housework and 
monetary compensation and heavy housework and care hours are quite high. On the other 
hand, the :tviRS benveen care hours and the monetary compensation is low v.i.th values of 
less than 1 Euro. S'\vi.tching between care tasks seems to be more important in informal 
caregivers' valuation than prov"iding an hour extra care per week. 
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9.7 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we applied a CE to determine a monetary value of informal care in a 
heterogeneous population of care recipients. An important advantage of CE compared to 
more conventional methods, like the opportunity cost method and the pro:-..-y good method, 
is CE's ability to capture more accurately the informal caregiver's preferences concerning 
this heterogeneous commodity. 
Informal caregivers require an extra compensation of 0.54 Euro per hour for 
providing one additional hour of the same informal care task. They also require a 
compensation of 4.32 Euro per hour for S'\vi.tching from providing light housework to 
personal care and 18.15 Euro per hour for sv.i.tching from providing heav-y housework to 
personal care. 
Respondents' preferences are systematically related \vith informal caregiver's and care 
recipient's characteristics. First of all, informal caregivers' ratings of thcir own real life 
situation, has a positive effect on their ratings of the hypothetical caregiving situations. 
_1\.lso informal caregivers' subjective burden, care recipients health-related quality of life, 
caring for somebody on a waiting list for professional care and sharing the same household 
'.vi.th the care recipient has a statistically significant influence on the ratings. This seems to 
indicate that the informal caregivers' rating of the hypothetical care situations reflects, at 
least partly, their own experiences. 
Our application of CE shows that it is an interesting method to derive a monetary 
compensation of informal care. Tills is especially the case, because all kind of real life 
information influences the informal caregivers' ratings. Although, in the context of 
hypothetical caregiving situations, one may be ambivalent about the desirability of such 
influences, the results stress the heterogeneity of the commodity informal care. Therefore, 
it would be challenging to add additional attributes and levels to the vignettes. Tills could 
however put greater (cognitive) burden on the respondents, probably at the costs of higher 
non-response. On the other hand, it would be interesting to deal ""i_th greater heterogeneity 
of informal care by adding, for example, more care tasks, more qualitative information, for 
instance, on the nature of the illness or the relationship '.vith the care recipient or by adding 
an attribute covering the trade-off between informal caregiver's own tasks and other 
informal caregivers. :J\.Toreover, an attribute dealing with the trade-off ben.veen professional 
and informal care would probably prov-ide interesting information. Oral surveys with 
trained interviewers may help to overcome part of the non-response problem. 
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In sum, we suggest that CE's may be regarded as a promising alternative for the 
existing methods to value informal care, like the opportunity cost method and proxy good 
method. The presented monetary value of informal care can be incorporated in the 
numerator of a cost-effectiveness ratio in economic evaluations of health care. 
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10 The well-being of informal caregivers: 
A monetary valuation of informal care1 
Summary 
This chapter estimates the value cf providing informal care fry means of a n;e/1-being v·al!!ation method. The 
z-•aflle if providing infomwl core is monetarijy evaluated !?_y assessing the (compensating) income necessary to 
maintain the same level ojJPell-being after an informal caregiwr proz-ides an extra ho11r of informal care. In 
the econometric anafystS a distinction is made betJJ!ee/7 the care recipient ;;;bo is and the care recipient who is 
not a fami!J' !llfltJber of the informal caregiver. The infom!al caregiver's well-being is meas11red f!Jr means of 
fn;o se(f-reported Slfijectiz:e q~testiom: that were posed in a qtJestionnaire annPered fo' 865 D11tch i;iforma/ 
caregivers behveen the end o/2001 and the beginning q/2002. The results indicate tho~, at sample overage, 
an extra hour of informal care iS JPorth about 15 EHros. This eqtra!s 15 or 16 Euros if the care recipient 
is a Jami!J.' member and abo11t 8 or 9 E11ros if not. The res!llts obtained in this .ft11cfy are co»tporab/e to the 
res11/ts found 1ilbeJJ 11sing the contingmt vab1ation !TJethod on the same data set. 
10.1 Introduction 
Economic evaluations of inte.nrentions in health care should adopt a societal perspective 
(Russell et al., 1996) and (Drummond et al., 1997). This implies that everyone affected by 
the intervention under study should be considered and that all significant outcomes and 
costs should be counted, valued and included (Russell et al., 1996). Informal care is a 
significant part of the total of care provided, especially to care recipients 'With chronic and 
terminal diseases (Norton, 2000). Still, the costs of informal care are often ignored in 
economic evaluations (Stone et al., 2000). This might be due to the lack of valuation 
methods that are both theoretically valid and empirically feasible (Chapter 3). 
The existing literature on the economic valuation of informal care has mainly 
focused on the costs e::...-perienced by the caregivers, which are usually valued in terms of 
time spent on providing informal care. Two valuation methods are usually recommended 
and applied: the opportunity cost method and the proxy good method (Luce et al., 1996), 
(Posnett and Jan, 1996) and (Drummond et al., 1997)-' Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8 present 
1 Based on V::tn den Berg, B. ::tnd Ferrer-i-C:u:bondl, A, 2004. The well-being of inform:U c:uegivcrs; A monetary 
v:lluation of informal c:ue. Submitted for publication. 
~ See, Ketten (1990) for :111 overv1e\v :111d discussion of the: costs, other dun time, related to informal c:ut. 
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detailed discussions on the disadvantages of both methods. The main shortcoming of the 
opportunity cost method is that it is too narrow for a full economic evaluation, and of the 
prm .. y good method is that it is not preference based as welfare economics demands. 
1\{oreover. neither of the two methods captures the morbidity and mortality risks associated 
w:ith pro>~ding informal care (Hughes et a!., 1999) and (Schulz and Beach, 1999). 
Therefore, chapter 3 called for the development of new methods to value the costs 
associated \vith providing informal care. It suggested the use of stated preference methods, 
such as contingent valuation (CV) and conjoint analysis (CA) as more adequate to value 
informal care. 
This chapter presents an alternative valuation method in which the cost of 
providing informal care is valued in terms of the loss of well-being suffered by the informal 
caregiver. This method was first applied by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2002). 
Chapter 3 suggested to apply this method to value informal care. The method uses an 
individual's self-reported '\veil-being (or happiness) to estimate the (compensating) income 
necessary to maintain the same level of informal caregivers' well-being after providing an 
additional hour of informal care. The compensating income is taken as the monetary value 
of informal care. By looking at individuals' well-being this method aims at incorporating all 
the costs that caregivers experience. Thus not only time costs are incorporated, but also 
financial outlays related to informal care, such as telephone calls or home adaptations, and 
non-financial aspects, such as physical and mental tiredness associated with providing 
informal care. These costs are incorporated to the extent that they affect an individual's 
subjective well-being. 
Compared to CV and CA, the method presented here has one main advantage: 
the well-being question is relatively easy to answer for respondents. It has been shown that 
the percentage of individuals who do not respond to well-being questions is very low (Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). In the present sample, only 2.5% to 3.4% (depending 
on the questions used) of the informal caregivers failed to answer the well-being questions 
(compared '-'Vith, for example, 6.7% who refused to give their income). In contrast, CV 
questions are more difficult for respondents to complete, as it asks them to give an explicit 
monetary value of the commodity for which no market exists. In this sample, (depending 
on the questions used) 42.8% to 49.8% of the informal caregivers failed to ans'\ver the CV 
questions. It is '\vorth noting that the non-response on CV questions depends heavily on 
the choice format used. This sample consisted of open-ended questions, which are the 
most difficult for respondents to answer (Green et al., 1998). In another sample, using a 
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dichotomous choice CV question with an open follow-up question to value informal care 
the non-response was 19% (chapter 6). Even if lower than open-ended questions, the non-
response is still much higher than for the well-being questions used in this chapter. 
Similarly, the answering of CA questions requires a considerable effort from the 
respondent. This is especially the case when the ,,..:ignettes include many attributes or when 
attributes contain elements that the respondent is not familiar '.Vi.th (Ryan and Gerard, 
2003) and (Van Ophem et al., 1999). 
The present study contributes to the health economics literatttre in at least three 
aspects. First, it uses a fairly new valuation method that has never been applied to informal 
caregiving. Second, its results can be easily compared to earlier work that used the same 
data set to value informal care by means of CV (Chapter 7). This gives a unique 
opportunity to compare the outcomes of the t\Vo methods. If the monetary values obtained 
with the t\Vo methods are within the same range, the t\VO methods will be externally 
validated. This is what in the literature is called convergent validity (Bishop, 1995) and 
(Clarke, 2002). Third, the empirical analysis distinguishes betvleen t\V'O types of caregivers, 
depending on whether the care recipient is or is not a family member of the caregiver. This 
translates into n.vo sorts of (compensating) income and thus into t\V'o values of informal 
care. This exercise illustrates the flexibility of the present method. 
In what follows, section 10.2 describes the method, that is the survey questions 
used, the well-being mode~ and the econometric method. Section 10.3 presents the data 
and descriptive statistics. Section 10.4 gives the results for the well-being equation. Section 
10.5 assesses the monetary value of informal care and compares it "With the findings in 
other studies. Finally, section 10.6 presents the discussion and conclusions. 
10.2 The well-being method to value informal care 
10.2.1 Survey questions 
We give the three (groups of) questions that are most important for the present study: 
amount of informal care provided, t\V'O measures of well-being, and household income. 
In the survey, informal caregivers are asked how much time they spent on 
provi.ding informal care in the week preceding the interview. Additionally, the 
questionnaire includes a question on the social relationship between the informal caregivers 
and their care recipients. This allows us to distinguish betvleen hours of informal care 
provided to a family member and to a non-family member. Family members are partners, 
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parents, children, sisters and brothers, and non-family members are friends, neighbours or 
in-laws of the informal caregiver. 
The survey includes tv.To questions in which informal caregivers are asked to 
indicate their own happiness by placing a cross in or on a visual analogue scale. The answer 
to these (or similar) questions give an indication of what is known as subjective well-being 
(see Section 10.2.2). The tv.To happiness questions in the survey are phrased as follows: 
Figure 10.1: Satisfaction question, scale 1 to 5 
In general, how happy are 
Ve.ryhappy Fairly 
yott? 
happy 
D D D 
and 
Please, indicate with a cross how happy yott are at this moment on the scale below 
Figure 10.2: Satisfaction question, scale 0 to 10 
Completely 
unhappy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not happy 
D D 
Completely 
happy 
9 10 
Next to the verbal description, the scales (verbal labels versus 0 to 1 0), and starting points 
(very happy on the left side versus completely unhappy), the tv.To questions also differ in 
respect to their place in the questionnaire. The first question (Figure 10.1) is included in a 
section ~th the socio-economic questions. The second question (Figure 1 0.2) is included 
ID a section on the provision of informal care. The empirical analysis estimates the value of 
IDformal care by using both questions (see Section 1 0.5). 
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The third piece of information necessary to estimate the (compensating) income 
of prmriding an extra hour of informal care is the informal caregivers' income. The income 
question in the sunrey is: 
Figure 10.3: Income question 
What is yoHr net monthfy famijy income_. witho11t holidqy allowance? 
D Less than 1.200 GJti!ders per month 
D BetJJJeen 1.200 and 1.600 CHilders per month 
D BetJveen 1.600 and 2.000 Gm/ders per month 
D BetJveen 2.000 and 2.500 G11ilders per month 
D BetJJ/een 2.500 and 3.500 Guilders per month 
D BetJPeen 3.500 and 5.000 Guilders per month 
D More tban 5.000 Gt.ti!derJper month 
The income question is thus asked in intenrals. In order to valuate informal care in 
monetary terms, hmvever, income is needed on a continuous scale (see Section 10.5). As a 
good approximation the mean of the interval is taken as the income of the respondent. 
Given that the intervals are fairly small (a Guilder is equivalent to about 0.45 Euros), this 
question provides a very good approximation of the adHai income. For individuals in the 
lowest and highest category, household income was set at 800 and 7000 Guilders, 
respectively. Obviously, the imputed income for these two groups of individuals has the 
largest error. Nevertheless, only 19% of individuals indicated to have an income in one of 
these t\.Vo categories.3 
3 An altt:m~tive method is to esti!m.te an income eqllil.tion. HO\vever. this option \V~S disarded, as the clara set 
does not cont:ain sufficient information {e..-..::pbnatory v:l.riables) to explain income. 
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10.2.2 The well-being model 
Subjective questions on life satisfaction have been used in economics to understand and 
explain individual well-being (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), (Clark and Oswald, 
1994), (DiTella er al., 2001), (Easterlin, 2001), (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004), (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters 2004), (Frey and Srurzer, 2002), (Frijters et al., 2004), (Oswald, 1997). 
The frrst step of the present valuation method is to explain the well-being of the 
informal caregiver (LV;) by a set of objective variables. The follO\ving model is used to 
estimate W~; 
(1) 
where y denotes the net monthly income, H,, represents the hours of provided informal 
care per week, and xis a vector of individual socio-economic and demographic variables, 
such as age, working starus, and whether or not having an illness. 
Equation (1) postulates that informal caregivers' well-being depends, among other 
things, on income and on hours of provided informal care. The relationship between hours 
of prov-ided informal care and well-being is expected to be negative, while the correlation 
between income and well-being is expected to be positive. From equation (1) one can 
derive the existing trade-off betvireen income and hours of informal care provided. This 
trade-off is the monetary value of informal care. In micro-econometric terms, the monetary 
value of informal care is obtained by calculating the (compensating) income ( Lly) 
necessary to maintain informal caregivers' well-being (~c) constant after increasing the 
amount of informal care provided ( fJ!.ic ). Formally, this is \.\tr:itten as: 
0% 
- oH = 
,, OW,j 
/oy 
(2) 
For a theoretical discussion of this method, see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van Praag (2002). 
Equation (1) is extended so as to allow the (negative) effect of providing informal 
care to depend on the (non-) family relationship between the caregiver and the care 
recipient. In the present sample, about 65% of the informal caregivers provide care to a 
family member (partner, parent, children, sister or brother). Previous research has shO"\VTI 
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that prmriding informal care to close family members involves a relatively larger burden 
(both physically and emotionally) than providing care to non-family members (Hughes et 
al., 1999) and (Kramer, 1997). Therefore, we expect a stronger inverse relationship bet\'.reen 
hours of provided informal care and well-being for informal caregivers who are family of 
the care recipients than for informal caregivers who are not. If tllls is true, the monetary 
value of provided care will depend on whether the care recipient and the informal caregiver 
are family or not. 
10.2.3 Econometric methods 
The t\V"o measures of well-being provide different types of answers and thus will be 
regressed by a different method. In the subjective well-being literature, models of the type 
presented in equation (1) have been regressed with linear as well as '-"i.th latent variable 
econometric techniques. The flrst ones assume that the answers to well-being questions are 
cardinal, while the second type of techniques only assumes ordinality. Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and Frijters (2004) have shown that assuming cardinality or ordinality generates similar 
results. The first measure of well-being (see section 10.2.1) is regressed by means of an 
Ordered Probit (OP). This captures the fact that the answers can only take 5 discrete values 
and hence do not give the exact level of well-being but the range in which the caregiver 
well-being lies. Surprisingly, a significant number of caregivers answered the second well-
being question (see Section 10.2.1) by placing a cross at any point of the 0 to 10 line 
(instead of only at the integer numbers, as expected). The coding of the answers took this 
into account by rounding the answer to one decimal number. Thus, the happiness question 
can take 101 values. Therefore, the OP is not a logical method to use. Instead, we use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
The model to be econometrically estimated by 0 P is: 
W,, * = a+fJLn(y)+yLn(H;,)+rp(Ln(H;J* NF)+ox+c: 
W,, =kB,Uk $W*<,Uk+l 
(3) 
where Wic* is the unobserved latent variable, Wic is the obsenred \Veil-being, NF is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the informal caregiver and the care recipient are not family 
related, and E represents the unobservable error term. The specification for OLS is s.imilar 
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to the one presented in equation (3). The only difference is that there is no latent variable 
involved. 
Equation (3) shows that the household income and the provided number of hours 
of informal care are taken in logarithms. Tbis specification is chosen so as to capture that 
the monetary value of informal care depends on the caregiver's income as well as on the 
current number of provided hours of informal care. The logarithmic relationship between 
income and well-being captures the usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility of 
income. 
By rev.Titing equation (2) for the specification presented in equation (3), the 
monetary value of providing an extra hour of informal care to a family member can be 
written as: 
(4) 
and, if the care recipient is not a family member, as: 
(5) 
Because both income and hours of informal care arc e::-..-pressed in logarithms, the 
absolute money value of each hour of informal care depends on both the current income 
and the number of hours already provided. 
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10.3 Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis were collected 'Wi.th the help of the Dutch regional 
support centres for informal caregivers between the end of 2001 and the beginning of 
2002. Fifty-nine regional centres were approached and 40 of which participated in the 
research. Through these centres, 3258 postal surveys were sent to informal caregivers. The 
final sample consisted of 865 informal caregivers~ which amounts to a response rate of 
26.6%. The main objective of this survey was to collect information that allows a valuation 
of informal care by using different methods, namely CV (Chapter 7), choice experiments 
(chapter 9) and the well-being method. 
Table 10.1 presents descriptive statistics. 
Table 10.1: Descriptive statistics (n=865) 
Well-being. 1 to 5 
\V'ell-being-. 0 to 10 
Hours inform.1l care per week 
Care recipient no f=.ily member 
Net monthly household income* 
Infol:lTID.! C:J.rt:givc:r i.; unt:mployed 
Infol:lTID.! caregiver has children 
Dummy sex: male 
Infol:lTID.! caregiver is married 
Age 
Dummy education: low 
Dummy education: middle 
Dummy educ:l.tion; high 
Dummy individual h:1.s :m illness 
'']n D;Itch G11ilder.r: 1 EHro 2.203i1 GHildas. 
Mean Std. Dcv. 
2.846 1.151 
5.713 2.182 
49 52.49 
0.345 1.001 
1627.28 809.04 
0.015 0.122 
0.812 0.391 
0.234 0.423 
0.763 0.425 
60.2 12.1 
38.5 48.7 
45.4 49.8 
16.2 36.8 
74.7 0.44 
The mean reported well-being is quite similar for both well-being questions. The majority 
of the informal caregivers (65%) are family of the care recipient. On average, the informal 
caregivers in the sample provide many hours (49 a week) of care which is more than the 
average informal caregivers give in The Netherlands (Timmermans, 2003). The vast 
majority of informal caregivers are married women "Uti.th children. Only 1.5% of the sample 
is unemployed, viz. they do not have a paid job nor are looking for it. The mean monthly 
household income is fairly low. It is just over 800 Euro net of ta.xes per month, while the 
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Dutch average is 917 Euro. An explanation is that the respondents in this sample are 
relatively old, \Vi.th 35% being older than 65 years, the official retirement age. Moreover, the 
large amount of rime spent on providing informal care may hamper having a (full-rime) 
paid job. A large majority· of the sample reports having one or more illnesses. 
10.4 The well-being of informal caregivers: 
empirical findings 
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results for the two well-being 
equations. Table 10.2 shows the results of the t\Vo questions and the two different 
specifications, i.e. "\\.-i.th and without allowing the effect of hours of care provided to depend 
on the relationship between informal caregivers and care recipient. 
Table 10.2 indicates that there is, as expected, a negative effect of the hours of 
care provided on the informal caregiver's well-being. Thls negative effect is smaller if the 
informal caregiver and the care recipient are no family. For instance, the estimated 
coefficient of the variable ln(hours of informal care) on the 1 to 5-question is -0.12 (-0.222 
+ 0.1 00) if the care recipient and informal caregiver are no family, and -0.222 if they are 
family. Similar results are found when using the 0 to 10-happiness question instead. 
Table 10.2 also shows that a fairly large number of coefficients are not statistically 
significant. As will be e::-..--plained below, this could be due to the present sample specificities. 
Contrarily to the results presented here, the age coefficient is usually found to be 
statistically significant (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). A possible explanation is 
that our sample is fairly old. Therefore, there could be lack of heterogeneity to identify the 
age effect correcdy. The non-statistically significant coefficient for male is not surprising. 
Being married, having ch.ildren and level of education are, contrarily to the results 
presented in Table 10.2, usually found to have a strong coefficient on well-being (Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). In 49% of the cases, informal caregivers in the sample 
are taking care of their own partner. Therefore, one tempting e::-..--planation for the not 
positive coefficient of "being married" is that the 49% married caregivers, even if happy to 
have a partner, perceive hls or her presence as an emotional and physical burden. A 
possible explanation for the non-significant coefficient of having children is that, given the 
old age of the respondents, most of the ch.ildren are not living at home and thus have less 
direct contact with them. Being unemployed, as expected, has a significant negative effect 
on well-being. Individual income has a significant positive coefficient, although for the 0 to 
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10-happiness question it is significant only at 10%. Caregivers who report to have an illness 
have a significant negative coefficient on well-being. 
Table 10.2: Informal caregivers" well-being 
Happiness 1 to 5 Happiness 0 to 10 
OP OLS 
Spcc!ftcatiO!l 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 SpccijicotiO!l 2 
Est. z-v:tlue Est. z-v:tlue Est. t-value Est. t-value 
Ln(Hours Informal -0.227 -5.730 -0.222 -5.590 -3.620 -4.780 -3.540 -4.680 
Care) 
Ln(lli;. In£ 0.100 2.270 1.482 1.760 
Care)"'No Family 
Dummy sex: male 0.029 0.290 0.047 0.470 2.488 1.270 2.762 1.410 
Ln(agc) 0.037 0.170 0.050 0.240 7.038 1.730 7.158 1.760 
Inform:ll caregiver is 0.127 1.080 0.134 1.140 -1.281 -0.570 -1.143 -0.510 
married 
Informal caregiver -0.084 -0.730 -0.073 -0.630 -2.374 -1.050 -2.219 -0.990 
has children 
Dummy education: 0.013 0.100 0.000 0.000 4.176 1.650 3.977 1.570 
low· 
Dummy education: -0.134 -1.180 -0.150 -1.310 2.051 0.920 1.779 0.800 
middle" 
Informal c:u:egivcr is -0.752 -2.090 -0.736 -2.040 -10.660 -1.590 -10.334 -1.550 
unemployed 
Ln(net income per 0.223 2.220 0.233 2.320 3.318 1.710 3.434 1.770 
month) 
Indivi.dual has an -0.462 -4.780 -0.452 -4.660 -4.822 -2.580 -4.635 -2.480 
illness 
Intercept term 1 -0.366 -0.177 20.575 0.950 18.237 0.840 
Im<.-rcept term 2 -0.006 0.184 
Intercept term 3 1.370 1.567 
Intercept term 4 2.103 2.304 
Number of 678 678 674 674 
obse.t"\·ations 
Pseudo R~ 0.042 0.045 
R' 0.061 0.066 
·&ftrcnce grrJifp: illjorll1ol t:Jregin·r.s IJJitb h(f!.h cdHcah·on. 
208 I'!fom;a/ core: an economic approach 
10.5 A monetary value of informal care 
10.5.1 The well-being valuation method 
Table 10.3 presents the results when the relationship between the care recipient and the 
caregiver is not taken into account. Table 10.4 shows the results when taking rhls 
relationship into account. As discussed in Section 10.3, the (compensating) income for an 
extra hour of informal care depends on the current income and the actual number of hours 
given (thls because both variables enter the well-being equation in logarithms). To take this 
into account, Table 10.3 and 10.4 present the estimates of the value of informal care for 
various initial numbers of hours given. The income instead is taken at the sample average. 
Table 10.3: Monetary value of informal care, per ho11r, fust specification (in Euros) 
Informal Care Hours 
5 to 10 
10 to 15 
15 to 20 
20 to 25 
25 to 30 
1 c..>:t:r:l hour from aver::tg~:: 
(Averagt: hours= 49) 
""'Incor!J(' is HI eq11al /.() tbt .ran;p/,· arcrage 
Happiness 1 to 5 
%of current 
incom~:: 
20.55% 
10.24% 
6.82% 
5.11% 
4.09% 
2.08% 
Happiness 0 to 10 
~loneyv:tlu~ %of current Money valut..-* 
income 
151.967 22.61% 167.211 
75.731 11.13% 82.314 
50.423 7.37% 54.547 
37.791 5.51% 40.780 
30.220 4.40% 32.559 
15.393 2.23% 16.485 
The sample average of hours of provided informal care is 49 per week. At this 
average, caregivers would need an income compensation of about 2% of their current 
income to maintain a constant well-being after providing one extra hour of informal care 
per week. Given the average caregiver income, this equals about 15 or 16 Euros per hour 
(depending on the well-being question used). In other words, at the average income and 
number of informal care hours given, the value of an extra hour is about 15 or 16 Euros. 
Thus, the money v•a/11e of the 49 hours of informal care provided equals 734 or 784 Euros 
per week. 
Table 10.3 also shows that, when the number of hours provided increases, the 
average value of each hour decreases. For example, the value of each hour of informal care 
for a caregiver who pro,rides 27 hours of informal care per week is about 30 to 32 Euros. It 
is about 38-40 Euros if the caregiver prov-i.des 22 hours of informal care and 76-82 if she or 
he provides 12 hours a week. 
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Table 10.4: Monetary value of informal care, per holfr, second specification (in Euros) 
Inform:tl Care Hours 
Caregiver is no family 
5 to 10 
10to15 
15 to 20 
20 to 25 
25 to 30 
1 C..'>:tra hour from average 
(Average houn;:::: 49) 
Caregiver is family 
5 to 10 
10 to 15 
15 to 20 
20 to 25 
25 to 30 
1 extra hour from :werage 
(Average hours:::: 49) 
* lnconJt' is .ret tqtra/ to tbc J·an;p/c awragc 
Happiness 1 to 5 
%of current 
income 
8.82% 
4.76% 
3.27% 
2.50% 
2.02°/o 
1.07% 
18.75°/o 
9.45% 
6.32% 
4.74% 
3.80% 
1.95% 
Money value* 
65.213 
35.234 
24.212 
18.457 
14.916 
7.916 
138.658 
69.871 
46.721 
35.097 
28.106 
14.395 
Happiness 0 to 10 
%of current Moneyv:t!ue* 
income 
10.30% 76.159 
5.50% 40.679 
3.76% 27.828 
2.86% 21.161 
2.31% 17.076 
1.22% 9.008 
20.86% 154.322 
10.38% 76.757 
6.90% 51.068 
5.17% 38.260 
4.14% 30.587 
2.10% 15.565 
Table 10.4 shows the results when the effect of the hours of provided informal 
care on well-being is allowed to depend on the relationship between the caregiver and the 
care recipient. At the average number of prov-i_ded hours of informal care (49), the 
monetary value of an extra hour is about 1% of the current caregiver income if the care 
recipient is not a family member, and aJmost 2% if the care recipient is a family member. 
At the average income, this is about 8 or 9 Euros and about 14 or 15 Euros, respectively 
(depencling on the well-being question used). The difference bet\Veen the t\VO estimates is 
fillrly large. This may capture the emotional involvement of the caregiver \Vi.th a family 
related care recipient, which reduces caregiver's well-being considerably. Like in Table 10.3, 
the results presented here show a decreasing value of informal care, with an increasing 
number of hours of informal care provided. 
10.5.2 A comparison with contingent valuation results 
This section compares the above-described results \Vi.th the ones found with a CV study. 
This comparison is especially interesting because both srudies use the same data set. The 
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CV questions were posed in the form of informal caregivers' willingness to accept (\VI' A) 
in order to provide an additional hour of informal care per week (Chapter 7). Table 10.5 
presents this comparison. 
Table 10.5: Mean compensation '-"T.ith contingent valuation and well-being valuation (in 
Euros) 
Contingent Well-being valuation Well-being valuation 
valuation (Happiness 1 to 5) (Happiness 0 to 1 0) 
All c::u::cgivcrs 10.52 15.39 16.49 
Family rt:btcd c::u::cgivcrs 10.64 14.40 15.57 
Non-family n:btcd c::u::cgivcrs 9.44 7.92 9.01 
The results of CV indicate that the difference in required compensation betv.-een 
family and non-family caregivers is small and not statistically significant. At the sample 
average of 49 hours a '\veek, the monetary values found by means of the two methods 
diverge, \vi.th the monetary value found by means of the well-being method being larger. 
Nevertheless, both methods find monetary values that are '-"T.ithin an acceptable range. It is 
worth noting that~ although from the same survey, the two sub-samples are not identical: 
the CV question was answered by 503 informal caregivers, while more than 800 
respondents answered the happiness questions. The well-being question has a much higher 
response than the CV -question. 
10.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter presents a valuation study in which the well-being method has been used tO 
monetarise the costs of providing informal care, so as to incorporate them in economic 
evaluations of health care. This method enables the valuation of finds the (compensating) 
income necessary to maintain a caregiver's well-being constant after providing one extra 
hour of informal care. In doing so, it aims at capturing all the "costs" incurred by the 
caregiver, including not only time spent but also, for example, physical tiredness and 
emotional involvement. 
The contributions of this chapter to the literature can be summarized as: (1) it 
uses a fairly new method and proves its usefulness for the valuation of informal care; (2) it 
provides two monetary values, depending on whether the caregiver and the care recipient 
are family or not; and (3) it shows that the results found are, although not very close, in line 
'-"T.ith the ones found by CV, using the same data set. As the outcomes of the t\vo methods 
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are comparable, the new method is externally validated. Moreover, the chapter also sho'\vS 
that different type of well-being questions have only a small effect on the results, which 
illustrates the internal validity of the method. 
This chapter shows that the main advantages of the well-being valuation method 
compared to CV are that it is more flexible and the well-being questions are very easy to 
answer for respondents (as appeared by the relatively low non-response.) The method is 
also very flexible in the sense that it is easy to generate different results for different 
subgroups and different hypotheses. 
In short, this chapter shows that the well-being valuation method is a promising 
alternative method to value informal care in economic evaluations of health care. 
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11 The economic effects of cash benefits in 
the long-term care sector1 
Summary 
This chapter t.-"<amine.s empiricaf!y the conseq11ences for qNanti!J and price of long-term home health care 
JJJben having a transition from a .ry.stem based on slfppjy regulation to1JJards demand-side sttbsir!J·. In the 
]\.Tetherionds_. demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clients receive a cash benefit to purchase the 
type of home care (ho11sework> personal care_, s:tpport with mobi!ity, organisational tasks or social s:tpport) 
thry need from the care .sttpph.er o/ their choice (private care provider, reg1tlar care agenry, commercial care 
agenry or paid informal care provider). Fttrthern;ore_, thf!)' negotiate with the care supplier about price and 
quantity. 011r main findings are the following. 1) There is hard!J CJJ'!)' change in the composition and the 
auJotmt of care pttrchased between both .rystems. 2) In a .rystem if demand-side s~tbsicfy_. the component of the 
cash benifit a client has no resid11af claimant on, has a positive impact on the price if care, althottgh it is not 
clear rvhether the positive impact is dt1e to a lack if bargaining power or dtte to e.--..::-post moral hazard. 3) In 
contrast, the components if the cash benefit a client has resid~ta! claimant on, have no or a negatit•e impact 
on the price if care. Both rest~lts reject a lack if bargaining power if clients_. bttt instead thry point at the 
e:..istence if ex-post moral hazard in a .rystem if demand-side sttbsicfy. 
11.1 Introduction 
Although home care is a crucial element of long-term care, it has not received much 
attention in (health) economics (McKnight, 2004). Tbis chapter analyses empirically the 
consequences of the structure of the finance system for quantity and price of home care. In 
many countries, long-term home health care is fmanced and organised through a system of 
supplier regulation, in wbich (social) insurers pay providers of care directly. Clients get their 
care in kind from regular agencies (regular care) without having to pay for it at the point of 
use (except for an income-related co-payment in some cases). Furthermore, they may 
purchase care on the private market from independent care suppliers either on a 
commercial or non-commercial basis (private care) or from commercial agencies 
(commercial care). On top of that, they may get informal care from relatives, friends and 
neighbouxs. 
1 Based on Van den Berg. B. :md H::tssink, W.HJ. 2004. Th.: economic .:ffects of cash b.:ndits in the long-term 
care sectOr. Submitted for publication. 
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Some countries have developed alternative systems of demand-side subsidies in 
which clients get money (cash benefits also called consumer-directed services or direct 
payments) to puxchase the care themselves instead of getting their care in kind (in which 
case they do not decide about the actual transaction of home care). There are no 
restrictions on the type of care nor on the care supplier the clients spend the cash benefit 
on. In this way, rather than providers of care, clients control their own health care in terms 
of quality, quantity and price. 
Countries that have experimented with cash benefits include Austria, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Vnited States (US). For a detailed 
description of the programs see Tilly eta!. (2000) and Tilly and Wiener (2001). All of these 
countries are currently in transition from a system of supplier regulation towards demand-
side subsidy, except for Austria, which has a system of demand-side subsidy only. Supplier-
regulation dominates the long-term care sector in the Netherlands and the C'S2, while 
demand-side subsidy dominates in France and Germany (Tilly et a!., 2000, p.2) and (Tilly 
and Wiener, 2001, p.2). Furthermore, the health care reform proposal of the Clinton 
administration dismissed in 1993 contained elements of demand-side subsidy. It proposed 
to require all states to offer the option of demand-side subsidies to people -w-ith a disability 
(Tilly and Wiener, 2001). 
Basically, demand-side subsidies have evolved differently across countries and 
states (in case of the US). Thus, in some countries clients get a cash benefit, whereas in 
other countries they receive a voucher. Policy makers are concerned for an uncontrolled 
rise of demand for long-term health care services and the concomitant rise of health care 
costs, especially in the case of cash benefits. (Tilly et al., 2000, p.4) Therefore, in all 
countries eligibility for cash benefits is based on strict rules. Thus, only people \.vith a 
severe disability are eligible and there is a ma.Wnum to the number of people with a cash 
benefit, to the cash benefit a person may get, and to the total cash benefit budget. 
Despite its increasing use and popularity in many countries, empirical knowledge about the 
effects of cash benefits in health care on price has been absent in economic literature so 
far. This chapter attempts to fill part of this gap, by getting some empirical evidence about 
the consequences of demand-side subsidies in the long-term home care market. 
In this respect, the Netherlands forms a unique setting to investigate a transition from 
supplier regulation to demand-side subsidies. Cash benefits were introduced in the long-
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term home care sector in 1996. Between 1996 and 2001, the total annual budget '\vas 
limited to a maximum of five percent of the total e:-..-pendirures in the long-term home care 
sector. 
We describe the main fearures of the Dutch system. An independent committee 
determines the amount of care a client can claim legally. Clients are compulsory insured 
both in the system of supplier regulation and demand-side subsidy. The client can opt to 
get either his care in kind (supply regulation) or to receive a cash benefit to purchase the 
care himself (demand-side subsidy). \17hen the client opts for a cash benefit, he will receive 
a sum of money that is based on the amount and types of care needed. It can be used to 
purchase the type and quantity of care himself for the price the client negotiates with the 
care suppliers of his choice. 
The fust implication of a demand-side subsidy is that it may lead to a different 
amount and/ or composition of health care consumed. In particular, the client could spend 
the money not only on regular care, but also on informal care, care from commercial 
agencies, or care from private care suppliers on a commercial or non-commercial basis. In 
this respect, care could be provided from an additional pool of labor. For example, the 
client may be less embarrassed to ask people for care than in a system of supplier 
regulation. The first specific question of this paper is whether the transition in the system 
of financing care leads to a change in the composition of purchased health care. Clients in 
the system of demand-side subsidy could, for instance, substitute more expensive for less 
e:-..-pensive types of care. 
The second implication of a demand-side subsidy is that it could lead to a higher 
pnce of care\ ceteris paribus. In the Dutch system of demand-side subsidy, the cash 
benefit consists of three components, for which the client has different rights about the 
unspent residual. The client has no residual rights on the first component, the personal 
budget, but he is the residual claimant of the lump sum, the second component, and the 
income-related co-payment, the third component. All three components together v.ill be 
referred to as the cash benefit. 
Two price-increasing mechanisms can be dis~ouished. The first mechanism is 
that clients can negotiate about the price, but they may be insufficiently informed on this 
~ In the US. rruny states have e::-.."Perimented with demand-side subsidy, cspeciilly Arkansas. California., Colorado. 
Florida. Kansas, Maine. ).fichig::m, New Jersey. On:gon., Washington.. and \Vtsconsin (Tilly and \'Viener, 2001) and 
(filly et aL, 2000). 
~ In this chapter. \VC distinguish hourly and monthly prices because some clients agn:e on hourly and some on 
monthly prices \·vith their care suppliers. Table 11.5 will present regression results of hourly and monthly prices 
separ:ttdy. For convenience \Ve do not distinguish them in the text of the chapter. 
Chapl~:r 11: T!JI.' economic ijfects rf cash bemjit.r in the long-term care seetor 215 
matter or they have not enough market po'\ver, so that they may too easily accept an 
offered price, '\vhich could be too high. This mechanism is reflected by the outcome that all 
three components of the cash benefit have a positive impact on the hourly price. Because 
of the difference in residual claimancy right, clients may have different incentives to spend 
the cash benefit's components. The second price-increasing mechanism is e._;;_ post moral 
hazard4 because the client is no residual claimant of the personal budget (the first 
component). Ex post moral hazard means that consumers purchase more expensive care 
than they would purchase if they were the residual claimants, ceteris paribus. The second 
specific question of this paper is whether the various components of the cash benefit have 
an upward effect on the price, either because of a lack of price information (''bargaining 
power') or because of ex post moral hazard. 
In addition, in a system of demand-side subsidy, quality of care could be increased 
because of the larger potential of care suppliers and because of an increase in consumer's 
market power due to the cash benefit. However, problems of validity make it impossible to 
investigate empirically improvements in quality. For instance, from the client's perspective 
care provided by lower or unskilled care suppliers could be of a higher quality, although it 
may lead to care of a lower quality from a health care professional point of v-i_ew, for 
example, measured in tenns of education of the provider of care (Stiglitz, 2001). Quality of 
care is also e::-..-perienced very subjectively among consumers of care. In this paper we 
abstract from a change in quality. 
To answer the two research questions, we Utili use information from nvo unique 
surveys. The first survey asked 375 clients about the amount of care they got and whether 
or not they received a cash benefit. The second sunrey contains information on 301 clients 
with a cash benefit, for the sub-category nursing and caring. Next to the amount and types 
of care they purchase, the sunrey provides information on the price of care and the amount 
of the cash benefit (for each of the three components). 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 11.2 describes the Dutch 
institutional context in more detail as well as the roles concerning cash benefits. Section 
11.3 gives the empirical models to test for implications of the quantity and composition of 
care bet\.veen the systems (sub-section 11.3.1) and the implications for the price of care in a 
system of demand-side subsidies (sub-section 11.3.2). Section 11.4 describes the data sets 
and section 11.5 discusses the estimates. The data set described in sub-section 11.4.1 (sub-
4 For an over1rie:u.· of different forms of mor.ll hazard and of empirical studies in hc::alth CJ.rc. sec:: z .. vcifcl and 
Manning (2000). 
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section 11.4.2) and the estimates of sub-section 11.5.1 (sub-section 11.5.2) are related to 
sub-section 11.3.1 (sub-section 11.3.2). Section 11.6 presents conclusions. 
11.2 Institutional setting 
Long-term care, which is an important pan of the Dutch health care sector, can be 
distinguished into home care and institutional care. In '\vhat follows we will focus on home 
care. Traditionally, the home care sector was based on supplier regulation. In this system, 
the client gets his care in kind through professional care suppliers from an agency, so-called 
regular care. The market of professional home care is regulated by means of entry barriers 
for new agencies and ma..ximum prices determined by the government (CTG, in Dutch 
"College Tarieven Gezondheidszorg"). By means of entry barriers the government controls 
the quality of the care provided, for instance, by requiring educational standards for the 
employees of the care agencies. 
Long-term home care is financed by means of compulsory social insurance, but 
there may be an additional income related co-payment. Consequendy, a substantial pan of 
regular care is free of charge to the client in the short ron. Administration and payment are 
arranged among health care agencies and insurers . .A..ll insurers in a region handed voluntary 
over their implementation tasks (such as the purchase of care) to so-called regional care-
offices (in Dutch "zorgkantoor''). In practice, the dominant player in the region executes 
the care office. Each region has an office, referred to as regional indication organ (RIO, in 
Dutch "Regionaal Indicatie Orgaan''), which detennines independently the amount of 
regular home care an insured client may claim as a result of his health problems. Next to 
this regular care, clients are free to hire private care in the market from independent, 
private care prov-iders on a commercial or non-commercial base, or from commercial 
agencies. Especially in case of housework there are many market alternatives for the regular 
care agencies. Often clients also get informal care from family or friends. About 750,000 
informal care suppliers (the Netherlands has 16 million inhabitants) provide care for more 
than three months per year and for more than eight hours per week and 1.3 million 
informal care suppliers provide care for less dun eight hours per week (Timmermans, 
2003). About 1.7 million informal care suppliers pro'V"ide care for less than three months 
per year. 
For various reasons there has been a tendency in the long-term care sector from 
supplier regulation to demand-side subsidy. In the early 1990s, the main argument of 
interest groups was to achieve emancipation of clients "vith chronic diseases. Hence, they 
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would control their own health care services instead of being dependent on health care 
professionals and their agencies. In the late 1990s, there arose the additional motives that 
demand-side subsidy would increase the quality of home care and that it would reduce the 
scarcity in health care. 
Since 1996, there has been a transition from supply control towards demand-side 
subsidy in the Dutch home-care sector. Bet\Veen 1996 and 2001, the transition was partial. 
Most clients received regular care in kind (supply control), but they could opt for a cash 
benefit (demand-side subsidy). Cash benefits covered a ma..-illnum of five percent of the 
total Dutch e::-..-penditures in long-term home health care. Table 11.1 shows that the annual 
number of cash benefits increased rapidly after the introduction in 1996 from 5,401 to over 
48,000 in 2002. To give an impression of the relative importance of cash benefits in the 
Dutch health care system, cash benefits accounted for 3.5 percent of the total expenditures 
in the sector nursing and caring in 1999. This sector accounts for about 20 percent of the 
long-term care sector. The long-term care sector accounts for 20 percent of the total 
annual health care e::..-penditures of 36 billion euro. 
Table 11.1: Annual number of cash benefits in the Netherlands 1996-2002 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nursing and caring 4.000 6.045 7.184 9.408 16.282 26.753 34.544 
Psychiatrically disabled 1.400 1,500 3.101 3,641 6.195 9.164 11.197 
Mentally ill 100 125 120 141 608 2.203 
Physically disabled 0 0 0 0 0 57 95 
Total 5,4()1 7.645 10,410 13.169 22.618 36.582 48,039 
S()lfm:: (FJPccdc Nllmrdt·rSJatcn Gcncraa/, Ml·cJin!!J'rar 2002-2003). 
The cash benefit is the core of the system of demand-side subsidy. It consists of 
three components: (1) personal budget (In Dutch 'trekkingsrecht'), (2) lump sum, and (3) 
co-payment. The personal budget is the part of the cash benefit that the client does not get 
directly. The Social Insurance Bank (S\1J3)5 manages the personal budget. A client can 
instruct the SVB to pay his care provider, but he has to justify the expenditures of this part 
of the cash benefit. 6 The lump sum is used to compensate the client for transaction costs 
(overhead, unexpected costs, and cash pa}rments) he makes in the very short run. Clients 
5 The Social Insurance Bank is a social security :1gency. 
6 This \vas the actual situ.'ltion \vhen we collected the data bem·een December 2001 and Februarv 2002. From 
April 2003, clients get th(: person.'ll budg(:t on their bank ~ccount and m~mgc it themsdves. They hav(: ro justify 
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get the lump sum on their banking account, and they do not have to justify their spending 
afterwards. In 2001, the lump sum had a ma..-cimum of 1,089 euro annually. Finally, there is 
an income-related co-payment. Appendi"X A contains a description of the scheme. 
Clients may have different attitudes as to how they spend each of the three components of 
the cash benefit. They may be more inclined to spend carefully the lump sum and the co-
payment, as they may keep the remaining amount of money that has not been spent. In 
contrast, clients may be indifferent in their way of spending the personal budget, since they 
cannot claim the unspent residual. It may lead to moral hazard.7 
The RIO determines the size of the cash benefit, using the indicated amount of 
care needed. In an interview with the client, the RIO determines how many hours of 
different care types (parts or products) per week or per month a client needs. The different 
products are skilled and unskilled housework, personal care, specialised personal care, 
nursing, and specialised nursing. A main distinction between unskilled and skilled 
housework is that the client is either able or unable to give housework tasks to the care 
supplier. For instance, when a client cannot manage his O'\vn household, he needs skilled 
housework which means that the house worker not just follows the client's instructions but 
also determines that certain tasks need to be done. 
Cash benefits are distinguished into four sub-categories: Nursing and caring, 
Psychiatrically disabled, Mentally ill, and Physically disabled. Each of these categories has a 
different type of cash benefit.8 The categorization is made according to the client's health 
problems. For example, the sub-category nursing and caring is often used for elderly or 
people with a chronic disease who cannot care for themselves or for their household. The 
sub-category psychiatrically disabled differs also from the other three types '\vi.th respect to 
the calculation of the amount of cash benefit. The largest sub-category is nursing and 
caring, which accounts for about 70 percent of the total number of cash benefits (see Table 
11.1). 
thcir spt:nding aftei\vards. Control occurs by means of random checks. since thcre were many complaints from 
clients about the way the SVB m.'U1.1.ged the personal budgets. 
~ Clit:nts c.'IIlilot claim the unspent residu::U of the personal budget. e:<:cept 10% if the client also gets a cash benefit 
in the nc..xt period. Possible othcr savin~ are returned tO the insurance company. 
~ The four sub-cttegories -...vcre m:llnly distinguished for burcaucrnric rca$Ons. Since 1 April 2003. the different 
types of ca$h bent:fit are integrated into one type of osh bt:nefit. 
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11.3 Empirical model 
11.3.1 Quantity of care in supplier regulation and demand-side 
subsidy 
We will investigate whether for different types of home care the quantity of care used 
differs between a system of supply regulation and a system of demand-side subsidy. A 
system of demand-side subsidy has a larger potential supply of care because clients \Vith a 
cash benefit are free to hire the care supplier of their choice instead of only regular care 
suppliers in the system of supply regulation. This may lead to a change in the composition 
of health care prov--ided, because paid informal care or private care are probably less 
e::-..-pensive than regular care. 
Below, we distinguish between informal care, regular care, and private care (an 
independent worker on a commercial or non-commercial basis), which '\\rill be abbreviated 
by IC, RC, and PC, respectively. Clients can get different types of care simultaneously. 
For each of the types of care we will specify a separate regression equation. The dependent 
variable Q2 is the quantity of care in hours per week of type z (z = IC, RC, PC, 
respectively). In particular, we are interested in the influence of the independent variable 
DCB, \Vhich is a dummy variable for cash benefit, on Q2 . DCB is a pro::-..y· variable for the 
system: Supplier regulation versus demand-side subsidy (DCB = 1 if in the system of 
demand-side subsidy (cash benefit) and 0 if in the system of supplier regulation (no cash 
benefit)). The regression equations are: 
(1) z = IC, RC, PC; i = 1, ... , n 
where X is a vector that includes obsenred characteristics of the client. Subscripts i and z 
refer to the i-th individual client and the z-th type of care, respectively. a2 is a parameter 
and ~z is a vector of parameters. Finally, sis an i.i.d. stochastic error term. 
We will estimate equations (1) as a Tobit model. The control variables in X are age, gender, 
(the logarithm of) net monthly household income, marital status, education, and type of 
care (distinguished by housework, personal care, support with mobility, organisational 
tasks, and social support). 
With regression equations (1) we can test whether there are differences in terms 
of quantity of care used bet\.veen the system of demand-side subsidy and the system of 
supplier regulation for the three different types of care, respectively. Therefore, we are 
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interested in the sign of cx2 in particular. A positive sign of ·:X.z indicates that clients use 
relatively more care of type z in the system of demand-side subsidy compared with clients 
in the system of supplier regulation, ceteris paribus. 
11.3.2 Price of care in demand-side subsidy 
Next, we will inves~o-ate the factors that influence price of care in a system of demand-side 
subsidy. In our period of investigation, there were shortages in the supply of home care. 
Hence, we would e."X:pect prices to rise in a situation of excess demand. Furthermore, the 
hourly and monthly price of care depends on the type of home care indicated. An empirical 
analysis has to control for both influences. 
Then, we \Vill focus on the effect of the three components of the cash bffiefit 
(personal budget, co-payment, and lump sum) on price. All clients receive a cash benefit in 
the system, for which they may decide how to spend it on what type and amount of care. 
For clients it may be difficult to negotiate about the price. Thus, we would expect a positive 
impact on the price for all three components of the cash benefit. In a system of supplier 
regulation this mechanism is absent as the clients do not need to negotiate about price 
(except for purchased care in the private market from independent workers). 
Furthermore, the clients' incentives differ for different components of the cash benefit. 
Clients may keep both the unspent lump sum and the unspent income-related co-pay-ment. 
For both components the incentive system may lead to lower prices, ceteris paribus. Clients 
are not allowed to keep the unspent part of the component of the cash benefit, viz. the 
personal budget. Consequently, a personal budget may lead to ex post moral hazard. With a 
higher personal budget, clients may consume care at higher prices, ceteris paribus. \Y/e test 
for moral hazard by measuring the impact of the size of the personal budget on price. 
The second regression equation is a price equation. We specify the dependent 
variable as the logarithm of the mean price (P), which is weighed for the different types of 
care received. 
(2) Log(P;) = Y!*Log(PBJ+ Y2*Log(CP;) + Y3*Log(For;) + l.'X; + <i i = l, ... ,n 
The three components of the cash benefit, the s1ze of the personal budget, 
income-related co-payment and lump sum, are represented by the variables PB, CP and For 
(all of them are in logarithms). Yb k=1,2,3, are parameters and A is a vector of parameters. 
X is a vector of control variables. In addition to the control variables in equation (1), X 
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contains the indicated amount of care (distinguished by house,vork (skilled and unskilled), 
personal care, specialised personal care, and nursing per week) and the availability of care 
(regular and commercial). 
With equation (2) we can test for two price-raising mecha:oisms of the cash 
benefit. First, a positive Yk jointly for all components of the cash benefit (k = 1,2,3) 
indicates that clients lack bargaining pmver. A higher budget will be used to purchase care 
at a higher price, ceteris paribus. 
For the second mechanism, there '\V-ill be an indication of moral hazard '\Vhen Y2 
and Y3 become negative, while Y1 remains positive. A positive sign of Yl means that clients 
may pay a higher price when they are not the residual claimant of the unspent personal 
budget. In contrast, Y2 and Y3 are non positive, since clients are the residual claimant of the 
t\.vo remaining components of the cash benefit. Hence, there is an incentive to spend their 
money carefully. 
11.4 Data 
11.4.1 Data set 1: Supply regulation and demand-side subsidy 
\YJe '\vill use data set 1 to estimate equation (1). It consists of both clients in the system of 
supplier regulation '\Vho get their care in kind and clients in the system of demand-side 
subsidy '\Vho receive a cash benefit. Clients in the latter system could get the fom types of 
cash benefit as described in Table 1. We collected the data bet'\veen October and 
December 2001. The sample was reached through the primary informal care suppliers of 
clients with long-term care demand. \YJe reached the informal care suppliers via Dutch 
regional support centres for informal care providers and we approached 59 regional 
centres, of which 40 centres were -.,;vilJ.ing to participate to our survey. The informal care 
providers handed over a survey to the people they care for, with the request to participate 
in the research. The questions posed to the care recipients had a broader scope than just 
the care provided by the informal caregiver who handed over the survey. Tills approach is 
the only way to obtain a heterogeneous sample of clients (in terms of disease 
characteristics) who use a substantial amount of long-term health care in the Netherlands. 
Alternatives like disease-specific groups or a sample from the Dutch population 'Will not 
ensme to get such a sample. Our way of sampling .implies that we selected from a 
population of clients with a higher demand of long-term home care. Presumably, informal 
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care suppliers that provide care for clients '\vith IDtensive long-term home care register 
themselves by the regional support centres. 
We distributed 3258 postal surveys v'i.a these centres. 875 informal care suppliers 
and 552 clients responded to the survey.9 In the empirical analysis, we 'Will use a net sample 
of 375 clients, for whom we have information on relevant variables. Data set 1 contains 
information on the type of long-term home health care clients use, distinguished by 
housework. personal care, support Mth mobility, organisational tasks, and social support. It 
contains also information on the amount of care clients get from different care suppliers, 
informal care suppliers (family and friends), regular care supplier providing professional 
care, and private care supplier, respectively. It is noteworthy that there are a few 
commercial agencies in the Netherlands that have a licence to provide regular care. 
However, clients in the system of supply r~oulation might have difficulties in making a 
distinction between regular care from regular agencies versus commercial agencies. 
Therefore, we did not disrinoouish betv.reen both agencies in data set 1. Other observable 
characteristics of the clients we -will use in our analysis are the socio-demograpbic 
characteristics age~ marital stams, gender, and net monthly household income. Clients were 
not inquired about the price of care or about further details of the cash benefit. These 
issues were investigated in greater detail vvith our second sample that we \.Vill discuss in the 
next sub-section. 
For the variables of data set 1 that we used in the empirical analysis we report the 
mean and standard deviation (of the mean), see Table 11.2. The mean age of the clients is 
67 years, which is relatively high. This is not surprising, because elderly clients use long-
term care relatively often. \Vomen include 53 percent of the clients. A majority of clients is 
married (65 percent). 86 percent of the clients report that they use informal care for on 
average 25 hours per week. However, we reached the clients by way of their informal care 
suppliers. Therefore, one could argue that all clients use informal care. It could however be 
that since the informal care was temporary, some clients did not use informal care during 
the period of investigation. J\tfany clients use regular care (40 percent) for on average 1 hour 
per week. It is striking that 23 percent of the clients use also private care (for 0.77 hours 
per week). Apparently, clients use relatively more informal care than regular and private 
care. 
9 In this paper we will not use the infomution of the informal care suppliers. 
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Table 11.2: Descriptive statistics of first data set (net sample) and clients distinguished by 
cash benefit 
Net sample Clients with cash Clients without cash 
benefit benefit 
Variables Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation deviation deviation 
of mean of mean of mean 
Dummy cash bo::ndit (no - 0: 0.14 0.02 
yo::s = 1) 
A&F (rn years) 66.80 0.86 59.17 2.48 68.03 0.89 
Dummy gender (man = 0: \VOm= 0.53 0.03 0.58 0.07 0.52 0.03 
= 1) 
No::t monthly household income 1,351.4 33.45 1.507.5 96.12 1,326. 35.48 
(in o::uros) 8 36 
Dummy m:u:ried (unm:mio::d 0; 0.65 0.02 0.69 0.06 0.64 0.03 
tru.rried = 1) 
Education (in years) 11.93 0.17 12.87 0.46 11.78 0.18 
Care supplier: 
Dummy informal c.-u:e (informal 0.86 0.02 0.87 0.05 0.86 0.02 
c:u:e = 1; dscv.·hero:: = 0) 
Dummy regubr care (reguhr care = OA-0 0.03 0.37 0.07 0.41 0.03 
1; elsewhere= 0) 
Dummy private care (priY.Lte c:u:c = 0 ,, 
·'-' 0.02 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.02 
1: else\vhere = 0) 
Hour;: of informal c:u:c per weo::k 24.86 1.43 31.96 4.81 23.71 1.46 
Hour~ of regul:u: c:u:c per \Vt:ek 0.97 0.11 0.96 0.39 0.97 0.12 
Hour;: of private care per week 0.77 0.18 1.13 0.38 0.72 0.20 
I,;pt: nf C1tre: 
Dummy house\vork (hou.~t.'\vork = 0.77 0.02 0.79 0.06 0.77 0.02 
1: dsewh~;;:rc = 0) 
Dummy personal me (personal 0.59 0.03 0.69 0.06 0.57 0.03 
can: = 1; ds~;;:where = 0) 
Dummy support with mobility 0.57 0.03 0.60 0.07 0.56 0.03 
(support= 1: dse\vhere = 0) 
Dummy organisation:tl tasks 0.67 0.02 0.65 0.07 0.67 O.G3 
(organisation.'ll tasks= 1: 
else\vhere = 0) 
Dummy social support (social 0.70 0.02 0.67 0.07 0.71 0.03 
support= 1; else\vherc = 0) 
Dummy client on \\'airing list (on 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
waiting list = 1: not = 0) 
K umbo::r of clients 375 52 3'' 
-0 
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The incidence of various types of care ranges from 57 percent (support with mobility) to 
77 percent (housework). Finally, just 4 percent of the clients are on a \vaiting list for r~oular 
care. 
In our period of investigation., in the ~etherlands the majority of clients received 
home care in kind and are consequendy in the system of supply regulation. In the net 
sample, 52 respondents (14 percent of the clients) received a cash benefit.10 From the 323 
respondents without a cash benefit, 291 respondents answered a question about d~e reason 
for not applying for a cash benefit. The reasons why they did not apply for a cash benefit 
include: they were not aware of it (39.9 percent), they expected that they were not eligible 
to it (in terms of seriousness of the health problem) (21.2 percent), they could not give any 
reason (14.4 percent), they expected too much bureaucracy (13.1 percent), a cash benefit is 
not a good senrice (4.1 percent), and other reasons (7.4 percent). 
Table 11.2 gives also the descriptive statistics for the sub-categories of clients '\vith a cash 
benefit and "'-'-ithout a cash benefit. The main statistically significant difference between the 
means of both groups is that clients \\lith a cash benefit are almost ten years younger 
compared with the remaining clients. 
11.4.2 Data set 2: Demand-side subsidy 
We used information from the second data set to estimate equation (2). In this data set, all 
clients are in the system of demand-side subsidy, since they all receive a cash benefit. 
Another important difference \\l-ith the first data set is that the second data set contains 
information on the price of care, the three components of the cash benefit and the amount 
of care purchased from commercial agencies. 11 
\Ve reached the respondents through Per Saldo, which is the Dutch association 
for people who receive a cash benefit. Between December 2001 and January 2002, we sent 
a postal survey to 3,000 people with a cash benefit. 609 respondents '\vith a cash benefit 
returned a completed surv·ey. There are no reasons to assume that the members of Per 
Saldo are not representative for the whole population of clients Vv-ith a cash benefit in The 
Netherlands in the period of our investigation. 
The second data set gives detailed information on clients' cash benefits. In order to have a 
more or less homogenous group of clients '\V-ith the same type of cash benefit, we used 
10 This is irrespective of the four types of cash benefit (such :J.S distinguished in Table 11.1). 
11 This differs from d::tta set 1. The reason is that in conrrast to clients in a supplier~regu1'lted system, clients \'\i.th a 
cash benefit :J.rc bctn:r able to distinguish bet\vcen regul:J.r ::md commercial agencies since they purchase the C:J.re 
themselves. 
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clients from the category Nursing and caring. 404 out of 609 :respondents were clients '\vi.th 
a cash benefit Nursing and caring. The net sample of clients v.rith a cash benefit Nursing 
and caring consists of 301 :respondents12. We used the net sample in the empirical analysis. 
Table 11.3 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables that was used as a 
control variable in the regression equation (2). 
Table 11.3: Descriptives of data set 2: clients v.rith a cash benefit for Nursing and caring 
Hourly price Monthly price 
Variables Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation of deviation of 
mean mean 
Hourly price of care (m euros) 18.91 1.05 
1Jonthly price of care (in euros) 1.401.24 227.99 
Monthly persorul budget (in euros) 1254.10 108.10 1,226.93 123.21 
Monthly co-payment (in euros) 119.42 9.99 118.66 11.14 
Monthly lump sum (in euros) 157.29 17.79 143.27 19.39 
Age (in years) 52.64 1.33 53.83 1.45 
Dummy gender (\voman = 1; man= 0) 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.04 
::--Jet monthly household income (in Euros) 1,603.01 58.00 1.693.76 66.36 
Dummy married (m::u:ried = 1: urunarried = 0) 0.68 0.04 0.69 0.04 
Education (in years) 12.66 0.26 13.12 0.30 
C::1n• supplier: 
Proportion inform:U care 0.62 0.03 0.56 0.03 
Proportion regular care 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Proportion commerci:U care 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.03 
Proportion private cu:e 0.22 0.02 0.26 0.03 
Hours of informal care {per week) 7.40 1.02 6.78 1.21 
Hours of regular care {per week) 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.03 
Hours of commercial care {per week) 1.56 0.59 1.35 0.31 
Hours of private care (per \veek) 2.29 0.32 2.22 0.32 
~enfpre: 
Dummy housC\vork (housework= 1: elsewhere= 0) 0.98 0.01 0.97 0.02 
Dummy persorul care {persorul care = 1: dsev..·here = 0.69 0.04 0.67 0.04 
0) 
Dummy support \v:ith mobility (support \v-:ith mobility 0.68 0.04 0.68 0.04 
= 1; elsev..·hen: = 0) 
CMtirmrd on the nc.-:t page 
12 172 clientS pay their care suppliers on an hourly basis and 129 on a monthly basis. Clients are free to agree on 
the payment with their care suppliers. 
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Hourly Monthly 
price price 
Variables Mean Standard Mean Standard 
deviation of deviation of 
mean mean 
Dummy organisacion:tl tasks (organisacion:tl tasks- 1; 0.47 0.04 0.46 0.04 
dse\vhere = 0) 
Dummy socill support (social support = 1: dse\vhere 0.57 0.04 0.60 0.04 
= 0) 
Tnclipted hnur~ nf c:m· (per week): 
Hours of skilled house-w·ork 5.47 0.43 4.87 0.48 
Hour~ of unskilled housework 1.01 0.20 1.11 0.21 
Hours of person:tl can: 4.67 0.66 4.69 0.83 
Hours of speci:iliscd pcrson:tl can: 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.11 
Hours of nursing 2.25 0.45 1.66 0.37 
Hours of speci:iliscd nursing 0.27 0.19 
:t"on-ava.ibbility rcguhr c.uc (no= 0: yes= 1) 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.03 
~on-availability commercial c:tre (no= 0: ye~ = 1) 0.35 0.04 0.43 0.04 
Hours of purch:!~ed can: (per week) 11.39 1.20 10.43 1.29 
Number of clients 172 129 
There are no striking differences between the clients who pay their care recipients per hour 
or per month. We compare the descriprives of the variables in the net second sample '\vi.th 
those of the clients in the first data set who received a cash benefit (see fourth column of 
Table 11.2). It is noteworthy that the amount of regular care in Table 11.2 can be compared 
with the sum of rC::,oular care and commercial care in Table 11.3, because we did not 
distinguish bet\.\reen both types of care in data set 1. For the sample of Table 11.2, informal 
care is given for on average 32 hours per week, whereas in the second data set informal 
care is given for on average about 7 hours per week. The reason for this difference is that 
the :first data set '\vas collected through informal caregivers connected to an interest group. 
It is likely that they, therefore, provide more informal care than the average informal 
caregiver in the Netherlands. Table 11.3 gives the proportions of purchased care. This is 
because we wish to correct for composition effects in equation (2). 1v1oreover, the 
incidence of housework is somewhat higher in the second data set, while the incidence of 
support with mobility, organisational tasks and social support is somewhat lower. 
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Some variables of the second data set (fable 11.3) are not available in the fust 
data set. The hourly price of care is on average 18.91 euro13 and the mean monthly price is 
1,401 euro. The monthly personal budget is about 1,240 euro, whereas the co-payment 
(about 118 euro) and the lump sum (about 150 euro) are substantially smaller. Clients 
paying their care suppliers on a monthly basis, spend on average 1,401.24 euro per month. 
TJ.Us is 174.31 euro more than their monthly personal budget on which they do not have 
any residual claimant right. But the sum of their monthly personal budget, co-payment and 
lump sum is 1,488.86 euro. So, the clients spend on average 87.62 euro less on care than 
the care they need according to their indication.14 On average, the clients purchase around 
10 hours of care per '\veek. 
For the various types of care, the indicated numbers of hours are on average 
around 5 (housework, skilled), 1 (housework, unskilled), 4.5 (personal care), 0.15 
(specialised personal care), 2 (nursing), and 0.27 (specialised nursing). Note that the sum of 
these components is almost 13 hours a week, which is higher than the average number of 
hours purchased. The dummies indicating scarcity are defined as that a client attempts to 
get care from an agency for regular or commercial care, but that this type of care is not 
available yet. 
11.5 Estimates 
11.5.1 Quantity of care in supply and demand-side subsidy 
This sub-section gives the estimates of equations (1), using the data set discussed 
m Sub-section 11.4.1. Equations (1) are estimated for private care, regular care, and 
informal care separately. \Ve \\)ill use a Tobit-mode~ in which we take the number of hours 
of care as dependent variable.15 Table 11.4 presents the results. 
In particular, we are interested in the effect of the cash benefit on the different 
types of care. For private care, the estimated coefficient on the dummy for cash benefit is 
positive and differs statistically from zero at the 10%-level only, '\Vhereas for the other types 
of care the estimated coefficients on the cash benefit are not significant. 
t:. \Ve constructed the mean hourly price of home c~e :1$ follo\vs: Hourly price = L._, p .. ,.. (q,/(2: :· q?), \vhere p, is 
hourly price of care type z and q? is qu:mtity of c~e of type z. 
14 It i:; not possible tO do the s:une calculations for clients paying: thcir c~e supplier$ on :m hourly base. bec:t.use 
there could be a lor of variation in the :unount of supplied c~e per \veek while questions \Vere just asked regarding: 
the bst week and not regarding the bst month. 
ts \Ve also estimated a Tobit-modd for the amounts of inforrn.1.l., regular and private care .respectively, \Vhere the 
dependent Yar:i.able was a log transformation of the hours of c~e. Our main conclusions n.re unaffected by rhi~ 
transformation. 
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Table 11.4: Tobit r~o-ressions of equation (1); dependent variable: number of hours of care 
perweek~J 
Dependent variable: Informal care Regular care Private care 
Independent variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Dummy cash benefit (no O:yes 5.57 1.29 -0.55 -0.57 4.09 1.65 
1) 
Age (in ye:JIS) -0.06 -0.66 0.03 1.41 0.04 0.76 
Dummy gender (woman = 1: m:m = -4.88 -1.56 0.61 0.84 1.79 0.92 
0) 
Log(nt:t monthly house:hold income) 5.74 1.45 -1.18 -1.27 8.53 3.29 
Dummy m::u:rit:d (unmarried= 0: 6.12 1.61 -0.57 -0.66 -4.97 -2.13 
marrit:d = 1) 
Education (ln ye:trs) 0.05 0.09 0.24 1.96 -0.12 -0.35 
I;:p(· 0f c:1re: 
Dummy housework (h.ouse:work = 14.65 3.61 1.76 1.74 11.92 3.19 
1: ds~.-'\vhere = 0) 
Dummy personal eQte (personal core 10.46 3.27 4.74 5.59 -2.29 -1.13 
= 1: d~C\vhere = 0) 
Dummy support with mobility 7.09 2.08 -1.28 -1.60 3.46 1.54 
(support with mobility= 1; elsewhere 
= 0) 
Dummy orgmisacional ta~ks 12.65 3.39 -0.09 -0.10 2.14 0.88 
( orgmisational t::tsks = 1: dsC\\·here 
= 0) 
Dummy soci.'ll support (soci.'ll 19.53 4.95 0.09 0.10 -2.61 -1.02 
~upporr = 1 ; clsC\vhere = 0) 
St:mdard error of regression 26.52 4.89 10.78 
Pseudo R: 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Number of clients 375 375 375 
.1) Estimate.> are baHd on thcflrst data set dimr.>Hd in Sub-.rection4.1. 
Hence, there are hardly any differences in the composition of care between the system of 
supplier regulation and the system of demand-side subsidy. Furthermore, we found that 
additional education involves more use of regular care. An increase in household income 
leads to more private care purchased. Finally, unmarried people use more private care than 
married people. 
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11.5.2 Prices in demand-side subsidy 
This sub-section presents the estimates of equation (2), using the second data set. We are 
especially interested in the effects of the Oogarithm of the) three components of the cash 
benefit on the Oogarithm of the) price. Table 11.5 gives the estimated coefficients for the 
hourly and monthly price separately. 
Table 11.5: OLS regression of equation (2) \.Vi.th robust standard errors; dependent 
variables: log (hourly price) and log (monthly price):tl 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables: 
Log cash bem:fit 
Log co-p:tyment 
Log lump sum 
Age (m years) 
Dummy gender 
(wom:m = 1; m:m = 0) 
Log household income 
Dummy married 
(unmnried = 1: married= 0) 
Educ::tcion (in years) 
C:are s·upplier: 
Proportion inform:ll care (ref.= proportion 
commercial can:) 
Proportion n:gul::u: care (rtf. = proportion 
commerci::li cart:) 
Proportion priv::ttc c:1n: (n:£ = proportion 
commc::rcial can:) 
!ll2e nf c~re; 
Dummy housl.'\vork 
(house\vork = 1) 
Dummy pc::rsonal care:: 
(pc::rsonal care = 1) 
Dummy mobility outside:: 
(mobility outside:: =1) 
Dummy org::misacional t:t~ks 
(organisational t.1.sks = 1) 
Dummy social carr: 
(social care = 1) 
ContitJif('d on the m·xt page 
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Log (hourly price) Log (monthly price) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
0.19 3.0i 0.66 4.98 
-0.03 ·0.94 0.02 0.21 
0.04 0.72 .0.46 -4.64 
0.00 ·0.96 0.00 0.14 
-0.01 ·0.06 0.45 1.50 
-0.03 -1.03 -0.13 -1.52 
·0.15 -1.14 ·0.06 -0.29 
·0.01 -0.65 0.03 1.00 
·0.94 -3.62 -0.55 -1.24 
-0.34 ·0.96 .0.59 -0.31 
·0.44 -2.04 -0.19 ·0.51 
·0.40 -1.05 .0.64 -1.71 
-0.05 -0.35 .0.39 -1.26 
-0.22 ·1.49 -0.20 ·0.65 
-0.20 -1.57 -0.32 -1.54 
-0.33 -2.58 -0.29 ·1.50 
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Dependent variable 
Independent variables: 
Tndic~ted hnurs nf c~re (per \Veek): 
Log indicated hours house\·vork (skilled) per 
\Veek 
Log inclican:d hours hous<..,vork (unskilled) per 
week 
Log indicated hours persorul C.'l.!e per week 
Log inclic::tted hours speci.-ilised persorul C:l.n: 
per week 
Log incliC.'l.ted hours nursing per Wt:ek 
Log inclic::tted specialised nursing 
Availability n:gular care 
(yes= 1) 
Availability commercial care 
(yes= 1) 
Const.'l.Ilt 
St.wdard error of regre%ion 
).lumber of clients 
R' 
Log (hourly price) 
Coefficient t-value 
0.08 1.34 
0.00 0.05 
0.02 0.43 
0.29 2.14 
0.25 3.72 
-0.01 -0.09 
-0.10 -0.70 
3.36 4.64 
172 
0.48 
~J Estimates an· ba.rtd on th<· .recond data .ret di.rmssed in S11b-.recdon 4.2. 
Log (monthly price) 
Coefficient 
-0.17 
0.16 
0.11 
o.-w 
-0.07 
-0.61 
-0.35 
-0.21 
6.59 
129 
0.53 
t-value 
-1.47 
1.37 
0.97 
2.34 
-0.38 
-1.39 
-0.99 
-1.01 
5.18 
The clients are no residual claimant for the component personal budget. 
Definitely, for this component the cash benefit has a positive impact on the price of care. 
For the equation estimated with hourly prices, the estimated coefficient on the logarithm of 
personal budget has a value of 0.19 and is significandy different from zero at the 1 percent 
level (for the estimate with monthly prices the coefficient becomes 0.66). Its value implies 
that a 1 percent increase in the personal budget leads to a 0.19 percent higher hourly price 
of care. Notice that the hourly price is 18.91 euro and the monthly personal budget is 
1254.10 euro on average (fable 11.3). 
For the nvo remaining components for which the client is a residual claimant "\Ve 
get the follo\.V1.ng estimation results. The estimated coefficients on the income-related co-
payment are statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the lump sum is statistically 
insignificant in the hourly price equation but statistically significant and negative in the 
monthly price equation. 
Cbapter 11: The econo111ic effects rf ca.rb benifits in tbe /ong-tcr"!JJ care .r,·ctor 231 
Since we do not find positive coefficients for all three components jointly we can 
conclude that clients do not lack bargaining power. Instead the estimates point at the 
prevalence of ex-post moral hazard. 
There is some ev-idence that for the hourly price equation the proportion of paid 
informal care and private care seems to have a do-wnward effect on the hourly price, 
relative to the proportion of commercial care. For t\Vo types of care (specialised personal 
care and nursing in the hourly price equation) the number of indicated hours has an 
upward effect on the price. T'\VO dummy variables indicating scarcity of care (regular and 
commercial care) seem to have no influence on the hourly prices paid. 
11.6 Conclusion 
Jn this chapter we have investigated empirically the transition of a system of supplier 
regulation in long-term home care towards a system of demand side subsidy. Our main 
conclusions are t\VOfold. 
First, with respect to the quantity of care, our estimates show hardly any 
difference in the composition and quantity of care between both systems. This is 
remarkable, as one would expect there is more informal care in a system of demand-side 
subsidy. 
Second, with respect to the price of home care, '\ve fmd indication of an up'\vard 
effect from the component of the cash benefit for which the client is no residual claimant. 
In contrast, for the t\.vo remaining components we find no indication of an upward effect 
on the price of home care. These outcomes reject the hypothesis that in a system of 
demand side subsidy clients have a lack of bargaining power. Instead, the estimates indicate 
that there is some ex-post moral hazard in a system of demand side subsidy. 
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Appendix A 
Cash benefit co-payments 
Income related co-payments cash benefits. 
Your age is 65 years or older. Below, you will find below your maximum weekly 
co-payment. 
The co-pay'TI1ent \lit-ill be calculated over the gross family income. The maximum hourly co-
payment is € 4.60. 
Gro:;:; family income in 2001 in c:~.tcgories 
To €12.526 
From €12,526 ro 06,182 
From €16.182 to €18.270 
From 08.270 to €20.880 
From €20,880 to €25.056 
From €25,056 to €40,718 
From €40,718 
Living together or bcing Single person household 
m:micd 
Mnximurn per Week 
€2.20 
€3.00 
€ 10.80 
€29.60 
€ 59.00 
€ 89.60 
c 118.00 
).fa .. 'cimum p<:r \vcck 
€2.20 
€7.00 
€ 25.80 
€ 40.00 
€ 61.20 
€ 103.80 
€ 129.80 
Your age is betvveen 18 and 65 years. Below, you will find below yoU!' ma.ximum 
weeldy co-payment. 
The co-payment ...,;v-ill be calculated over the gross family income. The ma.ximum hourly co-
payment is € 4.60. 
Gross family income in 2001 in 
categories 
To €15J38 
From €15J38 to €19.,316 
From €19.,316 to €22.970 
From €22,970 to €26,624 
From €26,624 to €31 ,844 
From €31,844 to €48,550 
From (48,550 
Liv-ing together or being 
married 
Ma.ximum per week 
€2.20 
€3.00 
€ 10.80 
€ 29.60 
€ 59.00 
€ 89.60 
€ 118.00 
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Single person household 
).fa..-cimum per week 
€2.20 
€7.00 
€ 25.80 
€ 40.00 
€ 61.20 
€ 103.80 
€ 129.80 
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12The psychological 
monetarisation of informal care1 
effects 
Summary 
of the 
The increasing 11se of cash benefits in the long-term care sector enables clients to hire their informal 
caregivers. Hmnver information abolft the p.rycholo~cal effects o/ paying informal caregivers is lacking. This 
chapter examines ar;pirica!jy the P!Jcho!ogical conseq11ence.f if the monetarisation of informal care. we find 
that (1) paying informal caregivers inzJo!ves no negatiz;e psychological effects, and (2) i;ifomJa! caregivers who 
are paid are more !ike!J to state that caring is important to them. Rest1/ts i11;p!J' that paying informal 
caregiZJers with cash benefits inv•o/ves no negative e.--.::tema/ effects i'n terms cf p.rychological consequences. 
12.1 Introduction 
Informal care is crucial for the long-term care sector (Van Hourven, 2000). In many 
countries, informal caregivers are responsible for the majority of home care provided to 
people '\vith chronic diseases, or terminally ill people (Van den Berg, 2004), and many 
elderly. They get support from illformal caregivers with, for example, housewor~ 
organisational and administrative tasks, or personal care. Providing informal care involves 
opportunity costs in terms of wages, and career opportunities forgone, and it may also 
increase morbidity and in some sub populations even mortality risks (Enner, 1996), 
(Carmichael and Charles, 1998), (Carmichael and Charles, 2003), and (Schulz and Beach, 
1999). There is an increasing volume of health and social policy literature on the position of 
informal caregivers (Timmermans, 2003). The main focus of this literature is on the effects 
of different ways to support informal caregivers. Pardy based on the recommendations 
formulated ill this literature, policy makers spend money from the health or social budget 
on the support given by informal caregivers. 
In some countries it is possible to grve informal caregivers a monetary 
compensation for their activities. This because long-term care is increasillgly organised by 
means of cash benefits, also called consumer -directed services, direct payments or personal 
budgets. A cash benefit is a sum of money for a client to purchase care '\vi.th instead of 
getting care in kind. Clients may use the cash benefit to purchase the amount and type of 
t Ba:>ed on V:m den Berg. B., 2004. The psychological effects of the: moneuri:>ation of informal care. Submitted 
for publication. 
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care they '\vant from the care provider of their choice for the price they negotiate. Care 
includes regular care from a professional agency, private care (both on a commercial or 
non-commercial basis) or informal care. In tllls '\Vay, clients rather than prov--iders of care 
control their health care in terms of quality, quantity and price. 
Countries that have experimented '\Vi.th cash benefits include Austria, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See for detailed 
descriptions of their programs Tilly et al. (2000) and Tilly and Wiener (2001). Differences 
berureen the programs include policy makers' concern for an uncontrolled rise of demand 
for health care services and the concomitant rise of health care cost (Tilly et al., 2000). 
Therefore, in all countries eligibility for cash benefits is based on strict rules. Thus, only 
people \.Vi.th a severe disability are eligible and there is a ma.ximum to the number of people 
with a cash benefit, to the cash benefit a person may get, and to the total cash benefit 
budget. Finally, not all programs allow clients to hire informal caregivers "'With cash benefits, 
because policy makers are afraid of a substitution effect of free informal care -with paid 
informal care. 
Paying informal caregivers for (part of) their care provided has as yet not been, as 
far as we are aware of, debated or analysed. This may be because informal care is often 
defined as unpaid care (Timmermans et al., 2004) and (Van den Berget :al., 2004). Chapter 
3 argued that paid informal care is still informal care as long as an informal caregiver would 
not be "villing to provide the same care to someone outside of his social environment for a 
similar compensation as he receives now. 
It is argued that paying informal caregivers mil cause their motivation to decline 
and involves cro'\vding out effects (Timmermans, 2003). But there is no evidence to that 
effect; increasing the use of cash benefits in health care implies that informal caregivers 
more often get a monetary compensation for their efforts. Despite tllls increasing use and 
popularity of cash benefits in many countries and the importance of informal care in long-
term care, empirical knowledge about the psychological effects of hiring informal 
caregivers with cash benefits in health care has been absent in the economic literature so 
far. The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically the psychological consequences of 
hiring informal caregivers -with cash benefits. 
The Netherlands is a unique setting to investigate the effects of paying informal 
caregivers. Cash benefits (in Dutch called 'personal budgets') were introduced in the long-
term home care sector in 1996. BeN.reen 1996 and 2001, the total annual budget was 
limited tO at ma..ximum of 5 percent of the total expenditures in the long-term horrie care 
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sector. The main features of the Dutch system are as follows. An independent committe(; 
determines the amount of care a client is legally entitled to. The client can opt either to get 
his care in kind or to receive a cash benefit to purchase the care hllnself. A client who opts 
for a cash benefit will receive a sum of money that is based on the amount of care needed. 
It can be used to purchase the type and quantity of care himself from the care supplier of 
his choice, including informal caregivers. The client may negotiate about the price Vvi.th the 
potential care supplier. Because the Dutch long-term care is in transition from a supplier 
regulated to'\vards a demand-oriented system, clients can opt for care in kind or for a cash 
benefit they are free to spend as they like. This transition and freedom of choice constitute 
an ideal context to test for the psychological effects of payi.ng informal caregivers. 
\Y./e use information from a unique surv·ey involving 522 informal caregivers. All 
of their care recipients get a cash benefit. Approximately half of the sample gets paid from 
the cash benefit. The surv·ey also collected information on the psychological effects of 
informal caregiving, socio-demographic variables, and informal care characteristics. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 12.2 describes the survey 
questions and the econometric model. The data collected are presented in section 12.3 and 
section 12.4 presents the estimates. Finally, section 12.5 discusses the estimations and 
policy implications. 
12.2 Method 
12.2.1 Survey 
\Y./e conducted a survey among 522 informal caregivers. Questions that are central in the 
present study concern the payment of informal caregivers, psychological effects regarding 
the provision of informal care, and independent variables of informal caregivers and 
informal caregiving. 
As to the payment of informal caregivers, the sunrey contains questions about 
'\Vhether or not informal caregivers get money for the informal care they provide, and, if so, 
how much money they get per month. 
As to the psychological effects of informal caregiving, informal caregivers were 
asked about their attitude towards the prmrision of informal care. In psychology this 
subject comes under the heading of subjective burden (Kramer, 1997). \Y!e use questions 
from the Caregiver Strain Index (CSI) (Van Exel et al., 2004) and the Caregiver Reaction 
Assessment Scale (CRA) Oacobi et al., 2003). Figure 12.1 gives the exact phrasing of the 
subjective burden questions in the survey. 
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Figure 12.1: SUNey questions 
Questions: 
1) My care recipient appreciates my care efforts 
2) Our emotional relationship has changed due to my care provision 
3) I enjoy caring for my care recipient 
4) Caring for my care recipient is important to me 
Answer categories: 
Yes/No 
Other questions regarcUng the provision of informal care concern the amount of 
time informal caregivers spent on provicUng care in the week prececUng the interview, the 
number of years they have already provided care, and the number of days a week they 
provide care, if they share the same household -with the care recipient. They are also asked 
about their social relationship -with the care recipient and socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. Finally, caregivers are asked about the diseases of the care recipients and 
whether they suffer from a disease themselves. The latter is of importance because it is 
\Veil-known that provicUng informal care may go at the costs of one's own health (Schulz 
and Beach, 1999) and, health problems of informal caregivers may cause psychological 
problems that need to be corrected for. 
12.2.2 Econometric model 
It has been argued in the policy oriented literature that the payment of informal caregivers 
\\•ill crowd out their motivation and their self-esteem derived from the provision of 
informal care (Timmermans, 2003). We will investigate empirically whether and how the 
payment of informal caregivers influences their attirude towards the provision of informal 
care. 
In our regression model, the dependent variable A2 is the informal caregiver's 
attirude towards the provision of informal care, where z (z = 1, ... , 4) represents to the 
four psychological attitude questions. The independent variable DPC is a dummy variable 
for the payrment of informal caregivers (DPC = 1 if the informal caregivers get money and 
0 if not). The regression equation is: 
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(!) z = 1, ... , 4; i = 1, ... ,n 
where X is a vector that includes observed characteristics of the client. Subscript i refers to 
the i-th individual client, et.2 is a parameter and ~z is a vector of parameters. Finally, s is an 
i.i.d. stochastic error term. 
\Ve 'Nill estimate the four equations (1) as a probit model. With regression 
equation (1) we can test whether there are differences in terms of psychological attitude 
towards the provision of informal care benxreen caregivers who get money and caregivers 
who don't get money for the care they provide. Therefore, we are particularly interested in 
the sign of et.2 . A positive and statistically significant sign of et.2 (z = 1, ... , 4) indicates that 
informal caregivers who get paid have a relatively higher probability of giv"ing a positive 
answer on the relevant psychological attitude question compared '-V'ith informal caregivers 
who do not get paid. 
We also estimate a similar equation '\vi.th a continuous variable instead of the 
dummy variable DPC to test for the influence of the magnitude of the payment on the 
informal caregiver's psychological attirnde tmvards the provision of informal care. This 
regression equation is: 
(2) Az,i = ~2*Log(PC+l)i + ~2'X; + •i z ::::= 1, ... , 4;i ::::= 1, ... ,n 
where PC is the monthly amount of money the informal caregiver receives for his care 
tasks. A positive and statistically significant sign of PC indicates that A is positive, and a 
statistically significant sign of ~z (z :::::: 1, ... , 4) indicates that informal caregivers who get 
paid more have a higher probability of having a positive attitude towards the psychological 
attitude question compared "'\vith informal caregivers who get paid less. In section 4 we will 
present estimates of equations (1) and equations (2). 
12.3 Data 
12.3.1 Data collection 
We reached the respondents through Per Saldo, which is a Dutch association for people 
who receive a cash benefit. Bet\.Veen the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, we sent a 
postal survey to 3000 people with a cash benefit. This survey included a questionnaire for 
the informal caregiver and we asked them to give the questionnaire to their most important 
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informal caregiver, if available. 609 people \Vith a cash benefit and 522 of their informal 
caregivers returned a completed sur;rey2• There are no reasons to assume that the members 
of Per Saldo are not representative for the whole population of clients \v:ith a cash benefit 
in The Netherlands in the period of our investigation. 
12.3.2 Descriptives 
Table 12.1 gives the descriprives of the gross and net sample of informal caregivers. 
Table 12.1: Gross and net sample 
Dependent variables 
Question 1 (Jre~ "" 1) 
Qu(;stion 2 6res = 1) 
Qu(;stion 3 (yes = 1) 
Question 4 (yes = 1) 
Independent variables 
Pa)'IJJcnl if il!fom;a/ cangil:ers 
Dummy payment 6'cs = 1) 
Monthly :unount of payment in euro 
Socio-t·COfiMJic a11d dcJJJograpl;ic r•ariabks 
Dummy gender (m:lie"" 1) 
Age 
Durruny married (yes = 1) 
Dummy children 6'es = 1) 
~et monthly income in euro 
Education in yeMS 
Dummy paid \vork (yes = 1) 
It!fom;a/ can· wriablcs 
\V'eddy number of provided informal CMe in hours 
Y e:m; of provided informal care 
Weekly :unount of da:ys informal CMe prO\i.dcd 
Dummy informal caregiver :md care recipient share the 
same household (yes = 1) 
Co!!tiH!tt'd 011 Jbc next page 
Gross sample 
N Mean 
503 0.84 
498 0.33 
501 0.90 
506 0.93 
499 0.56 
474 283.12 
522 0.36 
516 49.69 
522 0.82 
522 0.78 
522 1634.30 
522 13.45 
522 0.47 
522 29.17 
463 7.65 
485 5.09 
517 0.62 
~ \V'e only use the data of the informal caregivt.--rs in this paper. 
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Net sample 
5<. Mean 5<. 
Dcv. Dcv. 
0.36 0.84 0.37 
0.47 0.34 0.47 
0.30 0.91 0.29 
0.26 0.93 0.25 
0.50 0.52 0.50 
568.88 290.38 570.98 
0.48 0.39 0.49 
19.53 47.70 11.78 
0.38 0.86 0.35 
0.41 0.79 0.41 
778.77 1725.85 729.53 
3.30 13.79 3.12 
0.50 0.48 0.50 
59.78 34.21 67.72 
8.04 7.78 7.86 
2.50 5.24 2.43 
0.49 0.65 0.48 
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Gross sample Net sample 
N Mean 5<. Mean 5<. 
Dev. Dcv. 
D11n:1J1ic.r JWial n·iafi(Jrl cartgir't:r a11d care n·dpimt 
PJ!.rtl.1t:r (yt:s = 1) 522 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 
P::u:enr (yt:s = 1) 522 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 
Child (yes = 1) 522 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 
Eb: (yes= 1) 522 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 
D111JJillit.r &rt-a.rt·.r i:ifom:al can-gircro· {J<'J =f) 
R~:spiratory d.isc;:ases 522 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 
Circulatory dis~:ases 522 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 
Dig~:stive dist::J.Ses 522 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 
Endocrine, met:tbolic :111d nuo:ition:J.l dise:tst:s 522 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 
Musculoskdctal diseases 522 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 
:-Jcurological diseases 522 O.li 0.38 0.17 0.38 
Skin diseases 522 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 
C:tncc.r 522 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 
Psychological diseases 522 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 
Dt1111n()' di.rca.rt:,· can· n·cipimt.r {jlt.r = 1) 
Respintory diseases 522 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 
Circuhtory diseases '?? o_ 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 
Digestive diseases 522 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 
Endocrine, metabolic and nutrition...'ll diseast:s 522 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 
Mu..;;culoskdeul dist:::tses 522 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 
)\)ew:ological diseases 522 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Skin diseases 522 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 
C:mc~:r 522 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 
Psychologic:U diseases 522 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 
N 352 
The table shows that the probability of ans\vering yes to the questions 1, 3, and 4 
IS very high, '\vhile only one third of the informal caregivers answered question 2 
affirmatively. :,Yiore than half of the informal caregivers get paid for their tasks and their 
mean monthly payment is around 290 euro. The caregivers provide more than 30 hours 
informal care per \Veek. The majority of informal caregivers is female. This is consistent 
'\vith other srudies that find that prmriding informal care is still mainly a female activity 
(Carmichael and Charles, 1998). Almost half of the informal caregivers have a paid job, 
'\Vhlch is quite high in comparison \vid~ a male dominated Dutch caregiver sample (36.9% 
'Wi.th a paid job) and a female dominated Dutch caregiver sample (23.4% with a paid job) 
01 an den Berg et al., In press-a). The high percentage might be eA"Plained by the relatively 
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low mean age of the caregivers in our sample. l\fost of the informal caregivers are partner 
of the care recipient. 
12.4 Results 
We present the estimates of equations (1) for the four psychological attitude questions, 
model 1 to 4 respectively. Table 12.2 gives the marginal effects of the probit model where 
DPC is the dummy variable for the payment of care (DPC = 1 if the informal caregivers 
get money and and 0 if not). 
Table 12.2: Probit regressions of equation (1); dependent variable: psychological attitudes:c) 
Modell Modd2 Model3 Model4 
Independent variables Marginal T-t•a!!lc iVIargina/ T-ra!Jr( Mm:ginal T-t.'a/uc Marginal T-ral11c 
cffl'ct iffect effie/ cffi-•c! 
Dummy pay-TIIent (yes 0.03 0.62 -0.07 -1.15 0.02 0.64 0.05 2.08 
1) 
Socio-econoiJ!ic and 
rU:mographit Fariabl.cs 
Dummy gender (male= 0.05 1.14 -0.05 -0.75 0.01 0.23 0.03 1.08 
1) 
Age 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.86 0.03 2.03 0.00 0.49 
AgC:. 0.01 0.10 0.13 1.04 -0.20 -2.10 -0.03 -0.60 
Dummy married (ye~ = -0.03 -0.59 -0.02 -0.16 -0.03 -0.76 -0.03 -1.13 
1) 
Dummy children (ve~ = -0.07 -1.25 0.07 130 0.02 0.39 0.02 0.64 
1) 
Log net monthly -0.01 -0.67 0.02 0.79 0.01 0.71 0.00 0.18 
income in euro 
Education in years -0.02 -3.22 0.00 0.31 -0.01 -1.13 0.00 -1.08 
Dummy paid \VOrk (yes 0.07 1.57 0.09 1.51 0.01 0.40 0.00 -0.10 
= 1) 
l1rjortJJa/ care ;:ariabfc.r 
Log -..veekly amount of -0.01 -0.76 0.02 1.11 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.86 
provided informal c:u:e 
in hours 
Yem of provided 0.00 O.Q9 -0.01 -1.91 0.00 0.77 0.00 1.20 
informal c:J.re 
Weekly number of days -0.01 -0.46 -0.02 -1.17 0.00 -0.21 0.00 0.56 
inforrrul care provided 
Contimred on t/;,· next pag1· 
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Modell Model2 
Independent variables Marginal T-wllfe Marginal T-Pailll' 
e§ect eji:ct 
Dummy informal 0.08 1.07 0.11 1.64 
caregiver :lild can: 
recipient share the same 
household (yes= 1) 
DHHJI!I)' .rocial n:lation 
injom;a/ cangiPtr and carr 
n·cipi.cnt (n.f = partntr) 
Parent 
Child 
Ebe 
InfortTI..:J.l caregiver has 
one of the illnesses (yes 
= 1) 
DllnlH!J' disca.rc.r carr 
n:cipimt.r &e.r = 1) 
Respiiatoty diseases 
Ciicubtory dis<::as<::s 
Digestiv<:: diseases 
Endocrine. metabolic 
:md nutritional dis<::as<::s 
-0.13 
-0.18 
-0.01 
-0.03 
0.08 
0.02 
0.04 
0.09 
Musculoskeletal dis~S{.'S -0.03 
Neurological diseases -0.01 
Skin diseases -0.02 
C:l.!lcer -0.11 
Psychological diseases -0.03 
352 
Ps<::udo R~ 0.16 
J Dependent r•ariab/es: 
-1.36 
-2.51 
-0.08 
-0.76 
1.63 
0.41 
0.61 
1.31 
-0.77 
-0.29 
-0.24 
-1.09 
-0.70 
Modc/1: Aij• care n:cipimt appmiaks "!Y carr efforts 
-0.08 
-0.01 
-0.19 
0.04 
0.06 
-0.13 
0.08 
0.05 
-0.07 
0.10 
-0.01 
0.18 
-0.01 
352 
0.12 
-0.76 
-0.16 
-1.67 
0.71 
0.79 
-1.71 
0.94 
0.48 
-1.15 
1.80 
-0.16 
1.24 
-0.10 
1\1.ode/ 2: 011r el!lotional rclationsbip bas cbangl'd dff(: to my canprot•ision 
Modc/3: I enjoy can·ngfor Ill)' can: rtcipicnt 
Model 4: Caringjor "!Y carr recipient iJ· in:portanllo n;e 
Model3 Model4 
Marginal T-1/al:tc Marginal T-1:a/m· 
cffi:ct c]Ji:ct 
0.09 1.53 0.03 0.73 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.06 
0.02 
352 
0.10 
0.66 
-0.02 
0.35 
0.77 
-0.28 
0.12 
1.37 
-0.76 
-0.23 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.88 
0.73 
0.03 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
352 
0.15 
0.79 
-0.60 
-0.21 
0.40 
1.31 
1.11 
0.06 
0.22 
-0.26 
1.34 
0.09 
0.49 
The picture that emerges from the estimates is very clear. The coefficient on the 
dummy for payment of the informal caregiver is only statistically different from zero at the 
5 percent level for model (question) 4. Thls implies that, more than unpaid informal 
caregivers, informal caregivers who get paid indicate that caring for their care recipient is 
important to them, ceteris paribus. More precisely, the probit-estimates indicate that 
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informal caregivers who get paid have a 5 percent points higher probability of stating that 
caring is important for them compared to those \Vho do not get paid. As to the other three 
questions regarding appreciation, emotional relationship, and enjoy caring there seems to 
be no difference bet\veen paid and non-paid informal caregivers. 
Table 12.3 gives the results of equations (2) in a \vay similar to the presentation of 
the results of equations (1). The only difference is that PC is a continuous variable. 
Table 12.3: Probit regressions of equation (2); dependent variable: psychological attitudes") 
Modell Modcl2 Modc13 Model4 
Independent variables Marginal T-r•al:rt l\:fm:ginal T-liallrt lvfarginal T-l'tlilrc Marginal T-raltrc 
1fcc1 iffu! ifji:ct iflcct 
Log (amount of payrm:nt 0.01 0.90 -0.01 -1.41 0.00 0.93 0.01 1.98 
inform.:ll Cl.regiver + 1) 
Socio-aonon:ic tl!td 
dt·o:ographic llariabk.r 
Dummy gender (male = 0.06 1.20 -0.06 -0.82 0.01 0.31 0.03 1.05 
1) 
Age 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.84 0.03 2.01 0.00 0.50 
Agd 0.01 0.09 0.12 1.02 -0.19 -2.09 -0.03 -0.63 
Dummy married (yes = -0.03 -0.58 -0.02 -0.16 -0.03 -0.75 -0.03 -1.14 
1) 
Dummy children (yes = -0.06 -1.23 0.09 1.26 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.73 
1) 
Log net monthly income -0.01 -0.70 0.02 0.80 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.16 
in euro 
Education in yca.rs -0.02 -3.21 0.00 0.30 -0.01 -1.10 0.00 -1.12 
Dummy paid work (yes 0.07 1.61 0.09 1.47 0.01 0.42 0.00 -0.13 
= 1) 
lr!fom;a/ carl' tariablcs 
Log \vcckly amount of -0.01 -0.80 0.03 1.16 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.79 
provided infonrul care 
in hours 
Y e:u:s of provided 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -1.86 0.00 0.74 0.00 1.22 
informal care 
\\ieekly number of days -0.01 -0.47 -0.02 -1.11 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.41 
inforrml c:tre provided 
Continlfcd Of/ //)(' no~-.;/ page 
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Modell Model2 Modcl3 Modcl4 
Independent variables Afm;giMl T-Palm· }vfat;ginal T-rallf(' lviat;ginal T-ra!!lc M{//ginal T-r·al/t(' 
ifji:ct ejixt effect cffi·ct 
Dummyinfol't11:11 0.08 1.07 0.17 1.61 0.10 1.55 0.03 0.78 
caregiver and care 
recipient share the s:unc 
household (yes= 1) 
Dff!lll!l)' .rocial n:lation 
infomml can.;giH·r and care 
recipiml (nj = part!!er) 
P:l.rent -0.13 -1.36 -0.08 -0.76 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.79 
Child -0.18 -2.52 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.65 
Else -0.01 -0.09 -0.18 -1.66 0.02 0.35 -0.01 -0.22 
Inform:ll C.1Iegiver lu$ -0.03 -0.73 0.04 0.66 0.02 0.81 O.D! 0.39 
one of the illnesses (yes 
= 1) 
DHn!JJI)' dista.re.r carr: 
recipients 6'e.r = 1) 
Respintory diseases 0.08 1.66 0.06 0.77 -0.01 -0.28 0.03 1.35 
Circubtory dist:ases 0.02 0.38 -0.13 -1.68 0.00 0.08 0.03 1.12 
Dige.."tive dise:J$e$ 0.04 0.61 0.08 0.93 0.05 1.39 0.00 0.04 
Endocrine, metabolic 0.09 1.32 0.05 0.47 -0.04 -0.76 0.01 0.24 
and nutritional dise.~ses 
:vfusculoskclet.'ll disea:;.es -0.03 -0.79 -0.07 -1.12 -0.01 -0.26 -0.01 -0.26 
Neurologic:ll diseascs -0.01 -0.30 0.11 1.82 0.00 -0.02 0.03 1.36 
Skin diseases -0.01 -0.22 -0.02 -0.19 0.00 -0.01 
Cancer -0.11 -1.09 0.18 1.24 -0.06 -0.86 0.00 0.05 
Psychologic:ll dise.~ses -0.03 -0.67 -0.01 -0.14 0.02 0.72 O.D! 0.51 
N 352 352 352 352 
Pscudo R2 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.15 
~ D,pmdcnt rariabkr: 
}vfodd 1: N[y care nxipicnl appreda!f.1· "!)' care ejforJJ· 
i\Iodd 2: Ot~r e!llotional relation.rhip ha.r cbar:gcd d11e to H!J• can.· pr01:ision 
lvfodd 3: I a!/0)' caringJor "!)' can.• n:cipiml 
A.fodc/4: CaringJor "'J' care recipicn/ i.r il!lportan/ to 111e 
The results of table 12.3 are consistent with the results of table 12.2. There seems 
to be no relation bet\>.reen the amount of payment an informal caregiver receives and the 
psychological attitude questions regarding appreciation, emotional relationship, and enjoy 
caring. The relation between the amount of money an informal caregiver receives and the 
psychological attitude 'caring being important for the caregiver' is positive and statistically 
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significant at the 5 percent level. So, the larger the monetar;.r compensation an informal 
caregiver receives for his care tasks, the more important caring seems to be for him. 
In sum, our findings indicate that there seems to be no negative psychological 
effects of paying informal caregivers -with a cash benefit. 
12.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated empirically the impact of paying informal caregivers on some 
psychological aspects of their well-being; viz. (1) care recipients' appreciation of the 
informal caregivers' care efforts, (2) emotional relationships have changed due to the 
informal caregivers providing care, (3) caregivers enjoy caring, and ( 4) caring is imponant 
to caregivers. 
The results showed that there is a difference in the statement "caring is imponant 
tO me' between caregivers who get and those who do not get paid, and between caregivers 
who get relatively more fmancial compensation versus caregivers who get relatively less 
compensation. On the other psychological statements, there seems to be no difference 
bet\\7een both groups nor bet\veen caregivers receiving relatively more and less money. Our 
results imply that paying informal caregivers '\v:ith cash benefits involves no negative 
external effects in terms of psychological consequences. 
The policy implications of our fmdings could be that there is no problem -with 
pa)ing informal caregivers for their care provided in terms of negative external 
psychological effects. Suppon programs could therefore also focus on direct payment of 
informal caregivers in stead of only focussing on indirect payments like the provision of 
care leave facilities. 
A drawback of this study might be that we just tested for four psychological 
attitude questions. Another drawback could be reverse causality. These issues warrant 
future research. 
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13 Conclusions and discussion 
This chapter discusses the main conclusions of this thesis. All separate chapters ended \.Vith 
detailed conclusions and discussions of the results. We 'Will not repeat these here. Thls final 
chapter brings together the various conclusions along the lines of the three research 
questions presented in the introduction. Moreover, this chapter 'Will identi.f)r and discuss 
areas for furore research. 
13.1 Supply of informal care 
The first research question was about the relation bet\veen providing informal care and 
other economic acri:vities like paid work. Therefore, chapter 2 provided a theoretical and 
empirical model of the informal caregiver's preferences regarding the supply of paid work 
and informal care simultaneously. It was sho\.\rn that the supply of paid work was 
statistically significant in the informal care decision and that the supply of informal care 
was statistically significant in the decision regarding paid work. 
These findings complement other studies on this topic. For instance, Carmichael 
and Charles (1998) modelled the prov-ision of informal care as exogenous in analysing the 
opportunity costs of caregiving, just like Barmby and Charles (1992) and Carmichael and 
Charles (2003) did. Ettner (1995) investigated the effect of providing informal care on 
labour supply. Informal care was an endogeneous variable in their models. Stem (1995) on 
the other hand, analysed the effect of labour supply on the decision tO provide informal 
care, where labour supply was an endogeneous variable. However, tO the best of our 
knowledge, there were no studies that modelled informal caregiver's simultaneous supply 
of paid work and informal care, like we did. We found that the amount of prov-ided 
informal care has a negative effect on the amount of prov-ided paid work and that the 
amount of paid work has a negative effect on the amount of provided informal care. Large 
differences in caring and working exist be&een males and females and persons v.rith and 
without young children. 
\Y/e used a Tobit model to analyse the data, because it is an often applied model to 
analyse these kind of problems. Using a Tobit model implies that we considered 
respondents who did not prov-ide informal care (respondents with zero hours) and 
respondents who provided informal care (respondents with positive hours) in one step. 
The same holds for respondentS -without a paid job (zero hours) and respondents v.rith a 
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paid job (positive hours). This is sometimes seen as a disadvantage of the Tobit model, 
because the choice of becoming an informal caregiver could differ from making decisions 
about the amount of provided care (Verbeek, 2000). The second decision is conditional 
upon the flrst decision to provide care. It would therefore be better to analyse thls problem 
'\vith a nvo-step model, but it remains to be seen if this produces other results, see 
(Amemiya, 1981). The same reasoning applies to the decision to accept a paid job and the 
amount of paid '\Vork prov--ided. Future research may apply thls nvo-step approach. 
13.2 Economic valuation of informal care 
Our second research question was about the incorporation of informal care in economic 
evaluations of health care. The chapters 3 to 10 tried to provide guidance on how informal 
care should be incorporated in economic evaluations. Chtrpter 3 discussed the current 
practice~ chapter4 \vas an empirical investigation in the measurement of informal care, while 
the chapters 5 lo 10 '\vere empirical contributions to the valuation of informal care. We 
discuss our main findings according to the following structure: (13.2.1) measurement, 
(13.2.2) valuation, (13.2.3) operationalisation, (13.2.4) hypotheses, (13.2.5) results, (13.2.6) 
non-response, and (13.2.7) recommendations for future research. 
13.2.1 Measurement 
Measurement of informal care is for an important part measurement of time. The 
measurement of time allocation is troublesome Guster and Stafford, 1991). This holds also 
for the measurement of time that informal caregivers spend on prO\riding care. In the 
literature on the measurement of time, the diary is often seen as the gold standard Guster 
and Stafford, 1991) and (Robinson, 1985). One could, however, put fonvard some minor 
qualifications. First, there is no standardised operationalisation of the diary. Second, there is 
no arranged way to correct for joint production in diaries. This is especially troublesome :in 
the context of informal caregiving, where it is difficult to separate benveen the provision of 
household informal care tasks and normal housework. Third, a more practical problem is 
that a diary is time consuming to complete, leading to a high non-response. 
In this d~esis '\Ve used therefore a less time consuming, but presumably a less 
accurate, method to measure informal care time, namely the recall method. But this 
method has also a theoretical advantage compared to the diary. It is namely argued, but 
never empirically sho'Wil, that respondents take into account their joint production when 
completing the recall method. 
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To get an impression of the measurement bias due to the recall method., we 
compared the recall method with a diary by means of a v.rithin subject comparison. The 
diary was especially developed to account for joint production in the measurement of 
informal care. Respondents could separate bet\veen household informal care tasks and 
normal housework. Because of the lack of a standardised way to correct for joint 
production, '\ve corrected for joint production in t\vo different ways in order to examine 
whether or not this correction influenced the results. 
Chapter 4 showed d1at the recall method gives roughly the same results compared 
to the diary, if one assumes that respondents take into account joint production when 
completing the recall questionnaire. This assumption involves that time spent on different 
activities can add up to over 24 hours per day. If we however do not assume that 
respondent._.:; take into consideration joint production when completing the recall 
questionnaire, we also have tO correct the diary for joint production. Under this second 
assumption, chapter 4 showed that the recall method overestimated the time spent on 
providing informal care '\vi.th more than two hours per day. Moreover, on the level of the 
individual care tasks, there was a lot of difference in results. For instance, the recall method 
gives an underestimation of eating and drinking of more than half an hour per day. This 
difference in results on a more detailed level makes it impossible tO make a simple 
correction of the recall method with t\'VO hours per day. 
\Y/e also compared the recall method at t'\vo moments in time in this chapter. It 
turned out that the recall method \vas unstable over time. This could be due to learning 
effects from completing a diary. In sum, we could not definitely conclude that the 
measurement of informal care with the recall method v.ill yi.eld reliable results. 
Measurement of informal care time with the recall method should therefore be interpreted 
carefully. 
A more specific issue regarding the measurement of time compared to the above 
mentioned general issues, is how the measure informal caregiver's time forgone in order to 
pro,ride informal care. This is crucial for the application of the opporrunity cost method. 
Especially, when the provision of informal care started many years ago, as is the case in 
many chronic diseases. But, in most applications of the opportunity cost method, this issue 
is neglected by assuming that the time spent on providing informal care is exactly the same 
as the time forgone in order tO be able to provide informal care. This seems 
straightfonvard, but implicitly assumes that there is no joint production and neglects 
income and substitution effects in the context of time measurement. In chapter 5, we 
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therefore developed and applied alternative questions to measure informal caregivers' 
opportunity costs of time and asked respondents to indicate how they would spend their 
time when they did not had to provide informal care anymore. Results showed that the 
measurement according to both operationalisations of the opportunity cost method is 
more problematic than its valuation. 
Chapter 5 tried also to separate between normal housework and informal care 
housework tasks in order to prevent double counting of housework in the application of 
the pro::-..y good method. We did this by comparing the predicted housework time of the 
caregivers in our samples based on a representative sample of people in The Netherlands. 
This did not solve the problem of double counting, because many respondents spent less 
time on some housework tasks than predicted. An explanation could be that they 
substituted some housework tasks for other informal care tasks. We concluded that more 
precise guidelines are necessary regarding the measurement of time in the opportunity and 
prm .. --y good methods, at least as long as it is still recommended to apply both methods to 
value informal care. Without these standardisation, results could substantially differ which 
hampers comparability of economic evaluations. 
13.2.2 Valuation 
Chapter 3 described and discussed the current practice of the incorporation of informal care 
in economic evaluations. We split up the valuation methods into three main categories: (1) 
revealed preference methods, (2) stated preference methods and (3) other methods. We 
observed that the standard handbooks about economic evaluations, v--.iz. Gold et al. (1996) 
and Drummond et al. (1997) recommend t\.vo revealed preference methods to value 
informal care, namely the opportunity cost method and the prm ... y good method. The same 
holds for the other literature, see, for instance, Smith and \Vright (1994) or Posnett and Jan 
(1996). The opportunity cost method is seen as the theoretically correct method, while the 
proAl' good method is considered as a good alternative. 
Despite the opportunity cost method is seen as the theoretically correct method 
to value informal care, chapter 3 stated that the focus of opportunity cost method is too 
narrow to value the full impact of providing informal care. The same holds for the proxy 
good method. Informal care is namely not only about the cost of paid work, unpaid work 
or leisure, but it involves also morbidity and even mortality risks (Schulz and Beach, 1999). 
Moreover, providing informal care involves both direct clisutility and direct utility for 
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informal caregivers. Another theoretical disadvantage of the pro::-.y good method is that is 
not preference based, as welfare economics demands. 
\YJe proposed two stated preference methods as better alternatives for the 
opportunity and pro::-.-y good methods, at least in theory, in order to value the full impact of 
providing informal care, namely the contingent valuation (CV) method and choice 
e::-.-periments (CE). Chapter 3 discussed also the use of other methods to value informal care. 
It suggested especially to apply the well-being valuation (\YJBV) method as an alternative 
method to value the full impact of providing informal care. To the best of our knowledge, 
CV, CE and \"VBV, were not applied to value informal care yet. We applied them in this 
thesis: CV (chapters 6 and 1), CE (chapters 8 and 9), and WBV (chapter 10). The three proposed 
alternatives are, in theory, capable to value the full impact of providing informal care. 
13.2.3 Operationalisation 
Because CV, CE, and \X!BV were not yet applied to value informal care, it was not always 
straightforward how to frame the questions. We opted for asking real informal caregivers 
to answer the questions, because they are familiar \Ni.th decisions regarding the provision of 
informal care. 
Chapter 6 showed how to frame CV questions, in the form of v.i.llingness to accept 
(\.."'VfA), an exception in the health economics literature (Klose, 1999), to elicit the 
preferences of informal caregivers. First, we asked caregivers to indicate their most 
favourite care task, in order to account for the heterogeneity of the commodity informal 
care, and second we asked them to indicate their minimum \TIA in order to provide an 
extra hour informal care per week. 
Chapter 8 on CE showed how to develop relatively simple vignettes to elicit 
informal caregivers' preferences. We asked informal caregivers to abstract from their real 
caregiving siruation and to imagine four different hypothetical caregiving situations, 
described in the •rignettes. The ~onettes consisted of only three attributes: care tasks, care 
time, and monetary compensation. Then we asked informal caregivers to compare the four 
siruations, and to rate them according to their preferences. In chapter 9, we also asked 
informal caregivers to rate their own caregiving siruation compared to the hy-pothetical 
siruations, as a challenge to account for the indivi_dual heterogeneity. 
Chapter 10 described the necessary pieces of information in order to apply \YJBV 
to value informal care: informal caregivers' income, their time spent on providing care and 
their subjective happiness. 
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13.2.4 Hypotheses 
In order to test the above mentioned statement that CV, CE, and \'X!BV are capable to 
value the full impact of providing informal care, we derived some theoretical hypotheses 
from economic models and derived some hypotheses from the (empirical) literature. 
First, in chapter 6, regarding CV, we derived some hypotheses from a graphical 
economic model and the literarure. We tested whether or not there was a relation between 
informal caregivers' \Nillingness to accept in order to provide an additional hour of informal 
care and some background characteristics. Especially, hypotheses about informal 
caregiver's and care recipient's health-related quality of life, informal caregiver's income, 
and institutions were accepted. Hypotheses about informal caregiver's subjective burden 
and CV's scope validity were not accepted. 
Because the hypotheses as tested in chapter 6 were not derived from a 
mathematical but a graphical economic model, there could be lack in precision. 
Presumably, the issue of interdependent utility functions of informal caregivers and their 
care recipients is important in the context of informal caregiving. Chapter 7 tried to solve 
both issues. 1t presented a formal economic model of informal care that took into account 
the perspectives of both the informal caregivers and their care recipients and modelled the 
interdependencies in their preferences, assuming that informal caregivers take into account 
the health staru.s of their care recipients and vice versa. We tested whether or not there was 
a relation ben~veen informal caregivers' and care recipients' -willingness to accept and 
willingness to pay and own income, health and others health. The effect of income on 
\VTP and W'TA was mixed. Own health generally had the predicted negative effect. The 
impact of other's health varied, but the theoretical model made no predictions regarding 
this effect. 
Regarding CE, we adopted an empirical approach, mainly from the informal 
caregivers' perspective. Chapter 8 showed that there was no relation bet\'veen the vignette 
ra~crs and informal caregivers' or caregiving characteristics. Especially, informal 
caregivers' rating of their own caregiving situation and their health-related quality of life 
were related to their vignette ratings, in chapter 9. Chapter 10 showed that the time spent on 
providing informal care was negatively and informal caregivers' income was positively 
related to informal caregivers' happiness, as we had hypothesised. Moreover, we also 
compared our findings of the relation ben.veen other variables, like sex and income, and 
happiness with results of other studies in the literature on happiness. Again, the perspective 
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of this chapter was the informal caregivers'. The perspective of the care recipient in this 
method is only useful when '\ve were able to disentangle the positive effect of receivWg 
informal care on happiness on the one hand and the negative effect of being cared for by a 
loved one on happiness on the other hand. 
In sum, chapters 6 to 10 suggested that CV, CE, and \VBV might be fruitfully 
applied to value the full impact of provl.ding informal care. 
13.2.5 Results 
Despite the recommendations in the literature to apply the opportunity cost method or the 
proxy good method to value informal care, it is unknown ho'\v both methods relate to each 
other. Therefore, chapter 5 applied and compared the t\vo methods. A second reason for 
this comparison was to serve as a benchmark in this thesis to compare their results '\vl.th the 
results of the proposed alternative methods to value informal care. Chapters 6 and 7 applied 
CV to value informal care, chapters 8 and 9 applied CE, and chapter 10 applied WBV. 
Table 13.1 summarises the main results of the different valuation methods. It is 
worth noting that not all the valuation methods were applied to the same population. 
Table 13.1: Comparison of results of different valuation methods from the informal 
caregiver's perspective (in euro per hour) 
Method 
Opportunity cost 
(avCr.J.gc) 
Proxy good 
(avcog<.:) 
CV (WTA) 
(m::trgiml from s::unple :twragc) 
CV (WTP) 
(m:trgin.'ll from s::unpk: :tvcr::Lgc) 
CE 
(m:u:gin.'ll from 15 tO 16 hour:> per \Vcck) 
\V'BV (HappiNeSS 1 /() 5) 
(m::trginal from s=ple :tvcogc) 
\~'BV (Happi11as 0 to 10) 
(m::trgirul from samplt: :tveogc) 
Cbapkr 13: Co!ld!ISiotu a!ld dismssio11 
Population 
CVA 
17.34 
13.51 
LOT 
10.64 
12.19 
7.80 10.52 
9.52 8.61 
16.00 8.00 
15.39 
16.49 
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Moreover, even if they were applied to the same population, then due to item non-
response it was not exacrly the same group of respondents that answered each of the 
questions. Sometimes, the same method was operationalised in a different way (see the 
subsequent chapters for more details). 
Table 13.1 gives an impression of the convert validity of the different methods to 
estimate a monetary value of informal care. It shows that hourly monetary values according 
to all valuation methods are \'vithin the same range: between 8 and 17.34 Euro. There are 
no outliers. However, the highest value (opportunity cost method in CVA) is N-ice the 
lowest value (CE in LOT), 17.34 versus 8.00. Applicants of the methods should therefore 
be aware that results strongly depend on the valuation method. It is argued in chapter 3 that 
a total valuation method is required to value the full impact of providing informal care. As 
long as CE and \\7BV do not have the same theoretical basis in welfare economics, \Ve 
would suggest using CV for the economic valuation of informal care in economic 
evaluations. 
The interpretation of the values is not always the same. Sometimes the point of 
estimation is at the sample average: opportunity cost and prm.y good methods. CV and 
\WV gives values at the margin from the sample average hours informal care pruvided. CE 
gives values dependent on the initial hypothetical compensation that could be varied. 
Finally, it is striking that despite CV, CE, and \'ifBV seem to value the full impact 
of providing informal care, as opposed to the opportunity and pro::-..7 good methods, their 
values do not systematically differ from the values derived \vith the latter t\•m methods. An 
explanation could be that the derived direct utility and indirect utility from providing 
informal care are in balance. 
13.2.6 Non-response 
Next to the proposed theoretical arguments regarding the choice of valuation methods and 
the discussed convert validity, there is also the empirical issue of the non-response. We flrst 
compare our findings \\li.th suggestions in the literature. The non-response gives at least 
also an impression of the respondents' understanding of the methods. Therefore, secondly 
we compare the non-response of the different methods in this thesis to value informal care. 
In the literature there is some suspicion towards the application of CV to value 
informal care. It is argued that money is low on the informal caregivers' agenda (Smith and 
Wright, 1994). Chapter 6 presented empirical evidence on this issue. It was shown that most 
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respondents '\vere >.Villing to answer questions about a hypothetical monetary compensation 
for the provision of additional informal care. 
It is well known from the literature that completing questions regarding CE 
involves a relatively high burden for respondents. Especially, when respondents have to 
rank many vignettes or when vignettes consist of many attributes. A relatively high non-
response, especially when it is not randomly. could bias the results of the method. Chapter 8 
showed that non-response is indeed a problem in CE. Even in a relatively simple CE, 
rating four vignettes 'With three attributes, the non-response was almost fifty percent. 
Surprisingly, chapter 5 showed that applyi.ng the opportunity cost method involves 
also a high non-response. Only, a quarter of the sample answered the questions regarding 
thls method. This was surprising, because the current literature did not yet notice this 
disadvantage of the method. Perhaps, because the method is often operationalised in a 
different way, not asking respondents the time they had given up in order to provide 
informal care but just the time they spend on providing informal care assuming that both 
are equal. 
This thesis showed that applying the proAJ' good method (chapter 5) and WBV 
(chapter 10) involved relatively the less non-response: respectively 4% and 2.5% to 3.4% 
(depending on the questions used). It is worth noting that applying \VBV requires, for 
example, also income information (non-response of 6.7%). This result is an empirical 
argument in favour of both methods. 
In contrast, 42.8% to 49.8% (depending on the questions used) of the informal 
caregivers failed to answer the CV questions in LOT (chapter 7). It is worth noting that the 
non-response on CV questions depends heavily on the choice format used. LOT consisted 
of open-ended questions, which are the most difficult for respondents to answer (Greenet 
al., 1998). RA. used a dichotomous choice CV question with an open follow-up question 
and had a non-response of 19% (chapter6). CE scored relatively bad with a non-response of 
50% (chapterS), while the opportunity cost method involved the highest non-response: 75% 
(chapter 5). 
Finally, empirical results in this thesis showed also that on sample averages, the 
non-response seemed not tO bias the results. This suggests that in terms of non-response 
all methods could equally been applied to value informal care. 
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13.2.7 Unresolved issues and recommendations for future 
research 
There are a few specific unresolved issues which could be solved in future research. 
Regarding the measurement of time in general and also regarding the measurement of 
informal care time, a crucial issue is joint production. Furore research should therefore 
focus on this question. In the application of the diary '\Vt corrected for joint production in 
t\vo different '\vays, but how to correct for joint production is still debatable. Moreover, the 
srudy design was based on a within sample comparison. It would be interesting to see 
whether between sample comparisons "villlead to the same results. It could namely be that 
our design involved learning effects for respondents by completing first the diary and 
afterwards the recall method. Bet\veen sample comparison would not involve such learning 
effects, but it introduces probably other unobserved heterogeneity. A final issue in the 
measurement of informal care time is the number of care tasks distinguished. It is 
questionable whether adding extra informal care tasks to the recall method, \Vill yield more 
reliable results. Research could try to solve the question \vhat :is the optimal number of care 
tasks in the recall method, in order to get the most reliable results compared to the diary. 
A recurrent issue in the literature on CV, is the issue of scope validity, see for 
instance lvfitchell and Carson (1989) and BrO\VTI and Gregory (1999). This means that, 
according to economic theory, the respondents' preferences for the commodity under 
valuation should be but are not al·ways sensitive to the amount of the commodity. We did 
not test for scope validity in the usual way in the context of informal caregiving. A test 
could, for instance, be asking the same respondent how much he minimum was willing to 
accept in order to provide one extra hour of informal care per week versus four extra 
hours. This issue should be resolved in future research, in order to recommend \'V:ith 
certainty for the application of CV to value informal care in economic evaluations. 
Our applications of CE showed that it is an interesting method to derive a 
monetary compensation of informal care. Because the applications were relatively simple 
(\ve only considered care hours, care tasks and a monetary compensation), future research 
could and should focus on more complicated designs. It would, for instance, be challenging 
to add additional attributes to the vignettes (probably in an interview setting), like 
qualitative information on the caregiving situation, the trade-off between informal 
caregiver's o\Vn tasks and other informal caregivers, care tasks provided by other informal 
caregivers or professional caregivers. 
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CE are sometimes called CV's close cousins in the family of stated preference 
methods (Roe et al., 1996). They do not have the strong welfare economic theoretical 
foundation as CV, but they also do not suffer from some biases like strategic bias as CV 
does. Theoretical work is necessary regarding the foundations of CE. This in order to 
develop and test the internal validity of CE according to economic theory. 
Chapter 3 discussed the usefulness of other methods (non-monetary valuation 
methods next to \VBV) that already were applied to value informal care. \Y/e concluded that 
the other methods (objective burden, health-related quality of life and subjective burden) 
were not, just like the revealed preference methods, able to value the full impact of 
informal care. They may therefore only be used in combination \vi.th other, complementary, 
methods in order to value the full impact of informal care. \'V/e also suggested that a 
applying a combination of different methods involves the danger of double counting. It 
also does not naturally value the full impact of informal caregiving. For example, a 
combination of the opportunity cost or pro::-..7 good method with health-related quality of 
life is not able to detect the interdependencies in the informal caregiver's and care 
recipient's utility functions. A combination of the opportunity cost or prm .. y good method 
with health-related quality of life supplemented with process utility may involve double 
counting in relation to health-related quality of life and process utility. Obviously, future 
theoretical and empirical research could therefore contribute to the incorporation of other 
methods to value informal care. 
13.3 Cash benefits 
The final research question of this thesis \vas about the (economic) consequences of the 
introduction of cash benefits in the long-term home health care sector in general and 
particularly for informal care. Chapter 11 was an empirical examination of the economic 
consequences of the introduction of cash benefits for quantities and prices of different 
types of care. 
\'V/e found a shift towards more private care and some evidence of ex post static 
moral hazard. Moreover, we observed no substitution of regular care for informal care due 
to the introduction of cash benefits, a.<> is sometimes suggested by policy makers. 
Chapter 12 discussed the psychological consequences of the payment of informal 
caregivers with cash benefits. It was argued that this payment involved negative 
psychological effects in the motivation of informal caregivers. We did not find empirical 
support for this hy"f'othesis regarding (1) care recipients' appreciation of the informal 
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caregivers' care efforts, (2) the changed emotional relationships due to the provision of 
care, (3) caregivers enjoy caring, and (4) caring is important tO caregivers. 
The policy implications of our flndings are that there is no problem with paying 
informal caregivers for their care provided in terms of negative external psychological 
effects. Support programs could therefore also focus on direct payment of informal 
caregivers in stead of only focussing on indirect pa;rments like the prov-1.sion of care leave 
facilities. 
13.4 Other areas for future research 
Thus far many areas and topics for future research were already suggested. But here flnally 
a few general remarks about areas for furore research that mainly deal 'Ni.th the applications 
and implications of our flndings for policy making. 
Regarding the supply of informal care it would be interesting to analyse how 
informal caregivers '\vill respond to the introduction of new schemes regarding the 
combination of prov-1.ding informal care and paid work in real life, such as paid leave or 
respite care. These kinds of natural experiments would obviously involve all kind of 
difflculties in the sense that they could lead to inequalities that are societal unacceptable. 
However, such analyses could provide crucial information about the costs and beneflts of 
actual policy measures. 
The same kind of reasoning holds within the framework of economic evaluations. 
It would be interesting tO apply the valuation methods as discussed in this thesis in real 
economic evaluations. This thesis tested the valuation methods empirically in terms of, for 
instance, feasibility, construct validity and convert validity. Though the data were collected 
from real informal caregivers and their care recipients, respondents \Vere not exposed to an 
inte.nrention, as is generally the case in an economic evaluation. It is therefore not possible 
to conclude whether or not the valuation methods are sensitive enough tO discriminate 
beroreen, for example, an experimental group and a control group. 
A complementary issue in the context of informal care in economic evaluations is 
whether the care recipients or the informal caregiver is the main object of the intervention 
under study. The cited handbooks concerning economic evaluations Gold et al. (1996) and 
Drummond et al. (1997) focus on care recipients. Other studies, for instance Mohide et al. 
(1988) and Drummond et al. (1991) focus conversely on interventions to support informal 
caregivers. The main aim of this thesis was the incorporation of informal care in economic 
evaluations regarding care recipients instead of economic evaluations of support programs 
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of informal caregivers. Despite this aim, CV could also be used in a cost-benefit analysis of 
a support program for informal caregivers. The same holds for CE, but CE could also be 
applied to derive utility scores in a cost-utility analysis of support programs for informal 
caregrvers. 
It would be superfluous to stage the same kind of reasoning regarding natural 
e::-..-periments about the chapters on the effects of cash benefits. But future research in this 
area could focus on t\vo partly different and partly interrelated issues. First, it would be 
interesting to analyse in more detail ho'\v prices and quantities of purchased care would be 
realised. Especially, when cash benefits are seen as crucial tools to increase efficiency and 
consumer choice in the long-term care, as is the case in The Netherlands. Symmetric 
market power berneen different market parries is crucial for the functioning of markets. 
Detailed information about the realisation of prices and quantities could help '\vith possible 
adjustment of the rules regarding cash benefits. Second, cash benefits are perhaps not 
feasible for all consumers in the long-term care sector. Detailed information about possible 
sub groups that do not opt for cash benefits could protect them against a possibly rigorous 
implementation of this rool. But also cash benefits for consumers that are not very well 
able to express their preferences as a result of their illness could involve some problems. 
Guardians can manage their cash benefit, but this introduces a complicated principal agent 
problem. \Y/e ask some attention for this principal agent problem in future research. One 
could, for instance, test whether or not there are differences in the way cash benefits are 
spend between clients '\vho manage their own cash benefits and clients with a guardiafl:, 
ceteris paribus. This, tO test if guardians act mainly according to their own preferences or 
according tO the preferences of their clients. 
13.5 Epilogue 
This thesis tried to fill some gaps in the economic literature about informal care. It 
provided some theoretical and empirical innovations regarding the simultaneous supply of 
informal care and paid work. The same holds for the incorporation of informal care in 
economic evaluations, with a focus on three new valuation methods in this area, viz. CV, 
CE, and \X!BV. About the (economic) effects of the introduction of cash benefits in the 
long-term care secror '\Vas hitherto no information, while many countries experiment with 
cash benefits. 
Vnfortunately, we could not definitely, solve all the problems in the raised areas. 
Particularly, they include: (1) more work is necessary regarding the valid measurement of 
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time spend on informal caregiving. (2) The usefulness of applying stated preference 
methods to value informal care, for instance, respondents from the general population 
instead of real informal caregivers in case of CV and CE, scope validity in CV, more 
complicated vignettes in CE, and the care recipients' perspective in \X!BV. (3) Developing 
and applying non-monetary methods (m chapter 3 called other methods) to value informal 
care. (4) Applying the proposed methods to evaluate support programs for informal 
caregivers and comparing their results. (5) Trying to get a clearer picture about the role of 
interdependent utility functions in the valuation of informal care. This issue deserves also 
much more attention in other areas of health economics. (6) Cash benefits get presumably 
a more dominant position in regulating long-term care and perhaps also in other health 
care sectors. More theoretical and empirical work is necessary regarding their incentives. 
But we believe that this thesis has contributed to the clarification of at least some of these 
issues. Hopefully, the results of this thesis would stimulate and accelerate future theoretical 
and empirical research about informal care in general and in particular about the position 
of informal care in health care and in health care decision making. 
It is almost impossible to work on this topic \'\rithout getting any illvolvement with 
some of the e:x:perienced problems of informal caregivers. Especially, visiting informal 
caregivers to test a developed sun•ey or getting phone calls from respondents completing 
the surveys, puts your attention on their, sometimes, painful life circumstances. Therefore, 
policy makers will hopefully also use the results of this thesis to develop health care and 
social care institutions \'Vi.thout adverse incentives in the sense that the burden. in the broad 
sense of the word, of long-care in an ageing society is solely on the shoulders of informal 
caregivers. 
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Samenvatting 
Mantelzorg: een economische benadering 
1. Inleiding 
Als gevolg van deze stijging van de kosten in de care sectOr is in beleidskringen discussie 
ontstaan over de v--raag hoe de A \VBZ vormgegeven moet worden om verdere 
kostenstijgingen te voorkomen en efficiencywinsten te behalen. Econornische evaluaties 
zijn in de c11re sector een beproefd middel en zouden daarom een rol kunnen spelen in deze 
discussie. Een economische evaluatie is een analyse om bijvoorbeeld verschillende 
technologieen in de gezondheidszorg te vergeleken in termen van kosten en opbrengsten. 
Naast deze discussie is ondanks de stijging van de uitgaven in de care sector de tevredenheid 
van de zorgconsumenten niet evenredig toegenomen. Deze omevredenheid van 
zorgconsumenten wordt deels veroorzaakt doordat ze weinig invloed kunnen uitoefenen 
op de zorg die ze ontvangen: gebrek aan keuzevrijheid. 
De care sector heeft enkele specifieke kenmerken in vergelijking met de cure sector. 
Dit maakt het lastig om beleidsmaatregelen die in de cttre sector worden of zijn 
geiinplementeerd om kostenstijgingen te voorkomen en om efficiCntie en keuzevrijheid te 
vergroten niet zomaar toegepast kunnen worden in de care sector. Zo is er in de care sector 
vaak sprake van een veelal langdurige relatie russen zorgvragers en zorgaanbieders, omdat 
de zorgvraag vaak chronisch is. Het flnancieren van huishoudelijke hulp uit het collectief 
gefinancierde verstrekkingenpakket heeft een relatief groot risico op moral hazard. Moral 
hazard houdt in dat mensen meer of duurdere zorg vragen als gevolg van 
verzekeringsdekking vergeleken met een situatie waarin ze zelf voor de kosten moeten 
opdraaien. In ieder huishouden moet huishoudelijk werk verricht worden waardoor een 
beroep op middelen uit het collectief gefinancierde verstrekk.ingenpakket .aantrekkelijk kan 
zijn. Bij de uitkomsten en bvaliteit van zorg gaat het vaak om het welzijn van de zorgvrager 
en diens sociale omgeving en niet zozeer om het verberen van de gezondheid van de 
zorg'-rrager zoals in de c!lre sector. Deze specifieke kenmerken van de care sector zijn 
methodologisch en beleidsmatig interessant. Ze staan centraal in dit proefschrift. Daarbij 
wordt de meeste aandacht besteedt aan mantelzorg. 
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Een belangrijk thema van dit proefschrift is hoe te voorkomen dat er een 
ongewenste verschuiving van de colleccief gefinancierde zorglasten plaatsvindt vanuit het 
gezondheidszorgbudget naar de private sfeer van de zorgvragers en hun mantelzorgers. Als 
mantelzorg buiten beschou'-ving wordt gelaten, kan een intervencie in de gezondheidszorg 
relacief kosteneffeccief lijken te zijn. Ivfaar deze relacief gunstige kosteneffecti'Viteit wordt 
dan aileen veroorzaakt doordat de kosten en effecten van mantelzorg onzichtbaar, lees niet 
meegenomen, zijn. Dit irnpliceert het gevaar van beleidsaanbevelingen waarbij 
gezondheidszorgkosten worden verplaatst naar de private sfeer van de mantelzorgers. 
Daarnaast staan het aanbod van en de V'Xaag naar mantelzorg centraal in dit proefschrift. 
Evenals de (econornische) effecten van de introduccies van persoonsgeboden budgtten 
(pgb's) in de care sector. Een pgb is een som geld waarmee zorgvragers zelf hun zorg in 
l"Urulen kopen bij de zorgaanbieder van hun keuze. Deze pgb's worden gezien als een 
belangrijk instrument om consumentensoevereiniteit te waarborgen in de care sector. 
2. Onderzoeksvragen 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert mantelzorg vanuit een econornisch perspectief. Het behandelt 
drie verschillende maar gerelateerde econornische problemen ten aa.n7ien van mantelzorg: 
1) Wat is de relatie tussen het verlenen van mantelzorg en andere economische activiteiten 
zoals betaald werk? 
2) Hoe moet mantelzorg worden meegenomen in econornische evaluaties binnen de 
gezondheidszorg? 
3) \Vat zijn de (econornische) gevolgen van de introductie van persoonsgebonden 
budgetten in de A \VBZ sector en in het bijzonder voor mantelzorg? 
We bespreken de drie onderzoeksvragen hieronder afzonderlijk. In paragraaf 3 de 
relatie tussen het verlenen van mantelzorg en andere econornische acti'Vitciten, in paragraaf 
4 de economische waardering van mantelzorg waarbij we eerst het meten van mantelzorg 
(paragraaf 4.1) en vervolgens het waarderen van mamelzorg (paragraaf 4.2) behandelen en 
in paragraaf 5 de (econornische) gevolgen van de introductie van pgb's in de A \'V'BZ sector. 
Hierbij hanteren we steeds de volgende structuur: allereerst presemeren we de achtergrond 
en de aanleiding van de onderzoeksvraag. Wanneer het noodzakelijk is, bespreken we 
vervolgens de onderzoeksmethode. Daarna beschrijven we hoe de gebruikte data zijn 
verzameld en hoeveel mensen aan het onderzoek hebben deelgenomen. Dan presenteren 
we de belangrijkste onderzoeksresultaten. Tenslotte bediscussieren we de 
onderzoeksresultaten en trekken we de belangrijkste conclusies. 
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3. Mantelzorg in relatie tot andere economische 
activiteiten 
Het aanbod van mantelzorg hangt samen met andere econornische activiteiten van de 
(potentiele) mamelzorger, zoals het verrichten van betaald of onbetaald werk. Er is veel 
literatuur over de karakteristieken van mantelzorgers. Niantelzorg wordt bijvoorbeeld vaak 
verleend door vrouwen aan hun partner of ouders. Economen benadrukken vaak de 
opportuniteitskosten van het verlenen van mantelzorg. Zij stellen dat mantelzorg ten koste 
gaat van bijvoorbeeld het verrichten van betaald werk. 
In deze literatuur wordt echter nauwelijks rekening gehouden met het 
zogenaamde endogeniteitsprobleem van het verrichten van betaald werk en het verlenen 
van mantelzorg. Endogeniteit betekent dat het verrichten van betaald werk van invloed kan 
zijn op het verlenen van mantelzorg en dar her verlenen van mantelzorg van invloed kan 
zijn op het verrichren van beraald werk. Het negeren van dit endogenlreirsprobleem kan 
leiden tot een onderschatring of overschatting van deze invloeden. Een oplossing van dit 
endogenlteirsprobleem is belangrijk omdar het zorgt voor een completer inzicht in de 
keuzeprocessen van mantelzorgers. 
Dir endogenlreirsprobleem is gemodelleerd en empirisch getoerst op een 
steekproef van 1106 respondenten. Iedereen had iemand met een zorgvraag in hun sociale 
omgeving en was daarom een potentiele mantelzorger. 67,7 procent van de potentiCle 
mantelzorgers had betaald werk en 32,3 procent nlet. Driek-wart van de respondenten is 
mantelzorg gaan verlenen en een h.-wart nier. 
\Ve vinden dat het verlenen van mantelzorg een negatieve invloed heeft op de 
hoeveelheid verricht betaald werk. Het heb ben van betaald werk he eft een negatieve 
invloed op de hoeveelheid verleende mamelzorg, maar de hoeveelheid beraald werk heeft 
bierop geen invloed. Dit lijkt erop te duiden dat mantelzorgers de gevraagde zorg leveren, 
ondanks hun arbeidsmarkrverplichtingen. \Vanneer beleidsmakers een groter deel van de 
zorg door mantelzorgers zouden willen laten verrichten, zijn er mogelijk effecten re behalen 
wanneer ze zich richten op het keuzeproces van potentiele mamelzorgers russen het 
verrichten van betaald werk en het verlenen van mantelzorg. Zo zouden ze nlet-
mantelzorgers, indien wenselijk, kunnen stimuleren om mantelzorg te gaan verlenen. 
Doordat het verlenen van manrelzorg een negatief effect lijkt te hebben op de hoeveelheid 
verricht beraald werk zouden beleidsmakers zich ook kunnen richten op het ondersteunen 
van mantelzorgers bij het verlenen van hun zorg. 
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4. De economische waardering van mantelzorg 
Mantelzorg '\vordt regelmatig genegeerd m economische evaluaties binnen de 
gezondheidszorg. Bijvoorbeeld doordat het perspecrief van een verzekeraar in plaats van 
het maatschappelijk perspectief wordt gehanteerd of vanwege meet- en 
waarderingsproblemen van mantelzorg. Een gevolg zou kunnen zijn dat beleidsmakers 
besluiten om een interventie in de gezondheidszorg te implementeren op basis van de 
resultaten van een econornische evaluatie omdat de interventie relatief kosteneffectief lijkt 
te zijn. Wanneer deze relatief gunstige kosteneffectiviteit slechts wordt veroorzaakt doordat 
de kosten en effecten van mantelzorg niet 7jjn meegenomen, zal het implementeren van de 
intenrentie ertoe kunnen leiden dat gezondheidszorgkosten worden verplaatst naar de 
private sfeer van de mantelzorgers. 
4.1 Meten 
Het betrouwbaar meten van mantelzorgrijd is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het 
waarderen van mantelzorg. Tijdsmeting blijkt echter lastig te zijn. Een van de problemen is 
dat mensen vaak verscbillende activiteiten tegelijk combineren, zoals auto rijden en radio 
luisteren. Dit wordt joint productie genoemd. Bij mantelzorg kan deze joint productie extra 
lastig zijn doordat mantelzorgers bijvoorbeeld huishoudelijk werk, dat ze ook of juist niet 
deden wanneer ze geen mantelzorg zouden verlenen, combineren met 
mantelzorgactiviteiten. 
In dit proefschrift is om praktische redenen de herinneringsmethode gebruikt om 
mantelzorgrijd te meten. Het dagboek is een andere methode om tijd te meten en wordt 
gezien als de gouden standaard. Daarom hebben we de wee methoden met elkaar 
vergeleken en hebben we getest in hoeverre de herinneringsmethode stabiele resultaten 
genereert. 
I-:lierv~oor hebben we 199 mantelzorgers benaderd via de regionale steunpunten 
mantelzorg die zijn verenigd in X-Zorg en worden vertegen'.voorcligd door de Landelijke 
Organisatie Thuisverzorgers (LOT) en v--ia de belangenvereniging voor mensen met een 
pgb, Per Saldo. Deze mamelzorgers hebben gedurende wee dagen binnen dezelfde week 
een door ons ont\.v-ikkeld dagboek bijgehouden. Vervolgens hebben ze over dezelfde week 
een door ons ont\villelde vragen.lijst met de herinneringsmethode ingevuld. Bovenclien 
hebben 150 mantelzorgers (waarvan 70 met een stabiele gezondheidstoestand) op rwee 
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meetmomenten, december 2001 en april 2002, de herinneringsmethode ingevuld om de 
stabiliteit van de methode te testen. 
Zonder correcrie voor joint producrie ZlJn er nauwelijks verschillen russen 
dagboek en herinneringsmethode. V olgens beide methoden besteden mantelzorgers 
gemiddeld ongeveer acht uur per dag aan zorg. lviet correctie voor joint productie 
overschat de herinneringsmethode de hoeveelheid verleende mantelzorg echter met 
ongeveer N.ree uur per dag ten opzichte van de dagboekmethode. Een ander probleem met 
de herinntrir\:,o-smethode is dat deze instabiel blijkt te zijn wanneer resultaten van t\vee 
verschillende meetmomenten met elkaar \Vorden vergeleken. Dit zou het gevolg h"llnnen 
zijn van leereffecten doordat de herinneringsmethode op het rweede meetmoment een 
week na het bijhouden van het dagboek is ingevuld. De herinneringsmethode lijkt de 
hoeveelheid verleende mantelzorg dus te overschatten. Deze informatie is van belang bij 
het interpreteren van de hoeveelheid tijd die mantelzorgers elders in dit proefschrift 
rapporteren te besteden. 
Een specifiek probleem bij het meten van mantelzorgtijd hangt samen met een 
van de waarderingsmethoden voor mantelzorg, namelijk de opportuniteitskosten methode. 
Voor deze methode is het noodzakelijk om de rijd te meten die een mantelzorger heeft 
opgegeven om zorg te kunnen gaan verlenen. V ooral wanneer mantelzorgers al lang zorg 
verlenen, kan clit problemarisch zijn. Daarom hebben we een alternarieve methode 
ontwik.keld waarbij we mantelzorgers vragen aan welke acriviteiten (betaald en onbetaald 
werk en vrije rijd) voor hoeveel uur per \Veek ze hun tijd zouden gaan besteden wanneer ze 
geen mantelzorg meer zouden hoeven te verlenen. 
255 mantelzorgers voor mensen met een cerebrovasculaire aandoening (CVA) en 
153 mantelzorgers voor mensen met reumatolde artritis (RA) hebben geparricipeerd in dit 
onderzoek door middel van het invullen van een door ons ont\V-ikkelde vragenlijst. 
Vergelijking van beide groepen is interessant omdat een CV A een duidelijk startpunt heeft 
en RA. niet, waardoor het bij CV A relatief eenvoudig zou kunnen zijn om opgegeven tijd te 
meten en bij RA. niet. 
Vergelijki.ng van de twee groepen leert dat het voor CV A-mantelzorgers iets 
eenvoucliger is om de gestelde v"Tagen te beant\voorden. De alternatieve vragen zijn door 
RA.-mantelzorgers veel beter ingevuld dan de normale vragen. Dit suggereert dat de door 
ons ontwik.kelde methode een beter alternatief is dan de normale methode. 
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4.2 Waarderen 
Wanneer er in de interoationale literatuur aandacht is voor het opnemen van mantelzorg in 
economische evaluaties dan staat de economische waardering van mantelzorg meestal 
centraal. De opportuniteitskosten methode wordt gezien als de theoretisch correcte 
methode om mantelzorg te \vaarderen, terwi.jl de prm . -y goed methode wordt aanbevolen 
als een bruikbaar alternatief. In de opporruniteitskosten methode wordt mantelzorg 
gewaardeerd tegen de prijs van het opgegeven alternatief, meestal het netto uurloon van de 
mantelzorger. De proxy goed methode waardeert mantelzorg tegen de prijs van een 
altemarieve dienst, bijvoorbeeld professionele thuiszorg. 
Dit proefschrift betoogt dat de focus van zowel de opportuniteitskosten methode 
als van de prm . -y goed methode te beperkt is om een complete economische waardering 
van manteb:org te geven. Het verlenen van mantelzorg leidt namelijk tot verhoogde 
morbiditeitrisico's en in somrnige subgroepen mantelzorgers zelfs tot verhoogde 
mortaliteitrisico's die niet meegenomen worden in beide methoden. Bovendien brengt het 
verlenen van mantelzorg zowel positief als negatief direct nut voor de mantelzorger met 
zich mee dat beide methoden negeren. Een specifiek aanv'Ullend probleem met de pro::-.·y 
goed methode is dat deze niet is gebaseerd op de preferenties van zorgvragers noch van 
manteb:orgers, zoals de welvaarteconornische theorie vereist. 
Daarom beveelt dit proefschrift drie andere methoden aan die theoretisch wel een 
complete economische waarde van mantelzorg genereren. Het gaat om de contingente 
waarderingsmethode, de vignettenmethode en de webijnswaarderingsmethode. Voor zover 
we hebben kunnen ~CYaan zijn deze drie methoden niet eerder toegepast om mantelzorg te 
waarderen. In dit proefschrift worden ze toegepast en wordt getest of ze aan de 
theoretische verv.rachtingen voldoen. Bovendien worden de opportuniteitskosten methode 
en de pro::-..7 goed methode in dit proefschrift toegepast om mantelzorg in Nederland te 
waarderen en de uitkomsten van deze t\.Vee methoden te vergelijken met de resultaten van 
de drie eerder genoemde methoden. 
We hebben de methoden toegepast op verschillende popularies mantelzorgers, 
zogenaamde ervaringsdeskundigen. Voor de operationalistatie van de conti.ngente 
waarderingsmethode betekent dit dat bijvoorbeeld aan mantelzorgers is gevraagd hoeveel 
compensatie in geld ze van de overheid zouden will.en ontvangen om per week een 
hypothetisch uur extra manteb:org te gaan verlenen. Bij de vignettenmethode hebben we 
aan mantelzorgers gevraagd om zich te verplaatsen in vier hypotherische situaties die 
k"Unnen af..v:ijken van hun eigen situatie. De situaties variCren in zorgtaken, in uren 
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mantelzorg per week en in financiele compensatie van de overheid. Mantelzorgers hebben 
hun voorkeuren voor deze situaties aangegeven door middel van rapportcijfers. Daarnaast 
hebben ze aangegeven of ze deze hypothetische situaties hoger of lager waarderen dan hun 
eigen situatie. De welzijnswaarderingsmethode vereist dat mantelzorgers aangeven hoe 
gelukkig ze zijn op bijvoorbeeld een verbale of numerieke schaal. Beide schalen zijn in dit 
proefschrift toegepast en vergeleken. 
De opportuniteitskosten methode en de pro>..-y goed methode zijn toegepast op 
t\Vee populaties: 255 CVA-mantelzorgers en 153 RA-mantelzorgers. De contingente 
waarderingsmethode en de vignettenmethode zijn ook toegepast op de 153 RA-
mantelzorgers alsmede, evenals de webJjnswaarderingsmethode, op een populatie van 865 
mantelzorgers die zorg verlenen aan mensen met diverse aandoeningen, benaderd via X-
zorg. 
Het blijkt dat de contingente waarderingsmethode vooral samenhangt met 
hypothesen over de gezondheidsgerelateerde l-waliteit van leven van mantelzorgers en 
zorgvragers, met hun inkomen en met instituties zoals flexibilitcit van betaald werk. 
Hypothesen over de subjectieve belasting en rijdsbesteding ZlJn ver\Vorpen. 
Nutinterdependenries, zoals het mee\vegen van aspecten van het leven van een naaste, zijn 
crociaal in de context van de waardering van mantelzorg. Ontwllelde hypothesen ten 
aa11.7Jen van deze problemariek zijn over het algemeen niet ver\Vorpen. De waardering van 
mantelzorg via de vignettenmethode lijkt vooral samen te hangen met de waardering van 
de eigen situatie door de mantelzorgers en met hun cigen gezondheidsgerelateerde l-waliteit 
van leven. Zoals veruracht, hangt de tijd die mantelzorgers besteden aan zorgverlening 
negatief samen met hun geluk. te.t"\.\1-ijl hun inkomen posirief met hun geluk samenhangt. 
Een en ander suggereert dat de drie alternatieve waarderingsmethoden in staat zijn om een 
complete waardering van mantelzorg te genereren. 
Tabel 1 geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste resultaten van de vijf 
verschillende waarderingsmethoden. 
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Tabcl 1: Vergelijking van de resultaten van de verschillende toegepaste 
waarderingsmethoden vanuit het perspectief van de mantelzorger (in euro per uur) 
Methode 
Opportuniteitskosren methode 
(gemidddde) 
Pro;..)· goed methode 
(gemidddde) 
Contingence \V:tarderingsmethode 
(JJJi//ingness Jo acetpt) 
(marginxtl ten opzichte van het gerniddddc) 
Contingeme \v::mrderingsmethode 
(l!Ji//ingm:ss to P0~ 
(margin:t..1.1. ten opzichte van h<..-1: gemiddelde) 
Vignettcnmethode 
(margi=al van 15 ruar 16 uur penveek) 
\'V13V (GdH/.: n·rbaaf: 1 to/ 5) 
(IIl:l.r£;in:tal ten opzichte van het gcmiddelde) 
\\/BV (Gdtr/.: nH!!Icrid::: 0 Jot 10) 
(margimal ten opzichte van hct gernidddde) 
Populatie 
CVA1 
17.34 
13.51 
1 Q/ A: 225 mantd:;pt;g.('TS t'oor mensen md cm·/Jro/Jasmlairr aandomingm 
R-4: 153 1!/anld:::p!J!,ers wor 11/CI/JI:'!f 111t'1 rrtlll:atoi'dt attritiJ· 
LOT: 865 fllallkizorgtrs r'OOr 111,'1/Scn md afh:r!t:i /.'t'r.rcbilk:mle aandoeni11gm 
R.!-\: 
10.64 
12.19 
7.80 10.52 
9.52 8.61 
16.00 8.00 
15.39 
16.49 
De tabel geeft inz.icht in de exteme valicliteit van de verschillende methoden. Uitkomsten 
varieren tussen de S en 17 euro per uur. Interpretatie van de resultaten is niet altijd identiek. 
Soms gaat het om een gerniddelde waarde per uur zoals in de opportuniteitskosten 
methode en in de prOAJ goed methode. De contingente waarderingsmethode en de 
welzijnswaarderingsmethode geven een marginale waarde ten opzichte van het 
steekproefgemiddelde, tenvijl de waardering op basis van de ~onettenmethode afuangt van 
het startpunt. In tabel 1 bijvoorbeeld een verandering van 15 naar 16 uur mantelzorg per 
week Het is opvallend dat de resultaten van de opportuniteitskosten methode en de pro::-..1' 
goed methode niet systematisch af lijken te '.Vijken van respectievelijk de contingente 
waarderingsmethode, de vignettenmethode en de \Velzijnswaarderingsmethode. Deze 
laatste drie methoden genereren in tegenstelling tot de eerste twee methoden een complete 
282 llifom:al carr: an economic approacb 
waardering van mantelzorg. Een mogelijke verklaring is dat het clirecte nut en disnut van 
mantelzorgverlening in balans zijn. 
Op het vlak van de non-respons scoren de prm .. --y goed methode en de 
welzijnswaarderingsmethode rehrief goed. De opportuniteitskosten methode en de 
vignettenmethode komen er relarief slecht vanaf en de contingente waarderingsmethode is 
een rniddenmoter. 
5. ( economische) 
persoonsgebonden budget 
De effecten van het 
In veellanden wordt langdurige zorg georganiseerd en gefmancierd door rniddel van zorg 
in natura. Dit houdt in dat zorgfinanciers de zorgaanbieders direct, zonder tussenkomst 
van de zorgvragers, betalen voor hun diensten. Sinds de jaren negenrig van de vorige eeuw 
is er in een aantal landen een alternarief systeem ont\vikkeld waarbij zorgvragers van 
zorgfinanciers een budget (in Nederland een pgb) onrvangen. Hiermee kunnen ze zelf zorg 
in kopen bij \Ni.e ze willen voor de prijs die ze met aanbieders overeenkomen, inclusief hun 
mantelzorgers. Tot op heden is er weinig bekend over de economische effecten van pgb's. 
De economische effecten van pgb's zijn geanalyseerd aan de hand van een zelf 
ont'\\ti.kkelde vragenlijst over onder andere zorggebruikgegevens, ingevuld door 609 mensen 
met een pgb, bereikt via Per Saldo. Resultaten laten zien dat mensen met een pgb meer 
private zorg, meestal verleend door freelancers, inkopen vergeleken met mensen die zorg in 
natura ontvangen. Voor reguliere thuiszorg en mantelzorg vinden we geen verschillen 
mssen mensen met een pgb en mensen met zorg in natura. De prijzen die mensen met een 
pgb betalen voor hun zorg liggen gemiddeld iets lager dan de prijzen die in het 
narurasysteem worden betaald: 18,91 versus 25,40 euro per uur. Een mogelijke verklaring 
voor de ongeveer 25 procent lagere prijzen die mensen met een pgb betalen, zijn de 
transacriekosten voor bijvoorbeeld gebouwen van de thuiszorg die in het naturasysteem wel 
en in het pgb-systeem Diet vergoed worden. 
Een pbg is opgebouwd uit drie componenten: een ink.omensafhankelijke eigen 
bijdrage, een vrij te besteden bedrag (voorheen een forfaitair bedrag) en een niet vrij te 
besteden bedrag dat teruggeven moet worden wanneer het niet wordt opgemaakt. Binnen 
de groep mensen met een pbg lijken de eigen bijdrage en het vrij te besteden bedrag geen 
invloed te hebben op de hoogte van de betaalde prijzen (bij maandprijzen lijkt de hoogte 
van het vrij te besteden bedrag een negarieve invloed te hebben op de prijs). Een relarief 
hoger niet vrij te besteden bedrag lijkt echter te leiden tot relarief hogere betaalde prijzen 
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ceteris paribus. Een 1 procent hoger niet vrij te besteden deel van het pgb ten opzichte van 
een maandgemiddelde van 1.254,10 euro lijkt te leiden tot een 0,19 procent hogere uuxprijs 
voor zorg. Voor clienten die een maandprijs betalen, geldt dat een 1 procent hoger niet vrij 
te besteden deel van het pgb ten opzichte van een maandgemiddelde van 1.226,93 euro lijkt 
te leiden tot een 0,66 procent hogere maandprijs. Wanneer mensen met pgb zorg inkopen 
zonder dat ze hier;;oor uiteindelijk financiele consequenries onderv'inden~ lijken ze minder 
geneigd te zijn om een zo laag mogelijke prijs te bedingen: JJJora! hazard. 
Om efficientere zorginkoop door mensen met een pgb te stimuleren, zou de 
inkomensgerelateerde eigen bijdrage of het v'Tij te besteden bedrag omhoog moeten. 
Verhogen van de eigen bijdrage heeft als belangrijk nadeel dat het kan leiden tot 
toegankelijkheidsproblemen in de zorg. Dit kan leiden tot gebruik van relatief duurdere 
zorg op lange tennijn. Het verhogen van het vrij besteedbare bedrag is daarom een beter 
altematief. Dit zou kunnen stuiten op maatschappelijke weerstand omdat mensen middelen 
uit het collectief gefinancierde verstrekkingenpakket voor private doelen h.-unnen gaan 
gebruiken. Hetzelfde gebeurt echter in de CJtre sector, maar dan op het niveau van de 
zorgverzekeraars. 
Er is weinig bekend over de effecten die het betalen van mantelzorgers, 
bijvoorbeeld uit een pgb, heeft voor de mantelzorgers. Het is wel gesuggereerd dat het 
geven van een financiele compensatie aan mantelzorgers negarieve psychologische effecten 
heeft voor bijvoorbeeld hun intrinsieke motivarie of voor de relatie russen mantelzorger en 
zorgvrager. 
Deze hypothesen hebben we getest door middel van een ontwikkelde vragenlijst 
die is ingevuld door 522 mantelzorgers bereikt via Per Saldo. Ongeveer de helft van deze 
mantelzorgers geeft aan dat ze uit het pgb betaald worden voor (een deel van) hun 
zorgverlening, gemiddeld bijna 300 euro per maand. De resultaten lijken erop te duiden dat 
het betalen van mantelzorg niet leidt tot negatieve psychologische effecten voor de 
mantelzorger in termen van zelf\vaardering, emotionele relatie tussen mantelzorger en 
zorgv'Tager en plezier in het verlenen van zorg. Er lijkt wel een positief verband te zijn 
tussen het betalen van mantelzorg en de kans dat een mantelzorger aangeeft dat het 
verlenen van zorg belangrijk is. De resultaten impliceren dat het betalen van mantelzorgers 
geen negatieve exteme effecten in de vorm van psychologische attitude lijken te hebben. 
Voor beleidsmakers lijkt er dus vanuit dit oogpunt geen belemmering te zijn om 
mantelzorgers financieel te compenseren of om het betalen van mantelzorgers vanuit een 
pgb te verbieden. 
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6. Epiloog 
Dit proefschrift heeft geprobeerd enkele problemen in de economische literaruur ten 
aanzien van mantelzorg op te sporen en op te lossen. Er blijft echter een bijna 
onuitputtelijke onderzoeksagenda open staan. Hopelijk stimuleert dit proefschrift 
toekomstig economisch onderzoek naar mantelzorg en naar de positie van mantelzorgers 
binnen de gezondheidszorg. 
Het is vrijwel onmogelijk om aan her thema mantelzorg te werken zonder oog te 
krijgen voor sommige problemen die mantelzorgers ervaren. Vooral het bezoeken van 
mamelzorgers om een onrwikkelde vragenlijst te testen of het beanwoorden van 
telefonische vragen over een uitgezette enquete geeft af en toe een blik achter de schermen 
van hun soms zware levensomstandigheden. Hopelijk zullen beleidsmakers de resultaren 
van dit onderzoek dan ook gebruiken om insrituties te ontwikkelen, zowel in de 
gezondheidszorg als in het welzijnswerk en op de arbeidsmarkt, die ervoor zorgen dat de 
lasten, in de breedste zin van het woord, van zorg in een vergrijzende samenleving niet 
volledig op de schouders van de mantelzorgers worden gelegd. 
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